I've explained, because it is an example of the fallacy of composition. It's a fallacy to infer that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole, or even of every proper part. — Sapientia

The fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole. For example: "This wheel is made of rubber, therefore the vehicle to which it is a part is also made of rubber." This is clearly fallacious, because vehicles are often made with a variety of parts, many of which may not be made of rubber.

How am I doing this by deploying a consistent test toward each justification that people use for killing animals? I am not saying, eliminating one invalid trait (part) means their (whole) position is invalid. I am saying, if we go one-by-one and assess the validity of each trait, and all the traits they point to are invalid, then clearly their entire position is invalid. But I don't start with "their whole argument is invalid because one trait is invalid." - I start with, "Let's go one-by-one and see if each trait is valid and logically consistent. If each treat is not, we can eliminate it and move on to the next trait."

This is nothing remotely similar to the fallacy of composition. Because I am saying, let's asses each PART. And if each and every PART is invalid, then the WHOLE becomes invalid.

Again, unless you want to produce an inconsistency within your own ethical framework, you would need to grant the same 3 basic rights to animals. — chatterbears

I do not believe that humans have inalienable rights. They have legal rights, and that's it. As God does not exist so too with Inalienable rights -- they do not exist. There is no God who we stand in front of as equals.

Since you claim you are not a speciesist, you seem to be basing your reasoning on preference? Which we can easily refute right now.

Is "preference" a valid justification to use for causing needless harm to another sentient being? It could be the preference of a white man to enslave a black man. It could be my preference to torture a dog and then kill it. It could be your preference to contribute to factory farming. None of these are a "need". So when you say, "when it comes to satisfying needs", eating meat is not a NEED for survival.

Clearly "preference" is not valid, and not consistent. — chatterbears

My preference was for human needs, not for causing needless harm. It is a moral preference, if you will, and I don't think there is anything more than preference to secure moral feeling. Reasoning only goes so far, and is moored in moral preferences of moral agents. Also note that need, for myself, is not just brute necessity, but is defined by what makes human beings happy rather than what is required to survive.

The beasts aren't even moral agents. They are not culpable for their actions, because they are beasts. We are. But, in being culpable, we are also simply reflections of what we desire in a moral sense. So, for yourself, you desire rights to be universal. This would include beings that can feel pain, and not just morally culpable agents. You believe this in your desire to be consistent. Consistency is the main drive behind all of your replies -- maybe you could give up rights, but whatever you or someone else proposes you believe that they must be consistent in their proposals.

I'd say that this notion of consistency is a bit vague. Nothing wrong with that, but I don't think it's just mere logical consistency you're thinking of. I think it only makes sense for your notion of consistency to apply to animals in the light of another commitment -- that those deserving moral consideration are those who can feel pain. I don't think that sentience makes sense, because that's a much harder thing to prove of various animals, and besides it seems that you're mostly concerned with animal suffering anyways. In light of an animals ability to feel pain you believe they should have three rights, because you believe all humans deserve those three rights. In that sense I can see what you mean by consistency -- anything that feels pain is worthy of moral consideration, and animals can feel pain, so you would be inconsistent if you just decided that only humans got these basic rights when the important thing is that all animals feel pain.

That makes perfect sense to me. But I don't believe in rights. Further, I don't think that the ability to feel pain is enough, or even the only thing. What if a human couldn't feel pain, after all? Well, they would still be human, and deserving of the respect afforded them as a moral agent regardless of this trait. I believe in a commitment to other human beings, and maybe more generally to moral agents (so in the case of aliens who are relatively human-like I would say we should treat them like humans, and not like cows).

I think pain is an important thing to consider in how we treat some being. Needless suffering I can understand should be prevented -- I am the sort of moral agent who prefers this kind of world, and think it a good thing to pursue. But I don't think that leads to veganism, simply reform of how we kill animals.

Plants do not have a brain or nervous system to experience pain, therefore they don't' belong in this discussion. As far as basic rights, my "feeling range" is the same for all sentient beings. So I don't know how your point applies to my argument. — chatterbears

Plants have no nervous system to feel pain. I agree but what is critical in ethics is the ability to feel the pain of others. Yes, a pain sensing ability in others is necessary but what is equally important is the ability of the self to feel pain.

