1. If one is fully committed to physical determinism, one is necessarily committed to the proposition that the laws of nature, together with the prior physical state, fully specify future states. Thus, teleology need posit no vitalistic principle and objections to vitalism are irrelevant. — Dfpolis
For example, the theory of evolution is proffered as illustrating the triumph of mechanism over teleology. — Dfpolis
Evolution offers a triumph over teleology by providing a causal explanation for teleology, thus clarifying the primacy of causality over teleology. — Hanover
This is it, it seems to me. As explanation, it stands or falls as explanation; and as explanation I'll leave its value to others to determine. A problem arises on the insistence of its advocates that it's accurate/true. As explanation, it needs be neither. As accurate/true, it must be exactly that: accurate and true: but by the terms in which it is usually presented, it can't be.Teleology is a projection of nature that explains — Dfpolis
Biologists for a while were prepared to say a turtle came ashore and laid its eggs. These verbal scruples were intended as a rejection of teleology but were based on the mistaken view that the efficiency of final causes is necessarily implied by the simple description of an end-directed mechanism. … The biologists long-standing confusion would be removed if all end-directed systems were described by some other term, e.g., 'teleonomic', in order to emphasize that recognition and description of end-directedness does not carry a commitment to Aristotelian teleology as an efficient causal principle.
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The concept of teleonomy was largely developed by Mayr and Pittendrigh to separate biological evolution from teleology. Pittendrigh's purpose was to enable biologists who had become overly cautious about goal-oriented language to have a way of discussing the goals and orientations of an organism's behaviors without inadvertently invoking teleology. Mayr was even more explicit, saying that while teleonomy certainly operates on the level of organisms, the process of evolution itself is necessarily non-teleonomic.
Mayr says, 'The existence of complex codes of information in the DNA of the germ plasm permits teleonomic purposiveness. On the other hand, evolutionary research has found no evidence whatsoever for a "goal-seeking" of evolutionary lines, as postulated in that kind of teleology which sees "plan and design" in nature. The harmony of the living universe, so far as it exists, is an a posteriori product of natural selection.
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Philosophy: In teleology, Kant's positions as expressed in Critique of Judgment, were neglected for many years because in the minds of many scientists they were associated with vitalist views of evolution [and 'vitalism' is strictly taboo]. Their recent rehabilitation is evident in teleonomy, which bears a number of features, such as the description of organisms, that are reminiscent of the Aristotelian conception of final causes....
Kant's position is that, even though we cannot know whether there are final causes in nature, we are constrained by the peculiar nature of the human understanding to view organisms teleologically. Thus the Kantian view sees teleology as a necessary principle for the study of organisms, but only as a regulative principle, and with no ontological implications.
the biological hypothesis that organisms have an innate tendency to evolve in a definite direction towards some goal (teleology) due to some internal mechanism or 'driving force'. According to the theory, the largest-scale trends in evolution have an absolute goal such as increasing biological complexity. Prominent historical figures who have championed some form of evolutionary progress include Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Henri Bergson.
