Take a look at the old Stoic conception of the cosmopolis (the universal polis). That was the first conception of a citizen detached from local political entities. However, in my not humble opinion, the last 2,000 years of history have shown that universal citizenship is a concept for the very, very few. Most of mankind requires, in an absolutely necessary way, some kind of shelter from the superhuman forces (cosmic, social, political, historical, economic, psychological) governing human life as we know it. The detachment of cosmopolitarianism is inaccessible for that enormous majority of people. Is this bad? I'm not in the business of judging the workings of the universe, but I lean towards answering "no" on account of my natural optimism.

I was thinking of how the Romans had a pretty advanced concept of the universal citizen for the region they were in, but actually there has been similar substitutes elsewhere as well, the Iroquois League Confederacy being one of them. In the Iroquois League Confederacy, inter-tribal breeding was encouraged, and intra-tribal breeding discouraged. Then, there are less elaborate forms, for instance tribes that believed that the human species itself was to be protected, and this stemmed from the polydeist religious views that came from them. In some hill tribes up here in the North of Thailand, there are remnants of the old Nat religion, which, prior to the Burmese incorporating into their city-state for hegemonic control, was similar to many religions that saw spirits in all things.

However, to address Mariner's point about the necessity for shelter from superhuman forces, in the modern era, the advancement of the concept of the universal citizen came during the industrial age, which was, of course, building on the concepts built during the Renaissance. The idea is that since now (even in the early 1800s) productivity potentialities has increased so manifold, it makes no sense to keep the hierarchical structure that is found in nation-states or old centralized tribalist societies, but that is makes more sense to simply open up society and let people simply migrate freely. This seems to be the root of the "no human is illegal" saying that migrant rights activists seem to use.

This raises interesting questions about the role of the quite novel concept, the universal citizen, a class of individuals that really don't identify with any particular village, tribe, or nation-state, but rather identifies with humanity as a whole. This is actually reflected in material form with things like the previous League of Nations, or the United Nations today (although in practice it is merely an arena for conflicts over nation states), International Socialist Movements, Worker's Movements, Anarchist Movements, Marxism, International Solidarity, Doctor's Without Borders, and so on. The concept of the universal citizen has its roots, likely, in some sort of egalitarian thought, but was then co-opted by the nationalists into a concept that justifies empire and eminent domain over others. — discoii

The League of Nations and the UN both came out of despair related to world war. Like: "Surely we aren't stupid enough to keep doing this to ourselves."

I think you could look at nation-states in terms of natural selection. There was something about them that was irresistible in both positive and negative ways. If the rise of that form of life now threatens the human species, an alteration is on the horizon.

The UN and League of Nations concept came from a Kantian legal theorist named Hans Kelsen, basing it off of the concept of the universal man as can be found in Kant's Perpetual Peace.

As for natural selection, I don't know, can you elaborate?

Well, productivity is swell, of course, and nowadays we have much less to fear from wild animals, the occasional thunderstorm, etc. But there are still tremendous superhuman forces lurking around (many of them have been created by the advancement of technology), and much more than 99% of all humans still need some shelter. It's not just a Rolling Stones' song.

Nations and other social constructs (such as -- to take the discussion into a completely different direction -- monasteries) will be required as long as people need shelter. The dream of the bios theoretikos among like-minded friends, good family, in an affluent position, is nothing more than a limit towards which our most intelligent members aim at. And it will be so for some centuries at least, in my appraisal.

Or Tsar Alexander's Holy Alliance. Maybe there are different ways to think of origin.. the first appearance of the idea vs why they actually did it.

Regarding natural selection.. over time, some cultures survive and others are lost (often subsumed). Military power and some kind of intolerance (ethnic, religious, etc.) can both be seen as cultural survival tactics. A strong sense of group identity is perhaps another. The British had all three. Today, pretty much the same British imprint can be seen in places all over the world. The effects of that sort of thing can be somewhat hidden because when a perspective becomes ubiquitous, it falls out of consciousness. There are portions of the Islamic world where the British Effect is in view. Pakistan is an example of a nation that wanted to be an Islamic state, but the British culture it previously absorbed is stuck there. They can't get rid of it because it's part of who they are now.

↪discoii Well, productivity is swell, of course, and nowadays we have much less to fear from wild animals, the occasional thunderstorm, etc. But there are still tremendous superhuman forces lurking around (many of them have been created by the advancement of technology), and much more than 99% of all humans still need some shelter. It's not just a Rolling Stones' song. — Mariner

Of course, and as people live in certain places, they adapt to it, as usual. But I'm confused, can you tell me how this would be an indictment of the idea about dropping the concept of nation states?

