I'm saying, in the case of the masochist, what you are calling "bodily pain" does not involve "ethical pain." Their body might hurt, but they do not expeirnce the ethical pain (which is just as much of the physical) that many other people would. Rather, they feel ethical joy at being subjected to this "bodily pain." — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm still not getting this distinction. What and where is "ethical pain/pleasure?"

Ethical pain/pleasure. It's its own state.

The hurt/joy we experience upon encountering a world which as it ought not/ought to be.

I'm afraid it's still a muddle to me. Thanks for trying at least.

But notice the binary you set up. I can understand the general claim that, under nihilism, nothing can matter except to the individual, but this need not entail that what matters to the individual is pain or pleasure. One can act out of self interest without acting in the interest of obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain, it seems to me. Then again, perhaps this is impossible. I'm not sure.

Maybe a good question to ask is whether egoism is the same as hedonism. — Thorongil

The idea I am proposing is that what matters to the individual on the most basic animal level is the avoidance of pain and the seeking of pleasure. Anything that is of interest to the individual beyond that is of interest either because it leads to a pleasurable feeling or avoids a painful feeling (however attenuated away from simple physical sensations those feelings might be, for example it might be the self-satisfaction of obtaining a doctorate or making millions or the pain felt while watching your house burn with all your worldly possessions, or seeing a loved one slowly become ever more fragile as a result of a debilitating terminal illness).

But the salient point is that what makes those more elaborated pursuits and situations joyous or sorrowful must be the acceptance of values which embody some conception of what is beautiful, true or good, or on the other hand, what is ugly, false and evil; values which are well outside of the simplistic animal ambit of 'pleasure/pain'.

So, for example, the masochist may enjoy pain because he feels that he is somehow unacceptable, not good enough, deserving of punishment and so on. And that desire to punish the self because of its unworthiness may become connected with sexual desire.

As the popular Divinyl's song would have it: "It's a fine line between pleasure and pain".

If I have understood, then that is just what Willow means by "ethical pain/ pleasure":

The hurt/joy we experience upon encountering a world which as it ought not/ought to be. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think egoism is always coterminous with hedonism, unless you broaden the latter term to cover all self-interested pursuits whatsoever.

I'm not talking about hedonism or egoism (there are strong arguments both are functionally incoherent as ethical systems) at all. Someone is not acting or immoral/moral because the experience pain/pleasure. Rather, these are feelings which occur in responding to the world around us.

The immoral/moral world is not immoral/moral because it painful/pleasurable. It's painful/pleasurable because it's immoral/moral. A question not of what is morally sought after or how ethics are justified, but how we are affected.

A masochist does not necessarily need think they need to be punished. Some might, the ethical victory of delivering oneself just punishment is certainly ethical pleasurable. But others just happen to feel pleasure at certain instances of pain. That is beautiful enough on it's own to give to some people ethical pleasure.

I would certainly agree that egoism and hedonism are functionally inadequate if not incoherent. But in any case the little I said regarding a possible connection between them was not addressed to anything you had said.

So, I certainly would not wish to say that people should be said to be acting morally or immorally on the basis of whether they are experiencing pleasure or pain. I don't want to say that morality/ immorality is contingent upon pleasure/pain, in other words. The whole point of the OP implies a movement away from any such idea, as far as I can see. If this idea follows from anything I have said then I will be pleased to be corrected.

Now, the obverse idea that things are painful/pleasurable insofar as they are moral/ immoral I am more sympathetic with; although I certainly don't agree that this formulation is universally true. Many simple things which are pleasurable or painful are simply morally neutral, as far as I can tell.

Also, in regard to masochists, I didn't say they must think they need to be punished, I said the masochist may enjoy pain because he feels that he should be punished. The Divinyl's quote that I endorsed also implies that pain shades into pleasure, regardless of any considerations about morality or psychologically based desires to be punished, so of course I will agree that

others just happen to feel pleasure at certain instances of pain — TheWillowOfDarkness

The idea I am proposing is that what matters to the individual on the most basic animal level is the avoidance of pain and the seeking of pleasure. Anything that is of interest to the individual beyond that is of interest either because it leads to a pleasurable feeling or avoids a painful feeling — John

I suppose I get this. We're still talking about what the nihilist is committed to, right?

