When we talk of nothing existing, we may say that there are zero entities. Yet zero is still a description, an entity. So paradoxically, one comes before zero. There is before there is not. — darthbarracuda

Yes, parallel with the antinatalism- non-being is only seen through being. The paradox. I also wrote about the "ever vigilant existence" (not literally of course), which gets at some of what you say here:

I agree that the individuated would seem to need to come from the unindividuated. Plurality, diversity, individuality, all come from a breakage of uniformity. The basic, fundamental "theater" is a single unity. Lately, I prefer to simply call this the posteriority. There is the puppet theater, and while the illusion is that the puppets are operating on their own, we understand that there is something "behind", pulling the strings. There is the anterior appearance, and the posterior ... "whatever". — darthbarracuda

I'll be very charitable and try to digest this behemoth and get back to you. I know this is a primary source for some of your Peircean ideas, so I guess I'll learn to speak better apokrisis- learning more about the ideas does not mean consenting with it or at least everything about it, obviously.

I agree that the individuated would seem to need to come from the unindividuated. — darthbarracuda

Right. So now there is a clear direction to concentrate on. Now next steps, avoiding false moves.

The basic, fundamental "theater" is a single unity. Lately, I prefer to simply call this the posteriority. There is the puppet theater, and while the illusion is that the puppets are operating on their own, we understand that there is something "behind", pulling the strings. — darthbarracuda

OK. I see a problem here in claiming posteriority pulls the strings. I would agree that all individuation might be contextual - shaped by constraints that are outside it, behind it, more fundamental than it.

But note how much ontic furniture creeps in with all those terms. They all conjure up some kind of concrete image of a relation which is dimensional or has an already present causal direction. And there is a confusion if all of them seem equally applicable, and none is being preferred.

So we have to start distinguishing the grades of contextuality that produce individuation. That itself must become a developmental story which begins with a general lack of individuated context.

To be outside is spatial context. To be before is temporal context. To be pulling the strings is energetic context. All these must be dissolved together to get closer to posteriority as a lack of either definite individuation OR definite context.

So posteriority has to be somehow a fundamental resource or potential - where individuation~context springs from - but not itself some kind of actuality with definite dimensions of structure or material.

There is the anterior appearance, and the posterior ... "whatever". — darthbarracuda

Yep. But is the anterior the "appearance" or the actuality? Again, the words really matter as they are how ontic commitments creep into the game.

Calling the posterior the "whatever" seems pretty good. It is going to be the unspeakable or ineffable to a large degree. We can point towards it as "something" that must have been "there" - after we have dissolved away both thingness and thereness in our metaphysical acid bath.

But "appearance" is again speaking to a type of relation that ought to be in question. Yes, our actuality must have emerged via development. But it might have been its own cause of that emergence too. The appearance might be the necessary state and not an accidental result of something else.

In space-time, we can always move beyond. There is always more. But the posteriority, by its nature, cannot be finite, there cannot be anything further behind it. It is where we move to once we move beyond all else, including space-time itself. It is infinite, but dimensionless. When we talk of nothing existing, we may say that there are zero entities. Yet zero is still a description, an entity. So paradoxically, one comes before zero. There is before there is not. — darthbarracuda

Good. @wellwisher's quantum symmetry breaking is on the right track. But all quantum mechanics then has to explain why its rules would apply. As regulatory facts or laws, they would need a developmental explanation for their existence as a structuring necessity of worlds in general.

So spacetime extent and energetic content - form and matter - must be folded back into each other to arrive back at posteriority. Jumping ahead, they must have the right kind of complementary or reciprocal nature to cancel each others individuated existence away.

The problem with the quantum fluctuation which naturally splits into matter and anti-matter is that this is both true, and yet does not account for the quantum laws themselves. Time, especially, is the dimension that stands completely outside the quantum laws as a presumed fixed backdrop. That is why quantum gravity theories - which would unite spacetime and energy density - are taking the view that time needs to be incorporated into a final theory as a further emergent feature of the deal.

So, as you say, we must arrive at some kind of big fat zero as the cosmic starting point. And then as quantum cosmology suggest, there is every indication that this does happen because everything that has emerged does all seem to cancel away in the required reciprocal fashion. Spacetime extent and energy content are opposites that cancel in some absolute fashion as we run the clock back to the Planck scale.

