If you don’t have an ethically consistent justification for your actions, then your justification is just arbitrary and useless.

The justification you used was “advanced intellectual capacity”. If this capacity was not present in a human, would it then be ok to factory farm that human? If not, then you’re being inconsistent, or there is some other trait that matters more than “advanced intellectual capacity”. In which case, if there’s a better trait than that, then use it. But it’s obvious you are unwilling to stay consistent with your first justification, which makes it invalid. So do you have another?

What justifies farming a chicken but not a human? And if that trait is present in the human, would it then be ok to farm the human? (This is basic consistency within ethical frameworks)

Nice dodge. I'm not going to answer your question until you answer mine. You have a bullet to bite just as much as I do here, and I'm prepared to wait until you make the first move.

That only seems wrong to someone who is so against the value of non-human animals that equating them in any way to humans is to denigrate human status. Whereas I would say equating them is to leave humans in value right where they are while raising the status of animals.

But I wouldn't even equate them in every way. A dog and a pig are simply as capable of pain as any human, and as conscious as three year olds, and in many ways as smart too.

If you don't mind me asking. Why do you eat meat? — chatterbears

I don't know. I guess it's just a habit from childhood. To tell you frankly I haven't given the whole issue serious thought.

Now that you ask I think it's the fact that I don't do the actual killing that makes me feel less responsible for what is obviously cold murder.

No, actually, the distinction I made was on the basis of advanced intellectual capacity, rather than value, and I think that it might also seem wrong to someone who knows about the intellectual capacities of chickens and those of severely autistic or mentally disabled people.

A pig and a dog both lack the advanced intellectual capacities that humans have, and which render the limited ways in which they can relate to pain distinct from those of humans. They lack the same overall level of intelligence that a human has or can develop, so they're not equivalent, just similar in limited ways, which is something I haven't denied. Humans and nonhuman animals should be treated similarly in light of any sufficient similarities, and treated differently otherwise.

What exact mental capacity does a being at minimum need to deserve moral status according to you? Because if you draw the line to exclude all nonhumans including dogs and pigs, you will be excluding some humans. And as someone who has previously worked many years with handicapped persons, I can assure you that some are little different than your average human adult, and others are far less capable, mentally and physically, than a dog or pig.

You have no real basis to claim the pain perception of a pig is wildly different from a human's. Evolutionary theory and what we know about the biology of mammals (their nervous system and brains) leads to the conclusion that they do feel pain in the ways we do. And even if you cannot know it for absolutely certain, since it's way more likely than not, you have to err on the side of caution.

What exact mental capacity does a being at minimum need to deserve moral status according to you? Because if you draw the line to exclude all nonhumans including dogs and pigs, you will be excluding some humans. And as someone who has previously worked many years with handicapped persons, I can assure you that some are little different than your average human adult, and others are far less capable, mentally and physically, than a dog or pig. — NKBJ

It's not about having or not having moral status. I haven't spoken in those terms. So you're asking me the wrong question. It's about the difference in how we treat humans and other animals in light of the differences between them. If there were no differences, then I would advocate treating them equally. But there are, so I don't. I've already given a couple of examples of this sort of thing, from which it should be clear that I don't view other animals, or some people for that matter, as having no moral status whatsoever or that we'd be justified in doing whatever we like to them. Yet, nor do they have equal moral status.

You have no real basis to claim the pain perception of a pig is wildly different from a human's. Evolutionary theory and what we know about the biology of mammals (their nervous system and brains) leads to the conclusion that they do feel pain in the ways we do. And even if you cannot know it for absolutely certain, since it's way more likely than not, you have to err on the side of caution. — NKBJ

If you want to talk past me, then you're going the right way about it. If you carefully compare my wording to yours, you should be able to see that we're talking about two different things. And I'm only really interested in a response which addresses what I was talking about, which wasn't simply about the sensation of pain.

It's not about having or not having moral status. I haven't spoken in those terms. So you're asking me the wrong question. It's about the difference in how we treat humans and other animals in light of the differences between them — Sapientia

To me that just seems to be a matter of difference in semantics. My same argument applies. If you exclude animals from certain types of treatment, you exclude some humans, and if you include all humans you have to include at least some other animals.

If you want to talk past me, then you're going the right way about it — Sapientia

I don't believe I was talking past you. I said pain perception, which means also how animals relate to pain, and would include their intelligence levels. The latter, as I already said, animals possess to the same degree as many groups of humans whom we protect.

To me that just seems to be a matter of difference in semantics. My same argument applies. If you exclude animals from certain types of treatment, you exclude some humans, and if you include all humans you have to include at least some other animals. — NKBJ

No. There's no human sufficiently like a chicken to justify equal treatment.

