On the seventh proposition of the Tractatus.

Shawn

The seventh proposition of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus reads (or the meta-philosophical claim):

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. (7.0)

There are several implications that can be derived from this proposition that I would like to explore here.

First, the mystical or the ethical is what can be referred to as those things which cannot be spoken about. They simply are and no amount of descriptiveness will allow one to fully encapsulate their significance and meaning.

Second, and most arguably the practice of philosophy as typically understood is futile and irrelevant in regards to the ineffable and mystical. Meaning, that when one comes to the realization of the seventh proposition of the TLP, then one either engages in philosophical quietism, and reduces the practice of philosophy to linguistic analysis for ill formulated questions or altogether abandons philosophy and engages in life itself, which Wittgenstein himself did both, although in the reverse order.

Third, and this is the deepest insight. Is that when one engages in philosophy as an individualistic enterprise of sorts, and with that the realization that much of that enterprise are actually blatant rationalizations, then the self becomes secondary to the mystical and ineffable. It's a very hard realization to arrive at because it reduces the significance of the self and instead elevates the importance of the world at hand. In other words, everything that you know about the world cannot and will never be able to explain in totality its scope. Think of this proposition if you're having trouble understanding this point:

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62)

As I have read in literature, Wittgenstein quite often would go too deep into philosophy, and at times almost lose himself in that process. I experienced a small sliver of that state of affairs, and was hoping if anyone else could relate or criticize these implications, possibly arrived at through different means or methods.

Thanks.

fishfry

I've always taken this more as practical advice. Not only as you note that he's saying we shouldn't try to speculate on things we can't possibly ever have knowledge of -- the ultimate nature of the world, for example; but also that if we are ignorant of a topic we should put a sock in it. Don't go spouting off about things you don't know anything about.

MetaphysicsNow

First, the mystical or the ethical is what can be referred to as those things which cannot be spoken about.

Aren't you already speaking about them in making that claim (and then going on to talk about them even more later on)? I presume, then, that you either disagree with Wittgenstein, or you believe that one can say something about the mystical and the ethical. Or do you mean to be deliberately paradoxical? I've heard it said that the entire Tractatus is meaningless nonsense if one takes literally this particular aphorism from Wittgenstein.

The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62)

I'll have to reread the Tractatus, but at that stage in his philosophy I think the idea of a private language still made sense to Wittgenstein, and this certainly seems to be lying behind this remark. He gave up on that, as well as the idea that the fact-picturing model of language developed in the Tractatus was the only way in which language operates. He later went on to appreciate that you can do more with language than just state facts (although fact stating remains an important part of language, of course).

Also, Wittgenstein was not the first philosopher to attempt to set limits to what philosophy can accomplish. Kant got there before him, and arguably did a better job of it. One thing one can certainly say about Wittgenstein is that he was parsimonious with this acknowledgement of his debt to others that came before him.

unenlightened

There's an old trope about 'the experience of red'. We agree to call this apple 'red' and that one 'green', but we cannot compare our experiences, only their structural consistency. We agree that this bus is red like the red apple, and this pair of pants is green like the green apple, but of the experience itself, we can say nothing, and this becomes the beetle in the box in later W. that falls out of the conversation.

So my mate Richard used to talk in the normal consistent way about green pants and red buses, and it was only when he applied to be a telephone engineer that he took one of those tests, and discovered he was red/green colour-blind. At which point, although he used the words 'red' and 'green' correctly, it became apparent that his experience of red and green was different. The only difference that showed, was his inability to read the numbers on those blobby graphics they use to test for colour-blindness. And that's all there was to say about it, except that the phone company didn't want him messing with their multi-coloured wiring system. What it is like to see red, or not to see red, no one can say, because one does not even know oneself, except by one's ability to use the word correctly.

Whatever our experiences, we can make up a word for them, so there is nothing we cannot talk about. And yet no amount of talk can capture the experience, so there is always a chasm between talk and world. We can talk about anything, but it will only ever be talk.

