I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about. — javra
I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about.
— javra
Are you asking me to use my own philosophical position to offer an alternative account of the dog's behaviour? — creativesoul
You, however, have not provided a single interpretation of what belief is. Describing that a belief about belief is not the belief itself does not define what you mean by belief. Give it a go. What is belief to you? — javra
All belief presupposes it's own correspondence somewhere along the line. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul
On the ground that any and sensible notions of trust must include - in some fundamental sense - what our everyday notions of trust include. — creativesoul
The same grounds as above, and on the ground that that definition inevitably leads to aburd consequences(reductio ad absurdum).
The performance of a vehicle relies on all sorts of different qualities and people. It does not trust. — creativesoul
That conversation hinges upon what counts as deception. I would deny that the dog deliberately sets out to trick another dog. — creativesoul
All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul
If non-linguistic belief is correlations drawn between different things such that it presupposes its own correspondence to fact/reality then this belief will be acquired, hence learned, via the different things that become correlated. The belief then “comes about”. And unless lesser animals’ beliefs are always fully devoid of error, there must then be a means by which well-grounded beliefs attain this property in their initial formation.
You seem to however insist otherwise. — javra
For the record, the Wiktionary definition is what everyday notions of trust entail. It is a long standing wiki page, after all. — javra
Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.
— creativesoul
On what grounds do you affirm this?
Example: I see an odd shaped red apple on the table for the first time. I'm not at all familiar with this type of apple. — javra
I either trust that it is there as seen, trust that it is not as seen, or trust that both possibilities might be valid; the latter being an instance of uncertainty while the two former cases are instances of certainty. Regardless, all three scenarios are initially experienced by me without without a sense of familiarity, without thought, and without beliefs about beliefs (belief is what we're addressing to begin with, so I'm assuming you were here addressing beliefs about beliefs).
All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul
Yet this does not distinguish thought from belief so as to define what belief is. — javra
I greatly doubt that we’ll find common ground. I’ve also lost the desire to further debate this issue. I’m giving a partial reply so as to not be utterly off-putting: — javra
To refresh a previous argument of mine, operational knowledge can well be, ontically, not erroneous. Nevertheless, this is not currently possible to prove epistemically.
Are we not somehow agreeing to this? My only issue here is that infallibility to me is an epistemic property. My bad if I didn’t make that explicit previously. Maybe this facet makes a notable difference? If not, then we indeed disagree. Call it a day? — javra
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.