No, if it were then philosophers would have to be linguists and definitions could easily be resolved by the dictionary. — Pseudonym

Again, if that was the case then the work has already been done. The staff at the various dictionaries have already invested far more time than you or I ever could in determine exactly what the common usage of words is in the real world. So what more work needs to be done? — Pseudonym

The dictionary is a good start, but you will notice that some definitions are not perfect for they do not state the essential properties; they only give a vague description of the term, which is sufficient for most readers to understand the meaning, but not capture the essence. Look up the dictionary definition of 'knowledge' for example.

It is important in philosophy to find the essence of things in order to find essential truths about them. E.g., is x always y?

I wasn't commenting on the value, only that, contrary to your assertion, it is not the Socratic method which allows me to know when two philosophers disagree, a simple empirical study of their words does that. The expression "I disagree", for example, would do the job. — Pseudonym

You misunderstood my original point. My point was not to determine how we know others disagree, but what makes them disagree.

No. Consider the earth-centred solar system, the flat-earth, humours as a cause of disease, phlogiston, creationism. An idea's persistence has no bearing on its rightness. — Pseudonym

You are right regarding your examples; but regarding the definition of knowledge, Gettier did not attempt to disprove the original definition, but only to show it was incomplete. And the fact that the original definition held up for so long shows that it must have been close to completeness, otherwise people would have found exceptions earlier.

He didn't "discover" some property was missing. He claimed some property was missing, others disagreed, and still do. That's the point, he simply made a claim it was grammatically possible to make and no one had any means of determining if he was right or not. — Pseudonym

Claims are made valid or not depending on if the reason that backs it up is valid or not. Gettier backed up his claim by finding counter-examples that aim to falsify the original definition. Whether he was successful or not is besides the point; the point being that even he used the Socratic Method.

The assumption here is that there is a something that is the meaning of a word; [...] But there isn't, of course. — Banno

Does it follow that your comment, made of nothing but words, is meaningless? :joke:

if this meaning-of-a-word were identified, we would all agree on it. — Banno

Agreed. This is why it is so important to identify that real meaning or concept.

Does it follow that your comment, made of nothing but words, is meaningless? :joke: — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, yes, apart from it's use. Which might be to have you think in terms of use rather than meaning.

if this meaning-of-a-word were identified, we would all agree on it.
— Banno
Agreed. — Samuel Lacrampe

So we should do philosophy by vote?

This is why it is so important to identify that real meaning or concept — Samuel Lacrampe

Is it really so inconceivable that words not have a "real meaning"?

Both. I think it is applied because even your description of sifting the meaning from a proposition by context is still using the Socratic Method on a particular test. I also think it ought to be applied, because it is the scientific method applied to definition of terms as used in the common language. If the scientific method works, then this should work too. — Samuel Lacrampe

IS it the scientific method? I don't agree. Science proceeds by looking and generalising rather than repeated questioning. A scientific approach might be more about stoping to observer the way words are actually used rather than making guesses at a boozy party.

The assumption here is that there is a something that is the meaning of a word; and further, if this meaning-of-a-word were identified, we would all agree on it.

But there isn't, of course. — Banno

I don't think the argument requires that assumption. Concluding that because a method has attempted to do something for thousands of years but failed to do that thing, it is probably not possible to do that thing by that method, does not imply that it is possible to do that thing by some other method.

The fact that there is no meaning of a word, and that even if there were, we might not all agree, does not invalidate the argument that attempts to find such meaning and engender agreement on it via some particular method have failed.

Or have I misunderstood the point you were trying to make?

The dictionary is a good start, but you will notice that some definitions are not perfect for they do not state the essential properties; they only give a vague description of the term, which is sufficient for most readers to understand the meaning, but not capture the essence. Look up the dictionary definition of 'knowledge' for example. — Samuel Lacrampe

How do you know that there are essential properties for such words to be found?

It is important in philosophy to find the essence of things in order to find essential truths about them. E.g., is x always y? — Samuel Lacrampe

Is it?

And the fact that the original definition held up for so long shows that it must have been close to completeness, otherwise people would have found exceptions earlier. — Samuel Lacrampe

This just repeats the same error; that people would have found some flaw if there was one to find. My examples surely must cause you to question that assumption?

