Name a contemporary Cartsian — frank

Searle.

And the rest of us.

We are all Cartesian.

There are some philosophical paradigms that permeate culture from top to bottom.

Cartesianism is the most recent.

Prior to that it was Aristotle.

Name a contemporary Cartsian. Most of us lean toward ontological anti-realism. An example of clarity: — frank

And he lacks clarity from sentence one. "The basic task of ontology is 'What exists?'" That is the basic task of metaphysics. The basic task of ontology is the nature of what exists.

What are the odds that clarity would be lost in the very first sentence of an article you consider to be an example of clarity.

Philosophy is so much fun. :smile:

Searle says Descartes was a disaster. I'm pretty good at imitating him saying that. Its like:

It
was
a
Dis
AAAA
ster!

Philosophy is so much fun. :smile: — Arne

I'm glad you're enjoying it. Chalmers is a model of exactness as it happens.

Most of us lean toward ontological anti-realism. An example of clarity: — frank

You can't shed the Cartesian baggage by changing the name of the school.

You can't shed the Cartesian baggage by changing the name of the school. — Arne

You're out of the know my friend. Welcome to AP.

he can describe anyone he wishes. But the notion of self identification can only go so far. It walks like a Cartesian and quacks like a Cartesian. . .

You're out of the know my friend. Welcome to AP. — frank

Left that sinking ship thirty years ago. Waved goodbye to Chalmers as I went.

Being reaches beyond the personal, not-being does not. The dreadful is the closing in. That is why the question is a reawakening of the trauma and not of the reaching beyond of birth. — unenlightened

I don't agree with first sentence tho. You said it authoritatively but I can't see why that's the case.

Our dread/anxiety must be related to us, I think, at the least, and we're in the world and probably qualify as entities. But it seems we can't have anything like a discussion about "the nothing" so that's that.

My thoughts, for what little they're worth. Our dread's right here with us, and for me it arises, like anything else about us, because we're creatures of a particular kind that are part of the world. I'd say we're the cause of our dread as such. If dread can be said to reveal, it reveals something about us alone, and if we encounter anything through dread we encounter only something about ourselves.

If I've offended anyone, I apologize.

I don't agree with first sentence tho. — csalisbury

Curious. If I were a solipsist, I would say, 'all being is personal, nothing is beyond it.'

Whenever an existential choice or commitment is made — Janus

Do you mean like when I just chose to make coffee, the possibility of tea slipped away from the personal? I'm not clear what an existential choice is as distinct from a non-existential one...

Because it seems that the no-tea is entirely personal, whereas coffee is for sharing and the aroma wafts up the stairs and wakens my lover.

To be a bit more radical, the fear of death and the fear of birth are the same.

Curious. If I were a solipsist, I would say, 'all being is personal, nothing is beyond it.' — unenlightened

Actually, that would never happen because the personal is all there is to a solipsist. So, nothing more can be said about what's 'beyond the personal'.

So, nothing more can be said about what's 'beyond the personal'. — Posty McPostface

nothing is beyond it — unenlightened

Hi Posty. What's the difference between 'nothing' and 'nothing more'?
The way my arithmetic works, 0 + 0 = 0

As an aside: I normally frown heavily on the psychologising of philosophy, but in this case exceptionally I think it is legitimate, because the philosophy is itself founded on the psychological phenomenon of dread, so my claim that its source is misidentified is pertinent.

Hey, Bob. I'm not sure. I feel as though it's the foundational difference between being a solipsist or not one.

Do you mean like when I just chose to make coffee, the possibility of tea slipped away from the personal? I'm not clear what an existential choice is as distinct from a non-existential one...

Because it seems that the no-tea is entirely personal, whereas coffee is for sharing and the aroma wafts up the stairs and wakens my lover.

To be a bit more radical, the fear of death and the fear of birth are the same. — unenlightened

I was referring to significant personal choices and commitments; but I suspect you know that and are just trying to be funny.

I can see how a significant personal commitment might be a kind of birth, in the sense of being a transformation that awakens new possibilities, as well as being a kind of death that closes off many others. Although there may be some trepidation on account of the birth of new possibilities, I think fear, or better in this context, anxiety is more likely to be occasioned by the closing down of possibilities which any commitment entails.

As to biological birth and death, in case that is what you have in mind, I can't see how fear of those could be the same since one is in the past and the other in the future.

I suppose I am saying that solipsism is the philosophy of the unborn; until the first contraction, there is no reason to distinguish self and world. The world as womb first imposes itself by crushing rejection, and birth is the death of the solipsist.

As to biological birth and death, in case that is what you have in mind, I can't see how fear of those could be the same since one is in the past and the other in the future. — Janus

Most people cannot remember their birth, and this makes what I am saying hard to relate to, but yesterday's cup of coffee is much like tomorrow's cup of coffee. The trauma of birth is the terror of annihilation - the fear is of the ending of the known, rather than of the unknown. And death is the ending of the known.

I guess when you look back to an unremembered birth it appears un-traumatic, even joyful - the opposite of death. But it is a theoretical view, not an experiential one.