But the salient point is that what makes those more elaborated pursuits and situations joyous or sorrowful must be the acceptance of values which embody some conception of what is beautiful, true or good, or on the other hand, what is ugly, false and evil; values which are well outside of the simplistic animal ambit of 'pleasure/pain'. — John

And this is a problem for the nihilist, as you see it, correct?

I might question what you mean by nihilism. Ethical nihilists deny meaning to moral terms. Someone who assigns meaning to moral terms, but does not consider there to be any such thing as intrinsic moral worth, need not be a nihilist.

I suppose I get this. We're still talking about what the nihilist is committed to, right? — Thorongil

Yes, exactly.

And this is a problem for the nihilist, as you see it, correct?

I might question what you mean by nihilism. Ethical nihilists deny meaning to moral terms. Someone who assigns meaning to moral terms, but does not consider there to be any such thing as intrinsic moral worth, need not be a nihilist. — Thorongil

Yes, the problem for the nihilist is that, because of her rejection of any objective values of truth, beauty and goodness, she has no way of explaining why pursuits or situations where the joy or suffering involved in them is well beyond mere sensory pleasure and pain, should be joyful or sorrowful.

Now she might say that while there are no objective values there are subjective values, but the problem with this is that if we genuinely believed values were merely subjective, then they would be seen as utterly arbitrary and would have no power to compel, or even persuade, us to adhere to them. So, we must be committed to the belief that values are objective in order to take them seriously at all. Therefore we are logically committed to the belief that there objective values, even if we are unable to say precisely what their objectivity consists in.

So, if an ethical nihilist denies there is any meaning to moral terms, are they not merely denying that there is any objective meaning; and would this not be the same as to say that they are inconsistently denying there are any objective values? If so, then I say their denial is inconsistent, because they are recommending that we should believe as they do, which is implicitly to claim that there is some normative (i.e. objective) value that should compel our adherence; at least in this instance.

On the other hand if someone "assigns meaning to moral terms" is this not to acknowledge that there are objective meanings as opposed to merely subjective meanings, since otherwise their position would be indistinguishable from the "ethical nihilist's"? If so, then it would seem to be inconsistent for them to claim that there is no such thing as "intrinsic moral worth".

Along similar lines to what some others have expressed. If the nihilist only values pleasure and pain, then how does he value them (which goes to John's 1st post), if he says pain is bad and pleasure is good, then aren't they assigning ethical categories to what are essentially natural responses.

Perhaps the nihilist would say, I too live in the same world, speak the same language, but I choose to be ruled by the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure...I call these good and bad as experiential categories. As a nihilist I do not accept any non-experiential categories, beyond what is pleasurable or painful. Value for the nihilist seems to be more like instinctive attraction/repulsion, attracted to the pleasant and repulsed from the painful, not essentially a cognitive reaction. The fact that these categories pleasure/good, pain/bad can be applied to more complex behaviors does not detract from their origins.

My question concerns the quantification of pleasure and pain. Are pains and pleasures additive, accumulative in some manner, or is this some sort of temporal bias. Is a life that is 80% pleasurable better (quantitatively) than a life that is 50% pleasurable? Suppose the life that is 80% more pleasurable only lasts 20 years and the one that is 50% pleasurable lasts 80 years. I suppose a similar approach is possible if the nihilist say that pleasures and pains are qualitative.

So, if an ethical nihilist denies there is any meaning to moral terms, are they not merely denying that there is any objective meaning; and would this not be the same as to say that they are inconsistently denying there are any objective values? — John

It seems to me that in denying meaning to moral terms, they deny it in an objective and subjective sense. Hedonism, as an ethical position that does think moral terms are meaningful (in a subjective sense), would be something the nihilist would deny. So I think your target is actually hedonism, not nihilism.

