How do you reconcile the above notion with a solipsistic entity, which I have come to understand that we are to some degree?

For example, you can assert that "god" is the ultimate solipsist or the 'wavefunction' here; but, then that would be redundant if we too were in some sense solipsists also partaking in his wavefunctional dream...

The problem with these kinds of claims is that they take a tautology - the fact that the results of measurement cannot occur with without acts of measurement - and try and wring from it a substantive claim that does not follow: that as a result, the universe itself is existentially dependent upon those acts of measurement.

Or put otherwise, it is simply trivially true that the experimenter cannot be separated from the experiment: and this speaks to the nature of experiments (as conducted by human/other experimenters) and not, as it were, the universe itself. So one needs to be very careful about how to treat these kinds of claims. It is undeniably true that the observer is always part of the picture - insofar as it is only ever a picture.

Or put yet otherwise, because this is a hard point to grasp: the relation between measurement and universe is absolutely asymmetrical. Of course any measurement of the universe will depend on the fact of it being so measured: that is what it means to be part of the universe. But it does not follow that the universe depends, 'existentially', on measurement. But this attempt to wring a substantive from a tautology is just the kind straightforward logical fallacy committed by quantum-woo charlatans day after day.

It is true that this does require a reevaluation of what 'objectivity' means: measurement isn't just about attaining a POV 'from nowhere'. It is always a kind of POV 'from somewhere'. But this speaks to the enterprise of measurement itself, and not anything else.

StreetlightX — StreetlightX

This is true so far as it goes, but there is a lurking problem: there are parts of the universe that are dependent ontologically on the act of measurement. But then, these are precisely the things that are likely to be involved in what's gleaned from the measurement itself.

In other words, if you take seriously the idea that measurements only reveal things qua measured, and there's no reason to think that it's possible to measure things qua things as they are independent of or prior to measurement, then you immediately end up in Kantianism.

How, then, do we know what effect the measurement has? Presumably, we measure this too...and so on ad infinitum.

The worry therefore is not as trivial as you make it out to be.

Beats me, Posty. There’s a lot of physics heavyweights who don’t know what to make of it.

I think you misunderstand the significance of the ‘measurement problem’ and what has come out of it. The point is, it came to light precisely in the attempt to measure and understand the ostensible ‘fundamental building blocks of the Universe’. What it seems to do is undermine the presumption of the mind- independent nature of the objects of physics - the very ‘principle of objectivity’, as the article says. It’s a big deal. This implication is what made Albert Einstein so uncomfortable about it - it is why he famously asked the question ‘does the moon continue to exist when we’re not looking at it?’ Whereas Bohr and Heisenberg were not nearly so bound to a realist attitude - hence their so-called ‘Copenhagen interpretation’.

If it were only saying what think it is, then indeed it would be ‘trivially true’ - but it’s not.

Here is an easily digestible illustration of the problem:

In other words, if you take seriously the idea that measurements only reveal things qua measured, and there's no reason to think that it's possible to measure things qua things as they are independent of or prior to measurement, then you immediately end up in Kantianism. — Snakes Alive

But this would only be the case if you ignore the specificity of the experiments involved. The cool thing that QM teaches us is that measurement is just another kind of physical interaction. It places us on the same footing as everything else in the universe. That's just what it means to say that 'we are part of what we are trying to measure'. The whole import of QM is that it demolishes any pretence to human exclusivity - we don't stand apart from the world, we are already of it. There's no need to try and attempt to 'get outside' because one is 'already inside', if I may put it that way. This in turn bars any Kantian interpretation of QM, insofar as it denies any attempt to make of us exceptions to the rule.

’. What it seems to do is undermine the presumption of the mind- independent nature of the objects of physics — Wayfarer

Thanks for not addressing my point, charlatan. Now is about the time you post a coat-of-arms picture I believe, or whatever other detritus you usually spew in lieu of argument.

There's no need to try and attempt to 'get outside' because one is 'already inside', if I may put it that way. — StreetlightX

I'm sorry, I don't see how this addresses my post. Can you explain?

Measurement = physical interaction = not exclusive to humans = no Kantianism.

↪Snakes Alive Measurement = physical interaction = not exclusive to humans = no Kantianism. — StreetlightX

We seem to be talking past each other. I don't understand what this has to do with my post.

In other words, if you take seriously the idea that measurements only reveal things qua measured, and there's no reason to think that it's possible to measure things qua things as they are independent of or prior to measurement, then you immediately end up in Kantianism. — Snakes Alive

?

