Why does philosophical theory not have a similar evolution whereby philosophical conjecture evolves into established maxim? — Marcus de Brun

Philosophical inquiry is a continuing process of questioning established beliefs and theories. It is misplaced to compare the trajectory of scientific experimentation and conjecture with philosophical quest for truth and reality.
I am tempted to say that if you are still in that line of thinking ( your OP), then this philosophy site, and all the other communities of philosophy out there have not done a good job articulating to you the purpose of philosophy.
But, I can also see that your post is a philosophical question itself. So, all the more reason why you should seek good books on the subject.

Philosophy bickers, whilst Science evolves!

Why? — Marcus de Brun

What would be the difference between a life well lived, by philosophical lights, and one that was not? If philosophy is indeed 'the love of wisdom', and entails virtues such as equanimity, rational decision-making, acceptance of death; or even collective goods, 'the greatest good for the greatest number', as utilitarians have it; then what would be the evidence of progress in philosophy? How would one go about assessing that evidence? The overall sense of well-being of those in a particular culture? Mind you that is one of those very squishy questions that social science loves but which might be exceedingly hard to quantify.

Both Schopenhauer and Darwin can provide relatively irrefutable observational evidence for their respective assertions — Marcus de Brun

Schopenhauer presented no evidence - only argument. Whereas Darwin's predictions can be tested against the fossil record, in that there is considerable evidence for evolutionary change over time.

A number of philosophers have tackled this question. David Chalmers did a good lecture on it which I think is on YouTube, Peter Unger has written an entire book about it called 'Empty Ideas', Peter Hacker and Peter Van Inwagen have both written quite extensively about the subject and would be well worth your time reading about if you have the inclination. (more interesting though would be answering the question why such an unreasonably high proportion of those interested in the subject are called Peter)

In summary though the answers all converge on the same general problem;

The only propositions that can be expressed with absolute clarity are axiomatic and so can be disputed without recourse to argument, once certain premises are agreed upon, further exposition become sufficiently imprecise that counter-arguments can be presented to absolutely any argument simply by the interpretation of meaning.

Basically, anyone looking to philosophy to provide some kind of 'true' answer is (to paraphrase) like a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat ... which isn't there

"Schopenhauer presented no evidence - only argument. Whereas Darwin's predictions can be tested against the fossil record, in that there is considerable evidence for evolutionary change over time."

A counter argument might run as follows:

In light of Schopenhauer's logical and irrefutable deduction as to the functional reality of determinism and the absence of 'free will', and David Hume's recognition of the absence of definitive causal relations between the modes of 'cause' and 'effect'; the Demigods of Philosophy have decreed today that beyond reasonable doubt: Darwin's predictions and indeed the putative relations between Evolution and the Fossil Record are entirely illusory and unfounded, and a new more comprehensive theory must be established immediately.

?

M

"Basically, anyone looking to philosophy to provide some kind of 'true' answer is (to paraphrase) like a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat ... which isn't there "

Surely it is the job of the Philosopher to inform the 'citizen in the room' that he is in fact 'in a dark room looking for a black cat that is not there.' Thereby the seeker might look for a door that might lead him to a cat.

If Schrodinger can have his cat and kill him too, why must Philosophy continue to play the role of the executed cat, or the cat who is not there?

The revolutionary will insist upon disillusionment, so that society can evolve. He will do so with a stick if necessary. Why does the Philosopher choose to play the part of the absent or dead 'cat', and thereby permit society to evolve upon the dictates of the paraplegic offspring that is 'science'.


M

Take for example Determinism and the freedom of the will. The question has been sufficiently answered by Schopenhauer (one cannot will to will. All events in nature are caused, human actions are events in nature, ergo, human actions are caused/determined). — Marcus de Brun

It's your opinion that answer is sufficient.

Bluebanana:

It is also my opinion that yellow banana's are more common than blue bananas, and it is also my opinion that reality is not a complete illusion.

We must assume some opinions as true and some as false upon the evidence that is afforded by the mind, we can do this whilst also remaining cognizant of the truth that it (reality) is a mind construct.

Opinions are like assholes, everybody has one. But like the animals on Animal Farm some are more equal than others. Kant has gifted science with the appropriate methodology for discerning the difference. The question is why is Philosophy paralyzed by itself, whilst her daughter Science is not.

