• Francesco di Piertro
    7
    Recently I came across the Argument from Moral Autonomy against the existence of a God, which I believe was originally posed by James Rachels. Rachel’s argument includes two key factors for showing that the existence of morally autonomous beings disproves the existence of a God.

    The first key factor to understand in this argument is that Rachels suggests that the concept of a God – one that is on par with the greatest conceivable being – usually refers to that being as worthy of worship. The term “worthy of worship”, for Rachels, seems to refer to a being that is entitled to unconditional obedience.

    The second factor that is key to understanding Rachel’s argument is that he suggests humans tend to think of themselves as morally autonomous agents – that is, human beings are the deciders of their own actions. They may listen to the council of others or have outside agents influencing their decisions, but at the end of the day, determine as individuals what ought to be done.

    Thus, I have done my best to summarize Rachels' Argument from Moral Autonomy as follows:

      1. If any being aligns with the concept of a God (GCB), then that being will be worthy of worship (unconditional obedience).
      2. Unconditional obedience to such a God would require abandonment of one’s moral autonomy.
      3. Human beings exist as morally autonomous agents.
      3a.It is not possible for morally autonomous agents to owe anyone or anything unconditional obedience.
      4. Therefore, there is no God for human beings that is worthy of worship (unconditional obedience) (1,2,3, MP).
      5. Therefore, there is no God (1,4, MP).

      I personally object to premise two of this argument. I think that human beings can utilize their own moral autonomy to choose unconditional obedience to a God that is in line with a GCB. I find no issue with considering that though one may be morally autonomous, he can still choose to limit his moral autonomy, to the best of his ability, to do what is morally good. It also makes sense that within the various major world religions that posit the existence of a God that is on par with a GCB, sacrificing the autonomy to do moral evils is aligned with obedience to the will of such a God. Of course human beings will fail to perfectly hold themselves to a standard of this sort, but if one chooses to attempt unconditional obedience to a God whose commands are morally good, I see no reason why that individual would not still be morally autonomous. I view humans of this kind as morally autonomous agents who have individually decided that obedience to the will of a GCB God, which imposes limitations on their moral autonomy to choose to do evil, is the best morally autonomous decision they could make on how to best live.

      I look forward to hearing your thoughts on this argument and on my objection.
  • Sir2u
    3.5k
    the concept of a God – one that is on par with the greatest conceivable being – usually refers to that being as worthy of worship.Francesco di Piertro

    If there was such a god, everyone would give unconditional obedience and devotion to it. Humans are by nature worshippers of things that are above what is considered normal, natural or beyond their realms of existence. Exceptional beauty, great athletes, great artists of all kinds, even Kartrashians backside are worshipped by many.

    If such a god said do not kill, steal, lie, cheat on the missus, who would have the courage or desire to go against its wishes? No one, all would willing give up their free will and moral autonomy to live the good life under its guidance. Why not, there would be nothing to lose and lots to gain by doing so.
    Unconditional obedience to such a God would not requireabandonment of one’s moral autonomy, but no one would want to invoke the privilege of moral autonomy because they would be living in paradise.

    In real life everyone goes against its wishes at some time or other. Most people also think they know what is best for them better than anyone else(god included) does.

    If an advance civilization came to visit us tomorrow and gave us all of the knowledge we needed to save our planet and build a future that is easy, healthy, and eliminates all kinds of barriers in mankind and asked nothing in return except that we use the knowledge for well being, what do you think would happen?
    Would we be able to follow their simple directive? Could we eliminate discrimination and biases? Or would we still want to "do what ever we wanted"?
  • Sam26
    2.7k
    I think that any such being wouldn't want us to worship him/her/it. Nor would any such being want us to be obedient to their demands. That's seems to be a human construction. Especially if that being loved us unconditionally.
  • flight747
    15
    Although I do see where the author is going with their argument, I feel there are some weaknesses in their argument. I will recopy the outline of the argument and afterwards challenge them:

    1. If any being aligns with the concept of a God (GCB), then that being will be worthy of worship (unconditional obedience).
    2. Unconditional obedience to such a God would require abandonment of one’s moral autonomy.
    3. Human beings exist as morally autonomous agents.
    3a.It is not possible for morally autonomous agents to owe anyone or anything unconditional obedience.
    4. Therefore, there is no God for human beings that is worthy of worship (unconditional obedience) (1,2,3, MP).
    5. Therefore, there is no God (1,4, MP).

    I challenge premise three on the basis that some human beings are not, in fact, morally autonomous agents. For example, many disabled human beings cannot exert their moral autonomy because they are challenged in some cases mentally or physically. As a result, another individual has to exert morality over them, guiding them to do certain behaviors and avoid other ones. In view of this evidence that some human beings are not morally autonomous agents, the author’s argument is very well undermined. The author’s argument is undermined because how could a person without moral autonomy surrender their “no moral autonomy” to God, after deciding to believe in Him/Her/It? This concept would be absurd because some humans do not have any, adding doubt to the idea that to obey God one has to surrender moral autonomy.

    I definitely agree with you @Francesco di Piertro that a human being who is morally autonomous can choose to believe in a God that can offer them the best possible life without neglecting or surrendering their own autonomy. Where I do think the issue comes from is the institutions that claim to advocate for said God. In some religious institutions people do surrender their moral autonomy. For example, the Greensboro Baptist church in North Carolina is known to demand money and obedience from their attendees, and if they don’t, they forgo their chances of entering Heaven and be sent to Hell. In those instances, however, people are not surrendering their moral autonomy to a God but to a human institution and their rules. With this in mind, the issue is not God but rather religious institutions, because the concept of God which most people agree to is someone who is unconditionally loving.

