Of course, the problem loops back and asks how one determines the truth of LOGIC itself? The answer is LOGIC is self-proving mechanism. — TheMadFool
Not sure about that last part, but I like where you're taking this. :smile: — Posty McPostface
We can employ a strong argument in favor of logic which depends on its predictions coming true in every field of knowledge we know of since we even began thinking. — TheMadFool
What I'm saying is there's a plethora of ''particulars'' in favor of the logical method. — TheMadFool
Said differently, logic works as the method to prove the truth of propositions. — TheMadFool
How so? — Posty McPostface
So, science is a method, hence; the scientific method...
Can you name any particular stances?
And, is the method approach winning against the particularistic one? — Posty McPostface
Both are two sides of the same coin and only together can we make a purchase. — TheMadFool
Hmm, unsure about that. I think both cannot be spoken without the other. Kind of like dialectics? — Posty McPostface
I think I am a dissolutionist about this problem. To pose the problem is already to have distinguished properties of knowledge that make it different, and thus to already have both a sample and some criteria and a method. — unenlightened
To deny it is to deny knowing what the problem is that one is posing. It is to talk of 'knowledge' whilst denying that there is knowledge. That's nonsense. — unenlightened
Don't start with knowledge at all, start with a method - the method of no method. — unenlightened
"Fuck about and see what happens." There's your solid foundation. Then start giving names to what happens when you fuck about like this. — unenlightened
The method of F-ing about is how it actually works. — ChatteringMonkey
It's just nonsense all the way down from this starting point. — Posty McPostface
If I put it politely for you, it is play that is the beginning of knowledge. Play is imitation, recitation, messing about. — unenlightened
One does not go looking for Roderickite that one has no idea what it is, one plays in the sand and something different comes out of that, and one calls it Roderickite. — unenlightened
If there is any knowledge which bears the mark of truth, if the intellect does have a way of distinguishing the true and the false, in short, if there is a criterion of truth, then this
criterion should satisfy three conditions: it should be internal, objective, and immediate.
It should be internal. No reason or rule of truth that is provided by an external
authority can serve as an ultimate criterion. For the reflective doubts that are essential to
criteriology can and should be applied to this authority itself. The mind cannot attain to
certainty until it has found within itself a sufficient reason for adhering to the testimony
of such an authority.
The criterion should be objective. The ultimate reason for believing cannot be a
merely subjective state of the thinking subject. A man is aware that he can reflect upon
his psychological states in order to control them. Knowing that he has this ability, he
does not, so long as he has not made use of it, have the right to be sure. The ultimate
ground of certitude cannot consist in a subjective feeling. It can be found only in that
which, objectively, produces this feeling and is adequate to reason.
Finally, the criterion must be immediate. To be sure, a certain conviction may rest
upon many different reasons some of which are subordinate to others. But if we are to
avoid an infinite regress, then we must find a ground of assent that presupposes no
other. We must find an immediate criterion of certitude.
Is there a criterion of truth that satisfies these three conditions? If so, what is it? — Cardinal D. J. Mercier
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