Does philosophy have its finger stuck somewhere? Could it (Philosophy) possibly remove the digit and replace it with a banana?

M

Surely it is the job of the Philosopher to inform the 'citizen in the room' that he is in fact 'in a dark room looking for a black cat that is not there.' Thereby the seeker might look for a door that might lead him to a cat. — Marcus de Brun

Just did... job done.

Both Schopenhauer and Darwin can provide relatively irrefutable observational evidence for their respective assertions. And yet, modern biology operates upon the basis of the veracity of the theory of Evolution, whilst the 'Theory' of Determinism remains outside of the scope of mainstream thought. Even Philosophers do not accept that Determinism has been established or proven by Schopenhauer and others. — Marcus de Brun

It's even stranger than that. Modern biologist who argue against free will would never apply identical arguments against evolution.

Darwin wrote about this metaphysical problem in his most important work "The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication", in which he claimed that if determinism was true, evolution would be false. Evolution requires metaphysical randomness.

While the implications of determinism may be ignored, determinism in science is far from "outside the scope of mainstream thought". Our two main physical theories, when interpreted realistically, are entirely deterministic.

Thank you for that Pseudonym.

Now that you have enlightened me as to the absence of the cat, are you going to assist me in finding the door? Or are you about to decree that there is no door either? At which point your part in the discussion has perhaps come to an end?

If you are willing to permit the presence of a door then let us continue:

You state:

"The only propositions that can be expressed with absolute clarity are axiomatic and so can be disputed without recourse to argument, once certain premises are agreed upon, further exposition become sufficiently imprecise that counter-arguments can be presented to absolutely any argument simply by the interpretation of meaning."

This interpretation suggests that further deductions from and initial unproblematic axiom are problematic or perhaps idiosyncratic. This is sounds at best lazy and at worst hopeless and defeatist? The fact that 'further exposition becomes imprecise' is not the fault of anything inherent to the axiom, itself unless the axiom deals with probability as opposed to certainty, and even probability can be agreed upon with sufficient reason or statistical precedent.

If you accept an initial axiom (can with agreement be disputed without recourse to argument) the deduced dependent axioms can be similarly derived "without recourse to argument" if the balance of probabilities is subject to sufficient reason.

Further exposition becomes imprecise only as a failure of the use of precise language, or the failed usage, not as a consequence of axiomatic failure. The axiom fails only where it is verifiably false.

Axioms dealing with probability can be true and untrue (I ought to close the window can be both true and untrue). However 'the window is closed' cannot be true and untrue, and is not subject to imprecision. Furthermore if it is agreed that the window should close when the room temperature falls below an agreed point, then closing the window becomes subject to the higher order principle of an agreed premise.

If logic, sufficient reason and balance of probabilities become the higher order principle that resolves axiomatic probability or paradox, it is possible to move forward and construct a philosophy that is on balance indubitable.

Descartes arrived at the axiom of 'thought exists' through an avoidance of doubt. The imprecision of what followed might well be a consequence of the fact that he proceeded then to look for his 'probable' or 'improbable' God, without the higher order principle of sufficient reason.

Determinism is no less valid than Evolution, yet Philosophy fails to construct an agreed or indubitable model of the Universe upon its axiom.

Modern biology has constructed a Universal biological model upon the weaker supposition of Evolution. Are biologists more intelligent or simply more tenacious than philosophers?

M

are you going to assist me in finding the door? Or are you about to decree that there is no door either? — Marcus de Brun

Well, for an exercise in clarity and precision, we're not off to a very good start, looking for a metaphorical 'door'. Perhaps to start with you could define, in plain English, what this investigation you talk about is actually trying to achieve.

Further exposition becomes imprecise only as a failure of the use of precise language, or the failed usage, not as a consequence of axiomatic failure. The axiom fails only where it is verifiably false. — Marcus de Brun

I agree with this entire proposition except for your use of the word 'only'. I see no 'only' about it. Philosophers have been using language to express ideas for more than 2000 years and have got absolutely nowhere by your measure of eliminating the unreasonable. All major philosophical ideas that have ever been expressed are still held to be reasonable by at least one of our epistemic peers.

Far from being 'only' about imprecise language, the project is permanently and irrecoverably crippled by it.