Nations and other social constructs (such as -- to take the discussion into a completely different direction -- monasteries) will be required as long as people need shelter. The dream of the bios theoretikos among like-minded friends, good family, in an affluent position, is nothing more than a limit towards which our most intelligent members aim at. And it will be so for some centuries at least, in my appraisal. — Mariner

One of the issues, in my experience, as far as this global bios theoretikos goes, is that there is an inefficiency when it comes to the ability for decision making to be made upon there being an influx of new people to certain areas. However, take any nation state today: people already move from place to place that previously would be considered territories of the others. In the United States, people move literally cross continent. I guess my point is that there seems to be no theoretical reason why this couldn't be applied globally.

Regarding natural selection.. over time, some cultures survive and others are lost (often subsumed). Military power and some kind of intolerance (ethnic, religious, etc.) can both be seen as cultural survival tactics. A strong sense of group identity is perhaps another. The British had all three. Today, pretty much the same British imprint can be seen in places all over the world. The effects of that sort of thing can be somewhat hidden because when a perspective becomes ubiquitous, it falls out of consciousness. There are portions of the Islamic world where the British Effect is in view. Pakistan is an example of a nation that wanted to be an Islamic state, but the British culture it previously absorbed is stuck there. They can't get rid of it because it's part of who they are now. — Mongrel

I see, and I think I agree insofar as nationalisms can be explained through a historical cultural evolution that came through hegemonic institutions set up throughout the years. Nationalism is the cartoonish ideological apparatus--the less paint you have, the thinner it is the coat, so to speak, and applying a nationalism across 130 million people in Pakistan is incredibly difficult. This is apparent from the huge amounts of conflict within Pakistan itself between different sects of people.

However, in my view, this concept of the nation-state is actually quite unnatural and is only conjured up as a result of nationalist ideologies. — discoii

I disagree on the naturality aspect. I think here far too much emphasized is the 19th Century and the nationalist ideologies of that time. Here in what I disagree (and hence might not be at all disagreeing with you) is the assumption that somehow before there wasn't anything similar to a nation state or comparable to the ideologies of the 19th Century nationalism. That somehow everything was invented then... and that it's so artificial that we ought to forget get it.

First example that comes to my mind is also Rome.

First Romans were defined as the people in the City of Rome. Then the surrounding areas. Then Italy. And later with the edict of Caracalla in 212 AD Roman citizenship was enlarged to the whole Empire (all free men in the Roman Empire were to be given full Roman citizenship and all free women in Empire were given the same rights as Roman women were). And when the Roman Empire was cut into two, the East Romans didn't at all consider them to be "East Romans" and especially not "Byzantinians", which was a derogatory name given by West Europeans, they saw themselves as Romans, clear and simple. And they had every right to use the term, far more that the later western monarchies.

But dicoii, is being a Roman a concept of universal citizen?

Romans, just like the Greeks, made a notion of them being Romans and others being the lowly Barbarians. Actuall Roman citizenry is far more closer to the classical citizenry of the nation states we have now. We shouldn't forget that many nation-states are indeed a hodgepodge of different people with different languages and cultures, actually. A lot of them compromise various people: the French, the British, the Germans etc. are exactly these kind of "universal" definitions. Especially the British example is obvious, yet this "artificial" and "created" term did just some time ago show it's power with Scotland not going out of the UK.

(go figure what is artificial and what is not...)


Was being Roman an artificial thing, conjured up by leaders? Sure, but how artificial was it? Because any kind of collective group based on geography, culture, language, seems also quite artificial... where the people actually don't know each other. Just what is a culture is also defined by people, invented. And even with language it can be difficult. Just how many use English? Do they all really form a single entity a common group?

Just as Mariner said, "the last 2,000 years of history have shown that universal citizenship is a concept for the very, very few". Universal citizenship is the thing truly artificial in my view too. It's basically a normative definition, a desire to see people in a new way that they typically don't see themselves.

The world may or may not be entering a post post-westphalian era, and even if it is, no one has the slightest idea how long s complete transition might require, how long the post post-westphalian regime will endure, and whether anyone will think the new post-post world order was a good idea 100 years from now.

The collapse of regimes like Assad's Syria, Gaddafi's Libya, Hussein's Iraq and a few others are not in the same city and league, let alone the same ballpark, as the EU's efforts to submerge the states of Europe in a transnational union. The waves of refugees from the middle east are pursuing personal survival strategies. They may, to a significant extent, isolate themselves in Syrian or Iraqi enclaves--a transplanted Syria or Iraq in Sweden.

