Word games. What is the basis of "morality" for moral relativism? One's whims and fancies? That is the "basis"? — Ram

Don't act like you're not guilty of playing word games. Whims and fancies? Trying to trivialise a position you disagree with? Anyway, it depends on what it's relative to. I've already provided the answer and given an example in a previous reply. The example I gave was the culture of the United Kingdom, which is certainly not that anything is permissible. We don't look approvingly on rape, murder, and so on. Is that really what you'd expect of a secular society? Coo-coo.

Don't act like you're not guilty of playing word games. Whims and fancies? Trying to trivialise a position you disagree with? Anyway, it depends on what it's relative to. I've already provided the answer and given an example in a previous reply. The example I gave was the culture of the United Kingdom, which is certainly not that anything is permissible. We don't look approvingly on rape, murder, and so on. — S

So the basis of "relative morality" is what the local culture is? You said something about the culture of the UK. I didn't see that post.

Okay. So you say the "basis" of "morality" for the moral relativist is whatever is accepted in the local culture.

So if you live in a culture where human sacrifice is accepted- then human sacrifice is okay?

So the basis of "relative morality" is what the local culture is? You said something about the culture of the UK. I didn't see that post. — Ram

It doesn't have to be relative in that sense. It's a broader position than that. It could be relative to a culture, a group, or an individual.

Okay. So you say the "basis" of "morality" for the moral relativist is whatever is accepted in the local culture. — Ram

It can be, under moral relativism.

So if you live in a culture where human sacrifice is okay- then human sacrifice is okay? — Ram

Relative to that culture, yes. But personally, I wouldn't approve of that aspect of that culture, as it clashes with my own sense of what is right and wrong.

So the basis of "relative morality" is what the local culture is? You said something about the culture of the UK. I didn't see that post.
— Ram

It doesn't have to be relative in that sense. It's a broader position than that. It could be relative to a culture, a group, or an individual.

Okay. So you say the "basis" of "morality" for the moral relativist is whatever is accepted in the local culture.
— Ram

It can be, under moral relativism.

So if you live in a culture where human sacrifice is okay- then human sacrifice is okay?
— Ram

Relative to that culture, yes. But personally, I wouldn't approve of that aspect of that culture, as it clashes with my own sense of what is right and wrong. — S

What? So if you live in a society where human sacrifice is accepted, you would be against it? It clashes with your own sense of what is right and wrong?

So very strangely, I don't think you are actually a moral relativist. I think you clearly believe in an objective morality- which is inconsistent with your atheism.

What? So if you live in a society where human sacrifice is accepted, you would be against it? It clashes with your own sense of what is right and wrong?

So very strangely, I don't think you are actually a moral relativist. I think you clearly believe in an objective morality. — Ram

I had a feeling that you were going to say something like that. Why would you jump to the conclusion that I believe in an objective morality, just because I mentioned a sense of right or wrong that's relative to my own subjective moral judgement?

That's the type of merely assertion I'm talking about. You don't actually show your claims to be truthful.

Their texts show otherwise. Sartre asserts an objective morality based on the objectivity of reason and human freedom. His ethics are somewhat similar to Kant's in this respects. He uses what is essentially the Catergorical Imperative to identify our responsibility to each other as agents of freedom.

de Beauvoir argues we ought to recognise how humans are free agents who make choices. In this space, she talks about the significance of humans actions towards each other, forming a space in which actions have objective significance to each other and a range of ethical consequences.

Nietzsche is dedicated to the objectivity of values. One of the major parts of his analysis is how states and actions of the world are characterised by meaning. His primary target is exactly the sort of nilhism which claims life had no value or meaning.

This is partly why he attacks religions so harshly. He identifies the religious move of saying "God must be there to give the world meaning" is premised on an initial idea that the world is without meaning . God only needs to be there to add meaning to the world if it lacks meaning in the first place. Thus, the malaise of "meaningless" didn't begin with atheism, but actually has far older origins that lie at the base of much religious thought.