Claims are made valid or not depending on if the reason that backs it up is valid or not. Gettier backed up his claim by finding counter-examples that aim to falsify the original definition. Whether he was successful or not is besides the point; the point being that even he used the Socratic Method. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, whether he was successful or not is exactly the point. If he used the Socratic method, but was unsuccessful in sufficiently backing up his claim, and if every other person using the Socratic method to make such claims was also unsuccessful in backing up their claim (empirically true, since no such claims have been taken to be unquestionably 'right'), then at least by inference that pushes us to conclude that the Socratic method does not work as a means of backing up a claim.

Well, yes, apart from it's use. Which might be to have you think in terms of use rather than meaning. [...] Is it really so inconceivable that words not have a "real meaning"? — Banno

The problem with this view is, if words don't point to real things (concepts), then no proposition ever spoken can be objectively true, for truth means 'reflective of reality'. Example: The proposition "The Earth is round" cannot be objectively true if the words 'Earth', 'is', and 'round' don't point to anything in reality.

So we should do philosophy by vote? — Banno

Of course not. I was merely stating I find no flaw in your logic for that quoted sentence; though the conclusion that words don't have meanings doesn't follow from this.

Science proceeds by looking and generalising rather than repeated questioning. — Banno

That is indeed part of science, but a topic is truly scientific only if it is testable, verifiable, falsifiable. Thus the hypothesis definition is tested and falsified by finding examples and counter-examples in the common language that uses the defined term. This is essentially the Socratic Method.

if words don't point to real things (concepts), — Samuel Lacrampe

Real things are all concepts? That's not right.

How do you know that there are essential properties for such words to be found? — Pseudonym

Same demonstration as given here (middle section).

Is it? — Pseudonym

Sure is. It is one of the best ways to arrive at principles. E.g. "Knowledge implies justification", by definition.

This just repeats the same error; that people would have found some flaw if there was one to find. My examples surely must cause you to question that assumption? — Pseudonym

You gave examples of hypotheses that have been debunked. The original definition of knowledge has never been debunked, but at most, added on to. The fact that it has never been debunked and there was a long time lapse in adding more properties is indeed not a proof, but makes it reasonable to suppose that the original definition is close to the truth.

This is nothing but the scientific method at work: a hypothesis becomes accepted if it is the simplest one that people have not been able to falsify.

If he used the Socratic method, but was unsuccessful in sufficiently backing up his claim, and if every other person using the Socratic method to make such claims was also unsuccessful in backing up their claim (empirically true, since no such claims have been taken to be unquestionably 'right'), then at least by inference that pushes us to conclude that the Socratic method does not work as a means of backing up a claim. — Pseudonym

This statement seems to contradict your previous claim, namely, the fact that people did not find a flaw is not a proof that there is not one to find. Using the same rationale here, the fact the people merely disagree on the result of a method is not a proof that the method is bad. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, merely stating others' opinions without the justification for their opinion is not productive.

Back to the original definition: Justified true belief. Does anyone dispute any of these properties as being essential? If no, then it is reasonable to infer these are truly essential; and credit goes to the socratic method. While it may not have found the perfect definition (yet), it did get us close to the truth by finding these first properties. Personally, I'll take a method that, while possibly imperfect, leads closer to the truth, over the alternative which is nothing.

Justified true belief. Does anyone dispute any of these properties as being essential? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes. None of them is necessarily essential. As ever, it depends on context. For lightweight everyday social chit-chat, none of them need intrude. In a philosophy forum, a little more rigour might be expected. :wink:

Being relatively new on this forum, it surprised me that many discussions start with a well formulated question, but without defining the words used in the question even when it's not clear wich definition applies. Wich could (and in many cases does) result in confusion about what is being discussed. — Tomseltje

I agree, it's important in philosophical conversation to clear up our terms.

There are many ways to go about this, however. One need not provide a glossary at the outset, or at any point in the exchange.

The very process of earnest philosophical discourse tends to provide definition for relevant terms as conversation proceeds. There's no reason to suppose that, in general, there is a beginning and an end to this process of definition, or that the tidy little definitions we may provide from time to time are sufficient for all purposes and immune to revision.

I make it a practice to sort out my own habits of speech, to listen closely to the way my interlocutors speak, to question them about their linguistic intentions when it seems relevant to do so, and to point out differences in my own habits of speech when it seems relevant to do so, in pursuit of mutual understanding and good common sense.

Real things are all concepts? That's not right. — Banno

Almost; but rather, the concepts in our mind reflect intelligible beings in reality. What else does it mean to call a statement "true"? A statement is called true because it reflects reality. So the statement must be connected to reality in some way. Since statements are made of concepts (represented by words), then the concepts themselves must be connected to reality. If there is connection between concepts and real beings, then no proposition ever spoken can be called "true"; which is absurd.

