This is a spinoff of a conversation from the Shoutbox. Here it goes:

The validity of our motivations enables an act to be classed as 'moral' and the authenticity behind these motivations are about our capacity to freely choose. — TimeLine

This is circular. As a Kantian you would say that the validity is derived from a deontological ethical schema. From a utilitarian perspective its all about consequences (even though the evaluation of those consequences is irreversibly deontological too). Do you see the issue with talking about the 'validity of our motivations'? I'm just trying to deflate the issue here.

Now, talking about 'freely' choosing. What that entails from a moral standpoint is that an action that could have been done otherwise, should have been done if the alternative to the current action produces more good than the available disposition. So, again this goes back to determining the qualitative 'good'ness' of an action... — Posty McPostface

Now, I've always been wary of the divide between deontological ethics and consequentialist ethical theories. I feel as though, the process of evaluation of a moral act or deed essentially comes down to the propositional attitude of the observer. Normatively, we derive our sense of the valence of moral acts from what we believe to be good, along with social constructs that are drilled into us, although one doesn't read the entirety of the effective penal code to know what is right or wrong.

So, this leads me to believe that both Kant and Hume were right in each regard. To generalize feelings we need to appeal to empathy and reason // emotion, which is manifest in moral and ethical rules about proper behavior and conduct.

Thoughts?