Mariner is quite right that people need protection from superhuman, or at least superinstitutional forces like transnational corporations or transnational drug cartels. Ruthless exploitation, environmental degradation, global warming, famine, pandemics, and corruption can not be individually defended against, except here and there where a few people have found pleasant niches in out of the way places--for the time being. The list of overwhelming threats is quite long.

It is quite easy to spot a wrinkle, turn it into a trend, and then declare it the inevitable new wave. Somethings work that way, but when it does it is usually because a corporation has decided to make it so. Cell phones, for instance.

Post Westphalian state

One can observe that nationalism today not only persists but is rearing its ugly head in new movements. Far-right nationalist parties are gaining in popularity in Europe, with right-wing and anti-migrant (so-called 'Euro-skeptical') parties just now winning elections in Poland and Switzerland. The successor to the Nazi party in Austria is polling over 30 percent, and Denmark's right-wing is enjoying popularity. These are all more popular than Golden Dawn in Greece, even though the Greek fascists were treated with more anxious international attention—not so much due to the supposed bleeding-heart concern of liberal Europe as self-interest considering EU fiscal policy was on the line. This is all to just name a few examples, and they are all now riding waves of populist anti-migrant protests in the wake of the influx of refugees.

But I think discoii hits upon a worthwhile point that these nationalisms are reactive in the face of increasing structural importance of inter-state unions that increasingly diminish the sovereignty of individual nation-states. This is in stark contrast to the romantic nationalism of 19th Century popular movements when the particular liberal character of states was at stake in its structural relation to capitalist economic structures and persistent landed aristocratic wealth. The horizons of what the nation-state would be were still open to some degree, and the particular nature of modern capitalist nation-state was to be determined in the field of political struggle. Now nationalist ideologies are retrospective, nostalgic, and fantastical. It can only refer back to an idealized conception of national sovereignty that, according to the ideological mind, if restored in its proper form we could free ourselves from the postmodern discontents surrounding the pressures and demands of increasingly global capitalist economic structures.

I don't think that what is at stake here is the very existence of broad and unifying biopolitical infrastructure, but rather what that infrastructure might be, and in some sense the 'question' of the nature of the state is opening up again to be contested. It's worth noting that many of the 'superhuman' or 'superinstitutional' threats that Mariner brought up that we face today are largely generated, or intensified, by the very institutions that are ostensibly there to protect us. The economic crisis of 2008, as well as the debt crisis in Europe were generated by factors inherent in the basic logic and operation of the system itself. In any case, what is in question in this thread is the particular formulation of the Westphalian system.

The election of left-wing governments in Greece and (now) Portugal seems to demonstrate what has happened to the Westphalian conception of the state. All three traditionally formulated 'principles' of the Westphalian system seem to be a joke (although it could be argued that they never really meaningfully applied). Individual states do not have sovereignty and self-determination, as even electing a political leadership of individuals that are anti-capitalist seems to offer no effect; the state of Greece itself is forced and compelled to act in a certain way due to various institutional and structural constrains of the economic union it is in, and in virtue of it occupying a place in a global capitalist economy. There is no assumed equality of states because the union itself privileges core states, especially Germany, whose finance minister was able to not only force its interests on Greece but to strong arm other 'stronger' European states like France. But most of all it privileges the interests of transnational corporations. And far from non-intervention in internal affairs, the agreement requires the Greeks to allow European technocrats to manage the market liberalization reforms and fire-sale of publicly-owned assets.

I'm not sure how anyone paying attention could take the pluralistic theory of the state seriously. Sovereignty lies with those interests and institutions that reserve the right to a state of exception. Individual state's political institutions don't mean anything if they can be outright suspended by force or coercion by inter-state parties. State power is the instrument of the dominant class and can be reformulated at need, either explicitly with your stamp of approval, or behind closed doors and through 'deep state' mechanisms (this isn't necessarily against a structuralist view, as per Althusser for example, but the trend seems to diminish what relative autonomy the state continues to have). It's interesting that discoii brought up how Chuck Hagel and elements of the American government itself is preparing strategically for this prospect. Probably this is reflected in the TPP and TTIP to begin to reformulate international political and legal infrastructure to reflect the demands of global capital, considering under the agreements transnational corporations can sue local states if it deems legislation (environmental or labor regulation, for example) hurts their profits. But of course the particulars are secret, so I can't be sure, but then again that's a part of the point.