Could you give a case example where a person rightfully "knows" something, but that knowledge is either unjustified, untrue, or unbelieved?

Granted, when we say "I know this person", we are here using the word ambiguously. We do not mean here that we believe any truth about this person, but merely that we have met them. Now we are not talking about this type of knowledge, but the type that is about a statement, like "I know x is y".

So language works by referring to concepts rather than to things in the world?

statements are made of concepts (represented by words) — Samuel Lacrampe

Are they? I don't see any good reason to suppose that this is the case. Indeed, while I have a clear idea of what sort of thing a word is, I have no clear idea of what sort of thing a concept is.

Further, I would have thought that "Samuel Lacrampe" refers to you, and not to my-concept-of-you.

That is, descriptivism is pretty much dead, finished off by Kripke. Am I wrong here?

Are they? I don't see any good reason to suppose that this is the case. Indeed, while I have a clear idea of what sort of thing a word is, I have no clear idea of what sort of thing a concept is. — Banno

Words are made of letters. The word 'apple' is made of the letters A, P, P, L, E. Words are symbols or signs that point to concepts. A Concept is the intelligible meaning intended by the word. E.g., the words ‘apple’ in english and ‘pomme’ in french are two words that point to the same concept (the fruit thing). On the other hand, the same word ‘bank’ can point to one concept as found in ‘river bank’, or another concept as found in ‘bank account’. This is sufficient to demonstrate that words and concepts are separate things.

So language works by referring to concepts rather than to things in the world? [...] Further, I would have thought that "Samuel Lacrampe" refers to you, and not to my-concept-of-you. — Banno

Words point to concepts, and my point is that concepts coincide with real beings. That's what I mean when I say concepts must be connected to reality. To use your example, the words "Samuel Lacrampe" indeed refer to the real being which is me.

But now I am confused about your position, because I thought you believed the meaning of a word is not a real thing.

That is, descriptivism is pretty much dead, finished off by Kripke. Am I wrong here? — Banno

That depends on the argument Kripke or yourself have to back up that claim. Now admittedly, I am not familiar with the notion of descriptivism. Is it what we are discussing here?

A Concept is the intelligible meaning intended by the word. — Samuel Lacrampe

I thought you believed the meaning of a word is not a real thing. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sort of. And hence, concepts are not all that clear either.

A first problem, to get us started. Where are concepts located? Do I have an apple-concept in my head, while you have an apple-concept in your head?

If so, when I present you with an apple and say "Here is an apple", "Apple" refers to the concept-of-apple in my mind; but for you it refers to the concept-of-apple in your own mind. The implication is that, despite the apple being there before us both, we are not referring to the very same thing.

Now I want to be clear that this is not a question that could be answered by some sort of triangulation, where your apple-concept and my apple-concept are found to have something in common; because that thing that they have in common is precisely the apple, not the apple-concept.

ANd if you have to introduce the apple in order to show how our concepts allow us to communicate, you may as well have not introduced concepts in the first place.

What I would like you to see here is how counter-intuitive it is to suppose that a name refers to something other than what is named; to suppose that the word "apple" does not refer to the apple here before us; or that "Sydney" does not refer to that city.

↪Pattern-chaser

Could you give a case example where a person rightfully "knows" something, but that knowledge is either unjustified, untrue, or unbelieved?

Granted, when we say "I know this person", we are here using the word ambiguously. We do not mean here that we believe any truth about this person, but merely that we have met them. Now we are not talking about this type of knowledge, but the type that is about a statement, like "I know x is y". — Samuel Lacrampe

A person who "rightfully knows something", in your terms, is someone who has factual, maybe even Objective, knowledge of something, I think. So no, I cannot offer an example of an Objective truth being incorrect, because that isn't possible. But that doesn't detract from the point I made, which had nothing at all to do with challenging Objective Truth (a stupid and impossible thing to do). Here is what I said.

Justified true belief. Does anyone dispute any of these properties as being essential? — Samuel Lacrampe

Yes. None of them is necessarily essential. As ever, it depends on context. For lightweight everyday social chit-chat, none of them need intrude. In a philosophy forum, a little more rigour might be expected. :wink: — Pattern-chaser

In everyday use, we all (appear to) claim justified knowledge when we are actually just exaggerating for effect, to bolster the apparent authority of what we're saying. It's just something people do. Having made that observation, there's little more to say or do. This isn't something that will gain us much if we dissect it thoroughly. It's just something humans do, even if they are wrong to do so. :up:

ANd if you have to introduce the apple in order to show how our concepts allow us to communicate, you may as well have not introduced concepts in the first place.