So, yes, plants can't feel pain but you should feel the pain of death and through such knowledge grasp the value of a plant's life.

Morality is empathy-based and empathy relies on the self being able to sense pain of others.

-Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security (Article 3)
-Freedom from Slavery (Article 4)
-Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment (Article 5)

I don't believe all animals deserve every right a human has, such as Article 17, which is the right to own property. But I do believe all animals deserve these basic 3 rights, which have been granted to humans. Animals deserve what they can understand and experience. Owning a car, house or voting cannot be understand by these animals. — chatterbears

That's arguably a consequence which arises from the endorsement of an equality of kind which neglects a difference in degree. Other animals can't understand or relate to life, liberty, personal security, freedom, slavery, torture, and degrading treatment, to the unique degree that we do, so it wouldn't make sense to treat them as if they did.

There's also an inappropriateness in your suggested application of those concepts with regard to other animals. For example, keeping chickens on a free range farm is not slavery, it's more like serfdom. Slaughter is not torture, it's execution. And what's degrading treatment for humans isn't necessarily so for other animals.

Seems to me that the question wether it is ethical to farm animals for consumption gets conflated with the question wich animals are ethical to farm for consumption and the question wether our treatment of the animals we currently farm for consumption is ethical.
To me those are three parts of the discussion that should be treated seperately. Though of course if ones position is that it is unethical to farm any animal for consuption under any condition, then the two other questions don't arise, but I doubt that is the case with chatterbears, since he doesn't seem to object to the ethics of growing unconcious animals for consumption.

Animals deserve what they can understand and experience. — chatterbears

So does a dog deserve to eat meat? Or would you force it to be vegetarian under your bill of universal sentient rights?

No wonder you won’t extend the vote to dogs.

I don't think I'm being a consequentialist, and like I said, consequentialism doesn't work without a certain amount of deontology and vice versa, but okay, we'll entertain your argument for the fun of it:

Unless you are willing to only eat those animals who have died of natural causes, the eating of one implies killing it. Killing is a form of harm. The consequence of getting the flesh you want to eat is therefore harming a sentient being. Harming a sentient being is causing more harm than good.

I'm saying that the suffering of other animals is nothing compared to the suffering of humans — Sapientia

It's not nothing. And even if that were true, giving up flesh still means NO ONE suffers. Which is a better outcome than some suffering.

The majority of meat currently comes from factory farms, which means the lives of the animals is definitely not "decent" or anything approximating decent. If you agree that they shouldn't be kept in such places and should be given decent lives, then you agree that their suffering matters. Period. No comparison to humans needed. If their suffering matters, and having a decent life matters, then killing them is wrong too.

Recent technology is making meat eating possible without harming animals, though. Clean meat, grown in a lab, is going to be available. I'll personally still find it gross (been vegan too long to go back, and I'm healthier for it anyhow), but you can then indulge without harming animals. Woot woot indeed :yum:

Quite simple. Don't kill other sentient beings if you don't need to. — chatterbears

I don't kill other sentient beings. Other people do so for me. And killing them is necessary for there to be meat available for me to eat.

There are two options.

A: Eat animals, which results in pain, torture and death.
B: Eat plants, which results in almost no pain, no torture and no death. — chatterbears

With the first option, there doesn't need to be torture, and the pain can be minimised to an insignificant level. So the only aspect of the first option which really needs to be taken into consideration is the death aspect, which, by the way, would also apply to your second option, although you mistakenly claim in your second option that there would be no death. Plants are living organisms too, and the food production process causes the premature death of any plants used. Although I accept that there's a big difference.

A is unnecessary to live and be healthy. B is necessary to live and be healthy. B will still have some indirect pain/death associated with it, such as the field mice that die during the harvesting of our crops. But the pain/death associated with B, is not even remotely similar to the pain/death associated with A. — chatterbears

Yes, I accept there's a big difference between the death of plants and the death of nonhuman animals, like there's a big difference between the death of nonhuman animals and the death of humans.