I'll put it simply. Mark Balaguer believes in indeterminism. He doesn't believe in it randomly, and he's at least as intelligent and well read as you or I. So if I come to the conclusion that determinism must be true, yet he (despite having access to the same empirical facts as me) is able to intelligently come to the conclusion that determinism is not the case, one of us must be mistaken. That means it's possible for an intelligent person despite rigorously analysing the facts, to be wrong. So how will I ever know that that person is not me?

"for an exercise in clarity and precision, we're not off to a very good start, looking for a metaphorical 'door'. Perhaps to start with you could define, in plain English, what this investigation you talk about is actually trying to achieve."

There is something within philosophy which seeks to confound Philosophy and (like ego's on philosophy forums) this something consistently masquerades as 'critical appraisal'. I would like to know if that 'something' exists, what it is, and why (if it exists) does it serve as a paralysis to Philosophy and not to Science?

The contention here is that no discipline is as destructive of itself than that of Philosophy. This capacity for, and wanton indulgence in, self destructive analysis, is a definitive symptom of the 'depressive', and it declares more of contemporary Philosophers than it does of Philosophy.

Within the Philosophical tenet one is far more likely to find a dialogue that seeks to destroy Philosophy, than that which seeks to build upon deduced and established philosophical principles. There are those (severe depressives) who insist that Philosophy has produced 'no sound theories of anything', despite the reality that many of Philosophy's theories are more sound and more enduring than the most currently entrenched Theories of Science. One need only consider the truth that it was the Epicurean who fostered and preserved 'atomic theory', long before Science had freed herself from magic and miracles, and could be enticed to see some truth in physical phenomena.

This oddly destructive sentiment becomes more apparent as one moves from criticism of contemporary philosophy, backwards, towards established principles. Modern Scientific Journals and Medical Journals are not as concerned with the destruction of; Cell Theory, Genetic Theory, Evolutionary Theory, Disease Theory, etc., as they are concerned with pushing the paradigm forward, upon the basis of equally 'unstable' a priori.

Progress entails taking risks. Arguably Philosophy is infatuated with the notion 'a priori', as a prevaricating virgin might be fascinated with the notion of intercourse. Science has no reluctance or fear of consummating the relationship, and getting on with the business that is Science; whilst Philosophy remains religiously precious about her virginity.

Contemporary Philosophy, with her self imposed virginity and her diagnosis of refractory depression, is intellectually paralyzed by her passion for stigmata and self destruction; and likewise with the depressive patient, others (happy people like Scientists) generally choose to avoid her company, and have given up listening to her never ending negative self appraisal, and melodramatic suicide attempts. Today, few wish to go the the party if they know she is going to be there, she may be precocious, but she is essentially a bore.

This self flagellation should not be permitted to hide behind the facade of critical appraisal. We must ask is there something pathological in the contemporary Philosopher that compels her diet towards a predilection for her offspring? Is there something Oedipal in the Philosopher's psyche that he seeks always to kill his father, rather than climb on top of his father's shoulders? Does Strawson or Balaguer offer a sound refutation of Schopenhauer's Determinism? Have they restored 'free will' to some kind of certainty? If not, what have the 'criticisms' achieved' other than paralysis?

Who then has posited the fault that justifies the Determinist sentence of 'life without parole'? Or is it the fact that it is in prison, that renders it suitable as the concubine of Philosophers. Witty intellectuals can go down into the dungeon and give it a few kicks now and then, to prove their worth to each other. How the tables might turn should it escape from the dungeon, or better still should it be appropriated by a more reasoned 'Science'.

If and when it does escape, it will foster a new; Epistemology, a Theory of Language, a Theory of Time, a Theory of Relativity, and a Theory of Cosmology. Quantum Mechanics may be about to proceed where Philosophy still lingers. The new 'Philosophies' will arise, as certainly as those of biology and genetics have arisen from Evolution, or the machinations of the monk and his pea plants.

I am trying to understand why we are prevented from constructing an appropriate metaphysical theory of reality using the existing building blocks that Kant, Schopenhauer Berkeley and Hume have afforded us. What Nietzsche angrily demanded vis: a 'Philosophy of the future'. (we do apparently occupy Nietzsche's future)

I am not presently interested in the form of that Philosophy, only that I feel (as Nietzsche did) that it is prevented, not by an absence of requisite axioms, but rather by a socially sanctioned determination to avoid its 'dire' conclusions. Much of the contradiction of Determinism arises out of the immature fear that 'Justice & liberty might die!', 'We will have no reason to live...' the veritable cries of the depressive.