? — StreetlightX

The comic is a more intuitive explanation of what I was talking about. I didn't say anything about measurement not being physical, exclusive to humans, etc.

The point is just that many things in the world are unquestionably dependent on measurement, no matter what your view of it is. Those things include the very things we're interested in as data when conducting expriements – say, impressions produced on our sense organs and so on.

Thus, we only ever measure things as they are while being measured. To the extent that what is recorded is an artifact of the measurement, we are not recording what the thing is independent of that measurement. This is a problem because we have no way of 'subtracting' the effect of the measurement except via more measurement.

This becomes especially odd when we consider that, say, even in looking at things, the info we get is from visual stimulus, the entirety of which is dependent on the 'measurement' – no measurement, no visual stimulus. Thus, so the classical problem goes, when we see something we indeed see it (and perhaps not an illusion), but what we see about it is how it hits our eyes, and so learn nothing about what it is as apart from that interaction with our eyes.

we are not recording what the thing is independent of that measuremen — Snakes Alive

What is this 'the thing' 'independent of that measurement'? It's like asking 'what does red look like in the absence of light?': it's not that it looks other than it does in light, it's that the question is wrong. It misunderstands what it means to be red, which is just to look like that in the presence of light. That doesn't make it an 'artefact': good measurements really do capture something of what is so measured: red 'really does' look like that. But: 'what does it look like in the absence of a look?' - this is just a badly formed question, leading to false puzzles.

It misunderstands what it means to be red, which is just to look like that in the presence of light. — StreetlightX

Very well – but if you say all properties of the thing we're interested in are relative to the measurement in this way (what it is to have that property just is to look a certain way under certain conditions), then this collapses into Kantianism. We deal with phenomena, and we learn about things only that they look certain ways to us.

But: 'what does it look like in the absence of a look?' - this is just a badly formed question, leading to false puzzles. — StreetlightX

This is not what I said, though.

Very well – but if you say all properties of the thing we're interested in are relative to the measurement in this way (what it is to have that property just is to look a certain way under certain conditions), then this collapses into Kantianism. We deal with phenomena, and we learn about things only that they look certain ways to us. — Snakes Alive

But what is the status of 'us'? You're treating 'us' as an exception that is somehow different from 'everything else'; but this is just what is unwarranted.

But what is the status of 'us'? — StreetlightX

"Us" would be whoever's measuring.

You're treating 'us' as an exception that is somehow different from 'everything else'; but this is just what is unwarranted. — StreetlightX

How am I doing this?

How am I doing this? — Snakes Alive

By assuming this entails Kantianism.

"Us" would be whoever's measuring. — Snakes Alive

And what is measuring? A: A physical interaction.

The notion of a completely objective reality is the bedrock principle of science

This sounds like the sort of thing Stephen Hawking would say, and it is wishful thinking on the part of people that would like to co-opt science in their evangelical quest to spread reductive materialism.

But science will not be co-opted.

The claim is belied by the rest of the post, in which four scientists: Planck, Bohr, Fuchs and Schack - two of them in the veritable pantheon of physicists - disagree with it. We could add Heisenberg and Bohm to that for a start.

In no sense at all is that notion of objectivity a bedrock of science. Science is silent on that topic. That people like Hawking claim it is a bedrock does not make it so. It may be a bedrock of scientism, but it is certainly not a bedrock of science.

By assuming this entails Kantianism. — StreetlightX

I don't follow. Can you explain?

And what is measuring? A: A physical interaction. — StreetlightX

I don't understand. I never denied this, and I don't see why it's relevant.

The claim is belied by the rest of the post, in which four scientists: Planck, Bohr, Fuchs and Schack - two of them in the veritable pantheon of physicists - disagree with it. We could add Heisenberg and Bohm to that for a start. — andrewk

What about Einstein, though? He was rather the odd man out in this respect, don’t you think?

But if you say all properties of the thing we're interested in are relative to the measurement in this way (what it is to have that property just is to look a certain way under certain conditions), then this collapses into Kantianism — Snakes Alive

Consider modifying this bold bit to something like: 'what it is to have that property is just to be interacted with in a certain way under certain conditions". Is this a Kantianism? But there are no noumena here: the idea is that all properties are relational in this way: any interaction whatsoever will yield a 'result' appropriate to that interaction. There's only a Kantianism if one tries to substaintialize an 'object' apart from these interactions (like a 'red' without the conditions of 'red': a nonsense). There's nothing special about measurement. If there were no measurement, the universe would still be there, quite independent of it, insofar as measurement is just a subclass of physical interactions, which take place all the time, everywhere. The charge of Kantianism only holds if measurement is not understood to belong to the larger class of physical interactions - that is, if you exceptionalize measurement. But this is just what the QM shows to be false: we are no different to anything else in the universe.

