Your are more right than you are giving yourself credit for here.

Paris is the capital of France is a fully analytic sense. If we are talking about our Paris, our language, then it is by definition the capital of France. We can't speak our language without this being true. Within our language about our world, it's necessary that Paris is the capital of France.

Don't worry, it might have been more than you were giving me credit for, but I was giving myself credit for it from the start; that is precisely what I have been arguing and why I introduced the "Paris is the capital of France" example in the first place.

But, as I have also acknowledged 'Paris' does not mean 'capital of France' in as 'full' a sense as 'spinster' means 'never married woman'.

There is no difference between those two. Both are logical possibilities. Each is a possible state of the world. Turning myself into a tiger is no less a possible state of the world than responding to this post. The apparent absurdity of the former claim doesn't make it merely logical in contrast to actuality of the latter.

"Natural" law is a lie. It's merely a misreading of our current theories about the world as pre-deterministic.

Have it your way then. "Determinism" in your sense is equivalent to necessitarianism, or to actualism in M. R. Arers's sense. It is a contentious metaphysical doctrine that I dont know any living analytic philosophers to be endorsing. I wonder what your ground might be for endorsing it, if it isn't the mistake in modal logic that I have highlighted. — Pierre-Normand

Yes. Determinism is an interesting viewpoint. No living analytic philosopher has proven determinism to be true or false.

And I'm pretty sure you misunderstand my position...

Possibility is, by definition, not an actual state. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, not as used by logicians and analytic philosophers. It's a basic axiom of modal logic that what is actual is, a fortiori, possible. It's not even a connotation of the term as used in ordinary language that something that's said to be possible isn't actual. If you ask me if it's possible that I may have left my keys in the car, and I reply that it is indeed possible, I am certainly not implying that it isn't actual -- that it is merely an unactualized possibility -- but rather that it might me the case.

"Natural" law is a lie. It's merely a misreading of our current theories about the world as pre-deterministic. — TheWillowOfDarkness

How could you possibly know that? Why would it not be possible that the nature of things is such that it is really and incontrovertibly impossible for you to transform yourself into a tiger? Do you have an argument?

Put it another way, forgetting about the laws of nature; it is actually impossible for you to transform yourself into a tiger right now; meaning that you actually don't know how to do it right now. If it was actually possible for you to do it right now, then you could do it right now, and refute my claim.

Did you do it? Nope, you didn't...and there are countless examples of what is actually impossible for you right now; triple back somersault, walking through walls, coming up with the next advance in QM, transporting yourself instantaneously into my living room, even knowing where my living room is, and so on, ad infinitum....

I didn't say that forms expressed in actuality were not also a possible world. I merely said that possibility does not equal actuality. Any possible world is, by definition, possible. This includes one with expression of the things in the actual world.

The basic axiom of many modal logic is "what is actual is possible." But that's the problem. It equates actuality with possibility, as if they we're the same. The issue is not saying that possibility is actuality, but rather that actuality is possibility.

They are not. The possible world where Paris is the capital is not the actual world where Paris is the capital, despite them expressing the same form. One is what might be. The other is what is.

If you ask me if it's possible that I may have left my keys in the car, and I reply that it is indeed possible, I am certainly not implying that it isn't actual -- that it is merely an unactualized possibility -- but rather that it might me the case. — Pierre-Normand

The issue is when you have left you keys in the car. For using the "actual is possible" axiom, it results in saying: "It's actual my keys are in the car. It's only possible. They might not be."

This is not true.

And I'm pretty sure you misunderstand my position — Mongrel

I am not going to understand your position any better if you are unwilling to clarify it. You've expressed your view thus: "Any statement about actuality that is true is necessarily true." There are no contingent facts, on your view, it would seem. The only contemporary philosopher I can think of who has endorsed a view that comes anything close to this is Timothy Williamson, but his thesis is restricted to the predicate of existence. He has argued that anything that actually exists exists necessarily. But things that exist can still have some of their properties contingently, on his view.

To say otherwise is a contradiction. If is is possible I may turn myself into a tiger tomorrow, then the world may work differently than how it does now. The "law" cannot be pre-determinstic. What I am depends on how I exist (e.g. human or tiger), not on the logical expression of how we think the world must work.

If it is impossible for me to turn into a tiger, there can be no possibility of me turning into a tiger (whether we call it "logical" or "actual" ).