Both options are necessary to live the way that I want to live, which involves eating meat and vegetables. So I choose both. I can live with the death of plants and other animals for the sake of my personal gratification, so I must be an evil monster. But it turns out that being an evil monster has it's upshots. I get to enjoy the food I like, and you get to enjoy feeling superior, so it's win-win.

Also note that need, for myself, is not just brute necessity, but is defined by what makes human beings happy rather than what is required to survive. — Moliere

This is just as flawed as appealing to 'preference'. What makes you happy does not say anything about what is right or wrong.

If it make me happy to cheat on my wife, am I then justified in doing so? If it makes me happy to torture animals, am I then justified in doing so? If it makes me happy to exploit animals for my taste pleasure, am I then justified in doing so? No. No. And no.

Also, as a side question. What do you base your moral foundation on. The bible? The mind of God? Etc...

So, yes, plants can't feel pain but you should feel the pain of death and through such knowledge grasp the value of a plant's life. — TheMadFool

I don't even understand what this means. I should care to not kill the plant because it has a life, just as I have a life? I specifically stated that we should take more consideration for sentient life, because sentient life can experience pain and suffering, while plants cannot.

Other animals can't understand or relate to life, liberty, personal security, freedom, slavery, torture, and degrading treatment, to the unique degree that we do, so it wouldn't make sense to treat them as if they did. — Sapientia

This is just completely false. You can't ignore facts about reality to feed your inconsistent position. Animals can experience mental distress, similar to how humans can. You think an animal is in a better mental state confined to a cage, or walking around in an open field?

There's also an inappropriateness in your suggested application of those concepts with regard to other animals. For example, keeping chickens on a free range farm is not slavery, it's more like serfdom. Slaughter is not torture, it's execution. And what's degrading treatment for humans isn't necessarily so for other animals. — Sapientia

Animals on typical organic and “free-range” farms often spend much of their time confined to crowded sheds or mud-filled pens, just as animals on conventional factory farms do. Slaughter is a violation of the 'right to life'.

Though of course if ones position is that it is unethical to farm any animal for consuption under any condition, then the two other questions don't arise, but I doubt that is the case with chatterbears, since he doesn't seem to object to the ethics of growing unconcious animals for consumption. — Tomseltje

Correction here. The proper term would be sentient, not conscious. So can you point to a non-sentient animal that we would raise for consumption? But even if you could, I'd say it would only be ethical if it was necessary. Which, raising any animals for food (in this current day) is NOT necessary. We have plenty of plant-based alternatives that can sustain our survival perfectly.

So does a dog deserve to eat meat? Or would you force it to be vegetarian under your bill of universal sentient rights? — apokrisis

The deserved rights I was referring to were about liberty, pain and freedom. But does a dog "deserve" to eat meat, isn't the proper question. The proper question would be, "Can a dog survive on a vegetarian diet?" - The answer is yes. I feed my dogs v-dog: https://v-dog.com/

I have even consulted with multiple vets, as well as done a lot of research, to ensure my dog would get its proper nutrients from a vegetarian diet. And it can. And if we run into any problems, we can do blood work every year or two, to make sure my dog has the proper levels it should have.

Both options are necessary to live the way that I want to live, which involves eating meat and vegetables. So I choose both. I can live with the death of plants and other animals for the sake of my personal gratification, so I must be an evil monster. But it turns out that being an evil monster has it's upshots. I get to enjoy the food I like, and you get to enjoy feeling superior. It's win-win. — Sapientia

Are you admitting defeat? Appealing to personal gratification is probably the worst justification you have used so far.

Not necessarily equality, as more so to do with consistency. Also, even if it was about equality specifically, what valid counter-argument have you presented to reject this principle? All you have presented is, "Cows are animals, humans are humans. Therefore I can subject cows to pain and slaughter." - This sounds like a speciesist position, in which can be easily refuted by an Alien hypothetical. So again, you're not logically consistent. — chatterbears

No, it's definitely not consistency. It's the hidden presupposition upon which you're judging consistency, which seems to be some kind of equality among species. Without the acceptance of this hidden presupposition, there's no inconsistency, and your argument falls flat on its face. It's as simple as that. Game over. You'll be forced to abandon the inconsistency angle and try a different tactic.

