Or perhaps a metaphysician/scientist can or has deduced the law of gravity from a more general law (gravity is just an example, not at all my interest here). Then this "law" is itself either deduced from yet a more general "law" or itself has "just because" status. Infinite regress or bust, in other words. Hence the "shallowness if explanation." — who

But isn't what really happened that Newton made a successful simplifying generalisation? So for a start, technically, it was an induction rather than a deduction.

Newtonian gravity made the generalisation that instead of just some things falling towards other things, everything had exactly the same propensity to fall together. And then to go beyond that Newtonian generalisation would require an even more complete generalisation - like general relativity, and after that, quantum gravity.

But while this seems like a regress - with no end in sight - you have to take into account that generalisation can only continue so long as there are local particulars to be mopped up in this fashion.

Newtonian gravity mopped up all the different ways objects fall by saying all mass had the same basic attractive force, so the only local difference to mention is the amount of mass in some spot. Then GR mopped up that kind of particularity in saying mass and energy were both the same general stuff, and a simpler, more general, way to model attraction was positive spacetime curvature, which handled local differences in momentum. QG would take the mopping up to a logical conclusion in putting all the difference physical forces on the one quantum field theory footing.

So what I am saying is that the inductive explanatory regress is self-limiting. It will halt at the point where it runs out of local particulars to generalise away. That is what founds a notion of a theory of everything. It is an asymptotic approach to a limit on explanation.

Asked why X occurred, we deduce X from a ascending chain of more and more general laws, but crucially from the just-because postulation at the top. — Hoo

This is the nature of conceptualization, the more specific is explained by reference to the more general. I do not believe that this leads to an infinite regress though, nor does it lead to a "just-because". It leads further into generalization until the meaning is lost in an extremely vague generality. So for example, we explain what it means to be a human being by referring to mammal, then mammal, we explain by referring to animal, and animal by referring to living, and living by existing, such that we approach a conceptual vagueness which escapes true understanding.

What this indicates is that a conceptual structure cannot be grounded in itself. Knowledge cannot consist of coherency alone, because justification will always lead to this conceptual vagueness. That is why we must include correspondence as an essential part of knowledge. We often must refer to sense experience, and principles derived from inductive reasoning, rather than having all knowledge produced by that ascending chain of more and more general laws.

Thanks for responding to my OP, M.U. I appreciate it! I think you are capturing something valid about a different structure than the one I have in mind. I'm not looking so much at what X means as a word, but how event X is explained.
--Why is there a world?
--Because [for instance] God created it
--Why did God create the world?
--Because he had love to give [for instance]
--Why did God have love to give?
Or we can leave God out and just look at the hope for a scientific theory of everything, from which all of the other laws can be derived. We could use this theory of everything to answer lower-level why questions about particular contexts. But I can't see how the TOE or top-level necessity avoids a "just because" status. I'm aiming at what I perceive as the apparently necessary contingency of (top level, most general) necessity. I could say more, but I'd rather develop it in a conversation. For me it occurred as sudden insight, in the context of theological (apparent?) explanations. But Weinberg has wrote about this insight applied to physics.
"Can Science Explain Everything? Anything?"
https://ned.ipac.caltech.edu/level5/Sept06/Weinberg/Weinberg.html

Here's a quote:
"Within the limited context of physics, I think one can give an answer of sorts to the problem of distinguishing explanation from mere description, which captures what physicists mean when they say that they have explained some regularity. The answer is that we explain a physical principle when we show that it can be deduced from a more fundamental physical principle....

We hope that in the future we will have achieved an understanding of all the regularities that we see in nature, based on a few simple principles, laws of nature, from which all other regularities can be deduced. These laws will be the explanation of whatever principles (such as, for instance, the rules of the Standard Model or of general relativity) can be deduced directly from them, and those directly deduced principles will be the explanations of whatever principles can be deduced from them, and so on...

Finally, it seems clear that we will never be able to explain our most fundamental scientific principles. (Maybe this is why some people say that science does not provide explanations, but by this reasoning nothing else does either). I think that in the end we will come to a set of simple universal laws of nature, laws that we cannot explain."

"By this reasoning nothing else does either" is exactly what I'm getting at.

