Common to Wittgenstein’s forms of life and hinges , Heidegger’s worldviews, Foucault’s epistemes and Kuhn’s paradigms is a rejection of the idea that social formations of knowledge progress via refutation. It sounds like your critique of ideology is from the right, which places it as a pre-Hegelian traditionalist thinking. — Joshs

It's a good point. Yet arguments do fly back and forth between ideologies, even though in principle they do not recognize how radical the break is at this level. However, here's a problem. If a given conceptual scheme is incommensurable with another, not even opposition or rejection are really possible.
1. So it is in the interest of each side to find and exploit such common ground as there is. (Since both sides are human beings, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there is some.)
2. More than that, it is in the interest of both sides to pretend that the other side is vulnerable to such refutations. How else is one to persuade them?
3. But there is also the point that even though refutations may not be effective in persuading the other side, but they are quite likely to be effective in strengthening the support of one's supporters.

On the contrary, scientific, legal, professional reporting practices presuppose supporting ideologies for such practices to thrive and inform social life. Indeed, all these procedures can as well be compromised by ideological struggles. — neomac

Yes. My only qualification is that the practices are likely not only be based on ideological positions, but will also tend to re-inforce, even enforce, them.

Why are these the only two options? Why couldn't I teach someone a different way of looking at world, the way which grounds my own arguments and facts, so that they can understand the basis of my criteria of justification? It would not be a question of justifying the worldview I convert them to, but of allowing them to justify the arguments and views that are made intelligible from within that worldview. — Joshs

Well, people do change their ideological stance from time to time. We're more or less committed to the view that standard rationality does not apply at this level. So the question becomes, what approaches and factors actually work? And, crucially, can we distinguish between fair and unfair ways of doing this. I suspect that, in the end, it will be a matter of teaching and allowing the persuadee to absorb and reflect on what they learn. (Very roughly).


I agree with a lot of what you say. But, inevitably, I have some disagreements.

he link between “necessity” and “irrationality” of ideological thinking as discussed in the opening post, and distances itself from more psychological understanding of ideologies (evil intentions, stupidity, comforting delusions ) which I find rather misleading (if not even, ideologically motivated!). — neomac

Strictly speaking, in my view, it is not really appropriate to call an ideology irrational, because usual standards of rationality do not apply between ideologies. There's also the point that it is misleading to dismiss one's ideological opponents as irrational - unless one is happy to accept that one's own ideology is irrational.

So ideology is the most basic form of coordination for social grouping to support a given informational flow within a society and political mobilisation. — neomac

Yes. That's how philosophers will need to think about it. But there's more than thinking involved in ideology. Praxis is also very important in understanding what it means.

Zizek, in that video, is giving a psychological explanation for why liberation from one own’s ideology needs to be forced on people — neomac

Zizek is wrong. Some American PoW's in the Korean War switched sides. I've seen one interview (which doesn't make a summer, I accept, but..) in which an American ex-PoW switched sides because he came to see American ideology through Chinese eyes - no force was required. The fundamental point was that the Chinese treated him better than the Americans. There's more to the story, or course, and I'm sure Google will find it for you if you want. But I don't accept what Zizek is saying. Seeing through one's own ideology is not easy, but it can be done.

But there's more than thinking involved in ideology. Praxis is also very important in understanding what it means. — Ludwig V

Sure, but the reasoning is still the same: actions are understood not as function of their expected and actual results, but again as markers of social grouping. And this likely becomes more clear in symbolic gestures ideologically inspired. On the other side ideological thinking can stir, guide, justify political mobilization (peaceful protests, violent revolts, electoral choices, social media propaganda, etc.).
But notice also that even the distinction between praxis and theory can be ideologically loaded.

Zizek is wrong. Some American PoW's in the Korean War switched sides. I've seen one interview (which doesn't make a summer, I accept, but..) in which an American ex-PoW switched sides because he came to see American ideology through Chinese eyes - no force was required. The fundamental point was that the Chinese treated him better than the Americans. There's more to the story, or course, and I'm sure Google will find it for you if you want. But I don't accept what Zizek is saying. Seeing through one's own ideology is not easy, but it can be done. — Ludwig V

I don't think Zizek is denying the possibility of changing views. He just remarks how painful it can often be and how often that this change can hardly come by our own intellectual initiative. Indeed, that's hardly surprising as ideological thinking can be also matter of mental habits, which we can find rather uncomfortable to change as any other habit, also when we would have reasons to believe they are bad. The example you gave of the American prisoners of wars is hardly a counter-example: since their traumatic experience during the war may have been the painful trigger for a revision of their own ideological views.
I don't think however that any of such considerations clarify the nature of ideological thinking and how it epistemically compels us.

I don't think Zizek is denying the possibility of changing views. He just remarks how painful it can often be and how often that this change can hardly come by our own intellectual initiative. — neomac

That's a rather charitable interpretation of "forced".
It's an interesting issue. On the one hand, it seems ideologically loaded and it is hard to believe that anyone would voluntarily leave one's own ideology. Hence the labelling that goes on. On the other hand, it is possible that there is empirical evidence that the separation of ideologies may be less radical than it seems at first sight. It will depend heavily on interpretation.

I don't think however that any of such considerations clarify the nature of ideological thinking and how it epistemically compels us. — neomac

Perhaps I just don't understand the situation very well.

The interesting question is what makes universal acquiescence impossible — Ludwig V

Is true coexistence between ideologies even possible when they’re wired to see each other as threats to their own legitimacy? Maybe the real obstacle isn’t just disagreement—but the fact that many ideologies survive by creating an ‘us vs. them’ narrative. If you’re only making room for another worldview because you think yours will still win, is that coexistence... or just strategic tolerance?

Is true coexistence between ideologies even possible when they’re wired to see each other as threats to their own legitimacy? Maybe the real obstacle isn’t just disagreement—but the fact that many ideologies survive by creating an ‘us vs. them’ narrative. If you’re only making room for another worldview because you think yours will still win, is that coexistence... or just strategic tolerance? — Alonsoaceves

Insofar as recognition of another ideology as disagreeing with oneself means recognizing (often at the same time as denying) that the other side are also human beings. In a rational world, that should be a basis for working out how to co-exist. But I realize that's somewhat idealistic.
That little word "true" makes this a bit complicated. But I don't see why strategic tolerance can't count as co-existence, though I would have to agree that it is unstable. I think the best way to think about this is by analysis of actual examples.
The conflict between capitalism (USA & co.) and communism (USSR & co.) was complicated. There was an element of strategic tolerance in that neither party really wanted an all-out war. But there was endless competition between them in other ways. A complication is that, IMO, the conflict was not purely ideological but was also an old-fashioned competition between what used to be called Great Powers. Paradoxically, it kept some sort of peace for quite a while.
There's a rich variety of examples if one thinks about inter-religious conflict. There are all sorts of disagreement and conflict between the religions and churches within the religions. But they are, as a matter of fact, co-existing. The co-operation between religions in Jerusalem is an interesting case study. Sometimes, one finds movements that explicitly aim to develop peaceful co-existence, often on the basis that all religions face competition from secularism and there's a feeling that co-operation would be a more helpful strategy.

strategic tolerance is motivated also by a perceived common ideological enemy: Christianity and Capitalism can ally against Communism, progressive socialism and conservative nationalism can ally against Capitalism, etc.

strategic tolerance is motivated also by a perceived common ideological enemy: Christianity and Capitalism can ally against Communism, progressive socialism and conservative nationalism can ally against Capitalism, etc. — neomac

Yes. Good point. Thank you.