_db

Thorongil
I'm wary of suffering-focused ethics, those in which the elimination/prevention of suffering is the only acceptable course of action and intention. According to negative utilitarians, for example, it would be better to avoid a pinprick than to allow this tragedy alongside an unfathomably large amount of pleasure. To negative utilitarians, the accompanying pleasure is not important.
Suffering-focused ethicists might accuse me of being empty of compassion or any number of things, but I find that suffering-focused ethics is far too narrow-minded to be even reasonable. It is clear, to me at least, that there are legitimately good things that are not simply the absence of suffering - in fact I'm rather skeptical that the absence of suffering can be a good thing simpliciter. — darthbarracuda
Eudaimonia, or flourishing, can only occur when someone is not suffering. — darthbarracuda
This means that a good state of affairs can only be so if it is a perfect state of affairs, and a perfect state of affairs is one that has eudaimonic persons, or no persons at all. — darthbarracuda
This is because pleasure by itself is not enough to call a state of affairs good, however pleasure can be a feature that makes state of affairs better than another. — darthbarracuda
_db
But I deem compassion, not happiness, as the basis of morality, and compassion can sometimes only occur when someone is suffering. Perhaps this makes me a suffering focused ethicist (though I am no utilitarian). — Thorongil
And what makes it better? Not suffering? Perhaps I missed it. If one is feeling pleasure, then one is by definition not suffering, so what, beyond pleasure, is necessary for eudaimonia? — Thorongil
Thorongil
I wouldn't say you're a suffering-focused ethicist, more like a suffering-prioritizing ethicist. I agree that compassion is the source of morality, in addition to the fact that eudaimonic individuals are self-sufficient and therefore not in need of our assistance. — darthbarracuda
since pleasure and pain can exist simultaneously. — darthbarracuda
schopenhauer1
then alternative routes should be taken, namely: nothing-ness. — darthbarracuda
schopenhauer1
I don't know about that.... — Thorongil
Thorongil
You can feel intense physical pain in the background and laugh at someone's joke, so I tend to agree with this claim. — schopenhauer1
_db
What is nothing-ness in this case? Suicide or simply lack of any concern/pain? — schopenhauer1
_db
Hmm, so what are you proposing eudaimonia as, if not an ethic? — Thorongil
mcdoodle
I deem compassion, not happiness, as the basis of morality, and compassion can sometimes only occur when someone is suffering. Perhaps this makes me a suffering focused ethicist (though I am no utilitarian). More specifically, fellow-feeling is the condition for compassion, and the latter does not always result unless one feels another's suffering as they do. This finally breaks through the I-thou relation which otherwise prevents compassion. Happiness is quite irrelevant in this situation — Thorongil
Thorongil
Eudaimonia would be the only perfect experience, and thus the only perfectly good experience. — darthbarracuda
_db
What led you to such a seemingly robust teleology? — Thorongil
Although, you do say "would be." Does this mean you doubt it can be achieved? — Thorongil
Hoo
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