There's an interesting Wikipedia article on the word 'teleonomy', coined in 1958 to describe the apparent 'purposefulness and goal-directedness of structures and functions in living organisms'. — Wayfarer
I had also begun to argue, however, in a manuscript titled Autonomy, Consequences and Teleology, that the Darwinian(*) process of natural evolution though natural selection is teleological, in the internal sense, in a manner that is entirely derivative from the internal teleological structure of the physiology (and/or behavior) of living beings that aren't merely being passively sorted out by natural selection, but that are thus selected while (and as a partial result of) being actively struggling to survive, and seeking to flourish, within their natural and social co-evolved Umwelten. — Pierre-Normand
Yet both selected and unselected organisms exhibit the intention to flourish. Or are you saying we should look at the whole group (or the group and its environment) as an evolving, living thing? — frank
An organism, for instance, engages in some sort of behavior in order to quench its thirst. If it tends to succeed, thanks to some heritable feature of its physiology or anatomy, then this feature tends to be positively selected. And the reason why descendants thereafter exhibit this feature, and have the ability to engage in the behavior that such structures enable, is precisely because they subserve the end that was being actively pursued by the ancestor: namely, quenching its thirst — Pierre-Normand
I'll later edit this post to provide references to a couple of interesting papers that have argued that Darwin himself likely was more of an Aristotelian (internal) teleologist than he was a reductive physicalist; although he was, for sure, arguing against external teleology, or against Paley's design argument. — Pierre-Normand
So the feature was highlighted for selection by the organism's quest to survive. I'm not sure that will generalize, though. Consider the moths who turned black because they lived in a town that was covered in coal dust. The white moths were all eaten by birds. The black moths weren't trying to hide. And I can't think of some behavior they were engaged in that links turning black to their quest to survive. Can you? — frank
I am arguing for the irreducibility of teleological explanations, not for their being the sole forms of explanations of all the inherited features of organisms. — Pierre-Normand
Evolution offers a triumph over teleology by providing a causal explanation for teleology, thus clarifying the primacy of causality over teleology. — Hanover
If I want to know why the bird flies south in the winter, and all I am told are the details related to how the bird's neurons fire and muscles contract, surely I know less than if I'm told "so he can find food when it gets cold." — Hanover
if I want to know why the bird wants to eat and I keep asking these "why" questions, at some point I'm going to resort to causality (namely evolution). — Hanover
If one took a different approach and thought of teleological explanations as primary, one would demand to know the purpose of one's life, not just demand a recitation of the meandering path that led one to one's dead end job — Hanover
And isn't that where the theological/scientific compatibility arises, where the theologian finally concedes the existence of evolution, but then asks for what great purpose did our Creator implement the existence of evolution? — Hanover
Are you saying that teleology doesn't entail vitalism since it is consistent, on your view, with "physical determinism"? Are you thus committed to defend a form of compatibilism regarding teleology and (nomological or physicalist) determinism? — Pierre-Normand
Meanwhile, biology students are taught to eschew talk of biological ends. — Dfpolis
Philosophical naturalists reject finality, not because doing so is rational, but because it threatens their faith position — Dfpolis
In biology in general, though, it's built into the way we talk about organisms. We think of them as causally closed systems. — frank
Simply, as description, it can't be. And as explanation in human terms, it cannot be (because the subjects are not human). — tim wood
Exactly so! Evolution is what needs to be understood first, and not as the behaviour of living things. Evolution is an idea, a theory. The two must be kept separate in thinking, and not confused with each other.I think it is fair to say that the need for adequate nutrition drove the evolution of the animals' migratory capabilities, — Dfpolis
Sure: 1) a description is not what it describes, and 2) Non-human things are not human things. I think these stand as self-evident.It seems that you are offering no argument, merely a claim. — Dfpolis
I reproduce part of my post from above.As for the truth of teleology as an explanation, the only question is: Is teleology adequate to reality. — Dfpolis
As explanation, it stands or falls as explanation; and as explanation I'll leave its value to others to determine. — tim wood
The biologists long-standing confusion would be removed if all end-directed systems were described by some other term, e.g., 'teleonomic', in order to emphasize that recognition and description of end-directedness does not carry a commitment to Aristotelian teleology as an efficient causal principle.
Pittendrigh's purpose was to enable biologists who had become overly cautious about goal-oriented language to have a way of discussing the goals and orientations of an organism's behaviors without inadvertently invoking teleology.
evolutionary research has found no evidence whatsoever for a "goal-seeking" of evolutionary lines, as postulated in that kind of teleology which sees "plan and design" in nature. The harmony of the living universe, so far as it exists, is an a posteriori product of natural selection.
Kant's position is that, even though we cannot know whether there are final causes in nature, we are constrained by the peculiar nature of the human understanding to view organisms teleologically. Thus the Kantian view sees teleology as a necessary principle for the study of organisms, but only as a regulative principle, and with no ontological implications.
the biological hypothesis that organisms have an innate tendency to evolve in a definite direction towards some goal (teleology) due to some internal mechanism or 'driving force'.