Our Universe is composed of the two orthogonal actions of expanding and cooling. Each is the cause of the other. And wind the clock back, they do mutually annihilate to create a "quantum foam". Curvature without connection. Action without direction. Fluctuation without bounds.

Or in relativistic terms - that see this from the point of view of classical mechanisms - you have a cosmic fabric composed of matched anomalies. You have a realm of blackholes and wormholes. Again curvature without connection, or curvature which makes connecting relations impossible. Space is curved like a blackhole everywhere - due to Plank-heat energy density. And time is likewise curved into thermally-closed loops. The Planck density bends time so it cannot even have a causal direction. Every event is its own beginning in being a wormhole.

So physics - by winding known physics backwards - actually tells us some pretty concrete things about the initial conditions. We can see what posteriority looks like from established science. Although we still need a theory of quantum gravity perhaps ... if the asymptotically safe version of quantum field theory ain't already enough. Well there is dark energy also to fold into the quantum story now. We know there are more ingredients to be explained. But we are closer perhaps than many believe to a reasonable view of how everything that actually observably exists is a spacetime extent and an energetic content that cancels exactly to nothing at the beginning.

But that is not then a "nothing" in the conventional sense of an absolute absence. A zero that exists. It has to be a nothingness that is the everythingness of the absolutely unindividuated - the kind of unactualised resource that is a grand symmetry just waiting to be broken in its possible complementary directions.

Is this fundamental reality what we mean when we refer to Being? Do entities Spinozistically participate in Being as clumps of transient solids participate in a non-Newtonian liquid? — darthbarracuda

Now you are offering an image of a quantum foam or geometrodynamical fluctuations - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometrodynamics

This is good. But the danger is again seeing it as a solidity, a state of materiality. There is some stuff that fluctuates, rather than fluctuation being the form that "stuffs" - that causes material being to be individuated as a substantial fact of a world.

Does the fluid take on the appearance of those little fluctuating shapes? Or do those shaped fluctuations create the appearance of there being some underlying fluid?

Which of these two intuitions are you reading into the same picture?

I'll be very charitable and try to digest this behemoth and get back to you. — schopenhauer1

I'm pretty sure we had this whole semiotic conversation before. I would have posted the same links.

And why not drop all the posturing if you want to continue the conversation. Park your ego at the door.

...learning more about the ideas does not mean consenting with it or at least everything about it, obviously. — schopenhauer1

Why would you even feel the need to say that?

Park your ego at the door. — apokrisis

Just showing a willingness to exchange ideas, that's all. How can you, of all the posters say that, when you posture almost all the time! Ironic. Pot calling kettle black and all that.

Unreal. The posture I am calling you out on is the one where you want to act like you are doing me favours here. It is the posture you would call arrogance.

Stop being a time suck. If you want to engage in the ideas, get on with it. Drop the attitude that I need to be grateful for your favours in this regard.

I agree that the individuated would seem to need to come from the unindividuated. Plurality, diversity, individuality, all come from a breakage of uniformity. The basic, fundamental "theater" is a single unity. Lately, I prefer to simply call this the posteriority. There is the puppet theater, and while the illusion is that the puppets are operating on their own, we understand that there is something "behind", pulling the strings. There is the anterior appearance, and the posterior ... "whatever". — darthbarracuda

This is funny. The analogy seems to work with the idea of a 'posterior' (behind or backside) coming "before" the 'anterior' (the front or "appearance") (but only if you are walking backwards :rofl: :joke: ), but it is actually a reversal of the meanings of the terms. 'Anterior' should really refer to prior conditions, and "posterior' to the appearances they produce.

I had the same thought about this as well. A best of both worlds: anterior posteriority: the-before-and-behind. :smile:

Naturalism is essentially the view that there is no ontologically transcendent reality. — Janus

That's an interesting definition of naturalism. I've always thought of naturalism in terms of a lack of belief in the existence of "immaterial" entities. Would you be willing to expound a little on what you mean by "ontologically transcendent"?