It is factually wrong to assert these thinkers are relativists. They hold objectivity to meaning, ethics and value.

That's the type of merely assertion I'm talking about. You don't actually show your claims to be truthful.

Their texts show otherwise. Sartre asserts an objective morality based on the objectivity of reason and human freedom. His ethics are somewhat similar to Kant's in this respects. He uses what is essentially the Catergorical Imperative to identify our responsibility to each other as agents of freedom.

de Beauvoir argues we ought to recognise how humans are free agents who make choices. In this space, she talks about the significance of humans actions towards each other, forming a space in which actions have objective significance to each other and a range of ethical consequences.

Nietzsche is dedicated to the objectivity of values. One of the major parts of his analysis is how states and actions of the world are characterised by meaning. His primary target is exactly the sort of nilhism which claims life had no value or meaning.

This is partly why he attacks religions so harshly. He identifies the religious move of saying "God must be there to give the world meaning" is premised on an initial idea that the world is without meaning . God only needs to be there to add meaning to the world if it lacks meaning in the first place. Thus, the malaise of "meaningless" didn't begin with atheism, but actually has far older origins that lie at the base of much religious thought.

It is factually wrong to assert these thinkers are relativists. They hold objectivity to meaning, ethics and value. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Mere assertion? Your post is utilizing mere assertion. Where are your proofs?

If you've never read Sartre and don't understand Existentialism, you're free to think what you want. Sartre was not remotely a Kantian. That you would even say that is bizarre. You are so dedicated to your agenda that you are willing to twist things. Furthermore, you don't characterize Nietzsche in an objective way either: https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/1u1up8/was_nietzsche_a_moral_relativist/

de Beauvoir was blatantly a relativist.

In that I was referencing what their texts talking about, showing the claim they are relativists to be a contradiction.

I've read Being & Nothingness, Existentialism is a Humanism, The Transcedence of The Ego in full, passages of his other texts and Nausea. Just the other week I was discussing the similarites of his ethics and Kant's with philosophy grad students with background in Kant . How much Sartre you read?

I'm not twisting anything. I'm talking about the content of texts, which you have clearly never examined.

You clearly aren't reading those comments on askphilosophy. They are drawing the distinction Nietzsche is not a fan of system which premise an "objective morality" that is an abstracted system of rules. With respect to meaning and value of the world, Nietzsche is clearly objective (which is why all those people in the thread, to paraphrase, are saying "It depends what you mean ").

Again, that's just an assertion. You don't go into detail de Beauvoir's thought and show how it is relativist. (We also know she's not because her texts contains postions holding people have objective meaning with respect to each other, with consequences for ethics).

Ram, you are misrepresenting my position. Without God, it's hard to see how you could get objective morality I said... not morality altogether. I think non-objective morality is based on a social contract (on agreement or convention), as did Nietzsche. I said this a couple of times already, but you didn't respond to that part.

And as other probably allready said, Nietzsche also wasn't a nihilist. He warned about nihilism in the West-European tradition because people still adhered to Christian morality, eventhough they didn't believe in its cornerstone God anymore...

So you acknowledge my point, throw it back at me and somehow that address's it? From your reply, you were unable to grasp the full extent of what I was saying. Do I see you as you do, with your background, your culture, your experience? No, there is no way for me to see you in the exact way you do any more then you can for me. That is my whole point!

Ethics will always be based on the secular as it is the only way a person can view the world and the very concepts involved in morality. I've studied various religions, both eastern and western and study is exactly what was necessary to understand them. Do I understand Islam? No, I have not studied it. Is it possible for me to grasp the morality offered by Islam and the God featured within that religion without some form of study or education in it? No doubt there are some similar concepts to be found in its cannon but as a from of morality to live by, no. Not unless you want to entertain the concept of miracles. Some way to instantly understand all the history, background and complex concepts needed to successfully adhere to the moral code Islam presents.