On the other hand, if moral nihilism is the view that rejects "intrinsic" value, but not necessarily the meaning of moral terms, then would this be the same as what you mean by "objective?" If so, one could deny that there is intrinsic moral worth and yet still hold to moral objectivity. The latter would be to claim, so far as I am aware, that ethical statements are not relative. If X is wrong, then it is wrong everywhere and for all time. I think one could hold to this and yet claim that there is no intrinsic moral worth, for the word "intrinsic" points to something that ought to be pursued for its own sake. Moral objectivism is thus a metaethical position, whereas the notion of intrinsic value applies to normative ethics.

Nihilism and hedonism are typically incompatible, not synonymous.

Yes, if the nihilist truly believed there were no inherent values at all ( including pleasure and pain) then he or she would say that life is simply neutral. But it is mostly impossible to be genuinely indifferent to pleasure and pain, so I think where the hedonic element necessarily comes in, even for the most ardent (sic) nihilist is that pleasure and pain, irrespective of any other considerations, are naturally imbued with value by all humans due to their incapacity to be indifferent to them and their capacity for reflection. We observe everywhere that the animal unreflectively gravitates towards the pleasant and away from the unpleasant.

So, all other values may be thought by the nihilist to be arbitrary, but our primordial concerns about pleasure and displeasure cannot genuinely be so thought. If the distress caused in the nihilist by her (for her, necessarily inculcated and hence irrational) desire that the meaningless world be somehow meaningful, causes sufficient distress to interfere with the 'normal' balance of unreflective pleasure and displeausre, then she may become an obsessive seeker of ever more extreme pleasures to fill the gnawing hole opened by her distress, or she may become a masochist in an attempt to subvert pain, or she may lose all interest in life and simply fade into states of ennui, anhedonia and/or overwhelming despair leading to suicide.

I think it is impossible to quantify pleasure and pain without assuming some value extrinsic to them, which provides the criteria used to carry out the quantification. Since all other values are relative to beliefs, worldviews or intuitions based on values other than pleasure/displeasure, then quantifications of pleasure and pain can only make sense within various ethical paradigms, and not at all in their own terms. I think the same could probably be said for any qualitative approach.

I think my response to Cavacava should clarify my position further and may answer your questions here.
I found it difficult to understand exactly what your objection here is, but just to touch on a couple of points which may make my perplexity clearer:

I don't know what it could mean to "deny meaning to moral terms in a subjective sense". Would that be to deny that people believe they mean something when they make moral statements or claims?

I don't understand how "moral nihilism" could be a position that "rejects "intrinsic" value, but not necessarily the meaning of moral terms", unless by that you mean "subjective meaning of moral terms". Are you asking here whether by intrinsic, I would mean objective? (Your next sentence seems to contradict this interpretation, though!) If so the answer is 'yes', but by intrinsic or objective I am not invoking any idea that values exist somehow 'out there in the physical world".

You say that moral objectivity claims that ethical statements are not relative, where not-being-relative is understood in terms of the formulation: "If X is wrong, then it is wrong everywhere and for all time". I don't agree with that and would say that both what is intrinsically valuable and what is objectively moral (which for me are themselves equivalent) may evolve or be otherwise context-dependent, and so would not necessarily be "everywhere and for all time". The point is that they would always be dependent on objective contexts and not arbitrary subjective opinion.

Why do you say that?

Nihilism is a position that denies the existence of something, and so if we're talking about value nihilism, it denies the existence of (at least 'objective') values. But hedonism is precisely an affirmation of the value of pleasure. Historically the two are opposed – the classical hedonists were not nihilists at all, and I don't see any compelling reason for it to go the other way either.

But that is my point: nihilism about objective values cannot be applied to the value of pleasure, because it is an objective fact that all humans (and arguably animals) value it. So, if nihilism can coherently deny all objective values except the value of pleasure, then it devolves to hedonism. The fact that nihilism may not have been historically aligned or associated with hedonism is irrelevant.

Also, one may be either an ardent hedonist; one who positively, even passionately, affirms the value of a life of pleasure-seeking, or a hedonist by default; one who resignedly resorts to mere pleasure because life can have no other value for him or her due to his or her nihilistic disposition.

That people objectively all value something isn't grounds to say that it is objectively valuable in any sense -- and even if it were, this would be a refutation of nihilism, since the existence of pleasure would make nihilism itself false.