I don't think your definition is really different. If the immanent is the realm of material entities, then an immaterial entity would be ontologically transcendent; part of an ontologically transcendent reality.

Naturalism would be a distinctive position, especially in the systems science, hierarchy theory and theoretical biology tradition, where nature is understood in terms of all four Aristotelian causes being regarded as both real and immanent.

So the stress would be on the developmental and self organising nature of Nature. No outside hand delivering the formal and final causes. Yet also, formal and final cause are just as real as material and efficient cause. A system has real global constraints or habits that have evolved. Local chance or creative spontaneity is real too.

This contrasts with scientific reductionism that would treat any global order as mere appearance. Complication rather than the actual cohesive thing of structure and complexity.

And it contrasts with theism or Platonism where something supernaturally dualistic is needed to provide the world with its order and purpose.

So a general loose definition would say naturalism simply asserts everything that is real results immanently from materiality. And a stricter Aristotelian definition specifies this includes the downward constraints that give nature its form and purpose.

Pfft :roll:

Ok, I can see how that makes sense.

So, do you consider yourself a naturalist?

Wow, there's a lot to digest in what you wrote! Not sure I understand it completely, to be totally honest. It sounds like you accept some of the features of an Aristotelean metaphysics (four causes) - do you also admit the Aristotelean concept of substance? If yes, to what degree or in what way?

do you also admit the Aristotelean concept of substance? — Esse Quam Videri

Yes. Hylomorphism was a good early stab at understanding Being. The problem would be that there was a lot of scholastic rewriting of what it might mean. But the systems view would take it as being essentially right, once shorn of any transcendental or supernatural aspects.

So the significant feature would be the irreducibly triadic or hierarchical complexity of substantial being.

There is monism - everything is one kind of substance or principle, whether it be ultimately mind, matter, whatever.

Then there is dualism - we always seem to wind up needing two realms or two aspects to describe substantial existence.

And then there is the systems view of causality which says there must be a three way relation that together produces substantial existence.

So the Aristotelian story would say that triad is the one of prime matter, form, and the substantial being that emergently results in the middle of that. Substance is the meat in the sandwich.

Or another way of putting it is that we have a reality that is composed of the three things of contingency, actuality and necessity.

Prime matter is pure material contingency - not yet any particular matter with a shape and hence a character, just a generalised potency for action waiting to be formed. A kind of chaotic freedom.

Then necessity is the downward acting constraints, the order or mathematical regularity that chaos cannot escape in finding some route into actual substantial being.

We have physical models of this idea from modern self-organising dissipative structure theory -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rayleigh%E2%80%93B%C3%A9nard_convection

And so between the two - pure contingency and unavoidable regularity - we have something actual, something we call substantial because it has a stability and necessity imposed on its contingency and volatility, emerging into persistent existence.

Yes, I can make no sense of the idea of the supernatural. This is not to say that I can make no sense of the eternal, though; it's just that I think the eternal is inseparable from the temporal, it is not some "separate realm".

Yes. Hylomorphism was a good early stab at understanding Being. The problem would be that there was a lot of scholastic rewriting of what it might mean. But the systems view would take it as being essentially right, once shorn of any transcendental or supernatural aspects. — apokrisis

So basically, hylemorphism without God? That's an interesting prospect, but I wonder if it works. In scholastic hylemorphism God is existence itself. How does the systems approach to hylemorphism account for existence in the absence of God?

That's very interesting. So would you say that an eternal entity is still a natural entity? Do you believe in the existence of an eternal entity? If so, do you believe that it participates in causal relations with other entities?

I’ve given the godless view quite a few time just in this thread. See the post just a few back on this page, for instance. Or on p2.

Basically I draw on CS Peirce for the broad metaphysics and a modern physical understanding of self organising systems (ie: systems science).

But anyway, to the degree that physical systems can self organise, and that this in turn is accounted for by an unavoidable mathematical logic, we have no need for any kind of god or supernatural/transcendent extras.

So if god exists, he is left with bugger all to do so far as existence is concerned. You could claim he could have made maths and logic come out differently. But there doesn’t seem any particular reason to believe that. And of course there is no evidence to suggest it. So why invoke something that makes no real causal difference?