I've given reasons as to why equality among species ought to be rejected. It can be summed up by saying that an equality in kind, or on some level, or in some respects, doesn't necessarily entail equal treatment. And that any relevant differences in circumstance and severity ought to be factored into appropriate treatment. The goal should be to strive for appropriate and proportional treatment, rather than equal treatment.

And your alien hypothetical is a laughable failure which has already been dealt with. It's not a serious challenge.

I'm done responding to your statements, so don't quote me anymore. Feel free to respond to the other Vegans in this thread, like NKBJ. You simply lack the understanding of why consistency matters, and I can't keep explaining it to you over and over again. And again, as stated earlier, you have no valid or coherent justification for why you are okay with animals being slaughtered unnecessarily for food. Other than saying something nonsensical like this:

It can be summed up by saying that an equality in kind, or on some level, or in some respects, doesn't necessarily entail equal treatment. And that any relevant differences in circumstance and severity ought to be factored into appropriate treatment. The goal should be to strive for appropriate and proportional treatment, rather than equal treatment. — Sapientia

I'd like someone else who reads what he wrote to explain how that makes any sense? And how does it answer my question, "What justification/reason do you have that allows you to be okay with unnecessary animal slaughter for food, but not unnecessary human slaughter for food?" - He has still never answered this question, and I am starting to think he is trolling at this point.

"But what does it mean to talk of killing other beings unnecessarily? The killing that we're talking about is necessary to meet the demand for meat produce, so it can't be unnecessary in that sense."

That is entirely the basis of my point. The demand is antecedent to the killing and it is the demand that renders the killing necessary or necessary. The demand is the horizon that both contains and perpetrates the immorality, it is also the domain over which the agent has power and personal responsibility. If he chooses to have a morality that includes the withholding of suffering from animals, this moral luxury, (if it is to be effected in a practical and real manner) must, confine itself to his demand or desire to consume things in general, as all consumption is interconnected via the universality of commerce.

When he buys a carrot the consumptive reality of the world is affected he has released his dollar into the commercial reality that contains and perpetrates the cruelty he seeks to avoid, and therefore he cannot avoid contributing to the suffering of animals directly or indirectly each and every time he engages in the consumptive transaction.

One cannot change aspects of our consumptive reality with the hope of changing that reality in toto. And the reality must be changed in toto, if we are to derive a moral benefit from eating vegetables instead of animals. To do so we must acquire those vegetables outside of a transaction with potentially 'immoral others', and this is impossible. This cannot be aspired to in any real sense by simply modifying the product within the transaction.

The mechanistic reality of the transaction must be altered, (Communism tried and failed) this can only be achieved by withholding ones participation from the transaction. In doing so, one does not behave immorally and one can claim a morality that is substantive and non-fictional.

By not consuming, or by strictly consuming in accordance with a philosophical validation of ones material needs (the demand) morality becomes possible. Electric cars, vegetarianism and recycling etc., these activities do not represent any threat to the consumptive act, they merely transform it into some sort of fluffy self serving delusion wherein only the material nature of the product has changed and the consumptive act remains unchanged, or is even further reinforced by 'new products' such as electric cars or genetically engineered steaks that don't come from cows and are not sentient.

A vegan world that remains confined to the transaction, contains the same potential for suffering that our non-vegan world already enjoys. The vegan remains smugly indifferent to those consequence because they do not yet exist. Within a vegan world if the transaction, (capitalism) is maintained more vegetables will be produced to generate vegetable based profits, all of these come at the expense of the natural environment and global ecology, and hence at the expense of the other animals with whom we share the earth. A vegan world would be just as ugly as a non vegan world.

So at this point, you're either being intellectually dishonest or are extremely confused. Other way, I think I have tried enough times to get a valid, coherent answer out of you, but you never supply one. I don't care to continue the discussion with you specifically, but others (such as Buxtebuddha or NKBJ) are welcome to try.