The claim of this discussion is - that there is no secular basis for morality. I ask you outright now: Could you adhere to Islam principles of morality without the mental concepts you've obtained through exposure and study of its religious teachings? The very concepts that influence your every thought, personal judgment and could arguably be said to influence every choice you make? Could another individual (like me) with little to no exposure regarding Islam live by the Islamic code of morality without any further exposure or study of the same religious teachings?

I think morality is like language. Is language subjective? Is language objective? It is neither. You don't get to decide what words mean, yet you partake everyday in their meaningfulness.

Merging @Andrew4Handel's observations on religious morality to here:

What is a religious morality.

Do you have to believe in a particular religion to be moral by its standards. Could you for example follow the most of the ten commandments closely but be considered immoral because you don't believe in God?

Is it consistent to follow a religious morality closely but not believe the religion itself is true?
Is it hypocritical to pick and choose different parts of religions whilst ignoring or rejecting some of their central dogmas.

As someone who grew up in a strict religious environment I some times wonder about the possibility of being condemned because I no longer believe the religion and its values even if I have what appears to be very good or rational reasons not to do so.

Some religions demand blind obedience and or blind faith and appear to rely on fear to reinforce this.
Morality as commandments (deontology?) seems strong in one sense as being enforceable because the alternative maybe moral nihilism or uncertainty.
However religions tend to have unreasonable commandments and contradictions.

Mark Dice (who I'm not particularly a fan of but who has made some good points at times) has here demonstrated how accepting atheistic premises will lead people to accepting incest as okay.

However, the matter is very basic.

There is simply no secular basis for morality. — Ram

How does one prove incest is wrong using objective moral values (OMVs)?

It seems wrong, but I can point to biological risks and the related possibility our instinctive feelings are a product of evolution. Surely it's such feelings (irrespective of their source) that are the basis our moral judgment. So how does one account for these moral feelings under the premise OMVs exist, and how does one show this account more likely to be true than the alternative?

There is simply no secular basis for morality.

Morality from a secular position is necessarily subjective.

Atheists will try to dance around this and you will see some incredible logical gymnastics around this but the plain fact is that when you boil it down.... consistent atheists don't believe in objective morality. They want to have their cake and eat it too. They claim that religions are immoral- but they have no basis for determining what is and isn't immoral. — Ram

Nothing could be further from the truth. First, that there is no secular basis for morality, is just not true, and it doesn't take much thought to recognize that this statement is clearly false. Moreover, one doesn't need to appeal to any religious or even mystical view of things to know that there are moral and immoral acts apart from religious or mystical beliefs. I'm not going to put forth a complete moral theory, but I can give an example that is clearly objective.

If I walk up to any person and cut their arm off without good reason, then I've have committed an immoral act by definition. Moreover, it's not a subjective claim, it's objectively immoral based on the harm done; and I don't have to appeal to anything religious to recognize that it's immoral. What's the basis of this immoral act? The basis for any immoral act is that it causes harm, not all harm is immoral but all immoral acts cause a degree of harm. Moreover, we can claim that some immoral acts are much worse based on the degree of harm done. So we can start with the principle of harm. If we get back to the example, was there harm done? Yes. Is it objectively true that there was harm done? Yes. We can see the objective nature of the harm in cries of pain, the arm severed from the person, the blood, etc. We can also observe the pain of friends and family members as well as strangers. The pain is also objective.

This is a clear example of why there can and is immorality apart from any religious or mystical belief. That there are more complicated moral issues there is no doubt, but how can anyone deny that the example given is not immoral without appeal to God.

@Sam26 I think this is a very good, simple example that most people would agree is immoral. There seems to be a core morality between most cultures and peoples that condemns senseless suffering like you described in the example of cutting off someone’s arm. I also think it is true that immoral acts cause harm in some form (i.e. there is a reason to say the act is wrong). I believe your argument is as follows:

1. Cutting off someone’s arm with no good reason is objectively immoral independent of religious belief
2. To cause pain without a good reason is objectively immoral
3. Therefore, some objective moral claims exist outside of religious belief.

