How could it not be? — Wayfarer

What about enlightened self-interest? Would that qualify as something that leads to the same conclusion, although via different means?

My point about compassion being an antidote to solipsism, is simply that the essence of compassion is 'feeling-with' - seeing yourself in others and others in yourself.

My point about compassion being an antidote to solipsism, is simply that the essence of compassion is 'feeling-with' - seeing yourself in others and others in yourself. — Wayfarer

I understand that much. I just was positing that it's possible to be a solipsist and be ethical under the guise of enlightened self-interest.

I can't see how.

You seem to assume that those who do not agree with your interpretation therefore must not "get it"; a little confirmation-biasy and self-serving, don't you think? — Janus

It wasn't at all meant in that spirit. I don't think that Einstein really had the insight that Kant said was his 'Copernican revolution in philosophy' and I certainly don't think I'm cleverer than Einstein. I do think that Heisenberg and Bohr were likely to have that insight, based on their philosophical writings (although I'm also not nearly so clever as them, either.)

I think it is only the living actuality of pre-reflective, pre-subjective/objective experience that allows us to make the reflexive move of talking about things in terms of subjects and objects. But then we often make the mistake of projecting the entities of our analysis (such as "transcendental apperception" back into our pre-reflective experience and imagining them to be primordial and a priori 'substantive processes' as opposed to being merely conceptual modes of understanding. Whitehead calls this the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". — Janus

So clearly there is a need here. How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)?

I was not suggesting that you were claiming to be smarter than those who allegedly "don't get it". I also don't deny that people who have had certain kinds of experiences may be more inclined to think in recognizably 'spiritual' ways about issues such as the reality of transcendence.

But to characterize those who don't think these ways as 'failing to get it' is an unjustifiable move in philosophical discussion because you cannot establish the truth of such a claim by logic or empirical evidence any more than a Christian who claims that those who do not place their faith in Christ don't get it could establish their claim.

Simple answer: we can't because no parts/ entities of analysis are pre-reflective. If you think they are, then you have committed a fallacy of misplaced concretenrss and/or succumbed to a transcendental illusion.

Simple answer: we can't because no parts/ entities of analysis are pre-reflective. If you think they are, then you have committed a fallacy of misplaced concretenrss and/or succumbed to a transcendental illusion. — Janus

That would explain some things...

Are you claiming that we cannot use complex analysis as a means for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to the analysis?

Of that which existed prior to any conceptualization or analysis at all, yes.

Trees?

Synapsis?

What knowledge of trees as existing prior to any conceptualization can you arrive at through "complex analysis"?

Pavlov's dog and it's correlations/associations between the bell and the expectation of being fed?

Are you claiming that none of these things existed prior to our analysis? That none of these things are rightfully or properly called "pre-reflective" things/entities?

Surely I've misunderstood?

You were speaking about knowledge of the things weren't you?

Yes.

So why are you, irrelevantly, asking me whether they existed prior to any conceptualization, rather than dealing with the question of whether we can preconceptually know anything about them?

How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)? — creativesoul

...no parts/ entities of analysis are pre-reflective. If you think they are, then you have committed a fallacy of misplaced concretenrss and/or succumbed to a transcendental illusion. — Janus

Are you claiming that we cannot use complex analysis as a means for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to the analysis? — creativesoul

Of that which existed prior to any conceptualization or analysis at all, yes. — Janus

So why are you asking me whether they existed prior to any conceptualization, rather than dealing with the question of whether we can preconceptually know anything about them? — Janus

I'm asking that because it is the crux of the issue, as is shown here...

The question is you ask here is irrelevant. Our knowledge of non linguistic thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language(concepts). I've never claimed otherwise.

You, however, clearly stated that no entities of analysis(which I took to mean posited within) are pre-reflective. That's quite simply not true. Seems we've misunderstood one another though.

How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)?

Try again?

What knowledge of trees as existing prior to any conceptualization can you arrive at through "complex analysis"? — Janus

I know that trees existed prior to our conceptualizations of them. My knowledge of that requires language. The trees did not. The same holds good of non linguistic(pre-reflective) thought and belief.

Yes, and this is utterly trivial; something merely stipulated; the trees are already taken for granted in asking what you know about them.

Not trivial at all. Quite remarkable actually given this...

...we often make the mistake of projecting the entities of our analysis (such as "transcendental apperception" back into our pre-reflective experience and imagining them to be primordial and a priori 'substantive processes' as opposed to being merely conceptual modes of understanding. Whitehead calls this the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". — Janus

Now, to be clear, I certainly agree that we can mistakenly project the entities of complex analysis back into our pre-reflective experience. However, it is also clear that we can become aware of that which is pre-reflective solely by virtue of complex analysis.

Thus, I asked...

How do we determine which parts/entities of our analysis are pre-reflective(what parts/entities could be prelinguistic and/or happen pre-reflectively)?

No, the pre-conceptual existence of an entity is something merely stipulated on account of the apparently very plausible assumption that what, for example, we call a tree appears to us because of pre-conceptual conditions. What, exactly, those pre-conceptual conditions are we cannot know, since the only conditions we know are post-conceptual, or to put it another way, we know, in the sense of 'can knowingly think and speak about' only that which has been conceptualized.

So it is really inappropriate to say that the entities of our complex analyses exist pre-conceptually. Whatever it is that gives rise to our complex analyses exists pre-conceptually to be sure, but cannot be as entities for us pre-conceptually, beyond their being merely stipulated as such.

I hope that clears up your confusion, because this has been my last attempt.

That is to conflate what our knowledge of pre-conceptual entities requires with what the existence of those entities requires.

The absolutely independent pre-conceptual existence of entities is something illegitimately extrapolated from their necessarily conceptually shaped existence for us. If you can't see that subtle distinction in thought which is so obvious to me, then I don't believe I can help you.

Conceptual analysis led to knowledge of black holes. Black holes are pre-conceptual. Conceptual analysis led to knowledge of all sorts of mental ongoings that are prior to language, and thus pre-conceptual.

Thanks for the offer, but it seems I do not need your help.