Sure, but the reality of the psychological effect of birth trauma is speculative. Being an old "psychonaut" myself, I'm familiar with Stanislov Grof's work and theories and all that, but...

In any case, even if there were a subconscious memory of the past fear attending birth; that is not the same as a present conscious, or even subconscious, fear of death.

I do agree that death is the end of the known; but where the known ends, the unknown begins; so I don't see much of a significant distinction there.

If I've offended anyone, I apologize. — Ciceronianus the White

You could be right.

But two technical points and both reflect failures on my part.

First, only Dasein is "in" the world. All entities not having the characteristics of Dasein are "within" the world that Dasein is "in." I do not think that affects your views/conclusions but I do hope it enhances your understanding of Heidegger.

Second and more important to this particular discussion, I should not have used the word relate(s). Instead, I should have used the word refer(s).

Heidegger is saying that what dread refers to (unlike what fear refers to) is not "within" the world that we are "in" and therefore by definition can not be traced back to us as its source. Though I suspect he would agree that it is related to us.

Though substituting refers for relates does impact your views/conclusions, I do think refer has a more outward sense to it than does relate. And as a result, it produces a more accurate presentation of Heidegger.

I certainly do not want anyone to misunderstand Heidegger based upon what I say. And if someone disagrees with my interpretation of Heidegger, I would hope they could and would tell me why. I do not know Heidegger well enough to intentionally present any extreme interpretations of his work. I am confident that any interpretation of mine that appears as extreme is a result of a mistake on my part.

But I certainly do not expect or insist that everyone or anyone agree with Heidegger or with me.

Sure, but the reality of the psychological effect of birth trauma is speculative. — Janus

It's speculative if you have no memory, but if you have some memory, it is experiential.

where the known ends, the unknown begins; so I don't see much of a significant distinction there. — Janus

I don't think you can even say that much. Possibly something begins, possibly not. From the pov of facing annihilation, of being squeezed out of existence, the unknown, in the form of bright lights and towels and breasts and noise is way beyond imagination - to say that death is the beginning of the unknown is to pretend to a knowledge that cannot be had by definition.

But I think I'd better shut up myself now, and let Heidegger deal with his problems his own way.

Sure, but the reality of the psychological effect of birth trauma is speculative. — Janus — unenlightened

Strikes me as consistent with the nature of reality in general and with the concept of dread in particular.

As an aside: I normally frown heavily on the psychologising of philosophy, but in this case exceptionally I think it is legitimate, because the philosophy is itself founded on the psychological phenomenon of dread — unenlightened

I agree.

The invitation to psychologize is built in.

Thought you might be interested:

"This development has taken hold as philosophers trained in the analytical tradition of thought have turned to Heidegger’s philosophy, and discovered that it contains a wealth of insight into the limitations of certain traditional views of human existence, ‘mind’, the nature of language, and so on – traditional views that analytical philosophers, too, have struggled to overcome. At the same time, philosophers trained in the continental tradition have discovered that analytical philosophy is neither as sterile nor as irrelevant tothe ‘big questions’ of life as one might suppose, and that many analytical philosophers are engaged in projects that parallel Heidegger’s own efforts to rethink the nature of human existence and our place in the world. What is Heidegger’s contribution to thinking? Why, despite the challenges posed by his difficult and unconventional prose (the common picture of Heidegger was not wrong about that), is he worth our striving to understand? Heidegger did more than any other thinker of the twentieth century to develop a coherent way of thinking and talking about human existence without reducing it to a natural scientific phenomenon or treating it as a ghostly mind haunting the physical world. This has inspired artists and social scientists, who have struggled to acknowledge the dignity and freedom of human existence; it has inspired scientists who have tried to keep mindful of the limits of scientific inquiry; and it has challenged us all to rethink our place in history and the direction in which we as a scientific and technological culture are moving."

-- Mark Wrathall, How to Read Heidegger

-- Mark Wrathall, How to Read Heidegger — frank

good book.

Yep. Sean Kelly mentioned it.

Thanks for the reference.

It's speculative if you have no memory, but if you have some memory, it is experiential. — unenlightened

Assuming that your memory is accurate and is also a memory of what it purports to be of.

" where the known ends, the unknown begins; so I don't see much of a significant distinction there". — Janus

I don't think you can even say that much. Possibly something begins, possibly not. From the pov of facing annihilation, of being squeezed out of existence, the unknown, in the form of bright lights and towels and breasts and noise is way beyond imagination - to say that death is the beginning of the unknown is to pretend to a knowledge that cannot be had by definition. — unenlightened

I wasn't meaning to reify the unknown into some actuality; I was merely making the point that what is not the known is the unknown.

In talking with Frank yesterday regarding the concept of "dread", he referred a couple of times to Heidegger's essay What is Metaphysics?. Not have read the essay, I deferred. I have read it. And as always with Heidegger, it is tough going but it is worth the read.

What I find most fascinating within the context of the OP is that "nothing" is not experienced as the negation of being or as separate from being. Instead, Heidegger maintains that certain moods (such as boredom) reveal being as a whole. But of course moods are impermanent. And with the slipping away of the sense of the wholeness of being, nothing rushes in. What is Metaphysics? At 45-47.