I don't believe I was talking passed you. I said pain perception, which means also how animals relate to pain, and would include their intelligence levels. The latter, as I already said, animals possess to the same degree as many groups of humans whom we protect. — NKBJ

You're either clearly wrong or have yet to reveal your own narrow interpretation of what I'm saying. No chicken, pig, cow, duck or other farmyard animal can relate to pain in the same ways that we do. You think that a chicken or a cow has an opinion on whether life is worth living, given the inevitable pain which we must live through? You think that they're able to contemplate whether that which doesn't kill me makes me stronger? You think they're capable of understanding to the extent that we are what pain is, and what causes it? No, of course not. That would be ludicrous.

If every cow or duck was a Hamlet or a Byron, or even just a regular Joe, then I would probably have a different view. But they're clearly not. Some quacking duck is simply incapable of relating to things like pain and many other things in those complex ways unique to humankind.

There's no human sufficiently like a chicken to justify equal treatment. — Sapientia

Does it follow that the more different an animal is to a human, the worse it can be treated?

Why not, the less human, the better it should be treated?

We seem to be generating an awful lot from the moral gold standard of human to human relationships, but why should evolutionary proximity be proportional to humane treatment once we step out of our species?

No. There's no human sufficiently like a chicken to justify equal treatment — Sapientia

Some of the persons I've worked with were much less capable than a chicken, since their disabilities kept them in the mental and physical state of infancy.

ou're either clearly wrong or have yet to reveal your own narrow interpretation of what I'm saying. No chicken, pig, cow, duck or other farmyard animal can relate to pain in the same ways that we do. You think that a chicken or a cow has an opinion on whether life is worth living, given the inevitable pain which we must live through? You think that they're able to contemplate whether that which doesn't kill me makes me stronger? You think they're capable of understanding to the extent that we are what pain is, and what causes it? No, of course not. That would be ludicrous. — Sapientia

By that logic it would be permissible to cause pain to an infant, because they are not yet able to think abstractly about pain.

If the natural hierarchy you're arguing for is based solely upon power and intelligence, then what happens when a being of greater "advanced intellectual capacity" swings by and decides he wants to eat you? Are you going to willingly scuttle into a cage to await your execution by beheading, or look forward to hanging from the ceiling as your throat is slashed, or pace forward in a metal canal so that your head can be shot with high voltage electricity?

I think he’s arguing more about humans having reached a certain threshold that other animals haven’t. It’s not just about a comparison between species.

Also, accepting that a thing isn’t unethical isn’t the same as resigning oneself to that thing, so your example doesn’t make much sense. Even if it wouldn’t be wrong for an advanced race to eat us we’d still fight back.

I think he’s arguing more about humans having reached a certain threshold that other animals haven’t. It’s not just about a comparison between species. — Michael

Such a threshold being power and intelligence, as far as I can see. What am I missing? If 1 is a rat, and 2 is a human, and 3 is a Martian, then 3>2>1. At present, because Martians don't exist, 2>1, and so Sappy can do what he wants with 1 because of A.) greater power, and B.) more intelligence. If, however, a 3 does exist, then Sappy can't, then, fudge the series and argue 3<2>1.

Does it follow that the more different an animal is to a human, the worse it can be treated?

Why not, the less human, the better it should be treated? — jastopher

Seeing different treatment as better or worse is loaded and potentially anthropomorphic. Oh, what a hellish life to be taken around on a lead and to eat food and drink water out of bowls on the floor! Yet, on the other hand, wouldn't it be great not to have to go to work or pay the bills?

I'm advocating appropriate treatment. Nothing more, nothing less.

We seem to be generating an awful lot from the moral gold standard of human to human relationships, but why should evolutionary proximity be proportional to humane treatment once we step out of our species? — jastopher

What is or is not humane treatment in a given scenario may be open to debate. There are some scenarios which might not be as clearcut as others, and people set the bar at different levels. It makes sense to me to consider humaneness in relation to various capacities, including intellectual capacity. Why do you think that turning off life support only becomes a legal option in some cases, but not others? Why do you think that there are different laws and sentencing for crimes relating to humans and crimes relating to the mistreatment of animals? Surely this has something to do with intellectual capacity. It's comparing apples and oranges.

Some of the persons I've worked with were much less capable than a chicken, since their disabilities kept them in the mental and physical state of infancy. — NKBJ

Okay, let's farm them too, then. I'm sure Kentucky Fried Human would be a real hit.

By that logic it would be permissible to cause pain to an infant, because they are not yet able to think abstractly about pain. — NKBJ

But that's not my logic. I was only disputing your claimed equivalence in how humans and other animals relate to pain in light of their respective intellectual capacities. If I had meant to single out infants, then I could have easily done so. I suspect that you're intentionally skirting around my meaning to try to score a point.

It seems that we justify the eating of vegetables based upon the fact that squash lacks consciousness, so it would make sense then to apply that standard to chickens as well and then allow us to eat them due to their diminished level of consciousness. There is some line I'd draw between what had sufficient consciousness and what didn't. I wouldn't be in favor of eating monkeys because of their high level of consciousness, but I would eat locust. So, no to Chimpanzee soup, yes to locust crunch snacks, and yes to chickens, but no to Kentucky fried people.

