The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions. — TheMadFool

Surely you don’t mean that? The flat earther is not holding a reasoned position.

Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them. — TheMadFool

Well, yes, the differences in views come from the different underlying assumptions.

Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes). — TheMadFool

Well I don't know about that. The project of picking axioms is intended to be done rationally, not "I like that assumption". So theory choice models come into play.

Surely you don’t mean that? The flat earther is not holding a reasoned position. — MindForged

Flat-earthers prefer to ignore the ''evidence''.

I want to clarify that it's not knowledge of the physical world I'm concerned with. What remains is what can be called the yin-yang structure of philosophy.

Well I don't know about that. The project of picking axioms is intended to be done rationally, not "I like that assumption". So theory choice models come into play. — MindForged

Axioms, by definition, have no supporting reasons. So, can't be rational.

Axioms, by definition, have no supporting reasons. So, can't be rational. — TheMadFool

If you apply a model of theory choice we very well get supporting reasons. If the axioms taken on result in a theory which introduces a bunch of ad hoc elements, isn't fruitful, is too inconsistent relative to another theory with the same results but sans-those defects, the latter theory is more rational.

Axioms can be supported with reason, just check out Penelope Maddy's "Believing the Axioms".

If you apply a model of theory choice we very well get supporting reasons. If the axioms taken on result in a theory which introduces a bunch of ad hoc elements, isn't fruitful, is too inconsistent relative to another theory with the same results but sans-those defects, the latter theory is more rational.

Axioms can be supported with reason, just check out Penelope Maddy's "Believing the Axioms". — MindForged

I see it's not as simple as I thought but I see an infinite regress in the making.

Consider theories A, B, C. Each has its own axioms. You're saying that the respective axioms must cohere with each other and that counts as reasons supporting the entire collection of axioms.

However, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. There must be a mother-theory, the beginning of all theories. It, being the first, doesn't have the luxury of such a support structure because no other theories exist alongside it.

So, this mother-theory consists of axioms that are arbitrary - preference based - and has no rationale in being chosen.

One could say that there's some kind of a feedback loop. Theory A (mother-theory) spawns theory B and that leads to theory C and so on and theory C supports B and B supports A; this chain of theories forming a kind of self-supporting structure.

In a sense it means we start off with our cameras out of focus and as time passes the focus adjusts (theories modify each other) so that we get a clearer picture of reality.

As I said, the above model mirrors physical theories, science to be specific.

I'm not talking about that. I'm referring to what people calls philosophy of life - a worldview that frames our thoughts, attitudes and practice. Worldviews are shaped by metaphysics (if I'm correct) and metaphysics is a region of space which is filled with contradictory philosophies and there is no actual process by which we may verify or disconfirm theories in it. Such a place is journeyed through only per choice; no rationale.

You're saying that the respective axioms must cohere with each other and that counts as reasons supporting the entire collection of axioms. — TheMadFool

Depending on what you mean by "cohere", no I'm not saying that. We can (and have had) theories which were contradictory (early calculus, Bohr model of the atom) but which were still the more rational theory at the time because they trumped their competition in how much they explained.

It, being the first, doesn't have the luxury of such a support structure because no other theories exist alongside it. — TheMadFool

I don't really understand this. The model of theory choice works for any kind of theory, including theories strictly about logic. Logicians essentially argue this way about their axioms, e.g. the intuitionist says to the classical logician, "My theory of logic is more rational because it makes less extravagant assumptions and is computationally useful."

This way of justifying theories does not depend on any particular axioms because it has basically universal support (everyone from logicians to sociologists essentially makes reference to such theories being made better or worse on these grounds), the only difference being how highly respective parties rate particular theoretical virtues and how they conceive of them.

metaphysics is a region of space which is filled with contradictory philosophies and there is no actual process by which we may verify or disconfirm theories in it. Such a place is journeyed through only per choice; no rationale. — TheMadFool

No, metaphysical theories rest on logical theories (for various reasons) and both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are.

If I understand you correctly, you seem to be asserting that axioms aren't arbitrary as I'm claiming.

I agree with you to the degree that axioms need to lead to systems that explain our world as best as possible. Ergo axioms not arbitrary.

Even logically, axioms shouldn't lead to contradictions.

It seems there are checks on our axioms and the systems they spawn.

But what of the yin-yang structure of reality? We all know duality is an essential feature of our world. Light-darkness, good-bad, etc. This pattern of opposites also extend into philosophy: theism-atheism, materialism-spiritualism, etc. It is in this region of philosophy where preference may play a greater role. For instance there's not much that can be said of God's existence or non-existence. God is a rational dead end. Other philosophical entities too are of such form. In such cases isn't it personal preference, not rationale, that swings our vote?