Descartes was depressing, only in that his metaphysical horizon was confined to that of the religious dogmatism of his day. What is the dogma that confines Philosophical dialogue today? If you are to say there is no such confinement, then history contradicts, for each generation (within the past) has had its dogmatism, or the mass psychogenic delusions that have corralled its thought. It (the dogmatism) only becomes evident to philosophers of the future. If Descartes was an atheist (in the Spinozan sense) how much closer he may have come to a proof of the 'I' and the 'am', in addition to the irrefutable axiom that 'thought exists'? Descartes ignored Spinoza because Spinoza defied dogmatism.


Joyce had a phrase which described the intellectual paralysis of the Ireland within which he lived, before he could tolerate it no more and fled in exile. He called it GPI General Paralysis of the Insane.

The same accusation might be put to the 'Philosophers of the present'.

M

"Further exposition becomes imprecise only as a failure of the use of precise language, or the failed usage, not as a consequence of axiomatic failure. The axiom fails only where it is verifiably false."
— Marcus de Brun

"I agree with this entire proposition except for your use of the word 'only'. I see no 'only' about it. Philosophers have been using language to express ideas for more than 2000 years and have got absolutely nowhere by your measure of eliminating the unreasonable. All major philosophical ideas that have ever been expressed are still held to be reasonable by at least one of our epistemic peers.

Far from being 'only' about imprecise language, the project is permanently and irrecoverably crippled by it."

This is a strange assertion for it contradicts itself in several ways.

'only' as it is used here refers to 'in all instances'. The assertion might be equally made: 'the axiom fails in all instances where it is false'. Or the axiom always fails when it is false.

You assert a problem with the use of 'only' or 'always', and then you follow on with your own application of an 'only' or an always by stating that: 'all' major philosophical ideas that have ever been expressed are still held reasonable'.

Which simply put just asserts that some people are incapable or unwilling to accept a falsity in spite of the evidence to the contrary. Because some people are stupid, it does not make everybody stupid, and the stupidity of the analyst does not have any bearing upon the truth or untruth of the axiom. It is not the 'majority' who decide on truth. It is for example, unquestionably incorrect that fellow human beings should be burned in ovens on the basis of their religion, simply because the 'epistemic peers' of the day believe it to be logical.

Because there are some who feel that a falsity is not a falsity. This does not undermine the falsity itself. It simply reminds us that human analysis of truth or falsity is subject to human bias or personal feelings. Descartes had a God bias, you and I may share a bias towards democracy... but these respective bias have no bearing upon the axiom in question.

You appear to be asserting that truth or falsity is 'only' arrived at by consensus rather than logic or reason.

I am a lover of democracy however it has no place in the present argument and I am curious to know why you should feel that it does? Science does not include 'democracy' into its reasoning, what claim have you, or your 'epistemic peers' upon this self serving nicety?

M

some people are incapable or unwilling to accept a falsity in spite of the evidence to the contrary. Because some people are stupid, it does not make everybody stupid, and the stupidity of the analyst does not have any bearing upon the truth or untruth of the axiom. — Marcus de Brun

Again, we are in complete agreement. I'm a Realist, so I believe that there is a 'truth of the matter' external to our own feelings. If you want to be so antagonistic as to use 'stupid' to describe people whose understanding of the world does not align with the 'truth of the matter', then we'll go along with that terminology for now (although I find it unnecessarily pejorative). The problem still remains how do we tell, in the face of conflicting understandings of the same empirical sense-data, which of us is 'stupid'?

You appear to be asserting that truth or falsity is 'only' arrived at by consensus rather than logic or reason. — Marcus de Brun

No, I'm asserting that truth or falsity cannot be arrived at at all. It is possible to arrive at something which might usefully be called 'truth', for the purposes of everyday communication, but that something would be that which none of our epistemic peers could find fault with. It's not about democracy, it's about logic, but I've already set out the logical argument and you've either failed to understand it, or ignored it so I'm not sure what more I can do other than repeat it in case you missed it.