If the natural hierarchy you're arguing for is based solely upon power and intelligence, then what happens when a being of greater "advanced intellectual capacity" swings by and decides he wants to eat you? Are you going to willingly scuttle into a cage to await your execution by beheading, or look forward to hanging from the ceiling as your throat is slashed, or pace forward in a metal canal so that your head can be shot with high voltage electricity? — Buxtebuddha

I would likely act as expected and try to avoid that from happening. It is not a logical consequence of what I've said that I would willingly submit to any of that, so I see no valid point from you there. Just a red herring.

I would likely act as expected and try to avoid that from happening. It is not a logical consequence of what I've said that I would willingly submit to any of that, so I see no valid point from you there. — Sapientia

Your position is one that must argue that it is right to eat that which is less powerful and intelligent than you, therefore that which is more powerful and intelligent than you is also right to eat you, so your unwillingness would be wrong.

Your position is one that must argue that it is right to eat that which is less powerful and intelligent than you, therefore that which is more powerful and intelligent than you is also right to eat you, so your unwillingness would be wrong. — Buxtebuddha

My position must be what you say it is? No, that's not how it works, pal. I'm priority number one, irrespective of whether there were to arise a more powerful or intelligent species than my own, and I haven't once claimed or implied otherwise, so you've got nothing on me.

Such a threshold being power and intelligence, as far as I can see. What am I missing? If 1 is a rat, and 2 is a human, and 3 is a Martian, then 3>2>1. At present, because Martians don't exist, 2>1, and so Sappy can do what he wants with 1 because of A.) greater power, and B.) more intelligence. If, however, a 3 does exist, then Sappy can't, then, fudge the series and argue 3<2>1. — Buxtebuddha

No, I took him as saying that once something reaches a certain level of intelligence then it would be unethical to eat that thing. Humans have reached that level and cows haven't. That there may be aliens who are more intelligent than humans doesn't change this.

My position must be what you say it is? No, that's not how it works, pal. I'm priority number one, irrespective of whether there were to arise a more powerful or intelligent species than my own, and I haven't once claimed or implied otherwise, so you've got nothing on me. — Sapientia

Yeah, I probably don't have anything on you because you've no coherent position to deal with.

No, I took him as saying that once something reaches a certain level of intelligence then it would be unethical to eat that thing. Humans have reached that level and cows haven't. That there may be aliens who are more intelligent than humans doesn't change this. — Michael

What level of intelligence and by what metrics might one judge x, y, z to not be intelligent enough to have its throat saved from a slashing? Once again, if it is that intelligence is the determinant for moral worth, then yes, Man can eat chickens all day, but as I brought up, this also means that it is morally justifiable on the same premises that one that is more intelligent than us can and ought to eat us as food.

No, I took him as saying that once something reaches a certain level of intelligence then it would be unethical to eat that thing. Humans have reached that level and cows haven't. That there may be aliens who are more intelligent than humans doesn't change this. — Michael

Yes.

Yeah, I probably don't have anything on you because you've no coherent position to deal with. — Buxtebuddha

If your first plan of attack fails, call it incoherent and give up trying. I like your style.

If your first plan of attack fails, call it incoherent and give up trying. I like your style. — Sapientia

I'm waiting for you to tell me to reread and go back and understand the illuminating insights thus blessed upon us which I fail to get, zzzz.

Well, I see I've no need to, so... :zip:

Michael's less of a dishonest shithead, so I'm glad he and I can get somewhere, perhaps. Unless of course he falls off the planet and stops posting entirely like he sometimes does.

I like Michael. It's good to have someone around to explain what others sometimes fail to understand.

Okay, let's farm them too, then. I'm sure Kentucky Fried Human would be a real hit. — Sapientia

Well, exactly because that is ludicrous we have to do the opposite: eat neither animals nor people.

But that's not my logic. I was only disputing your claimed equivalence in how humans and other animals relate to pain in light of their respective intellectual capacities. If I had meant to single out infants, then I could have easily done so. I suspect that you're intentionally skirting around my meaning to try to score a point. — Sapientia

It's what your logic leads to, whether you intended it to or not.

And I'm not trying to "score points." I wasn't aware that philosophical discourse was about winning or losing. I'm just trying to get at the truth and what the right thing to do is. Part of that entails explaining the problematic conclusions your argumentation would lead to logically. It's not personal.

Well, exactly because that is ludicrous we have to do the opposite: eat neither animals nor people. — NKBJ

No, I'm pretty sure that it's not all or nothing, and that we can and do discriminate.

It's what your logic leads to, whether you intended it to or not.

And I'm not trying to "score points." I wasn't aware that philosophical discourse was about winning or losing. I'm just trying to get at the truth and what the right thing to do is. Part of that entails explaining the problematic conclusions your argumentation would lead to logically. It's not personal. — NKBJ

It's not where my logic leads, it's where you're leading it. It doesn't follow from the nonequivalence of humans and other animals in terms of intellectual capacity that it's permissible to cause pain to an infant.