Until you supply me (or anyone) with a valid and coherent justification for why you feel it is necessary to kill animals, there's no point in a discussion. All you say is, "There's no single trait that I can point to, and I am not a speciesist." - If you don't even know why you are justified in committing the actions you initiate, it is no surprise that you have a hard time with considering animal well-being. — chatterbears

That's a weak and disappointing reply. You asked me whether I am a speciesist. Since you didn't provide a definition of what it is to be a speciesist, I looked it up myself and gave an honest reply based on a definition I found and its mismatch with my position. I know that you're eager to paint me as a speciesist, which to you is the same as being a racist, but if I ain't one, then I ain't, and that's that.

If I don't need to point to a single trait, as opposed to a set of traits, then why should I do so? Because you'd prefer it that way? Because it suits your strategy? Not good enough. If you can provide a good enough reason for me to answer any differently than I have done so thus far, then I will oblige you. But I'm sorry to say that I've found your responses thus far unconvincing, and you're coming across as increasingly disgruntled because you can't have it your own way. I won't be boxed into a corner, so deal with it. Threatening to end our discussion won't work on me, either. Go ahead and do so if that's what you want.

If I don't need to point to a single trait, as opposed to a set of traits, then why should I do so? Because you'd prefer it that way? Because it suits your strategy? Not good enough. If you can provide a good enough reason for me to answer any differently than I have done so thus far, then I will oblige you. — Sapientia

Because that is how two people discuss and debate a position. One side presents reasons for why they believe something, and the other side can respond. You have presented ZERO reasons for why you believe animal slaughter is justified, other than saying "I cannot pinpoint anything specific."

So in the same way you cannot have a productive conversation with a racist who says, "I cannot pinpoint anything specific that justifies my discrimination of blacks vs whites", I also cannot have a productive conversation with you. If you're unwilling to provide a coherent reason/justification, I cannot have a discussion with you. Simple as that.

The fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole. For example: "This wheel is made of rubber, therefore the vehicle to which it is a part is also made of rubber." This is clearly fallacious, because vehicles are often made with a variety of parts, many of which may not be made of rubber.

How am I doing this by deploying a consistent test toward each justification that people use for killing animals? I am not saying, eliminating one invalid trait (part) means their (whole) position is invalid. I am saying, if we go one-by-one and assess the validity of each trait, and all the traits they point to are invalid, then clearly their entire position is invalid. But I don't start with "their whole argument is invalid because one trait is invalid." - I start with, "Let's go one-by-one and see if each trait is valid and logically consistent. If each treat is not, we can eliminate it and move on to the next trait."

This is nothing remotely similar to the fallacy of composition. Because I am saying, let's asses each PART. And if each and every PART is invalid, then the WHOLE becomes invalid. — chatterbears

I'm guessing that you read the Wikipedia page on the fallacy of composition, since you quoted from it, so I'm also guessing that you read what it says about the fallacy applying even in cases regarding every proper part. If you did, then you should be able to realise that your response above doesn't get you off the hook.

If you examine each and every part of a plane, one-by-one, then each time, you will find that this or that particular part cannot fly. But that doesn't mean that a plane cannot fly.

If you examine each and every person in a crowd, one-by-one, then you will notice that each and every person in the crowd has a face. But that doesn't mean that the crowd has a face.

If you examine each and every atom which makes up a grain of sand, one-by-one, then you will find that each and every atom has a nucleus. But that doesn't mean that a grain of sand has a nucleus.

You're committing a version of the fallacy of composition, and the similarity is clear.

You give an example of a plane, person in the crowd, and sand. Where is the example that applies to me? Use the same structure and apply how that fallacy works with what I am apparently doing.

That a whole situation involving a chicken could be analysed by looking at each and every particular detail in isolation, one-by-one, and concluding that this or that particular detail alone is not sufficient grounds for justification does not entail that the situation as a whole is insufficient grounds for justification.

That weight alone isn't enough, and that species alone isn't enough, and so on, and so forth, does not mean that a collection of qualities together as a whole isn't enough.