Don't we invent? Create something (conceptually as a conjecture) that has no foundation and use it to unveil something through a process, which in itself affirms or denies our initial conjecture.

I agree. That's why I stressed the creative postulation of necessity. I like Nicholas Rescher's idea of this:

"I recall well how the key ideas of my idealistic theory of natural laws - of “lawfulness as imputation” - came to me in 1968 during work on this project while awaiting the delivery of Arabic manuscripts in the Oriental Reading Room of the British Museum. It struck me that what a law states is a mere generalization, but what marks this generalization as something special in our sight -- and renders it something we see as a genuine law of nature -- is the role that we assign to it in inference."
http://www.iep.utm.edu/rescher/#H7

We project/impute necessity and check deductions against experience? This suggests that the creativity of the physicist is central. Creative imagination (in this case mathematical) is crucial.

For instance, in Newton's time it was postulated that matter must be (is necessarily) attracted to all other matter according to an inverse square law. Why was matter attracted to matter? Just because. Or perhaps a metaphysician/scientist can or has deduced the law of gravity from a more general law (gravity is just an example, not at all my interest here). Then this "law" is itself either deduced from yet a more general "law" or itself has "just because" status. Infinite regress or bust, in other words. Hence the "shallowness if explanation." — Hoo

If that were the case, then why has there been any progress since Newton's gravity? If, as you assert, gravity is "just because" then why would anyone (particularly Einstein) bother to question why? Moreover, in asking "why" of gravity, Einstein discovered that the force of gravity does not exist. This incredible discovery was a product of pure reason!

According to current experimental evidence, both general relativity and quantum mechanics are perfectly correct theories of reality. No measurement has ever been made to cause one to be preferred to the other. However, we know they are incompatible because their deep explanations do not agree.

You could not be more wrong about science.

I agree that one can get stuck in an uncomfortable feeling of infinite regress if one insists that science is 'explanation'. I know we all talk about it like that, myself included. But I think that if we examine closely the real meaning of statements like 'Newton explained why objects fall towards Earth', it is no more literally accurate than when I say 'I laughed my head off'.

I think science does two important things.

(1) It enables us to make better predictions, so that we can better control our environment and increase the likelihood of achieving some of our aims. This is the 'instrumental' aspect of science and the only practical one. We don't care why Newton's or Einstein's gravitational laws hold. We just need to know that using them will enable us to get a communications satellite to where we want it to be.

(2) It enables us to see patterns in the universe - aka regularities, aka symmetries, aka laws. This is the more 'fun' part of science, and the one that gets confused with explanations. We call things like Newton's gravitational law an explanation, but neither it nor any other observed regularity can ever be a complete explanation, because we can always ask 'why that regularity'.

We live in a universe that has some delightful patterns in it and the non-instrumental aspect of science is finding ever more patterns, usually somewhat more general and wide-ranging than the ones they replace. They are lovely to behold and searching for them is great fun. But they are no more explanations than is 'because I wanted to' or 'because I said so'.

According to current experimental evidence, both general relativity and quantum mechanics are perfectly correct theories of reality
.......
we know they are incompatible because their deep explanations do not agree. — Tom

Without knowing anything about science, one can be certain from basic logic that one of those statements cannot be correct.

Adding my knowledge of physics to the mix, I can point out that it is the first one.

Philosophy's greatest (IMHO) ever contribution to science was Popper's notion of Falsifiability. Any scientist that claims to have a perfectly correct theory of reality needs to go back to university and start learning from the beginning again. ALL theories are only ever currently non-falsified hypotheses.

Thanks for responding. I agree with all that you said (and I like the way you put it.) I'd just add that I really enjoy the contingency of all things as apparently revealed by analyzing explanation. I don't dwell on it often, but it's one of those beautiful perspective opened by philosophical thinking.

I don't think you see my point at all, judging by your response. Hell, Weinberg seems to get it. He's just more interested in the explanations, while I'm interested in the concept of explanation itself.

How would you further unpack "induction"? Noticing a pattern in experience seems creative to me, even if it's spontaneously given in simple cases.

I think I see what you mean by "self-limiting," and I tend to agree. But I still don't see why a most general theory of everything avoids its "just because" status or contingency.