If there were an eternal entity, then nature would be its temporal unfolding. It doesn't seem to make sense to say there could be more than one eternal entity, because differentiation is a spatio-temporal thing. Also because temporal things become eternal by having been, then the eternal must consist in the having been of everything temporal.Every event becomes eternal by passing away into the objective history of the past. From the "point of view" of eternity, though, all of the past, present and future is always already eternally present.

Spinoza understood this distinction between eternity and temporality in terms of 'substance' and its 'modes'. In his view temporal events are contingent, in the sense of being reliant for their existence on everything else and ultimately on substance, on the eternal, Whereas substance is necessary in the sense that its existence is reliant on nothing "outside itself". But in his system, looked at from another point of view, temporal events are necessary because they are the result of the absolutely necessary unfolding of God's nature. His is an absolute determinism. I take the view that indeterminism is consistent with the eternal presence of all temporal events.

For Spinoza the eternal, God, is also nature. But he distinguishes between natura naturans and natura naturata, with the former meaning something like "nature naturing' and the latter 'nature natured'. Substance, the eternal, is nature naturing and mode, the temporal, is 'nature natured', for Spinoza. Oddly enough, these categories as applied to eternity and temporality could be reversed, and make a different kind of sense. I suppose this shows that there is no real separation between the eternal entity and the temporal unfolding of nature. Hence the idea of transcendence, in any ontological sense, is rejected.

Spinoza says God is the ultimate efficient cause of everything, but I don't think this is right, because causality belongs only to temporality, not to eternity. So the temporal is not caused by the eternal, but is the other side of its "Janus face", so to speak. As Plato beautifully said; "Time is the moving image of eternity".

My apologies. I admit that I did not read the entire thread. I have gotten in the bad habit of reading threads starting from the last page, and I've never replied prior to this (I've been a lurker for about 2 years) so my etiquette may not be up to snuff.

In the scholastic hylemorphic systems god played perhaps the most important of all causal roles - namely, that of ultimate first cause or "ground of being". Scholastic systems also tended to heavily anthropomorphize this entity, being as they were developed by Christian theologians and apologists of the day. Setting aside the question of anthropomorphism, does your system posit a "necessary" component that causally grounds the entire system?

Basically the yardstick for what can be considered real according to naturalism, is what an evolved intelligence is able to detect by sense (or instruments.)

The only final cause recognised in physicalist systems is the heat death of the Universe; life only exists because it provides a more efficient means to that end. The 'second law' of thermodynamics now occupies the role formerly assigned to God. There is no conception of transcendent cause or reasons, by definition, so ultimately it is nihilist.

That's as may be (actually I think it's a strawman). But, in any case what other overarching purpose can you imagine life to have? What purpose do you think life has for the Buddhist, for example? I asked you once before and you answered that it is 'the salvation of all beings'. But what are they to be saved from? From life and death? That would make no sense; why create life and death and beings that live and die so that beings can be saved from life and death. Are there any other more sensible alternatives you can think of?

That's as may be (actually I think it's a strawman). — Janus

No, not a straw-man. The second law of thermodynamics is 'the branch of physical science that deals with the relations between heat and other forms of energy (such as mechanical, electrical, or chemical energy), and, by extension, of the relationships between all forms of energy.' If the universe is indeed physical, then that is the boundary of the domain of possibility. As I understand it, the physicalist account is that complex life forms arise as a consequence of negentropy, i.e. they are a consequence of the overall degradation of order in the universe as it tends towards a final equilibrium state of minimum (or is it maximum?) entropy (I can never remember). This happens through a natural process whereby complexity spontaneously emerges and persists in some highly localised domain for some time before eventually perishing.

What purpose do you think life has for the Buddhist, for example? — Janus

I sometimes reflect on Russell's famous essay, A Free Man's Worship:

That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins--all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.