Correction here. The proper term would be sentient, not conscious. So can you point to a non-sentient animal that we would raise for consumption? But even if you could, I'd say it would only be ethical if it was necessary. Which, raising any animals for food (in this current day) is NOT necessary. We have plenty of plant-based alternatives that can sustain our survival perfectly.

Concious or sentient, I came to understood from other posts that it boiled down to wether or not the animal in question has a nervous system so it could feel pain. In wich case I was thinking of sessile and/or single celled animal life as examples of animal life without a nervous system.

I don't really see an ethical difference between killing plants for food and killing animals for food, other than that for some/most animals, humans are able to increase their suffering by doing so.
I don't really see much of an ethical problem as long as the animal isn't suffering any more than it would if it were born, living and dieng in free nature without ever being near a human being.
Hence I consider certain dog breeds more of an ethical problem than growing animals for food while treating them well,

It might be possible that humans could survive perfectly on a plant only diet, but it will be hard to convince me there is any practicality to it, seeing that even the most strict vegans eventually take supplements of animal origin.

The proper question would be, "Can a dog survive on a vegetarian diet?" - The answer is yes. — chatterbears

Great. You are consistent with your beliefs. And pragmatically, the modern techno-consumer society allows you to achieve that. There are the products out there now.

My argument was against your OP - where you argued that we should be consistent with our feelings. And what is obvious then is that we all could have different kinds of feeling about the issue of killing and eating animals.

So your initial argument could carry no real weight. Unless you could go on to say there is only one "right" way to feel about these things.

If you simply assert this rightness as some kind of objective moral absolute, then fine. But it lacks any actual reason. It is simply an expression of your personal faith.

And you do tend to respond just like that on a whole range of ethical issues, like slavery, discrimination, etc. You know what is right and expect others simply to agree.

I instead have argued for pragmatic morality. I see moral systems as expressing functional social and biological organisation. Morality evolves for actual good reasons. And that should be the starting point for ethical discussions.

This doesn't mean that our biological legacy should dictate outcomes - we evolved as meat eaters, therefore must remain so. But it does still rightfully inform the debate. If social and cultural choices are more under our control, then that is a thing too. But there is a context to which a final position must respond.

That was what I saw as ironic about your attempt to by-pass reason and invoke the "natural emotions" of compassion and empathy. Those are precisely the kind of evolve states of mind that are functional for an intelligent social creature.

And if we look to social science, we can see that the flip side of these feelings is just as functional - as our intelligence is all about weighing a competing balance of interests. We need to be competitive and co-operative, dominant and submissive, understanding and selfish, as best expresses some overall adaptive state.

So if you are going to look to evolved feelings as a basis to moral rightness, you would need to take both sides of the coin into account. Instead you pick out one aspect of what we naturally feel - the empathetic/compassionate - and then turn that into your absolutist rule.

As I say, I don't have a particular beef against vegetarianism. I won't lose sleep if we all generally head that way as food technology deals with the issues of our habitual taste preferences, the economics of lab meat means it wins on price in the supermarket aisle, and - what really counts - environmental footprints leave us with no other practical choice.

But when it comes to pain and suffering, that too is part of the pragmatic circle of life. For humans, it remains a natural part of the deal as well.

It is a different argument, but take away all apparent hardship and people still suffer. With no real sources of suffering and pain, people start to become hurt and anxious over the thousand trivial things they didn't have the time to focus on before.

Life just ain't simple in the way you need it to be simple to fit your one-sided analysis.

So there are good arguments - based on a balance of reasons - for encouraging a social trend towards veganism. Your OP was not an example of a good argument in my view.

This is just as flawed as appealing to 'preference'. What makes you happy does not say anything about what is right or wrong.

If it make me happy to cheat on my wife, am I then justified in doing so? If it makes me happy to torture animals, am I then justified in doing so? If it makes me happy to exploit animals for my taste pleasure, am I then justified in doing so? No. No. And no. — chatterbears

I'd say this suffers from a impoverished view of happiness. Happiness is not so singular as this sort of view suggests. There are general enough trends in happiness that it can serve as a guide to a good life. Not as something failsafe, or anything. Just general.

