And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions. — Relativist
metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. — Relativist
if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysics — Relativist
Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories. — Relativist
If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power? — Relativist
BTW - a metaphysical theory can be falsified by finding incoherence. — Relativist
physicalism has a problem with consciousness. If not for that problem, I'd lean more strongly toward physicalism rather than being on the fence. — Relativist
It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. — Relativist
I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each. — Relativist
A method to avoid imperfect metaphysical theories would be a monumental achievement - it would finally, after all these centuries, remove all controversy from metaphysical inquiry. I'm a wee bit skeptical.metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. — Relativist
Following the method I suggested will avoid this. If you have a specific example of contradictory arguments, I would be happy to comment on them. — Dfpolis
I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions.Since metaphysics is concerned with the nature of being, it must be based on our experience of being -- not on a priori assumptions, however "coherent" they may be. That's why I require metaphysical principles be abstracted (not induced) from experience.
Of course not, but the point is that incoherence is a guaranty of falsehood.Coherence is no guaranty of truth.
Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment.The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.
I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs.It's always good to give reality a bit of weight in your reasoning.
It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. — Relativist
No, it is not.
Instead?! Surely you misspoke. Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested. Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. This can help us decide what metaphysical beliefs are worthy of belief, and on which we should withhold judgment. Your assertions have not given me any reason to change my view that judgment should be withheld, and the fact that you're unaware of alternative metaphysical theories makes me think that you may have settled on something a bit hastily.You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.
I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions. — Relativist
The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.
Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment. — Relativist
I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs. — Relativist
You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.
Instead?! Surely you misspoke. — Relativist
Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. — Relativist
I agree falsification is not abduction, and I never suggested it was. I said, "Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested.Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. — Relativist
Falsification is not abduction. It is the basis for a sound deduction by the modus tolens, — Dfpolis
What you are "aware of" is belief. The conceptual framework in which you interpret this awareness is belief, and your conclusion is belief. Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief.I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs. — Relativist
No, I have some awareness of how the world interacts with me and I draw conclusions based on that awareness. — Dfpolis
That judgment is an IBE — Relativist
The same process is involved with historiography (which is also unfalsifiable, in principle). — Relativist
What you are "aware of" is belief. — Relativist
Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief. — Relativist
there are indeed contradictory metaphysical accounts — Relativist
in spite of the fact they are constructed just as you describe - based on "awareness of how the world interacts" with the metaphysician — Relativist
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