Consider modifying this bold bit to something like: 'what it is to have that property is just to be interacted with in a certain way under certain conditions". Is this a Kantianism? But there are no noumena here: the idea is that all properties are relational in this way: any interaction whatsoever will yield a 'result' appropriate to that interaction. There's only a Kantianism if one tries to substaintialize an 'object' apart from these interactions (like a 'red' without the conditions of 'red': a nonsense). There's nothing special about measurement. If there were no measurement, the universe would still be there, quite independent of it, insofar as measurement is just a subclass of physical interactions, which take place all the time, everywhere. The charge of Kantianism only holds if measurement is not understood to belong to the larger class of physical interactions - that is, if you exceptionalize measurement. But this is just what the QM shows to be false: we are no different to anything else in the universe. — StreetlightX

Would it help if the label "Kantianism" were dropped?

We are still left, on your purported solution, with the inability to ascertain any properties except those that are in relation to the measurer.

That all properties are relational, if they are, doesn't seem to help. When we seek knowledge of things, we don't generally think of ourselves as just reporting how the measured thing affects the measurement apparatus (ultimately, us). But your out seems to be exactly what a hardcore correlationist or idealist would accept: that the only properties we can possibly measure, are those that are artifacts of the measurement.

Whether the universe "is" independent of this is also irrelevant, because those things that "are" independent of the measurement are precisely what the act of measurement locks us out of ascertaining.

if one tries to substaintialize an 'object' apart from these interactions (like a 'red' without the conditions of 'red': a nonsense). — StreetlightX

Or, put another way: what is this, but an admission of what you tried to deny? You warn: do not substantialize the object outside of the interaction of measurement! But that seems to be the point of the OP.

Also, note that you deny the noumenon while affirming it: the universe is, you say, outside of our measuring it, but all we ascertain in measurement are our interactions with it!

If there were no measurement, the universe would still be there — StreetlightX

‘The measurement problem’ is called ‘a problem’ precisely because this is what it calls into question. It sounds preposterious; just the kind of thing a charlatan would say.

When we seek knowledge of things, we don't generally think of ourselves as just reporting how the measured thing affects the measurement apparatus — Snakes Alive

This 'just' here is doing a lot of work, and it hides over an equivocation: a measurement on its own doesn't really yield any knowledge whatsoever; a measurement is nothing other than a motivated physical interaction - and it's the motivation that matters. One observes particle decay in the ATLAS detector: what is its significance? Well, you need to place that observation within a theoretical framework in which it has a place (even if that place is, at it were, 'out of place' - perhaps this means you need a new theory, etc). But measurement qua measurement is just setting things up to bump into each other in a certain way. Ideally this bumping tells you something about the phenomena, if you know what you're looking for: if it bumps in this way and not that, it means...; otherwise, it means...; significance is never given in the mere observation itself.

the universe is, you say, outside of our measuring it, but all we ascertain in measurement are our interactions with it! — Snakes Alive

But this is a false dichotomy through and through. All we ascertain in measurement are our interactions with it, yes, but who gives a fuck about us? Why are we the 'measure or measure', as it were? It's only by elevating measurement itself into a transcendental principle of 'universe-constitution' that you can get the kind of idealist peddling that Wayfrer would like. But that's unwarrented, unscientific hogwash.

Ideally this bumping tells you something about the phenomena, — StreetlightX

But there's the rub: what it tells you is only that some bumping took place. In what way would this ever amount to bumping-transcendent facts? This I take it is the worry about being unable to 'exclude ourselves.' We "want" knowledge of things independent of measurement: but by design, that is never what measurement actually gives us.

But this is a false dichotomy through and through. All we ascertain in measurement are our interactions with it, yes, but who gives a fuck about us? Why are we the 'measure or measure', as it were? It's only by elevating measurement itself into a transcendental principle of 'universe-constitution' that you can get the kind of idealist peddling that Wayfrer would like. But that's unwarrented, unscientific hogwash. — StreetlightX

I agree that nothing follows from this about the universe being constituted by measurement; what does follow is that the only thing measurement ever allows us to partake in are those things that are ontologically dependent on it, and hence that the rest of the universe is, or might conceivably be, independent of it, doesn't seem to matter to the actual process of knowledge-seeking. It might be an interesting metaphysical hypothesis (a transcendent one that we could never in principle verify), but that's it.