Without knowing anything about science, one can be certain from basic logic that one of those statements cannot be correct. — andrewk

You have to be pretty confused about science and logic to be unable to distinguish between "experimental evidence" and "explanation" i.e. "explicanda" and "explicans".

Adding my knowledge of physics to the mix, I can point out that it is the first one. — andrewk

Bowing to your self-proclaimed expertise in physics, I think we will have to wait until you deign to inform us of the experimental evidence that allows us to falsify GR or QM. Absent such explicanda, we may nevertheless render GR and QM problematic, due to each other's existence. The deep explanations implicit in each theory do not agree.

Philosophy's greatest (IMHO) ever contribution to science was Popper's notion of Falsifiability. Any scientist that claims to have a perfectly correct theory of reality needs to go back to university and start learning from the beginning again. ALL theories are only ever currently non-falsified hypotheses. — andrewk

But if your expertise in Popper matched your expertise in physics, then you would know that, according to Popper, it is logically impossible to falsify any theory.

Without knowing anything about science, one can be certain from basic logic that one of those statements cannot be correct. — andrewk

Only if you're a scientific realist, right? If you're an instrumentalist then two incompatible theories are both valid if they both make successful predictions about their target subject matter.

As explained here on model-dependent realism, "Different world pictures that describe particular data equally well all have equal claims to be valid. There is no requirement that a world picture be unique, or even that the data selected include all available observations. The universe of all observations at present is covered by a network of overlapping world pictures and, where overlap occurs; multiple, equally valid, world pictures exist. At present, science requires multiple models to encompass existing observations".

It's only when you treat the elements of a physical theory as model-independent entities that one could claim what you claimed above, but given that you sided with instrumentalism over realism, you don't seem to be doing this.

Only if you're a scientific realist, right? If you're an instrumentalist then two incompatible theories are both valid if they both make successful predictions about their target subject matter. — Michael

If you are an instrumentalist - i.e. you believe that the role of science is to predict the outcome of experiments - or worse if you are a positivist - i.e. you believe that only statements predicting the outcome of experiments are meaningful, then the whole question of explanation is somewhat absent.

Explaining explanation:

Sure, which is the sort of thing andrewk argued for.

What did he argue for?

Then this "law" is itself either deduced from yet a more general "law" or itself has "just because" status. Infinite regress or bust, in other words. Hence the "shallowness if explanation." — Hoo

It seems that by "shallow" you simply mean "finite"? Is it surprising that finite reasoners would be limited to the construction and understanding of finite chains of explanation?

Asked why X occurred, we deduce X from a ascending chain of more and more general laws, but crucially from the just-because postulation at the top. Except that we usually stop before we get to that embarrassing or anti-climactic summit. — Hoo

Are we really limited to "just because"? How about simply "I don't know"? I am not sure why this should be considered embarrassing.

Or we could take the scholastic path and argue that the impossibility of infinite explanatory chains proves the existence of some necessary being that acts as the explanatory ground of everything else. Do you see this as equivalent to "just because"?

The genius of "why is there something rather than nothing?" is that it aims at this apex. — Hoo

We could just as legitimately say that the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" is asinine insofar as it asks after a reason for "everything". The possibility of explanation implies the postulation of context, but what is the context for "everything"?

On a less mystical note, I think this only supports the idea that reason is perhaps unavoidably instrumental. — Hoo

Not sure I understand the connection you're making here between instrumental and theoretical reason. Since theoretical reasons must terminate in "just because", therefore explanations are thinly (or thickly) veiled instruments for getting what I want? Maybe you can elaborate?

Instrumentalism.

Sure, the Instrumentalist fallacy is a thing.

But if your expertise in Popper matched your expertise in physics, then you would know that, according to Popper, it is logically impossible to falsify any theory. [bold added by andrewk] — tom

My knowledge of Popper's works is much less than that of physics, but nevertheless I think you may be mistaken here. Did you mean 'logically impossible to verify any theory'? If so, then that matches my understanding of Popper, and agrees with what I was saying.

If you really meant 'falsify' then could you please provide a direct quote from Popper where he says this.