You seem to be pointing out a nearly universal moral value (that senselessly inflicting pain on another human is bad) which is very important, given its dominance across religious and secular worldviews alike. However, I think the question still remains: where does this notion of morality come from? When you say, “it’s objectively immoral based on the harm alone,” do you mean that there is some independent moral truth that exists which humans have the ability to perceive, connecting the pain to “wrongness”? Or, do you mean that the widely accepted idea that senseless suffering is wrong is a sufficient basis for the term “objectively immoral” because of its popularity?

I would like to challenge premise 2 (and in effect, premise 1 as well) assuming that you are calling it objectively immoral because it is a widely accepted human intuition. Suppose you were to poll people about whether it is immoral to cut off someone’s arm without good reason and it turned out there were a small group of people who did not find such an act problematic. Suppose this group becomes very influential over time or a natural disaster wipes out the people who think otherwise to that the majority of the population does not believe the act is wrong (they don’t have to think it is moral, or engage in causing pain, just that it doesn’t necessitate a moral claim either way). Would this shift in core morality change the claim that it is objectively immoral? To call pointless pain objectively immoral is to say it is universally wrong, independent of personal interpretation.

It does seem very hasty to assume morality is subjective from a secular world view simply because God is not the basis, because, similar to claims about absolute religious truths, the same can be made about the existence of moral facts independent of divine origin. However it seems important to distinguish that claims about “objective morals” be attributed to the existence of such moral truths, independent of popular opinion, otherwise the basis of morality is not in truth value but random chance or evolutionary favorability.

However, I think the question still remains: where does this notion of morality come from? When you say, “it’s objectively immoral based on the harm alone,” do you mean that there is some independent moral truth that exists which humans have the ability to perceive, connecting the pain to “wrongness”? Or, do you mean that the widely accepted idea that senseless suffering is wrong is a sufficient basis for the term “objectively immoral” because of its popularity? — tenderfoot

There is an error in the quote, it should read, "...it's objectively immoral based on the harm done," that's what I meant to say. However, your questions stand.

I think there is an objective moral principle that we generally follow as people, viz., that we shouldn't inflict undo pain on others for no good reason. I believe this is an objective moral truth that most civilized people adhere to. I don't think popularity has anything to do with it. It may be true that most people believe it, but it's not a matter of popularity. Even if a majority of people rejected it, that still would not make it right.

There is an objectivity to the facts involved (in the e.g. I gave above) that make it stand apart from what I happen to think, i.e., it's not dependent on what anyone thinks. It has to do with what makes for a good life for humans, inflicting pain on others without good reason is not something anyone in their right mind would desire. In fact, we tend to generally avoid pain, even if the pain may have a good outcome, like having an infected tooth pulled. I believe what I'm saying is not only objectively true, but I'm saying that most people recognize it as true, it's self-evident for most people.

Another final point that I already alluded to, but needs to be emphasized. It also has to do with what we value in our lives, and a life free of senseless pain seems to be a something that almost all people value; and this arises out of the kind of biological beings we are (and I'm not thinking necessarily in terms of evolution), i.e., it's the background reality of our biology, what we value, what we feel, how we reason, etc.

Hope this helps.

Thank you that does help! I think that makes a lot of sense to believe, especially in a practical sense…regardless of where these morals come from or why we believe them some of these very basic widely held ideas certainly seem to promote human flourishing in a way that their counterfactuals do not. In general, ideas like: it is good to avoid needless pain, it is good to continue to live, it is good to have freedom, etc seem natural and self-evident without examination. I think the life-promoting, self-evident nature of these core morals is a good reason to hold them and live by them because we must make choices in life with incomplete information, but I still wonder what the connection is between these “values” and their “correctness”…

The objectivity in the example you gave that you mentioned above seemed to be that the pain was undeniable and it was caused without reason, thus it must be immoral. You are assuming I suppose that this is a necessary fact about the world we live in? Is it that we call actions that promote life “moral” and things that promote death we call “immoral”?