So that is very much a statement of that period in history - early 20th century - when science had been thought to displace religious myth and notions of spiritual transcendence. But I think Mahayana Buddhists always accepted that the Universe goes through periods of creation and destruction; that everything created is impermanent is one of the fundamental dogmas of Buddhism. So the fact that 'the universe is destined to extinction' doesn't negate or even really conflict with Buddhist philosophy, as their aim is not conceived of in terms of endless existence in some physical form. Rather:

The spiritual values advocated by Buddhism are directed, not towards a new life in some higher world, but towards a state utterly transcending the world, referred to as Nirvāṇa. In making this statement, however, we must point out that Buddhist spiritual values do not draw an absolute separation between the beyond and the here and now. They have firm roots in the world itself for they aim at the highest realization of that state in this present existence. Along with such spiritual aspirations, Buddhism encourages earnest endeavor to make this world a better place to live in. 1 — Nyanoponika Thera

If there were an eternal entity, then nature would be its temporal unfolding. It doesn't seem to make sense to say there could be more than one eternal entity, because differentiation is a spatio-temporal thing. — Janus

This raises a question in my mind: would this eternal entity be inside or outside of space and time? If inside, then differentiation would be possible after all, and it opens up the possibility that there could be multiple eternal entities. If outside, then temporal unfolding would presumably not be possible.

Also because temporal things become eternal by having been, then the eternal must consist in the having been of everything temporal.Every event becomes eternal by passing away into the objective history of the past. From the "point of view" of eternity, though, all of the past, present and future is always already eternally present. — ”Janus”

This would seem to imply that there are a multitude of eternal entities – namely, every entity (event) that has ever passed away.

Spinoza says God is the ultimate efficient cause of everything, but I don't think this is right, because causality belongs only to temporality, not to eternity. So the temporal is not caused by the eternal, but is the other side of its "Janus face", so to speak. As Plato beautifully said; "Time is the moving image of eternity". — ”Janus”

I do not have a ton of familiarity with Spinoza, so what I say here may not be completely hermeneutically correct, but my understanding is that Spinoza tied causality to the principle of sufficient reason. Everything in his system requires a reason for its existence, and causes provide those reasons. Since god (substance) is the only entity in Spinoza’s metaphysics that provides its own reason for existence, it must act as the causal ground for every other entity (modes) in the system.

I will say that I find it difficult to accept many of Spinoza’s propositions. For instance, I don’t not agree with his claim that substances are causally isolated, nor do I think that the concept of efficient self-causation is coherent. These are just some of the propositions that lead him to conclude that there is only one substance, which is yet another claim that I find difficult to accept.

That said, there is an undeniable, austere beauty to the rigor and concision with which he presents his metaphysics that I greatly appreciate and admire.

Basically the yardstick for what can be considered real according to naturalism, is what an evolved intelligence is able to detect by sense (or instruments.) — Wayfarer

That sounds more like strict empiricism rather than naturalism. Consider the fact than many arch-naturalists are willing to accept the existence of (for example) abstract entities into their ontologies (e.g. Quine).

There is no conception of transcendent cause or reasons, by definition, so ultimately it is nihilist. — Wayfarer

I would agree that nihilism with regard to ultimate purpose and meaning does seem to one of naturalism's more unsavory (in my opinion) implications.

so my etiquette may not be up to snuff. — Esse Quam Videri

I wouldn’t worry about that.

Setting aside the question of anthropomorphism, does your system posit a "necessary" component that causally grounds the entire system? — Esse Quam Videri

The part played by a prime mover would be the thermodynamic imperative or least action principle.

Modern physics tells us that the finality guiding the Cosmos is a general imperative towards a flat and even balance - a Heat Death. So we can discern in that end the goal that grounds the existence of the Universe.

So the hylomorphic story speaks to some generalised motion that turns the heavens. But now it is about the slithering down an entropy gradient in the most direct way feasible.

This won’t make sense unless you are familiar with the physics of course. But yes, I am saying that there has to be some form of telos in play for existence to be called into being in an immanent fashion.

