Common nouns like "planet" might work in the same sort of way as proper nouns like "Michael" – the only difference is that one is plural and the other is singular. — Michael
If every object in a group has certain consistent characteristics, why can't I offer a single word (like "planet") to describe them? — Hanover
"Michael" is not descriptive, but it's just a random group of letters assigned to you as an identifier. "Planet" is a descriptive term, indicating that the item identified has certain qualities.
I'm saying that it doesn't then follow that being a planet is reducible to these consistent characteristics — Michael
Sure, but you're just pointing out the consequences of an equivocation fallacy. We today call bucket X "Planet" whereas tomorrow we call bucket Y "Planet" and so to say that B is Planet today doesn't mean it's a Planet tomorrow because we've now redefined "Planet." I see none of this as a problem as long as we remain consistent in our terms over time.These consistent characteristics might simply be contingent influences on our decision to impose the planet-identity on these things. — Michael
This is nonsense really. There may not be anything similar in the objects we call planets? Then why do I notice all these similarities?Furthermore, there might not be any consistent characteristics. — Michael
That's the notion I'm questioning. It's problematic, as shown with the example of games, and also of planets (the point of this discussion). — Michael
There is something similar between the various objects. That is, objects A, B, and C all orbit the sun (for example). As such, we put A, B, and C in bucket X, and then we name bucket X "planet." If we realize that B doesn't orbit the sun, we remove it from bucket X. — Hanover
Sure, but you're just pointing out the consequences of an equivocation fallacy. We today call bucket X "Planet" whereas tomorrow we call bucket Y "Planet" and so to say that B is Planet today doesn't mean it's a Planet tomorrow because we've now redefined "Planet." I see none of this as a problem as long as we remain consistent in our terms over time.
This is nonsense really. There may not be anything similar in the objects we call planets? Then why do I notice all these similarities?
The problem doesn't appear to be in anything I've said, but it appears to be in what Wittgenstein said.
So you're saying that to be a planet is to belong in bucket X and I'm saying that to be a planet is to belong in whichever bucket we name "planet". — Michael
And my point is that being a planet is an identity that changes as our use of the word "planet" changes rather than an identity that's forever fixed to things in bucket X. — Michael
I'm not saying that nothing is similar in the objects we call "planets". I'm saying that it might be that there isn't anything that all things named by some common noun have in common. What is the thing that all (and only) games have in common (the thing that determines whether or not a thing is a game)? — Michael
I disagree. I think Wittgenstein was right. It's nonsense to look for some material characteristic that is the "essence" of being a game. All we can do is look to how we use the word "game". There is a family resemblance of material characteristics that influence our language-use, but being a game isn't reducible to these characteristics (such that if our use of the word "game" changed then being a game wouldn't change). — Michael
There might be material facts that influence what sort of identities we impose on what sort of things, but the connection is merely contingent, not necessary. — Michael
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