What I would like you to see here is how counter-intuitive it is to suppose that a name refers to something other than what is named; to suppose that the word "apple" does not refer to the apple here before us; or that "Sydney" does not refer to that city. — Banno

For simplicity, it is true that we might as well say that concepts are the real beings; or at least their intelligible part. The subtle difference between a concept and a real being is that the real being can exist without the concept existing in my mind if I have not apprehended that being. E.g., a baby has no concept of apples despite apples existing in the world.

To get technical, a 'concept' is a term in epistemology and requires a subject. It is the intelligible meaning our words refer to. A 'form' is a term in metaphysics and does not require a subject; only an object. It is what gives matter its intelligibility, organization, or identity. Once the subject has apprehended the object, then the concept in the subject coincides with the form of the object. We call that 'knowledge'.

A first problem, to get us started. Where are concepts located? Do I have an apple-concept in my head, while you have an apple-concept in your head?

If so, when I present you with an apple and say "Here is an apple", "Apple" refers to the concept-of-apple in my mind; but for you it refers to the concept-of-apple in your own mind. The implication is that, despite the apple being there before us both, we are not referring to the very same thing. — Banno

Indeed, my concept of apple, your concept of apple, and the form of apple from the real being must be one and the same. The problem of location is solved by inferring the immateriality of concepts (the universal kind), forms, and by extension, minds. Thus universal concepts don't have a physical location. The argument goes as follows:

P1: All physical beings are particulars. They all have particular spacial-temporal properties.
P2: Universal concepts are not particulars. Our concept of apple refers to many particular apples.
C: Concepts are not physical beings.

This unity of concepts and form is what connects subjects together, eg, you and I can have a meaningful coherent communication; and connects subjects with objects, eg, we can know something about the outside world.

Pascal summarizes it this way:

[...] it is impossible that our rational part should be other than spiritual; and if any one maintain that we are simply corporeal, this would far more exclude us from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. — Pascal

That does not seem overly complicated?

Instead, suppose that we just use words to talk about things, including apples, without the intermediary of concepts.

What is lost? What is gained by adding concepts to the mix?

Understood. The point of your comment was therefore to be descriptive, a pure observation of what people do; rather than to be prescriptive, a judgement of what people should do. I accept your point as such.

If science has taught us anything, is that reality is damn complicated. :wink:

As described in my last post, there is a difference between a concept and the real being, but that difference is so minor on a non-technical level that, for simplicity, I can side with you and say that words refer to real beings directly. This removes the need to talk about concepts, and preserves the ability of propositions to be true.

Back to the original dispute. My objection was not directly about concepts, but about your claim that the meaning of a word is not a real thing; that is to say, words don't refer to real things. As per your last post, it seems your new position is that words do refer to real things; thereby moving away from your original position. Am I interpreting all this right?

it seems your new position is that words do refer to real things; thereby moving away from your original position. — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, perhaps it was your understanding of my position that changed. I've long been an advocate of the view that we understand language better if we leave meaning aside and instead look to what we do with words. Been that way for forty years, since I first read Austin.

So to be sure, Nouns refer to things, real or otherwise. Lots of other words do not.

If so, when I present you with an apple and say "Here is an apple", "Apple" refers to the concept-of-apple in my mind — Banno

Which is obviously not correct. If that was the case I would not bother to look at the thing. An "Apple" is not in the mind but a real thing that is in the world. In being-in-the-world there is always being involved but that is not reason to talk nonsense. Everyone knows that you think you have an apple there if you say so, but you do not refer to something inside your head - it is in the world.
One could say being in your mind would disqualify that thing from being an apple.

I accept the clarification on your position.

So to be sure, Nouns refer to things, real or otherwise. Lots of other words do not. — Banno

Remember that if some words do not refer to beings, that is, are meaningless, then propositions that use those words are also meaningless and thus cannot be true. What would be an example of such words?

...if some words do not refer to beings, that is, are meaningless... — Samuel Lacrampe

That's just wrong. Not all words are nouns.

Yep.

Where exactly would you draw the border between an idea and a concept?

I wouldn't bother with concepts.

I wrote extensively about this in a previous incarnation. On thinking about Austin's criticism of universals and Wittgenstein' s meaning as use, it's just not clear what a concept might be, beyond a vague notion of abstraction.

And ...? Propositions are never made of only nouns; and my previous point stands.