Then you are aren't understanding, because it does not entail this at all. Oxygen molecules exist, and so do each of the oxygen atoms that comprise the molecule. This is not "dual existence" - it is simply a consistent mereological account. — Relativist
Once you understand it, you could perhaps try to find something incoherent - but you'll never understand it if you just dismiss the basics because it doesn't fit your preconceived model of reality. — Relativist
Armstrong's philosophy is broadly naturalistic. In Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Armstrong states that his philosophical system rests upon "the assumption that all that exists is the space time world, the physical world as we say". He justifies this by saying that the physical world "seems obviously to exist" while other things "seem much more hypothetical". From this fundamental assumption flows a rejection of abstract objects including Platonic forms.
Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects which aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.
His materialist theory of mind was only a component of his comprehensive metaphysics. Indeed it "stands or falls" with materialism - his comprehensive metaphysics aims to show that materialist metaphysics is coherent.ll, Armstrong’s major thesis was ‘A Materialist Theory of Mind.He certainly was no crackpot, but his philosophy stands or falls with materialism, and I don’t think his style of materialism is defensible, knowing what we now know from physics. — Wayfarer
Not really. It's consistent with atomism, but it's also consistent with quantum field theory.I mean, there are far too many unanswered questions about the nature of matter itself; his philosophy seems to assume a pretty simplistic kind of atomism,
Since when did physicists become good at metaphysics? A Platonic interpretation of mathematics is a consequence of the way it's conceptualized - it's an intellectual convenience.there are very many mathematical physicists who are indeed Platonist of some variety, with some of them adopting such views because of the discoveries associated with quantum mechanics — Wayfarer
Mathematics is essential to understanding much of the world (i.e. physics), but that doesn't change under physicalism. Physicalism just implies that the things that exist stand in relation to one another in ways that are describable mathematically. It seems more parsimonious than to think equations exist apart from the physical things they describe. Which brings up another of set of Armstrong's contributions: his theory of universals and his theory of natural law.there have been elaborate arguments developed about ‘the indispensability of mathematic — Wayfarer
How does the platonic entity "6" become get involved in the building of a collection of 6 objects, — Relativist
Some platonist accounts treat equations (which are abstract objects) as causally efficacious. — Relativist
That's not done in Armstrong's metaphysics. Remember that what exists is a state of affairs. 6 doesn't exist distinct from a state of affairs that has the property "6" .The problem here, as I see it, is treating a number - 6, in this case - as ‘an entity’ in the same sense that an object is an entity. — Wayfarer
How about as an "abstraction?" That fits the bill. The only possible point of contention is how we consider abstractions. If we treat them as mental objects, produced by the way of abstraction, that's consistent with physicalism. When we start treating them as existing apart from minds, that's platonism.But it can be said to be an object in a metaphorical sense, i.e. an 'intelligible object'.
I don't see the problem. The only "transcendence" I see is that universals exist, and relations between universals exist. This seems transcendent, but doesn't really entail true transcendent existence. We could explore this further.But I argue that there's a very deep problem of recursion in any naturalistic account, as we must already be able to count and to reason in order to even begin to develop such an account. That is the sense in which number (and the like) transcends a strictly empiricist account;
Agreed, and that's where metaphysics comes in. A lot of anti-physicalist analysis just counters the Humean tradition. The modern tradition (exemplified by Armstrong, Tooley, and Sosa) isn't subject to those problems.I don't think science actually explains the laws themselves;
The attitude you express seems consistent with physicalism. We kind of pretend "4" and equations exist, but they don't ACTUALLY exist apart from the states of affairs in which they are instantiated.So again, the platonist attitude is that such laws pertain to a different level or mode than the domain of phenomena; that being the 'formal realm', although that is not an expression that is in wide circulation. They don't exist - in a sense, they 'subsist' or underlie and inform the phenomenal domain, although the sense in which they are real is difficult to express in the current lexicon of philosophy.
You seem to be reading meaning into the word "object" that I didn't intend. I was just referring to existents - anything that can be said to exist. An oxygen atom can be said to exist. An oxygen molecule (consisting of two bound oxygen atoms) can be said to exist. This does not entail "dual existence." It is mereological. — Relativist
If we treat them as mental objects, produced by the way of abstraction, that's consistent with physicalism. When we start treating them as existing apart from minds, that's platonism. — Relativist
What the empiricist speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge plus unconsciously introduced intellective ingredients -- sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it.
I don't see the problem. — Relativist
We kind of pretend "4" and equations exist, but they don't ACTUALLY exist apart from the states of affairs in which they are instantiated. — Relativist
What exists apart from minds are the properties "1", "2", "3",... but that doesn't imply they exist detached from the states of affairs that have these properties. 7 marbles exist, 7 forks exist, and we can abstract out the property "7" from each of these states of affairs. There's a logical relation between the abstracted properties of "7" and "4", but that doesn't entail the existence of numbers except as mental entities.The way I express it is that the natural numbers (and the like) are the same for anyone who can count - hence, they exist apart from minds — Wayfarer
Physicalist theory of mind needn't deny the existence of mind. Certainly Armstrong didn't, nor do Jaegwon Kim and Michael Tye.That is why strictly physicalist philosophies of mind, like Dennett's, must deny that there actually is any mind. The very existence of mind defeats their philosophy.
7 marbles exist, 7 forks exist, and we can abstract out the property "7" from each of these states of affairs. — Relativist
There's a logical relation between the abstracted properties of "7" and "4", but that doesn't entail the existence of numbers except as mental entities. — Relativist
Physicalist theory of mind needn't deny the existence of mind. — Relativist
computers can be programmed to reason. — Relativist
Incoherent. Existence isn't "given". — Relativist
Consideration of parts doesn't entail dividing it. — Relativist
It would be overstatement to say the mind can only be understood in terms of X, for x=physicalism OR dualism (OR any other theory of mind). Some aspects of mind are easier to account for under physicalism, others are easier to account for under dualism. Being easier to account for doesn't make it true.But they all say that the mind can only be understood in terms of neurobiology, which amounts to almost the same. Sure the 'eliminativists' are more apparently radical, but all materialism must deny the primacy of mind - that's what makes them materialist, after all! — Wayfarer
Are you arguing intelligent design? My point is that the mental process can be accounted for under physicalism. The evolutionary development of a mind is another matter, but I don't see why that would be a problem. Traits that have a survival value are consistent with natural selection.computers can be programmed to reason. — Relativist
Computers are instruments of the human mind. They can indeed be programmed to emulate the processes of logic - that is fundamental to computation, after all - but they're artifacts. — Wayfarer
Are you arguing intelligent design? My point is that the mental process can be accounted for under physicalism. The evolutionary development of a mind is another matter, but I don't see why that would be a problem. Traits that have a survival value are consistent with natural selection. — Relativist
platonism entails reifying epistemological concepts. — Relativist
Gödel was a mathematical realist, a Platonist. He believed that what makes mathematics true is that it's descriptive—not of empirical reality, of course, but of an abstract reality. Mathematical intuition is something analogous to a kind of sense perception. In his essay "What Is Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis?", Gödel wrote that we're not seeing things that just happen to be true, we're seeing things that must be true. The world of abstract entities is a necessary world—that's why we can deduce our descriptions of it through pure reason.
I tried to do that by describing Armstrong's framework, and you simply rejected it based on your own ontological commitments. — Relativist
A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing... — Relativist
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.