My view is that methodological naturalism certainly must put aside or bracket out any consideration of an overarching purpose or intentionality. — Wayfarer
I was never a biology student (and neither were you, AFAIK), — SophistiCat
You know, when you write something as obnoxious as that, one is discouraged from reading further. — SophistiCat
Nowhere in this is the idea that any bird ever "wanted" to leave, say, Northern Saskatchewan and fly to Tierra del Fuego - and back. But teleology, in invoking purpose and attributing it to the living thing, supposes exactly this. — tim wood
a description is not what it describes — tim wood
Non-human things are not human things. — tim wood
But do you agree with my limitation on teleology? It may help if you distinguish "nature" from human nature - perhaps one as genus, the other as species. — tim wood
That does not mean that seeds lack a determinate potential (telos) to become mature plants. — Dfpolis
it is not at all clear to me that the seed has any potential anywhere (or, where is it?). In other words, the potential is all ours. — tim wood
Talk about fighting straw men! Aristotle never claimed ends were efficient causes. The author lacks the most rudimentary understanding of Aristotle's four "causes." — Dfpolis
The entire structure of Kantian philosophy has been rebutted by modern physics. — Dfpolis
My view is that methodological naturalism certainly must put aside or bracket out any consideration of an overarching purpose or intentionality.
— Wayfarer
Why? If humans are natural and teleological explanation applies to us, why should methodological naturalism exclude it a priori? — Dfpolis
The entire structure of Kantian philosophy has been rebutted by modern physics. — Dfpolis
I'm sorry, but I think that is entirely mistaken — Wayfarer
Because of what methodological naturalism deals with. Its job is to consider causal relationships evident in empirical experience, not to seek first principles or ultimate causes. — Wayfarer
Then you will not mind explaining how what Kant thought to be literally unthinkable (alternate views of space, time and causality) were thought and accepted in light of empirical discoveries — Dfpolis
I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. (CPR, A369)
The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance– which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing – matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are called 'external', not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another, but that space itself is in us. (A370)
i have read enough of Heisenberg and Bohr to know that their views on observation are Aristotelian, not Kantian. Heisenberg even wrote a paper in which he proposed that energy was Aristotelian prime matter. — Dfpolis
Considering potential things to be real is not exactly a new idea, as it was a central aspect of the philosophy of Aristotle, 24 centuries ago. An acorn has the potential to become a tree; a tree has the potential to become a wooden table. Even applying this idea to quantum physics isn’t new. Werner Heisenberg, the quantum pioneer famous for his uncertainty principle, considered his quantum math to describe potential outcomes of measurements of which one would become the actual result. The quantum concept of a “probability wave,” describing the likelihood of different possible outcomes of a measurement, was a quantitative version of Aristotle’s potential, Heisenberg wrote in his well-known 1958 book Physics and Philosophy. “It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.”
Thus, Aristotle never considers actual appearances "as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility)." For him, being perceptible is not a stand-alone feature. It exists only relative to a perceiving subject. Specifically, space and time do not exist independently of being measured. Aristotle famously defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." So, space and time are not independent existents (a la Newton), but the result of measuring space-like and time-like measurability, in conformity with Aristotle's general understanding of quantity:Things are 'relative' (1) as double to half, and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as that which can heat to that which can be heated, and that which can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception. — Metaphysics, Delta, 15
'Quantity' means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a 'one' and a 'this'. A quantity is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is a measurable. — Metaphysics, Delta, 13
It is exactly the 'mind-independence of sensible objects' which has been called into question by physics - which is why I think Kant's basic thesis is still directly relevant. — Wayfarer
Aristotelian moderate realists do not fit the straw man definition of "transcendental realism" — Dfpolis
It is exactly the 'mind-independence of sensible objects' which has been called into question by physics - which is why I think Kant's basic thesis is still directly relevant.
— Wayfarer
Not at all. What is called into question is the Platonic notion that numbers exist prior to counting and measuring operations. Rather, they are the result of measuring and counting operations. Measure numbers in particular are the result of an interaction between the measurable and the measuring operation. Both relativity and quantum theory tell us that measure numbers depend jointly on the prior state of the system and the type of measurement being made. — Dfpolis
Kant introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble 1 . — Emrys Westacott
Specifically, space and time do not exist independently of being measured. Aristotle famously defines time as "the measure of change according to before and after." So, space and time are not independent existents (a la Newton), but the result of measuring space-like and time-like measurability, in conformity with Aristotle's general understanding of quantity: — Dfpolis
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