I didn't say that forms expressed in actuality were not also a possible world. I merely said that possibility does not equal actuality. Any possible world is, by definition, possible. This includes one with expression of the things in the actual world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, that's not what you had said. You had said that "Possibility is, by definition, not an actual state." That's a bit like saying that mammals are, by definition, not elephants. And then walking it back: "...I merely said that being a mammal doesn't equal being an elephant." Sure, no contest. Actuality entails possibility, but possibility doesn't entail actuality.

If it is impossible for me to turn into a tiger, there can be no possibility of me turing into a tiger (whether we call it "logical" or "actual" ). — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, even if it is actually impossible for you to turn yourself into a tiger either because you just don't know how, or because the laws of nature simply don't permit it; that doesn't mean it is logically impossible for you to turn yourself into a tiger, except in the limited sense that it is logically impossible for you to do something you cannot do.

But, again this just reverts to actual impossibility. The unconstrainedly logical possibility consists just in the idea that things might have been different with you and the world such that you could transform yourself into a tiger; nothing purely logically precludes that possibility, even though actuality might very well preclude it.

My point is actuality doesn't contain possibility. If we are talking about an actual elephant, then we cannot say: "being [that] mammal doesn't equal being an elephant."

The issue with the standard modal approach is not in confusing possibility with actuality, it is in confusing actuality with possibility. The necessity of actual state is treated as if it is only possible.

You've qualified your view thus: "Any statement about actuality that is true is necessarily true."

I am not going to understand your position any better if you are unwilling to clarify it. There are no contingent facts, on your view, it would seem. The only contemporary philosopher I can think of who has endorsed a view that comes anything close to this is Timothy Williamson, but his thesis is restricted to the predicate of existence. He has argued that anything that actually exists exists necessarily. But things that exist can still have some of their properties contingently, on his view. — Pierre-Normand

Sometimes we look at things deterministically. Sometimes we don't. Modal logic can be used to examine both modes of experience and expression.

The issue with the standard modal approach is not in confusing possibility with actuality, it is in confusing actuality with possibility. The necessity of actual state is treated as if it is only possible. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's not a mistake of modal logic (or of "the standard modal approach", whatever that is) to resist the slide from actuality to necessity. Not everything that is actual is necessary. Hence the actuality of P doesn't preclude the possibility of not-P. If you deny this then you can't begin to make sense of the contingent/necessary distinction as applied to the states material objects are in at specific times, say. Every accidental property that an object contingently manifests at a time becomes an essential property for this object to have at that time. This makes nonsense of the idea of unactualized powers.

Still missing my point. The mistake of standard modal logic is to slide from actuality to possibility. To treat the actual world as if it's the same as the possible one-- creating confusion like over Paris in this thread. When someone tries to talk about actual Paris (e.g. as Mongrel has), it tries to suggest that actual Paris doesn't necessarily mean anything, that it is merely possible world.

Supposedly, Mongrel is wrong for suggesting actual Paris necessarily means the capital of France, as actual Paris is (supposedly) also only a possible world.

My point is standard model logic has confused the presence of the actual world for the possible one. There is a possible world in which France is the capital of Paris, but it is not given in actuality of Paris. Even is the meaning of the actual world is the same as this possible one, the possible one is still only logic.

Thus, even though Paris being the capital of France is a possible world, it is also true that actual Paris necessarily means the capital of France (until such time as that state of the world changes).

Hence the actuality of P doesn't preclude the possibility of not-P — Pierre-Normand

Indeed. I am talking about the relationship of necessity though. That the actuality/necessity of P (Paris exists as the capital of France) does not preclude the possibility of Paris being (or not being) the capital. The possible worlds (possibility) are true no matter what is necessary (actual).

Not everything that is actual is necessary. — Pierre-Normand

So this claim is too weak. Everything which is actual (necessary) has a true possible world which corresponds to it. The necessity of existence-- "if X is exists, then X must be"-- is not opposed or in conflict with possibility. Every state of the world is merely one possible outcome. Not even necessity of every actual state ( "if X is exists, then X must be") can overcome possibility. For states of the world to have logical necessity ("X is true anywhere, no matter what exists") is incoherent.

