It seems to me to be a reasonable epistemic justification for believing in some sort of god(s). In theory, it is a sensing of the existence of god(s), and if true - it can be deemed as trustworthy as any of our other senses. But it's not a basis for an argument for God's existence - your alleged sense of God carries no weight with me, who does not have it. I think you're mistaken in attributing the sensation to God, while you think I'm mistaken for failing to accept what my senses are telling me, or defective for failing to have these senses.I am wondering if sensus divinitatis should be used in the argument for the existence of God.
However, can sensus divinitatis really be used in argument for the existence of God? A feeling does not necessarily prove the existence of something. The joy of looking at a Christmas tree in anticipation of Santa Clause does not prove the existence of Santa. This feeling is tied, instead, to one of expectation or hope but not of truth — Play-doh
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