Emotions (from whence comes preference) are the mainspring of the mind. It isn't that "we think with the limbic system" rather, some thoughts are pleasing, and some are not. Which thoughts will be entertained most enthusiastically? The ones which please us.

I don't want to make it too simple -- the limbic system is shaped by experiences too, and prior thought, just as the cognitive systems are.

Who was it who said ''man can do what he wants but not not want what he wants''?

I think of the mind as a network and information flows in all directions. So, while the limbic system is the origin of our impulses, I believe reason also informs our emotions. If this were not so, morality would not exist. Morality, religion are about controlling our basic instincts and while how much of this has been achieved is debatable the fact remains that we're trying to rein them in.

Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes). — TheMadFool

That is simple relativism. The problem that presents itself in today's culture, is that the only arbiter of reality is science - but science doesn't deal with questions of value. I suppose the conservative view is that there really are moral standards, and that humans can either observe them, or not, and then face the consequences. But the libertarian view is that every individual is the sole arbiter of what is correct for him/her. So I think that in effect questions about value are indeed regarded as private or subjective or a matter of individual choice, as the alternative seems to be some form of coercive ethics.

This is the 'is-ought' problem in a nutshell that was identified by Hume, and which is still an outstanding problem in ethical philosophy. So - one form of that view is called the 'boo-hurrah theory'. It basically says, as you are more or less saying, that our choices are driven by what we don't (boo!) or do (hurrah!) like. And it's a very influential undercurrent.

I suppose, having written that, I've mostly addressed it in terms of ethical theory, but I think it also illustrates the general point.

:smile: :up:

By the way - that was Schopenhauer’s quote - and I know exactly what he means. But then so did Paul. :wink:

Even logically, axioms shouldn't lead to contradictions. — TheMadFool

Consistency is a theoretical virtue, but it's one we do not always get the pleasure of attaining. What's interesting is that even if a contradiction pops up, one can work around it. People have inconsistent beliefs all the time, and want to get rid of that if made aware of it. But oftentimes they cannot, and so have to tolerate the inconsistency for a time.

In such cases isn't it personal preference, not rationale, that swings our vote? — TheMadFool

I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particular are not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference.

Thanks

everyone from logicians to sociologists essentially makes reference to such theories being made better or worse on these grounds — MindForged

I don't know what model of theory choice you might be referring to, but I can't think of a single exposition to which "everyone" refers. There are perfectly well respected critics of pretty much every version from Popper to Becker. Its just wishful thinking to suggest we have some universally approved means of judging the value of theories (prior to formal proofs).

the only difference being how highly respective parties rate particular theoretical virtues and how they conceive of them. — MindForged

And even if the above were the case (which I'm certain it isn't) then the weight to give to each factor would itself be axiomatic and so subject to rational choice theory, and so on.

No, metaphysical theories rest on logical theories (for various reasons) and both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are. — MindForged

Really? So the popularity of theological-based metaphysics just about the time when most people were religious, and it's subsequent waning as atheism grows is just a coincidence? The popularity of laissez-faire existentialism, round about the time of anti-consertative cultural change, again just coincidence? The rejection of the predominantly Jewish logical positivists round about the time of rising anti-semitism in Europe, Heidegger's conclusion that German is a 'special' language just as nationalism is growing in Germany, the odd prevalence of Naturalism in Australia, even the glaringly obvious fact that continental philosophy is called continental, and you're still trying to claim that philosophical theories are largely accepted or rejected on their virtues?

I believe reason also informs our emotions. — TheMadFool

It's a reciprocal relationship... feeling thinking feeling thinking experience feeling memory thinking perception thinking feeling... Then "a network and information flows in all directions". It gets complicated fast. And "we" are in that reciprocating engine, trying to make sense of it. We externalize ourselves, observe others, theorize.

So, whence come our preferences?

I don't know what model of theory choice you might be referring to, but I can't think of a single exposition to which "everyone" refers. There are perfectly well respected critics of pretty much every version from Popper to Becker. Its just wishful thinking to suggest we have some universally approved means of judging the value of theories (prior to formal proofs). — Pseudonym

You misunderstand, my point was that arguing based on theory choice is used in all fields, not that there is a single model of theory choice everyone subscribes to. In fact, the bit right after what you quoted references this:

the only difference being how highly respective parties rate particular theoretical virtues and how they conceive of them. — Me

And even if the above were the case (which I'm certain it isn't) then the weight to give to each factor would itself be axiomatic and so subject to rational choice theory, and so on.

The specific value given to each weight probably doesn't matter, all you need is to be able to give them different weights (of we have to get deep down, primitive recursive arithmetic is more or less never doubted). I already said people disagree on the particulars of this.