John Doe

Whatever our experiences, we can make up a word for them, so there is nothing we cannot talk about. And yet no amount of talk can capture the experience, so there is always a chasm between talk and world. We can talk about anything, but it will only ever be talk. — unenlightened

I think that the spirit of this is correct way to go about reading the seventh proposition, although I would perhaps quibble with the substance.

In any case, I take it that what's key is Wittgenstein's use of the preposition "of" (von). If we take the proposition within the larger corpus, I think that what he's gesturing towards is something like this: one cannot speak of ethics, one can only speak ethically.

He recognizes early on in his life that the aim of the Tractatus -- to understand the stuff of human life from the outside-in, starting with the logical form of language/thought/world -- only gets you so far. The stuff of human life, tradition, practices, must then be lived and understood from inside-out.

So I guess, on this reading, an imperfect analogy might be something like this. It would be as if Rawls, in some uncharacteristically self-aware moment, ended A Theory of Justice by saying: "Aha, I've 'solved' political philosophy according to the rules of our game. Only now can we see how little use it is to actual politics. Perhaps we can integrate into our lives and into our practices, but probably not. We can no longer speak "of" politics, but perhaps only politically."

Shawn

I've always taken this more as practical advice. — fishfry

That's perhaps the only correct attitude to profess. I can't help but feel as though pragmatism is the logical conclusion to arrive at after reading the Investigations and the Tractatus.

Shawn

I presume, then, that you either disagree with Wittgenstein, or you believe that one can say something about the mystical and the ethical. — MetaphysicsNow

I'm not quite sure yet. In practical terms, there's no way to evaluate the truth aptness of any ethical theory, along with most ethical theories committing the naturalistic fallacy. Going off on a tangent, I do think consequentialist theories as making a serious attempt at addressing this issue. Anyway, I'm not trying to be facetious. It's just that the growing sentiment from the Tractatus seems to be that prescriptive ethical theories will always be moot.

I've heard it said that the entire Tractatus is meaningless nonsense if one takes literally this particular aphorism from Wittgenstein. — MetaphysicsNow

Not really. Wittgenstein set out to delineate the limits of language and thought with the Tractatus. I think he achieved that goal.

I'll have to reread the Tractatus, but at that stage in his philosophy I think the idea of a private language still made sense to Wittgenstein, and this certainly seems to be lying behind this remark. — MetaphysicsNow

One has to realize that if we really don't live in our heads or have private content, then why does so much misunderstanding occur? I don't necessarily think everything is public nor am I a logical behaviorist.

Also, Wittgenstein was not the first philosopher to attempt to set limits to what philosophy can accomplish. Kant got there before him, and arguably did a better job of it. — MetaphysicsNow

That's a matter of preference. Kant had to invoke the metaphysical. Wittgenstein got by with doing without it.

Shawn

What it is like to see red, or not to see red, no one can say, because one does not even know oneself, except by one's ability to use the word correctly. — unenlightened

Question begging. One needs criteria to address this, "correctness" issue. It can be like one of those "tests" or college or fundamentally the process of learning itself.

Whatever our experiences, we can make up a word for them, so there is nothing we cannot talk about. And yet no amount of talk can capture the experience, so there is always a chasm between talk and world. We can talk about anything, but it will only ever be talk. — unenlightened

I don't really think you actually believe that. Think solipsism.

MetaphysicsNow

↪Posty McPostface

Not really. Wittgenstein set out to delineate the limits of language and thought with the Tractatus. I think he achieved that goal.

