No point wasting time on someone responding in bad faith to a post made 3 years ago

Then what does it mean?

No point wasting time on someone responding in bad faith to a post made 3 years ago — Maw

*sigh*

In order to avoid starting new threads on an already existing topic, I looked up existing ones.

You said:

Insofar as human nature is real, insofar as human well-being is real, and insofar as human suffering is real (often in gratuitous forms), then it seems inescapable that moral realism is justified. — Maw

This can go at least two ways: It can be an utopian, idealistic concern for everyone, or it can be a form of narcissism. Hence a request for clarification.

I need to learn to respond to people like him in the succinct way you do, instead of wasting my time on long-winded clarifications that fall on willfully deaf ears. — Pfhorrest

Wonderful example of bad faith.

Oh, the irony: You're the one preaching concern for everyone, but you yourself don't live up to your own ideal, but instead eagerly jump to the conclusion that someone is acting in bad faith.

If anything I'm too hesitant to reach that conclusion, and I'm applauding Maw on their decisiveness.

Hi all. What do you think of moral realism? Does it have things going for it, or not? What do you think are arguments in favor or against it? — mcc1789

I think that morality is fundamentally a sense that human beings developed as a consequence of evolution in a tribal context. Proto-moral behaviours are evident in chimpanzees - in that they share food and groom each other, remember who reciprocates and withhold such favours accordingly in future. This is moral transactionalism - the root of morality and trade.

Subsequent events confuse the question of the nature of morality; firstly, the occurrence of intellectual intelligence, which is to say development of the language to express moral concepts, and also hunter gatherer tribes joining together to form multi-tribal social groups.

The latter is particularly relevant because that is where morality became objectivised; that is, attributed to an absolute authority i.e. God, as a common belief system that allowed the multi tribal social group common moral laws. It must have been quite difficult to achieve. There's around a 40,000 year gap between the occurrence of intellectual intelligence and the formation of the first civilisations - a mere 12-15,000 years ago.

Civilisation was made possible by morality attributed to an objective authority - and faith in the objective authority has been required. Consequently, when for example - Hume observes the imperceptible switch between is and ought - it is for him the last resort, but for me entirely natural that the individual infers ought from is.

The individual is imbued with an innate moral sense; a sensitivity to moral implication. A list of facts is not just a list of facts upon apprehension by us. Morality is from within; and objective to us as a consequence of civilisation. All that so; I do and do not agree with moral realism. I accept society must have laws - and therefore there will be values objective to me, but do not believe they are objective features of the world independent of subjective opinion. That said, morality is objectively premised in our evolutionary biology, so it's kind of chicken and egg! From us and unto us!

Then what does it mean? — baker

The opening post asked for arguments in favor of Moral Realism and I outlined a brief schema defending the concept with universal application ("human well-being", "human suffering", i.e. shared humanity). No corollary to this outline implies an individualized perspective which partitions the individual and the other, and removes the latter from the schema, or as you ask, "Whatever enhances my wellbeing and diminishes my suffering is moral (morally good, morally right, just, righteous), even if in the process of this, other people or their property get hurt or damaged" regardless of its context, gratuitous or not. I would suggest we don't look at ethical theories based on human collectivity and immediately seek to atomize it, asking how this can benefit me, irrespective of how it impacts others.

I would suggest we don't look at ethical theories based on human collectivity and immediately seek to atomize it, asking how this can benefit me, irrespective of how it impacts others. — Maw

Human wellbeing and human suffering necessarily take place at the level of the individual, for the individual.

It is self-evident that one person's happiness can result in another person's misery. Any theory of morality needs to account for this.

Human wellbeing and human suffering necessarily take place at the level of the individual, for the individual. — baker

It is self-evident that one person's happiness can result in another person's misery. — baker

Besides the fact that the latter contradicts the former, the latter also typically devolves in hypothetical moral qualms which are practically useless, even more so given vast ethical problems that actually exist today. I don't see the point in individualizing ethical questions when wealth inequality soared during a global pandemic which disproportionately affected minority ethnic groups while working classes suffer for the benefit of Capitalists. I just don't care about hypothetical mind experiments where e.g. John would gain more wellbeing than Bobby if Johnny took Bobby's flute, but this violates property ownership so how can he do that?? Don't care.

Can one person's increase in well-being result in another person's misery? Sure, but aren't we already working within the suffering/wellbeing framework I've outline? If you want to ask, what's the right thing to do in this hypothetical then we require an actual hypothetical example, but we're nevertheless working on the assumption that there is a moral realism predicated on human suffering and wellbeing.

You said earlier:

Insofar as human nature is real, insofar as human well-being is real, and insofar as human suffering is real (often in gratuitous forms), then it seems inescapable that moral realism is justified.
— Maw — baker

and I requested a clarification:

This can go at least two ways: It can be an utopian, idealistic concern for everyone, or it can be a form of narcissism. Hence a request for clarification.

because your formulation doesn't exclude a position like "Whatever enhances my wellbeing and diminishes my suffering is moral (morally good, morally right, just, righteous), even if in the process of this, other people or their property get hurt or damaged".

A justification of moral realism ends up in precisely the type of scenario you're so critical about:

I don't see the point in individualizing ethical questions when wealth inequality soared during a global pandemic which disproportionately affected minority ethnic groups while working classes suffer for the benefit of Capitalists. — Maw

Moral problems are experienced at the level of the individual. I'm not interested in hypothetical scenarios with individuals, but in the point that moral problems are experienced at the level of the individual, and not on some abstract level of "group" or "society".

Don't care. — Maw

A useful theory of morality would offer principles for dealing with precisely such individual, personal situations.

because your formulation doesn't exclude a position like "Whatever enhances my wellbeing and diminishes my suffering is moral (morally good, morally right, just, righteous), even if in the process of this, other people or their property get hurt or damaged". — baker

Right, so you asked for clarification and I said no, that it doesn't entail that position.

As for it going either towards utopianism or narcissism, no, it doesn't lead to either absurdly extreme positions.

Can moral problems be experienced at the individual level? Sure, but the most important and consequential ones aren't. Are moral problems experienced exclusively at the individual level? No.

Does moral realism lead to justification of Capitalist extremity? No.

Should a useful theory of morality provide guidance for individual situations? Sure, but I'm not discussing a normative moral theory that's based on moral realism, I'm justifying moral realism itself.