Indeed. I am talking about the relationship of necessity though. That the actuality/necessity of P (Paris exists as the capital of France) does not preclude the possibility of Paris being (or not being) the capital. The possible worlds (possibility) are true no matter what is necessary (actual). — TheWillowOfDarkness

That doesn't make any sense. You are not using "necessary", or "possible world" in the same way any one else uses those terms. "Necessary" doesn't mean "actual", and, yes, the necessity of some proposition P does preclude the possibility of not-P. You are letting talk of possible worlds confuse you. Also, possible worlds aren't true or false. Possible worlds aren't propositions. A possible world just is a way the world could possibly be (or have been). Paris being the capital of France (during some specified time interval) isn't a possible world, but rather is part of the specification of a possible world. Possible worlds, or the possibilities that are part of their specifications, can't be true of false anymore than a carrot can be true or false. Propositions are true or false; objects aren't.

As mentioned, I started sending the question that troubled Pierre and I to professionals to get the low down. The answer from Scott Soames is below. The email was:

Paris is the capital of France.

Could this statement be necessarily true?

Viewpoint A: Yes. It depends on the intentions of the speaker. If the speaker means by "France" the actual France, then there is only one possible world that includes this object. Therefore, if the statement is true, it's necessarily true. If the speaker meant an object that is included in multiple possible worlds, then it would not be necessarily true.

Viewpoint B: No. When we speak of the "actual France" (with Paris as its capital) we aren't talking about a object numerically distinct from any "alternative France" (e.g. France with Toulouse as its capital). In all possible worlds where France exists, it is the same object having various determinations, which is just to say that we are considering the very same object (that we refer to in the actual world) having counterfactual determinations. Hence the speaker's intentions alluded to above seem irrelevant to the question. Secondly, this question of the necessity of the statement "Paris is the capital of France", as interpreted in English, is ambiguous since it appears to conjoin two distinct claims of de re necessity: (1) regarding France, that it has Paris as its capital necessarily, and (2) regarding Paris, that it be France's capital necessarily. Both claims seem prima facie false although a case could possibly be made for the second one being true if Paris had arisen historically as France's capital (and depending on one's ideas about city individuation.) — email

The criticism of viewpoint A given in viewpoint B is correct.

However, the question Is the sentence 'Paris is the capital of France' necessary? is not ambiguous -- provided we are asking about the necessity of the proposition that is the semantic content of the English sentence. Since the sentence isn't ambiguous, it has a single meaning or semantic content. Either that content is a necessary truth or it isn't. In fact it isn't.

Qualification: Sentences with proper names typically can be used by speakers to make different but related statements. That is, assertive utterances of the same unambiguous sentence can result in different propositions being asserted. This is not a matter of the linguistic meaning of the sentence, it is a matter of slightly different uses of the sentence. However, the slightly different uses imagined in viewpoint B are alike in expressing slightly different propositions, neither of which is necessary.

Finally, your query indicates that you need to think about how words like 'actual' and 'actually' work. Different theorists have different views. Mine is given in a paper titled "Actually." You can find a manuscript version of it on my website. The published version is most easily found in my Philosophical Essays, Volume 2. — Scott Soames

Thanks for posting Soames' commentary, Mongrel. And thanks to Soames for commenting!

Sure. I thanked him. I'm reading some of the essays he pointed me toward as well.

Chalmers wrote back that he agreed with you. None of the lesser known philosophy people wrote me back. Yet.

This is the perspective of Dr Bernard Linsky, professor at U of Alberta.

Dear Ms Dunnagan and Mr Normand, I think that if both "France" and "Paris" are proper names, and hence rigid designators, that
"Paris is the actual capital of France", where that means "Actually, Paris is the capital of France" is clearly a necessary truth, and a posteriori, since we must know a contingent truth about the actual world to know that "Paris is the capital of France" is true in the actual world. Of course, if either "Paris" or "France" is not intended as a proper name, the truth of the assertion will depend on the intentions with which it is uttered. Also, "Paris is the capital of France" (without any mention of what is actually the case) could of course be false in a world where Toulouse is the capital. So, if one just hears that last sentence uttered, there are all sorts of ways of interpreting it, but the standard meaning, in which "Paris" and "France" are proper names, produces a contingent sentence, unless some use of "actual" or "actually" is included in which case it becomes necessary.
Does that help?
Bernard Linsky — Dr Linsky

Uh.. this answer is on the verge of confusing me. I haven't finished Soames' essay Actually. Maybe after I finish it, I'll be able to assess this answer a little better.