It's also questionable whether pleasure is universally valued. There's a certain sense in which that's true, but it has to be carefully worded -- there's a sense in which the experiences creatures have are such that these experiences present pleasure as intrinsically valuable. To deny this would seem not to know what 'pleasure' means (in other words, 'pleasant' is synonymous with 'feels good,' meaning that our feelings present the pleasant as good, and must do so, or it wouldn't be pleasant). But it seems that someone could very well hold an opinion at odds with their own experiences, and deny those experiences had any grasp on the truth. Although our experiences present pleasure as valuable, we might nonetheless deny that pleasure actually is valuable, by saying our senses can't arbitrate these things. This in fact seems to me what a nihilist must say, on pain of contradiction.

In other words, pleasure is intrinsically valuable in the court of our experiences, but those experiences can always simply be denied as irrelevant, misguided or illusory. I don't think that's a smart position to take, but then, neither is nihilism.

That people objectively all value something isn't grounds to say that it is objectively valuable in any sense -- and even if it were, this would be a refutation of nihilism, since the existence of pleasure would make nihilism itself false. — The Great Whatever

I think that people all (or even almost universally) valuing something is precisely the only possible ground for claiming that something is objectively valuable.

Also, I think that the claim that there are no objective values other than the sensory pleasures of the individual would certainly qualify as one form of moral nihilism.

In other words, pleasure is intrinsically valuable in the court of our experiences, but those experiences can always simply be denied as irrelevant, misguided or illusory. I don't think that's a smart position to take, but then, neither is nihilism. — The Great Whatever

Yes, our experiences can be "denied as irrelevant, misguided or illusory", but any such denial presupposes objective values beyond pleasure/pain, and could never be a position coherently held by an avowed nihilist.
Of course, I am not arguing that nihilism is correct, or even coherent, and certainly not that it is smart.

I think that people all (or even almost universally) valuing something is precisely the only possible ground for claiming that something is objectively valuable. — John

Not at all. Just because everyone values x, doesn't mean x is valuable. They can simply all be wrong. There are plenty of things in history that nearly everyone has been in agreement about and were demonstrably wrong about.

Also, I think that the claim that there are no objective values other than the sensory pleasures of the individual would certainly qualify as one form of moral nihilism. — John

That would be a form of hedonism, which seems on its face to be incompatible with nihilism, in that the former endorses and the latter denies some sort of intrinsic value.

Yes, our experiences can be "denied as irrelevant, misguided or illusory", but any such denial presupposes objective values beyond pleasure/pain, and could never be a position coherently held by an avowed nihilist. — John

I don't see why. The experiences could be denied as relevant without supposing that some other set of values would have to take their place.

What other criteria could there be to decide that something is objectively morally right or wrong than the fact that everyone or very nearly everyone thinks that it is right or wrong?

The converse to this is where just an individual or a few individuals, usually under the influence of some arbitrary belief system, think an act or attitude is right or wrong in which case it is merely a contingent (subjective) opinion.

What other criteria could there be to decide that something is objectively morally right or wrong than the fact that everyone or very nearly everyone thinks that it is right or wrong? — John

In general, the inference scheme 'everyone thinks x' to 'x' is invalid. People having an opinion doesn't make the opinion so. If everyone believes the world is flat, it's still round.

In general, the inference scheme 'everyone thinks x' to 'x' is invalid. People having an opinion doesn't make the opinion so. If everyone believes the world is flat, it's still round. — The Great Whatever

I think John is more concerned with the method of finding truth. Or, in this case, estimating truth. I don't think he's going to deny that group agreement is fallible. It's just that group consensus is the best thing we have going for us, as well as keeping the door open for any changes.

He seems to be saying that group consensus is somehow constitutive of objective truth, not that it's an indicator of it -- of course, it isn't either of those, so I don't know why the distinction should be important. But even if it were the latter, it wouldn't be the former.

You're muddying the waters by introducing an example which obviously may be empirically tested. If I say that murder is objectively wrong because almost everyone thinks it is wrong, what empirical test could be applied but the claim that almost everyone thinks murder is wrong? What other imaginable state of affairs could possibly have any bearing on the claim?