The only final cause recognised in physicalist systems is the heat death of the Universe; life only exists because it provides a more efficient means to that end. — Wayfarer

That's as may be (actually I think it's a strawman). — Janus

Not:

Modern physics tells us that the finality guiding the Cosmos is a general imperative towards a flat and even balance - a Heat Death. So we can discern in that end the goal that grounds the existence of the Universe. — apokrisis

Basically the yardstick for what can be considered real according to naturalism, is what an evolved intelligence is able to detect by sense (or instruments.)
— Wayfarer

That sounds more like strict empiricism rather than naturalism. Consider the fact than many arch-naturalists are willing to accept the existence of (for example) abstract entities into their ontologies (e.g. Quine). — Esse Quam Videri

But, Quine and his ilk are not representative, in that they’re philosophers, and are sufficiently educated to realise the difficulties inherent in abandoning realism with respect to abstractions. But as a rule of thumb, most nowadays believe that the human intelligence is an evolved adaptation, and that therefore the basic explanation for it is - and can only be - biological in nature.

What is often meant by ‘scientific rationalism’ in philosophy, is that there be evidence of the kind that satisfies the requirements of empiricism. And ‘the requirements of empiricism’ generally turn out to be that you can generate reproducible, quantitative data concerning a testable proposition which can be detected by the senses or their instruments. So what is rational actually turns out to be what is tangible [unless it is something unavoidably implied by mathematical physics, such as dark matter or parallel universes. In which case, even though it’s not tangible, it still apparently carries the imprimatur of scientific rationalism.]

There’s a critique of this attitude that I have recently been reading, Jacques Maritain’s essay on the cultural impact of empiricism, where he says that:

as a philosophical conception, empiricism means a theory according to which there is no distinction of nature, but only of degree, between the senses and the intellect. As a result, human knowledge is simply sense-knowledge (or animal knowledge) more evolved and elaborated than in other mammals. And not only is human knowledge entirely encompassed in, and limited to, sense-experience ...; but to produce its achievements in the sphere of sense-experience human knowledge uses no other specific forces and means than the forces and means which are at play in sense-knowledge.

Now if it is true that reason differs specifically from senses, the paradox with which we are confronted is that Empiricism, in actual fact, uses reason while denying the power of reason, on the basis of a theory that reduces reason's knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to sense knowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals.

Hence, first, an inevitable confusion and inconsistency between what an Empiricist does -- he thinks as a man, he uses reason, a power superior in nature to senses -- and what he says -- he denies this very specificity of reason.

This point is basically the same as that which underlies the ‘argument from reason’ - which is that reason itself is a faculty for which there is not a physicalist or naturalist explanation. This is because reason is founded on the capacity to abstract and compare which is intrinsic to language and rational inference, and which capacities are therefore logically prior to the very empirical disciplines that depend on them. As Leon Wiesleltier said in his review of Dennett’s ‘Breaking the Spell’:

the reason [Dennett] imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.

However, I contend that this is what it does, and that it does it by methodically denying the very faculty after which our species is named.

No, not a straw-man. — Wayfarer

Not:

Modern physics tells us that the finality guiding the Cosmos is a general imperative towards a flat and even balance - a Heat Death. So we can discern in that end the goal that grounds the existence of the Universe. — Wayfarer

I meant that it was a strawman for two reasons: firstly, not because it is not the case that some physicalists (such as @apo) might understand entropy to be a kind of ultimate telos, but because the implication in your statement seemed to be that on account of that physicalism is an untenable position,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but your position seems to be that since entropy is the only possible overarching general characteristic of physical reality (a claim that itself might be disputed, but let's leave that aside) which could count as a meaning for the existence of life, then it is an impoverished view and should be rejected. I then asked you to provide an example of an overarching meaning for life from any other metaphysical system, Buddhism for example, which you failed to do. I challenge you to give me any sensible and self-consistent statement at all about what could be the overarching purpose or meaning of life.

The other sense it which it is a strawman is that there are, under any metaphysical assumptions you care to make; countless final causes (although not "ultimate" ones). A final cause is, to use Heideggerian language, a "for the sake of which", and human life is replete with them. This is also why I disagree with your idea that the lack of an ultimate purpose to life constitutes nihilism. On the contrary, i agree with Nietzsche that the demand for such an ultimate purpose is what leads to nihilism. Such a demand leads to the devaluation of human purposes, which is nihilism. And the authoritarian imposition of any supposed ultimate purpose on a society leads to the annihilation of the value that any merely human purposes have in and for themselves, which again, is nihilism.