But, regardless, I did note other things in my reply to you. Namely that we are moral agents, and if aliens were sufficiently human-like to be moral agents then they'd be included and not treated like beasts. Beasts are not culpable for their actions, but they do suffer -- so it is reasonable to treat them as beings which suffer, and not with the same respect as I give moral agents. So we can kill them, though to make them suffer is too much.

Also, as a side question. What do you base your moral foundation on. The bible? The mind of God? Etc... — chatterbears

I don't believe there are moral foundations at all. We are adrift in a universe devoid of intrinsic meaning or value, and one way that we create a meaningful life in said universe is living an ethical life. But said meaning-seeking activities are a matter of choice more than anything. Rather than having a moral foundation we are beings which believe this or that is right or wrong, and act in accord with this or that to the extent that we are passionate enough about it.

For myself I think living a happy life is good. I also think that living a just life is good. I also have moral intuitions which are similar, but not identical, to Kantian moral philosophy. Those are probably the most foundational values I have, but I'm willing to go against them too depending on the situation. I'm willing to hear out other thoughts, and find a middle road between them when working with others. I have very few hard rules. I think that the world is too complicated to live a life bound by principles -- generally, a good will, a willingness to listen to others, and prioritize the people you love will go far.

But there are no guarantees and there are no answers. There are just choices which prioritize values, and the responsibility that this sort of freedom incurs: the acceptance of the choice and the act.

Plus, I view ethical thought as a constant work in progress. So there aren't any rods to hold to. As the world changes, as I change, so do the morals. It is more appropriate to deliberate the world as it is than it is to fashion whole new commandments from on high that we stand by.

That weight alone isn't enough, and that species alone isn't enough, and so on, and so forth, does not mean that a collection of qualities together as a whole isn't enough. — Sapientia

So a collection of bad reasoning, when put together, somehow creates a good whole reasoning? This makes no sense.

An argument can consistent of multiple justifications, but each justification needs to be valid in order to be part of the argument. Otherwise, the argument becomes flawed on some level. For example. I can say, "I believe women shouldn't have the right to vote because of these reasons: They have long hair, they have never been president, they are not physically strong like men." All 3 of these justifications are completely invalid and have very poor reasoning. But according to you, if you put all 3 of these justifications (parts) together, it somehow makes the entire argument as a whole, a valid or correct one? And if someone objects to it, you accuse them of appealing to the fallacy of composition.

I don't really see an ethical difference between killing plants for food and killing animals for food — Tomseltje

Have you done any research on the harm caused from factory farming?

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1REgp2VreWfgHhatxycdk0GN6P9HyXID6UTzuNb4f7sY/edit?usp=sharing

Click the environmental tab.

It might be possible that humans could survive perfectly on a plant only diet, but it will be hard to convince me there is any practicality to it, seeing that even the most strict vegans eventually take supplements of animal origin. — Tomseltje

This is false. There are Vegan supplements, as well as fortified foods. Some of which are GMO.

My argument was against your OP - where you argued that we should be consistent with our feelings. And what is obvious then is that we all could have different kinds of feeling about the issue of killing and eating animals. — apokrisis

Which creates an internal contradiction. The point of my OP was to display the consistency of our ethics. The compassion, empathy & consistency standpoint reaches the goal in a similar way as the universal rights perspective. They are just two different arguments, structured very similarly.

So in the same way that everyone has different kinds of feeling toward killing and eating animals, they also have different kinds of feeling toward racism, sexism and other things. The point is not, whether the belief/action is wrong in and of itself. The point is whether or not people have an internally consistent position based on their justification they have used to fuel their beliefs or actions.

So a person can think they are justified in their actions or beliefs, but that's where internal consistency comes in. No racist, sexist, slave owner or meat eater, are internally consistent. All these positions are based on unjust and invalid justifications based on discrimination.

My moral system is based on the consideration of the well-being of sentient beings. Racism, sexism and unnecessary meat eating, all goes against this system. Because if you consider the well-being of sentient beings, you would do your best to maximize their well-being, not diminish it.