Actually I wasn't saying that at all.

First of all, you're assuming a controversial principle of verification as if it were obvious.

Second of all, even if this held, the relevant moral fact would be the wrongness of murder, which is no more or less mysterious than any empirical fact. There is also no imaginable state of affairs that confirms or denies any 'factual' proposition (as the Skeptics have shown us), but for some reason people treat values as if they are different. This is in my opinion simply a prejudice -- empirical facts and value facts are equally inapprehensible, and it makes no sense to countenance one while being suspicious of the other, if you have any epistemological scruples at all.

Third of all, your position leads into obvious contradictions in that people can disagree, even unanimously disagree at different times, over what the relevant values are, which would mean that you'd be committed to affirming various contradictions, unless you adopt some sort of relativism about values by means of which they're constituted by whatever people (or most of people, I guess?) happen to believe at the time / place. But then this seems to conflate what people think with what is, which shows a basic misunderstanding of how belief works, that even the people who espouse the values you're looking at wouldn't agree with. That is, they would say they believe because it's so, not that it's so because they believe (and life would be quite convenient, don't you think, if we could make valuable whatever we wanted to just through consensus -- why not just all agree that whatever happens to us is valuable or good, and so solve all problems forever? Of course, because it doesn't work that way).

Finally, even if everything you said was true, this would go exactly no way to establishing that universal approval of some value does anything to establish that approval as right-headed.

I'm not assuming any "controversial principle of verification as if it obvious" I am just arguing for what I see as the only possible discursive or intersubjective justification of moral principles; that they are more or less universally believed. I think it is fair to say that the fact that ( at least almost) everyone believes in certain moral principles reflects the fact that they are in accordance with human moral intuitions.

The only possible discursive or intersubjective justification of an empirical belief is also that it is more or less universally believed.

In the case of morals the beliefs are based on moral intuition, in the empirical case on adequate observation. I am not, in either domain, arguing for infallibility, but to say, as you do that there is no difference between moral beliefs based on moral intuitions and empirical beliefs based on observations is just plain wrong. Observation is obviously subject to a different set of conditions than intuition is.

What do you think the skeptics have shown us except that our beliefs cannot be deductively certain? The certainty of empirical beliefs can only be relative, because they are contingent on observation, The certainty of moral beliefs is only as good as the intuitions they are based upon. I am not arguing for deductive certainty, so the skeptics' findings are irrelevant here.

You say that people can "disagree, even unanimously disagree at different times" over moral principles. Can you give me any examples from history of cultures wherein the people unanimously agreed that, in general, murder, rape, child torture or sexual exploitation, or even theft, dishonesty, cowardice, disloyalty or refusal to work and contribute to the life of the community were OK practices within their own culture?

I am not conflating "what people think with what is" either. In the empirical context it is obvious that what people think is what has been observed to be the case. Generally people cannot be wrong about their consensual observations such as that the sun is shining, the leaves are beginning to fall, the snows have come, it is windy today and countless other such common observations. When it comes to the flatness of the Earth, or the nature of the heavens, these are a different class of observations which may be improved upon, so that earlier observations may be contradicted by later ones. The general observation that the Earth is flat may be contradicted, but the general observation that the sun is shining cannot be contradicted unless the objective conditions change.

No analogy with this possibility of future contradictions exists in relation to the broadest moral principles regarding murder, theft, honesty and so on. But such things are ultimately determined by context; so perhaps in extremis it could be said that possibly there could be a society in which murder, theft, dishonesty, disloyalty, and unlimited sexual exploitation were universally considered to be right and just; but this would be a society based solely on the principle that might is absolutely right, and only the mightiest would want to live in such a society, so it could never be viable at all. It is actually highly implausible that even in such a necessarily short-lived 'society' any but the mightiest, the exploiters, murderers, thieves, rapists and so on, would think their behavior was just, that is morally right.

In reference to your final sentence; what could it possibly mean to say that disapproval of murder, child torture, dishonesty, cowardice and so on could be "wrong-headed"? What alternative standards could you offer to support such a contention, and on the basis of what could you justify them?