So the popularity of theological-based metaphysics just about the time when most people were religious, and it's subsequent waning as atheism grows is just a coincidence?
(...)
you're still trying to claim that philosophical theories are largely accepted or rejected on their virtues? — Pseudonym

Um, no. I'm talking about how to rationally pick between theories, hence why I made no claim about this playing out historically exactly according to any particular model (much more complicated). So instead of going off about it in an aggressive way, you could try a simple question, it's more civil. This can be seen above:

I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particular are not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference.

I made no claim about this playing out historically exactly according to any particular model (much more complicated). — MindForged

Really? Because....

metaphysics is a region of space which is filled with contradictory philosophies and there is no actual process by which we may verify or disconfirm theories in it. Such a place is journeyed through only per choice; no rationale. — TheMadFool


No, metaphysical theories rest on logical theories (for various reasons) and both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are. — MindForged

It's a very convoluted interpretation that has this exchange saying what you claim. Not only do you specifically make the claim that "both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are.", which is almost word for word what I argued against, but you answer MF's suggestion that they are chosen [from personal preference], rather than rationally selected, with the word "No". Now you're saying that what you really meant was "Yes, that is generally how they're chosen" and that I'm simply being uncharitable by reading 'no' to mean 'no'.

my point was that arguing based on theory choice is used in all fields, — MindForged

The arguments people use to justify their theories and the reason they chose them are not the same thing.

If you're claiming that arguing based on theory choice means that theories are selected by such rational means then you'd have to explain the trends in philosophical thought, rationality does not have a Zeitgeist.

If, however, you're claiming that regardless of how theories are actually chosen, they are defended using rational theory choice models, then your argument is a non sequitur, the OP is about how theories are chosen, not how they're defended. I very much doubt the OP was confused into thinking that philosophers actually admitted to his claim.

The specific value given to each weight probably doesn't matter, — MindForged

Yet your claim is that it is responsible for selecting one set of axioms over another. I can't think of very much that matters more in explaining the differences in fundamental philosophical lines of thought, which is what the thread is about.

It's a very convoluted interpretation that has this exchange saying what you claim. Not only do you specifically make the claim that "both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are." — Pseudonym

How is that convoluted??? People argue about their theories in this way, but that does not entail that the acceptance and historical proliferation of theories is guided in this way. As I also said, but which you seem incapable of reading, is:

I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particular are not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference. — MindForged

This conversation has a fairly narrow topic matter (the justification of axioms). Please actually read what was said instead of trying to overgeneralize. My point is that using a model of theory choice allows you to give justification to the axioms you choose (the example I gave being how intuitionists argue for their logic).

The arguments people use to justify their theories and the reason they chose them are not the same thing. — Pseudonym

Which I quite clearly said above. Again,.you simply do not read

If, however, you're claiming that regardless of how theories are actually chosen, they are defended using rational theory choice models, then your argument is a non sequitur, the OP is about how theories are chosen, not how they're defended. I very much doubt the OP was confused into thinking that philosophers actually admitted to his claim. — Pseudonym

Hmm, let's try reading the OP:

Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).

Therefore, philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences. — TheMadFool

OP is talking about whether the axioms we pick can be given rational justification, concluding that they essentially "must originate with our preferences". I articulated how they can be chosen rationally and argued that the manner used to pick theories is rather general, and can and has been used to support even fundamental positions rationally. This does not entail me claiming something about how positions gain traction/adherents in philosophy.

Yet your claim is that it is responsible for selecting one set of axioms over another. I can't think of very much that matters more in explaining the differences in fundamental philosophical lines of thought, which is what the thread is about. — Pseudonym

No, what is responsible is simply the differences in the weights you give, not their specific value. People nearly always place a higher importance on consistency than on existence of ad hoc elements, adequacy to the data is taken to be most important, etc. The values can be arbitrary so long as these relationships are established (especially since the values can be reduced anyway).

So I repeat, please actually read my posts, and actually read the OP. Tends to make one cranky to have to get this all in order when you could have just read...

How is that convoluted — MindForged

You actually said "No" in answer to the proposition that metaphysics is journeyed through by personal choice (as opposed to rational necessity). You then said directly that metaphysical theories have their worth assessed by how virtuous they are. Not, that they could be assessed this way (but actually aren't), not that people pretend to assess them this way but actually just follow the zeitgeist. It is convoluted to derive some interpretation of those propositions whereby "No, that is not how metaphysics is navigated" means "Yes, that's exactly how metaphysics is navigated (but there is another way". It is convoluted to derive an interpretation of "Metaphysical theories are assessed by their virtue" that means "Metaphysical theories are not assessed by their virtue but by their alliegence to the current culture".

Communication is generally a two way effort, has it even crossed your mind that rather than my not reading properly it might be you not writing clearly?