It also has to do with what we value in our lives, and a life free of senseless pain seems to be a something that almost all people value; and this arises out of the kind of biological beings we are (and I'm not thinking necessarily in terms of evolution), i.e., it's the background reality of our biology, what we value, what we feel, how we reason, etc. — Sam26

is it possible for this biological basis to be independent of evolution? Looking at the tenacity of life and how throughout history there is a drive in human beings to survive and create good lives, it makes sense that these life-promoting values be things we know a priori due to the “background reality of our biology.” If the inclination to follow that objective moral truth is innate in human beings, is it distinct from an evolutionary mechanism optimizing survival and reproduction? The question becomes: are actions moral on account of evolutionary advantage or are they moral in themselves and also coincidentally evolutionarily advantageous? The core of my questions here is whether these morals are based on an independent truth value or the product of random variation and natural selection (I sure hope not

I know you said you are not necessarily thinking in the terms of evolution, so if you see another explanation I would love to hear it! (also some of these thoughts come from Richard Joyce’s Evolution of Morality if you want to check it out)

I think there is an objective moral principle that we generally follow as people, viz., that we shouldn't inflict undo pain on others for no good reason. — Sam26

I disagree with the claim that this would be objective. You already state it yourself; "... for no good reason." Who decides what is a good reason? The perpetrator? The victim? A neutral third? All of these will have very different ideas of what a good reason might be. And why would any of their opinions be more valuable than that of the other?

If we were to take such a narrow definition of morality, the only thing that would be immoral would be those acts committed by a psychopath. And even then I doubt you can provide an objective argument to why the psychopath's reasons are "not good".

I believe what I'm saying is not only objectively true, but I'm saying that most people recognize it as true, it's self-evident for most people. — Sam26

You can't believe something is objectively true. This is like saying "I believe God is objectively real". It is either true, or you simply do not know whether it is true. Whether such a (perceived) truth would be objective is an entirely different matter and given the inherent subjective nature of human existence highly unlikely. Especially on a topic like morality I doubt anyone's ability to present a good case for objective truth.

That people recognize it as true or regard it as self-evident is no proof of objective truth. People used to think the Earth was flat. Even if the whole world believed it, it wouldn't make it true.

Another final point that I already alluded to, but needs to be emphasized. It also has to do with what we value in our lives, and a life free of senseless pain seems to be a something that almost all people value; and this arises out of the kind of biological beings we are (and I'm not thinking necessarily in terms of evolution), i.e., it's the background reality of our biology, what we value, what we feel, how we reason, etc. — Sam26

Reasoning out of biology seems unsound. There is no morality in nature, just survival. We also can't start cherry picking. If we make the (curious) claim that morality should be based on our biology, our entire biology should be moral, and by modern standards it clearly isn't. Think for example of the fact that girls become fertile around the age of twelve and what that implicates.

In short, morality based on biology would essentially be based on survival, which, if we could even call it morality, would be worth next to nothing.

Morality has to be objective to make sense, because if it were subjective it means it is pliable, and the entire concept of good and evil falls apart. The only way one could soundly argue the existence of morality is by reference to a force greater than man to impose these rules upon him. But that only brings us to the next hurdle; proving there is such a force, but that is a different debate.

I disagree with the claim that this would be objective. You already state it yourself; "... for no good reason." Who decides what is a good reason? The perpetrator? The victim? A neutral third? All of these will have very different ideas of what a good reason might be. And why would any of their opinions be more valuable than that of the other? — Tzeentch

This response is also to Tenderfoot.

Let's get back to my example, which by the way, needs no appeal to anything higher in order to determine that it's immoral.