Anyway the thread seems to have moved considerably away from the OP, but that's OK; I'm all for unfettered organic evolution within discussions, as long as it doesn't move away from significant relevance, however tenuous.

I am just arguing for what I see as the only possible discursive or intersubjective justification of moral principles; that they are more or less universally believed. — John

Well, then your imagination isn't very good. I don't think this is even a plausible lay account of how these things work. Moral principles don't become true in virtue of people believing them, and by and large no one thinks they can make them true by getting everyone to believe them. Presumably, people want to believe in moral principles or values because they're right or valuable, not vice-versa, and I'm not sure how the notion of a value is coherent otherwise.

The only possible discursive or intersubjective justification of an empirical belief is also that it is more or less universally believed. — John

But that's simply false. Again, if everyone believes the earth is flat, it's still round. And a way better justification for this is, say, looking at it from a distance and seeing what shape it is, not asking everyone what shape it is. They try to believe what is true, rather than trying to make true what is believed. I mean, to even consider this plausible makes a hash of the notion of any sort of inquiry other than survey taking, and of any attempt at advancement besides opinion-changing.

Observation is obviously subject to a different set of conditions than intuition is. — John

Observations are just certain kinds of intuitions -- we have certain feelings and then draw conclusions from them. What is the difference? Those feelings don't justify anything outside of themselves.

What do you think the skeptics have shown us except that our beliefs cannot be deductively certain? The certainty of empirical beliefs can only be relative, because they are contingent on observation, The certainty of moral beliefs is only as good as the intuitions they are based upon. I am not arguing for deductive certainty, so the skeptics' findings are irrelevant here. — John

The Skeptics have shown, not that such beliefs cannot be certain, but that thus far no means has been proposed to show that any one is any more likely than any other.

Can you give me any examples from history of cultures wherein the people unanimously agreed that, in general, murder, rape, child torture or sexual exploitation, or even theft, dishonesty, cowardice, disloyalty or refusal to work and contribute to the life of the community were OK practices within their own culture? — John

First off, this doesn't matter, because what you're committed to is actually far stronger -- you must believe that no community, past, present, or future, nor any possible community, could ever hold inverse values. This is what you must say if you think consensus is somehow what is required, or definitive of, the correctness of values. What's more, you have the same problem on a smaller scale so long as any two people, ever, at any time, have any value disagreement, even within a community. So providing examples isn't necessary, since your argument is flawed in a way that makes examples irrelevant. But even if it weren't, sure, people vary widely on whether it is okay to kill infants or the old, what constitutes rape versus use of one's property, whether torture is acceptable, what counts as theft and whether it's appropriate (see, taxation), and so on. To suggest otherwise is just profoundly sheltered.

Generally people cannot be wrong about their consensual observations such as that the sun is shining, the leaves are beginning to fall, the snows have come, it is windy today and countless other such common observations. — John

Of course they can. What a bizarre claim. Suppose we discovered the sun was a visual artifact and not a real object. Then we would have been very, very wrong about it.

But such things are ultimately determined by context; — John

That's not at all clear, and in any case, this could mean any number of things.

what could it possibly mean to say that disapproval of murder, child torture, dishonesty, cowardice and so on could be "wrong-headed"? What alternative standards could you offer to support such a contention, and on the basis of what could you justify them? — John

If it turns out those things are acceptable. Every decade people decide that things that were once deemed acceptable are now unacceptable and vice-versa. These people are not, and do not see themselves as, literally changing what is right and wrong by changing their opinion, but changing their opinion in light of a new moral sensibility and so discovering or taking seriously new moral truths. This is how they think of and present their motivations, and their desire to change them makes little sense otherwise.

You're writing a lot of words but you're not saying much of any substance; so I will just respond to one of your objections for now. You say my imagination is "not very good" because I can't see any other intersubjective or discursive justification for believing that a moral principle is right than that it is almost universally believed; so back up your claim by proposing an imaginable and reasonable alternative. If you can't do that then I can't see any reason to take your objections seriously.

What about its being true?

Also, don't give me this dismissive crap. If you don't have answers, then just cop to it. All my points are targeted directly at what you say and refute your central points. It's not like anyone's going to believe you if you just claim nothing is being said.