You actually said "No" in answer to the proposition that metaphysics is journeyed through by personal choice (as opposed to rational necessity) — Pseudonym

I stopped reading the moment you said this, because no matter how much you insist that, I can go up and quote what I said:

I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particularare not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference. — MindForged

This is a waste. You cannot seem to read, it seems trivial to show how you are misrepresenting what was said. That's very directly opposed to what you claimed I said.

A good philosophy will take into account both the thesis and antithesis, and resolve the paradox by finding a synthesis, that is, a principle that contains both thesis and antithesis, and can explain when the thesis is correct vs when the antithesis is correct.

Example:

• Thesis: negative emotions are bad because they are painful; they hurt. E.g. fear is painful and can lead health issues from lack of sleep etc.
• Antithesis: negative emotions are good because they serve to remove foolishness and allow for quick reaction. E.g. fear of a prey incites us to run away which can save us.
• Synthesis: Sometimes negative emotions are bad, and sometimes they are good for us; and we can determine this by how the emotion agrees with reason. E.g. fear of a harmless spider is bad, but fear of a harmful spider is good.

I don't think philosophy has anything to do with preference. Although preference determines one's philosophy. The lure of good philosophy is that it remains oblivious to preference and maintains truth as its objective. Preference almost always obscures truth but it is always a temporary obscurity.

Each age might well be defined more by its mass delusions than by its comprehension of truth. The future will laugh at the delusions we hold to be the truths of today. It is not a difficult thing to do, to close ones eyes and move into the mind of the future and laugh or cry at the delusions of today. To do so one need only posses a modicum of intelligence an that rarity that is the capacity for an independence of thought and an independence of preference.

I stopped reading the moment you said this — MindForged

So producing responses without reading through the whole post is an entitlement unique to you? Or is it your uniquely accurate judgement of the quality of the post which allows you to construct erudite responses based on isolated expressions where others doing so are are aggressive and uncivilised?

no matter how much you insist that, I can go up and quote what I said — MindForged

Nowhere have I made the claim that you did not say additional, perhaps even contradictory thing at some later point. I'm quoting you directly on something you actually did say. It either directly contradicts what you later said (in which case you have simply made an error somewhere), or you are making the case that theories needn't be selected by preference alone, but generally they are, which, as I said, is a non sequitur in respect of the point made on the OP.

If, in fact, what you meant to propose is some third option, I'd be interested to understand what that is, but if all you're going to do is re-quote what you wrote beforehand and claim that if I've misinterpreted it it must be my fault for not reading it properly, then you've clearly somehow missed the last 2000 years of philosophy, which has, by some understanding, just been one concerted effort to re-write Plato more clearly.

From what we know for sure, everything is either true or false. Just because something has an antithesis with good points doesn't mean it is possibly correct. Everything can be boiled down to objective science, and that is what we are doing. You must compare the choices before choosing the right one.

:up: Thank you

Not all preferences are mere preferences, sometimes people can have preferences for the truth, either something that happens to be true, or something they've reasoned to be true. One can prefer what is true, as well as what is arbitrary.

Generally, with argument, the disputants try to establish a basis of agreed axioms and facts and then the game is to discover whether one side or the other has made a logical slip on the way to their conclusions.

But sometimes the argument will reveal a deeper disagreement at the axiomatic level - at that point, people usually just agree to disagree, though sometimes arguments about axioms can result in insights and changes of mind too.

Although sometimes both can be right or wrong, often (with informed debates) one person is wrong and the other person right - but it's not always easy to figure out how and in what way, and with the really deep questions it might take decades or even centuries to figure out what's what.

I would agree to a point. However, there are theories that are supplanted by what most people would agree are better theories. One example is the earth as the center of the solar system being supplanted by the sun as the center of the solar system. Though some had their own reasons for doggedly maintaining the former view, it was ultimately supplanted by the latter. I suspect Occam's razor was at play, i.e., the simplest explanation is more likely to be the correct explanation.

And though I get what you are driving at, I am not sure "prefer" is the right word. For example, most of the people I know who doggedly adhere to one or the other view of what they consider to be a binary option (such as realism or idealism) behave as if their view is more likely than not to be correct.

And for the most part, when one theory does supplant another, it is because the new theory either resolves or dissolves significant issues that the supplanted theory was unable to resolve or dissolve.

From what we know for sure, everything is either true or false

Seriously?

Yes. We know for sure that 1+1=2. Everything has a state of yes, this is truth, and no, this is fallacy. Just because we don't know the answer yet does not mean the answer doesn't exist. Finding it requires people debating and that is the basis of philosophy and philosophy is the basis of math and science. To really believe the unknown will remain unknown is an affront to everything the human race has created. The answer is always yes or no, even in quantum physics, the answer may change upon observation, but it is always either yes or no at one given time, no matter if it fluctuates.