I don't think I believe the Kantian conclusion here, but I just don't see how what you've said coherently escapes from it. There are two ways to read the OP: one as Deepak Chopra, one as Kant. I think Wayfarer's "real" intention is to be Deepak Chopra, which I agree is silly. But the video he posted with the time stamp seems much more like Kant, and I'm aware of no good argument against this general picture of things.

but who gives a fuck about us? — StreetlightX

We're the ones that have to try to figure it out; hence we 'give a fuck about us,' because we have our limitations to work with in trying to figure it out.

what does follow is that the only thing measurement ever allows us to partake in are those things that are ontologically dependent on it — Snakes Alive

But how is this not just a fancy way of phrasing a tautology (and thus a triviality)? 'The only things we can measure are those things that we can measure.' Once you deny the 'constitution' route, that's all one is really left with.

'The only things we can measure are those things that we can measure.' — StreetlightX

That's not what I said.

What I said was, "the only thing measurement ever allows us to partake in are those things that are ontologically dependent on it."

That measurement changes the object, insofar as it's being measured, means that we can't ever see something except qua measured, and so can't know what it is independently of that measurement occurring. This is not tautological. Again, look at the jellyfish example.

What about Einstein, though? He was rather the odd man out in this respect, don’t you think? — Wayfarer

I feel that Einstein eludes classification. He was undoubtedly deeply philosophical, and I think his ideas changed greatly during the course of his life, which I see as a sign of an open mind. His large collection of memorable sayings is so varied that people of all different conflicting philosophical positions like to claim him as one of their own, but I I doubt he belongs to any neatly labelled philosophical school, or maybe he belonged to many of them, one after another.

His 'God does not play dice' and 'the moon is still there when nobody is looking at it' are indications of a lifelong inclination towards an anti-idealist position, perhaps materialism. But I very much doubt he was a reductive materialist, and I suspect he would have recoiled in distaste at the sort of scientism that is popular in some circles these days. After all, he said it was God that doesn't play dice, not The Universe. He was such a chameleon that he probably meant different things by the word God from one day to another, but I feel convinced that he thought there were great, deep mysteries out there, that we could never approach just by empirical experiment.

What are your thoughts on Einstein?

That measurement changes the object, insofar as it's being measured, means that we can't ever see something except qua measured, and so can't know what it is independently of that measurement occurring. — Snakes Alive

But this seems to be an incoherency: what you want to ask is something like: how can we know something that, in principle, be known? But this is not a question that makes sense. The idea seems to be that there is some set of knowable-things that, in principle, could be known if only we could... know it otherwise than though how we come to know things; but that's not how knowledge - or really anything - works. It's a category error to expect knowledge to be 'operative' independently of the kinds of thing which make it knowledge. It's not 'you can't know'; it's 'you're using the word knowledge wrong'. It's the attempt to wring blood out of an (oxymoronic) stone.

Reworded: Measurement changes the object, insofar as it's being measured, means that we can't ever see something except qua measured, and so... it makes no sense to speak of knowledge otherwise than this.

I guess we're talking about scientific objectivity here. The first thing that comes to mind is instrumental observation. Instruments come with their own error margins but that doesn't seem to be be what you're getting at.

Perhaps you mean to say that no observer, including instruments, is without causal force in the act of observing. We think the experiment is conducted without being influenced by the experimenter but that, some claim, is not the case. The very act of observing, by us or with instruments, has an effect on the thing being observed.

Does this harm our claim to scientific objectivity?

Yes, because if this claim is true then objectivity isn't achievable.

However, what do you make of repeatibility - the fact that experiments conducted at different places and at different times yield same or similar results?

To say the least it seems the subjective component in the act of observation is shared among ALL observers in exactly the same way. In short we can ignore it without consequence as it doesn't hamper the scientific enterprise.

It would be a real problem if the same experiment produced different results when done at different places and separate times. That would be chaotic.

Reworded: Measurement changes the object, insofar as it's being measured, means that we can't ever see something except qua measured, and so... it makes no sense to speak of knowledge otherwise than this. — StreetlightX

Yes, that seems to be the point of the OP, and it is the Kantian conclusion.