But (2) is false: if I do in fact see that I have hands, it's impossible that Descartes’ evil demon deceives me (about my hands) since (a) and (b) are logically incompatible. Thus, the skeptic cannot assume that (2) is true unless he can prove that I’m in fact being deceived by Descartes’ evil demon (which of course he cannot). And so conclusion (3) doesn't follow. — Fafner
Thus, the realist cannot assume that (2b) is true, where (2b) is that it is always logically possible that you are actually seeing your hands and are not deceived. — darthbarracuda
In other words, when the skeptic says "it's always possible that one is mistaken", it's not clear what he means by 'possible'. For if I do see (truly) that I have hands, then it is logically impossible for me to bein this very same state and be mistaken. — Fafner
(1) Either (a) I see that I have hands or (b) it merely seems to me that I have hands because I’m deceived by Descartes’ evil demon.
(2) According to the skeptic, whenever I seem to see that I have hands, it is always logically possible that I’m deceived by Descartes’ evil demon.
(3) Hence I can never really know for sure whether I really have hands. — Fafner
I think the argument would still work even if you replace 'know for sure' with a simple 'know'. According to the skeptical argument, all possible evidence for any proposition cannot support the proposition any better than its negation. If every experience of the external world you could have could turn out to be mistaken, then what reasons (even weaker than perfect certainty) could you possibly have for believing that you are not radically mistaken about the external world? — Fafner
concerning your question, I'm not sure what you mean by "epistemological solipsism", could you elaborate? — Fafner
Well, if doubt can only exist when there is lack of certainty, and if one can doubt whether solipsism is an actuality, then at most it follows that solipsism is not certain. — Fafner
But I can't see how that proves anything about the existence of my hands. — Fafner
Well, not quite. Because since the world and the self are the same thing in solipsism, then there can be no room for doubting the world since the self must exist. — Posty McPostface
Well, the mere fact that you can doubt, presupposes that solipsism isn't the case, therefore they are real. — Posty McPostface
It seems to me that even if this inference is correct, it still would not refute skepticism because the skeptic need not argue for strict solipsism (in your sense) for his argument to be disastrous for knowledge. — Fafner
Are you certain of that? Or is that just your way of defining solipsism? — Janus
Therefore, if we take the evil demon path of assuming that everything can be doubted and nothing can be certain — Posty McPostface
In a dream everything is perfectly clear, there's no room for/to doubt the existence of the dream world itself because there is no room for doubt itself. — Posty McPostface
I think it's perfectly possible to ask yourself from within your own dream whether you are dreaming or not. Some people can in fact do just that (lucid dreamers). — Fafner
Not had you eternally been in a dream, and had no sense of doubt due to everything in the world being the same as your level of knowledge about it. — Posty McPostface
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