P1 - One of my epistemic peers has an understanding of the world which disagrees with mine. I present my argument and my evidence to them and they maintain their contrary position.
P2 - If two people have understandings of the world which are mutually exclusive, then one of them must be wrong (my belief in Realism).
C1 - (From P1 and P2) it must be possible for a person of my level of intellect, when faced with all the evidence and arguments involved in the case, to be wrong.
C2 - (from C1) It is therefore always possible that I (a person as intelligent as my epistemic peers, and in position of all the evidence and arguments involved in the case) might very well be the one who's wrong.
C3 - It is therefore impossible from an analysis of the evidence and arguments involved in the case alone, for any person of equal intellect to me (including me) to ascertain the 'truth of the matter'. The only situation in which the 'truth of the matter' might be usefully said to have been approached is if none of my epistemic peers finds fault with the theory, in which case the objection at P1 disappears.

In brief your argument seems to be that if realism is true (in the sense that the truth of a proposition consists in its having a certain kind of connection to a reality which is independent of our knowing it), then no matter how much agreement is arrived at concerning any given proposition, that proposition could be false.
Seems perfectly cogent to me as an argument. It's the structure of a lot of skeptical arguments. There are, I suppose, limit cases such as certain arithmetical propositions, but perhaps even there the rule-following considerations from Wittgenstein come into play.
So, the next question is, what reasons are there for believing that kind of realism to be true?

In brief your argument seems to be that if realism is true (in the sense that the truth of a proposition consists in its having a certain kind of connection to a reality which is independent of our knowing it), then no matter how much agreement is arrived at concerning any given proposition, that proposition could be false. — MetaphysicsNow

I'm not actually sure how much a belief in Realism is required for the basic idea to pertain. Going back to Van Inwagen (where this concept originates), he talks about a "way things are", which you could substitute at P2 for Realism. However one frames one's philosophical propositions, one is essentially either saying nothing (or something vacuous), saying something admittedly subjective (something poetic or placatory) or making some claim about "the way things are". Even if the claim is Idealism, its still claiming that that's the way things are and they are not any other way.

As such, any non-vacuous philosophical proposition would be in the same position.

what reasons are there for believing that kind of realism to be true? — MetaphysicsNow

That's a whole other question deserving of a thread of its own (of which I'm sure it already had several) and in which I'm sure there will be absolutely no means by which one philosophical position can be demonstrated to be more 'true' than any other.

OK, I'll have to read van Inwagen, which I don't believe I ever have, but if by "way things are" he simply means "way things are independently of what anyone thinks", it seems to boil down to good old fashioned realism. Any other conception of the way things are might have to give a role for consensus amongst some sorts of epistemic agents as providing one of the criteria for truth. Anyway, as you say, it's really a topic for a different thread (or reactivating a dormant one).

if by "way things are" he simply means "way things are independently of what anyone thinks", it seems to boil down to good old fashioned realism. — MetaphysicsNow

I see the potential confusion, but what he's trying to get at is the final "way things are" so if the reality we experience is actually a construction of our consciousness, or a consequence of God's consciousness, then that's the "way things are". The important thing for the epistemic argument is that things cannot be both 'just a figment of God's imagination' and 'a determinate consequence of the physical forces at the big bang', therefore someone must be wrong despite having all the evidence and the intellect to examine it, so we haven't really got any justification for the idea that an intellectual examination of the evidence will yield "the way things are". It evidently has not done so.

Philosophy appears to be awfully fond of this impossible 'way things are'. This potential reality that actually is the pure form of things. "Is" and "are" amount to pure conjecture as the human subject, with all of his technology, can only ever be conscious of a 'was' or the way things were. There is no such reality as a present tense!

So, we mere mortals are chained to the cave, watching shadows on the walls? This reminding ourselves that we are limited in our perception of reality, that we are effectively (via our biological form) limited to what the mind tells us; Simply reiterates a notion as old as the Greeks, and indeed the Irish Bishop concluded that all qualities 'primary' and 'secondary' are 'mental qualities'. Reality for one and all, is (or more correctly was) a purely mental construct, because men must use their minds... seriously!

Lets move on at some point.

If the 'pure form' is beyond the senses, and beyond comprehension, then what use is it to anyone? Who cares about it and why? It belongs to the prime mover and he is welcome to it.