If I walk up to any person and cut their arm off without good reason, then I've have committed an immoral act by definition. Moreover, it's not a subjective claim, it's objectively immoral based on the harm done; and I don't have to appeal to anything religious to recognize that it's immoral.

If I understand you correctly, there is nothing about this example that is objectively immoral? The screams of the person in pain, the arm on the ground, the blood, the anguish of friends and family, none of this is objectively true? This, it seems, is a paragon case of immorality. One doesn't need to appeal to anything beyond the case itself. Are you saying that the concept of immorality doesn't apply in this case, independent of what I happen to think?

If I was teaching someone how to use the concept immoral, and they didn't use it in this case, I would assert that they didn't know how to use the word correctly. In virtually every case of immorality, the harm done is the reason it's referred to as immoral. And in cases where we argue over whether something is or is not immoral, usually it's because we don't see the harm, i.e., it's not clear that harm was done.

The question is, why do I need to appeal to anything beyond the example to defend the idea that this act (my example) is immoral? Are you making the claim that the only way I would know this act is immoral is by appealing to something metaphysical, for example, God?

All I need to appeal to is the harm, nothing further. If I can make a clear case of the harm done, then I can make the claim that it's immoral, as in the example.

Who decides what's reasonable? We do. There are principles of correct reason that are applied, just as there are principles of mathematics that determine the correct and incorrect use of mathematical symbols. Moreover, I would say that these principles are discoverable. They are built into the universe, i.e., they are built into the background of reality. For example, the principle of noncontradiction is not something I can simply deny based on someone's whim. If you deny it, then you deny the very ability to talk about these ideas in a rational manner. You couldn't even posit if there was religious truth without it. How would you argue that your ideas are true verses my ideas or arguments? So it's not a matter of someone deciding what's reasonable, it's about the objective principles. It's about the very idea of reasoning from one proposition to another.

I don't see atheists strapping bombs to their chest and blowing people up.

If I understand you correctly, there is nothing about this example that is objectively immoral? The screams of the person in pain, the arm on the ground, the blood, the anguish of friends and family, none of this is objectively true? This, it seems, is a paragon case of immorality. One doesn't need to appeal to anything beyond the case itself. — Sam26

There's nothing objectively immoral about it, if we argue from a secular standpoint, because without religion there is no basis for objective morality.

What you sketch cannot be the basis of objective morality, because it would imply that people's dispositions are what determine whether or not an action is immoral. This means that if you take into account the victim and the onlookers, you must also take into account the disposition of the perpetrator and perhaps he is quite happy with what he's done. Or perhaps some of the onlookers did not like the victim and are quite content seeing him suffer. If you want to base objective morality on emotions, which sounds impossible at the onset, you cannot ignore the other side of the coin.

In virtually every case of immorality, the harm done is the reason it's referred to as immoral. And in cases where we argue over whether something is or is not immoral, usually it's because we don't see the harm, i.e., it's not clear that harm was done. — Sam26

Yet, I can think of dozens of examples where harm is done, but the act is not immoral. Thus, harm cannot be the sole factor. In a previous post you argued "harm without good reason", and I think we have established that "good reason" is entirely subjective and therefore cannot be used (logically) to argue objective morality.

The question is, why do I need to appeal to anything beyond the example to defend the idea that this act (my example) is immoral? Are you making the claim that the only way I would know this act is immoral is by appealing to something metaphysical, for example, God? — Sam26

I would argue that you're using the word 'immoral' wrong. Morality is the absolute definition of good and evil. It cannot be pliable, otherwise it loses all its meaning. You're describing your disposition towards something, namely you think it's bad to cut someone's arm off for no reason. That's a reasonable thing to say. But calling it immoral is to say it is objectively bad, and without a force greater than man to determine what is objectively good and bad, that argument does not work. A force greater than man implies a vertical relationship, in other words, man would have a master. If there is no such force, then man has no master and thus the emotions and disposition of the perpetrator in your argument is worth just as much as the emotions and disposition as the victim, and therefore we cannot call it objectively bad.