    Thanks for your post!
  • LD Saunders
    312
    I reject premise one. Why would some supposedly greatest being of all be worthy of unconditional worship?

    I reject premise two. If the unconditional obedience aligned with one's moral beliefs, then how is there a conflict?

    I reject premise three. The science is still out on this issue, but, at present there appear to be many causes behind our beliefs and behaviors that are not fully within our control.
  • Relativist
    2.6k
    I reject the argument because it conflates moral autonomy with perfect knowledge of moral truths. Unlike a hypothetical God of religion (the sort of God that is worthy of worship), we are not omniscient. I am not relinquishing my moral autonomy by placing trust in a God who knows all moral truths, and is all-good, so would not steer me away from goodness.
  • CYU-5
    6
    Maybe I am missing something, but I don’t see the logical connection between premise 1 and 2. Premise 1 states that if any being aligns with the concept of God exists, such being will be worthy of worship or worthy of unconditional obedience. However, being worthy of worship or worthy of unconditional obedience doesn’t result in the actualization of any human being with moral autonomy worshiping this being or unconditionally obeying to this being necessarily. Despite the fact that it’s questionable whether such being’s identity or characters is fully revealed to human beings, even if both are revealed to human, it’s highly improbable that human beings can acquire and/or process such information. Even if human beings can acquire and/or process the amount of information that’s sufficient for them to realize such being’s worthiness, they are still not obligated to worship or unconditionally obey. Quite the contrary, if an individual is not able to choose otherwise given such information, it’s questionable whether this individual has moral autonomy at all. Each human being might choose to worship with careful moral consideration and judgement, but moral autonomy unlocks the possibility for them to choose otherwise, given autonomy allows one to make decisions independently without being distorted or determined by anything, including God. Only if the existence of any being aligns with the concept of God being worthy of worship or unconditional obedience entails the actualized worship and unconditional obedience from each human being, then would the discussion on the abandonment of one’s moral autonomy be relevant. Since premise 1 doesn’t state this entailment, I don’t think that premise 2 can be used with premise 1 to form an argument of the MP form as premise 4 stated.
  • reasonablewave
    9


    While I also disagree with Rachels' argument, I do not agree with your challenge to premise three. As such, I will counter your claim that "some human beings are not, in fact, morally autonomous agents." Rather than seeing human beings with disabilities as individuals who are at the mercy of others who "exert [their] morality over them," I'd argue that any human being who is able to take a morally significant action is a "morally autonomous agent," as used in premise three of Rachels' argument. While persons with disabilities may not have the same mental or physical capabilities as you or I, it does not seem reasonable to suggest that they are not autonomous.

    For instance, say Person A is incapacitated in such a way that the only control they have over their physical faculties is to use a device that allows them to move their wheelchair with the movement of their eyes. Otherwise, they cannot speak, move, etc. Yet, I would argue that they still have the potential to make morally significant choices. Sure, their opportunities for such actions may be minimal, but when they do arise they have that capacity. Should a small child be in danger of being run over by a lawnmower, they could move their wheelchair toward the lawnmower in order to indicate to the driver that there is a potential danger. This action, while small, is morally significant, because Person A could have instead chosen to not move their wheelchair and let the child be run over.

    In regard to mental disabilities, a similar thought process follows. Even if an individual only has the IQ of a 4 year old, they are still capable of autonomously making decisions that could have moral significance. Their ability to recognize and obey God is a different matter entirely, but that does not change the fact that they are able to make morally significant actions with or without the influence of God.

    In sum, my counterargument is as follows:
    1. If a human being is able to make a decision or take any action that ultimately proves to be morally significant, then that human being is a morally autonomous agent.

    2. Persons with mental and/or physical disabilities are able to make decisions and take actions that can ultimately prove to be morally significant.

    3. Therefore, persons with mental and/or physical disabilities are morally autonomous agents.
  • Belouie
    10


    I object to premise 1.

    As someone reading this argument in the context of the Christian faith, I feel as though premise 1 completely overlooks, at least, my own reason for worshiping God. I don't worship God simply because He is this great being, even if he is the GCB, that wouldn't be what makes Him worthy of my worship.

    What makes Him worthy of my worship is the fact that I have love for Him as my creator. The relationship between a creator and his creation is much more intimate than the relationship defined in premise 1.

    To help illustrate my point further, imagine a scenario in which the God that is worshipped by Christians, is not actually the GCB. Let's assume that in this scenario God, is the creator of our universe. However, perhaps he has a boss.

    I would feel inclined to worship God out of love for having created my entire universe and everything in it. As opposed to God's boss, who is still ultimately still the GCB in this scenario, however I would feel much less inclined to worship him over the God, because of the fact I bare no real connection to him.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    First, James Rachel's argument is just a complete mess in my opinion. It's not really worth bothering with. It's comically poor.

    However, I'm not sure your objection to the second premise makes a lot of sense as stated. For one, if one believed that a God exists in the "GCB" sense, then how would one believe that even a limited moral autonomy is justifiable? I could see maybe if you're solely thinking of issues where there's no clear moral proclamation from God. Is that what you're thinking?
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