BTW.. This is Soames' essay if anybody's interested. It's on his website.

Actually

LOL Scott Soames senpai noticed us ^_^

LOL Scott Soames senpai noticed us ^_^ — The Great Whatever

What?

So Dr Linsky is right:

Since adding the actuality operator to a contingent truth produces a necessary truth, and since it is widely assumed that adding it to a truth that is knowable only aposteriori preserves aposteriority, the actuality operator is often seen as a rich source of the necessary aposteriori.........Although these results appear obvious, it is wise to withhold judgment on them until we have a clearer picture of what the actual world-state really is. — Soames' essay, Actually

You actually have to use the actually operator to turn a contingent truth into a necessary one. Why couldn't it just be implied? What Scott Soames is talking about here is not ordinary language use.... that's why.

Bizarre.

LOL Scott Soames senpai noticed us ^_^ — The Great Whatever

Cute.

You actually have to use the actually operator to turn a contingent truth into a necessary one. — Mongrel

Yes, under the interpretation that Soames proposes, under Kaplan's 2D semantic framework, that is indeed the case. But one must be careful about what proposition is thereby taken to be necessarily true. First, notice that 'Actually...' is a sentential operator that operates on a complete sentence suitable as to expresses different propositions in a variety of context/situation pairs (where the context of utterance determines the references of the indexicals such as to determine the proposition expressed, and hence its truth conditions, and the situation refers to the state of the possible world relevant to the evaluation of the truth of this proposition. On Soames' proposed intepretation, 'Actually...' is a semantic device stating explicitly that the evaluation of the embedded sentence must take place at the actual world. Hence, if the sentence S is evaluated as true at the actual world (which we may find out a posteriori, through empirical investigation) then it is thereby necessarily true that 'actually S'. In that case, 'actually S' is not taken to be synonymous with the bare sentence 'S'. But neither one of them refers to distinct objects across possible worlds.

Yes. The fact that Soames asks in that essay 'Does the actual operator capture the common meaning of "actual"?' shows that he's not analyzing ordinary language.

Anyway.. "Actually, the capital of France is Paris."

We agree the above statement is necessarily true and aposteriori?

Cool.

Anyway.. "Actually, the capital of France is Paris."

We agree the above statement is necessarily true and aposteriori? — Mongrel

Let us denote "AS" the sentence "Actually, the capital of France is Paris."

Agreed, if by "the above statement" you mean to refer to the proposition P1 expressed while uttering this sentence ("AS") in the actual world, then, indeed, this proposition P1 is necessarily true. Our being in the actual world (in which Paris happens to be, contingently, the capital of France) provides a context of utterance such that the sentence "AS" can be used to express a necessarily true proposition. The proposition P1 therefore is true at all possible worlds.

Be aware, however, that in possible worlds in which Paris isn't the capital of France, the very same sentence "AS" -- "Actually, the capital of France is Paris." -- can be used to express a proposition P2 that is necessarily false (assuming that ordinary English is also in use in that possible world, or else a suitable translation of the sentence "AS" can be used). Hence, a fortiori, the proposition P2 thus expressed in such a world is false at the actual world! We must thus evaluate, empirically, whether or not Paris is the capital of France in order to know whether the proposition expressed by us with the use of "AS" is necessarily true or necessarily false.

But all of this just is a quirk of the actuality operator as interpreted in two-dimensional semantics. It has nothing to do with the essentialness (or lack thereof) for France to have Paris as its capital, or for Paris to be France's capital. The latter rather has to do with the socio/historical/conceptual roots of the concepts of cities, nations and capitals.

Actually, the capital of France is Paris. This is an example of aposteriori necessity.

We're so smart to have figured that out. The fact that we aren't examining ordinary language is significant here, Pierre. It means there's an artificial, stilted element to the proceedings. The conclusion is constructed. It's not something that follows from any logic and therefore being able to repeat that conclusion is not a sign of wisdom... certainly not a love of wisdom.

I'm not quite sure why it ended up this way, though. Is it that ordinary language is just too complex to fathom? Possibly. AP started out examining fake languages with the hope that something would be learned in the process.. something that would advance understanding of ordinary language.

It didn't work out that way, I don't think.