OK, but in the Tractatus he had a very restricted view of what language is (at least that is one interpretation of it). Language is precisely and only a way of picturing reality in the Tractatus, and in the Tractatus reality is just the totality of facts, so language in the Tractatus is just a way of picturing facts. All facts are built up from atomic facts, and the logical relations between propositions mirror the ontological relations between facts. With that in mind, proposition 7 reduces (or can be reduced) to the idea that you should shut up if you are not attempting to state either an atomic fact, or a fact constructed from atomic facts, because that's all that you can do with language. But where does that leave the propositions of the Tractatus? They are not statements to the effect that some specific atomic fact obtains. They also do not look like statements to the effect that some fact constructed from atomic facts obtains.

The later Wittgensteinian stuff does not deny that language is sometimes used in that picturing way, but it allows for other uses as well (perhaps the very use it is being put to in the Tractatus?)

(small edit - I forgot about tautologies in the Tractatus - not sure whether it is relevant, but they are allowed in language, but do not state facts.)

MetaphysicsNow

↪Posty McPostface

Kant had to invoke the metaphysical. Wittgenstein got by with doing without it.

Not sure about that: "reality is the totality of facts not of things" - that sounds like a metaphysical claim to me.

MetaphysicsNow

↪Πετροκότσυφας

I think I'd read a couple of papers in which the authors tried to distinguish between those and others that were really meant as nonsense. What do you think?

I might just do that - in any case I've been thinking about rereading PI and TLP for a while now (since I joined the forum in fact, and saw Wittgenstein's name bandied and battled about a fair bit). Do you happen to have any specific papers in mind?

Shawn

OK, but in the Tractatus he had a very restricted view of what language is (at least that is one interpretation of it). — MetaphysicsNow

I feel as though the Tractatus was not making a distinction between the self and language. They are one and the same thing, according to Wittgenstein in the TLP. But, that's clearly not the case, since whereof one cannot speak, thereof things must be shown, according to the Investigations.

All facts are built up from atomic facts, and the logical relations between propositions mirror the ontological relations between facts. — MetaphysicsNow

Yes, in logical space. See? No meta-physicality there.

With that in mind, proposition 7 reduces (or can be reduced) to the idea that you should shut up if you are not attempting to state either an atomic fact, or a fact constructed from atomic facts, because that's all that you can do with language. But where does that leave the propositions of the Tractatus? — MetaphysicsNow

Where does that leave the propositions of the Tractatus? Well, for one it leaves us at the very limits of our own world, and with that in a better understanding of it.

They are not statements to the effect that some specific atomic fact obtains. They also do not look like statements to the effect that some fact constructed from atomic facts obtains. — MetaphysicsNow

No, they are (as you said) about ontological/logical relations between facts in logical space.

Moliere

The TLP almost reads like a lament to me. I agree with your reading in that it is a treatise on ethics, primarily, and logic secondarily -- there are only a few hints that the treatise is about ethics, mainly when he's talking about the mystical or when a man sees the world right. It's like Wittgenstein wanted to find meaningful ethical content in philosophy but thought that it was impossible, and in fact could only be found outside of philosophy. So the very draw of philosophy ends itself by proving that philosphy cannot settle or expound upon the ethical life, and if one is logical, one should actually believe that ethical statements are not strictly meaningful.

So the 7th proposition, as an ending, reads to me like all the previous explorations of truth, logic, facts, and world are not worth speaking of. We have "climbed the ladder", and now may throw it away.

Shawn

Not sure about that: "reality is the totality of facts not of things" - that sounds like a metaphysical claim to me. — MetaphysicsNow

If I assert that facts are observer independent, then that deflates the meta-physicality on the issue. The Tractatus is a solipsistic work though, so that conclusion is warranted on face value.

MetaphysicsNow

↪Πετροκότσυφας

Thanks very much.

MetaphysicsNow

↪Posty McPostface

Not sure I'm following you - but in any case you've whetted my appetite for rereading TLP and PI , so thanks for that, and I may be back with more later.

Shawn

↪MetaphysicsNow

Here you go:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1648/are-facts-observer-dependent/p1

Take it for what's it worth. Just some ramblings on my part, nothing fully coherent and clear. At least not yet.

On the seventh proposition of the Tractatus.

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