This idiom does not undermine our notion of truth, it effectively defines its coordinates and lays the foundation for the evolution of Philosophy, rather than its paralysis. I do not desist from insisting that one plus one equals two, because of the argument that outside of the reality of mathematics, in a possible other aspect of 'pure-reality' it may amount to something different. Why and when should aspects of pure reality that are entirely precluded from relevance, be somehow hypothetically relevant?

On top of all that, Heraclitus reminds that everything is in flux. That the universe is in a state of effective motion. At each nanosecond all measurements change, and the way things 'are' becomes the way things 'were'. There can be no "are", everything 'is' perceived by the senses as it 'was'. During the time taken for sense-data to be processed by the brain; the way things are, has (in the sense of a pure-reality) actually evolved into a new form in space and time that we have yet to perceive. The true form of (your) pure-reality exists within the future, and is entirely beyond the reach of our historically confined sense-perception. If this 'pure-reality' does indeed exist (you have asserted its existence or possibility) and it is entirely confined to our future (by virtue of the historical nature of perception) it follows with complete certainty, that this pure-reality is entirely confined to the future. Therefore, if you assert that pure-reality exists, and you agree that the process of sensing reality confines 'pure-reality' to the future, this pure reality exists entirely within the future. If it exists only in the future then it is (by definition) entirely Determined.

This proposition is confirmed by the sequential arrival of 'new' albeit equally historical sense data which confirm that the preceding sense data were some vague reflection of the way things were.

So we must function in space and time and reality/truth is only partially conceived. This is the philosophical foundation of our material function within this unattainable pure-reality. Is there a model that undermines these necessary coordinates of our human reality in any substantive manner? We can swim about in an esoteric uncertainty until the cows come home, but what is to be achieved by this wallowing in the mire of uncertainty?

Humanity is chained, not only to sense data, but to a historicity of sense data. We know nothing of the present and the future is pure conjecture but at least we can say with certainty that it exists and it is Determined. Indeed our truth has its limitations, yet to be so limited does not deprive it of reality or definition; it does not make truth vague, but on the contrary gives it certainty.

For human beings in an absolute sense this "way" and this "are" remain out of bounds as a consequence of time, and the evolving nature of a Determined Universe.

So, we are left with a reality that is a 'mental construct' one that is necessarily limited by the fact that we can only receive certain sense data; it is limited by the fact that infinitely accurate measurement is impossible via the practical reality of infinite degrees of accuracy. No 'thing' in the world is like any other thing, and therefore we can have no Science of anything, other than the abstraction of mathematics, a life confined to the past, and perhaps the fancies of imagination. All of this has been hashed out by Locke and Boyle; and Berkeley had the final say. These established philosophical axioms do not undermine reality, or the truth of things, they accurately define the limits of truth so that logical discourse can proceed upon the basis of the Determined form of this pure-reality.

If we are discussing the reality of an apple, and we are human beings equally endowed with senses, what does it matter that the pure form of the apple is unknowable. Science equally agrees and moves on. No two apples can possibly be the same, and therefore there is no actual reference point for anything.

Every apple is entirely unique, the 'standard apple' does not exist. The standard notional agreed truth of an apple, is even less real than any apple that has actually ever existed. Yet, in spite of all the difficulties, in spite of the fact that the standard apple is completely untrue, we can, and do establish the effective truth of the object that is apple. There is of course no such thing as an apple because every apple is, in and of itself THE apple. Each is an example of itself alone. However, this does not prevent us from establishing unequivocal truths that pertain to the object apple; and consequently we can produce cultivate sell, classify and ultimately eat apples... all this without getting into a tizzy about the initial 'untruth' or impossibility of the apple.

If there is a 'pure' form of reality that is outside of human sense, and therefore cannot present itself to us as sense-data; what relevance does this potential input have to the reality-truth of the human subject. Data that is extra sensory, that is beyond the reaches of our sense-dependent technology, has no meaning for us, as by definition it can never be perceived.

To attempt to undermine the truth of a reality with the putative truth of one that can never be perceived is both having and eating an awful lot of cake. Reality/truth has a certain amount of irrelevant uncertainty included into its pure form... so what?

Let us not bore each other to death with the impossibility of pure-reality.

Science can leave that apple on the branch, whereas Philosophy fashions the branch into a rod to beat herself to death with.

The unanswered question remains as to: Why might this be so?