All I need to appeal to is the harm, nothing further. If I can make a clear case of the harm done, then I can make the claim that it's immoral, as in the example. — Sam26

Unless your willing to argue that in all cases where harm is caused, it is caused by an immoral act (including for example, self defense), this is unsatisfactory.

Who decides what's reasonable? We do. There are principles of correct reason that are applied, just as there are principles of mathematics that determine the correct and incorrect use of mathematical symbols. Moreover, I would say that these principles are discoverable. They are built into the universe, i.e., they are built into the background of reality. — Sam26

This sounds very nonsecular to me. I've heard similar theories described in lectures by Manly P. Hall and studies of Hermeticism, for example. There's nothing wrong with such views. In fact, I would largely sympathize with this approach, but to imply that there are principles built into reality that dictate how man should act is basically the same as admitting to a power greater than man, and thus to a form of God, or deity, or divine, but in a different sense than we're used to with the Abrahamic religions.

The objectivity in the example you gave that you mentioned above seemed to be that the pain was undeniable and it was caused without reason, thus it must be immoral. You are assuming I suppose that this is a necessary fact about the world we live in? Is it that we call actions that promote life “moral” and things that promote death we call “immoral”? — tenderfoot

Yes, the pain is undeniable, i.e., we can be as objectively certain about the pain, and the other components of the act (the arm on the ground, the blood, the pain of observers, etc). And of course the other important component is that the act was committed without good reason.

I don't want to word it the way to you did, viz., "...actions that promote life "moral" and things that promote death we call "immoral"?" For purposes of my argument, all I want to say is that all immoral acts have the property of causing harm, and for most of these kinds of actions we're able to discern the harm, and thus make the claim that it's immoral. Again, though, it must be pointed out for others reading this, that not all harm is immoral, but all immoral acts do cause harm.

is it possible for this biological basis to be independent of evolution? Looking at the tenacity of life and how throughout history there is a drive in human beings to survive and create good lives, it makes sense that these life-promoting values be things we know a priori due to the “background reality of our biology.” If the inclination to follow that objective moral truth is innate in human beings, is it distinct from an evolutionary mechanism optimizing survival and reproduction? The question becomes: are actions moral on account of evolutionary advantage or are they moral in themselves and also coincidentally evolutionarily advantageous? The core of my questions here is whether these morals are based on an independent truth value or the product of random variation and natural selection (I sure hope not — tenderfoot

When I talk about biology in reference to this argument, I'm simply pointing out that it's a fact of our biology that we experience pain; and this fact is part of what contributes to our experiences of pain, and how we talk about pain (pain behavior). Moreover, it's not something derived from my personal experience of pain, although there is that component, but our concepts are developed as we interact with others in social settings. So, we use the concepts of immoral, pain, objective, subjective, reason, etc., as we interact with others, so we learn to use these concepts in relation to others. They aren't dependent on metaphysical constructs. That doesn't mean there isn't a metaphysical reality, only that the way we talk about things, including immoral things, and what we mean by these concepts, is not dependent in a way that forces us to appeal to the metaphysical.

Let's use this analogy, let's say that I learned logic from professor X, but I don't need to appeal to professor X every time I make a claim about a deductive argument. So, if I say a deductive argument must be valid, I don't need to also add, because professor X said so, but I make the claim because those are the facts of deductive arguments. This analogy isn't perfect, but it illustrates an important point.

One could claim, if you believe in God, that God has access to the same facts about what makes something immoral, and therefore gives a set of commandments based on the same reasoning about harm.

I think there is something much deeper here than evolutionary mechanisms. I see some things as having an intrinsic worth, or intrinsic value, and causing harm without good reason is one such value that serves us well across a wide swath of our lives.

To answer your last question would take a lot of time, but since I've been writing about epistemology in another thread, let me refer you to the last few posts in the following:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1314/a-wittgenstein-commentary