Only if you're a scientific realist, right? If you're an instrumentalist then two incompatible theories are both valid if they both make successful predictions about their target subject matter. — Michael

Good point. I'm a little uncomfortable using the word 'valid' about a theory, as it doesn't seem to convey the aspect of provisionality (temporariness) that attaches to any theory (IMO), but I can't think of a better word, so let's go with 'valid'.

My knowledge of Popper's works is much less than that of physics, but nevertheless I think you may be mistaken here. Did you mean 'logically impossible to verify any theory'? If so, then that matches my understanding of Popper, and agrees with what I was saying.

If you really meant 'falsify' then could you please provide a direct quote from Popper where he says this. — andrewk

Do you appreciate how tedious this is?

"In point of fact, no disproof of a theory can ever be produced;...

Did you not read as far as p28 of the Routledge edition of LSD? Chapter 2, Section 9.

This truth, known as the Duhem-Quine Thesis is dealt with in several paces in LSD. The related misconception - the Duhem-Quine Problem is dealt with in 4:19 - 20.

Wow! Popper is deeper and more profound than any naive falsificationist might guess!

"In point of fact, no disproof of a theory can ever be produced;... — tom

Falsification of a theory is not equivalent to disproof of a theory, and you appear to be conflating the two in you responses to andrewk.

I don't know if I'd call us "finite reasoners" exactly (think philosophy of math), but I feel like you are roughly agreeing with me as if you were disagreeing. (Maybe we can figure it out). My theory is that we are hardwire, if you will, to postulate "just because" necessity. This is often called "induction." An event X is explained in terms of some necessity. It doesn't have to be sophisticated mathematically. It could be "whatever goes up must come down." This is false, of course, but it's hard to figure that out till you can give something escape velocity. And of course a sophisticated thinker can indeed experience such postulated necessity as a mere conjecture. "Maybe everything that goes up must come down." But then one might ask why must what goes up come down? So yet a more general postulation of necessity is reached for: "all matter must be (or "always" is) attracted to all matter." To simplify the situation, let's imagine a simple world where this was a theory of everything. All the laws recognized or projected by our primitive physicists can be derived from an inverse square law of gravity. The obvious question is why does the world they live in (its matter, anyway) obey an inverse square law? Because we answer such questions (in my view) in terms of postulated necessity either derived or "just-because" contingent, there is no explanation. We're out of tricks.

When you write:
The possibility of explanation implies the postulation of context, but what is the context for "everything"?
You are paraphrasing exactly the point that I made on this issue on the original PF thread (were you on that forum by chance?). Moreover, I mentioned "lyrical confusion" in the OP. I think "asinine" is a terrible word here, because I do not believe that the question is obviously "lyrical" or a "pseudo-question." If that were the case then religion and old-fashioned earnest metaphysics wouldn't be so popular, for this seems to imply that the world is massively and apparently necessarily contingent through and through, a gaping "miracle." I will grant that we can't live in this ecstatic/hysterical for long. Indeed, I can only remember the wonder I felt when I first had this vision as youth (it was my first unwittingly derivative "work" of philosophy, an ecstatic celebration of the "miracle" of empty space, color, sound, that "there was a there there.") Now it mostly supports the radical instrumentalism that I tend to embrace. No grand explanation even seems possible, if desirable in the first place. Rather than capital-T Truth, I think in terms of useful marks and noises or generalized technology, including the "technology of morale."

Just to be clear, I'm think more of this kind of instrumentalism: "a pragmatic philosophical approach that regards an activity (such as science, law, or education) chiefly as an instrument or tool for some practical purpose, rather than in more absolute or ideal terms, in particular." Except that I would certain include poems and novels among my instruments. I don't think we only move non-human nature around. We move human nature around.

What do you mean by the instrumentalist fallacy? Are you just saying that the instrumentalist approach to science is wrong?

I think it's worth providing the rest of the quote to give it its proper context:

In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable or that the discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the experimental results and the theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance of our understanding. If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are [my emphasis]. — Popper

So he's accepting the logical possibility that any "falsification" is mistaken, just as the realist might accept the logical possibility of solipsism or skepticism, but it doesn't then follow that he rejects falsification, just as it doesn't then follow that the realist rejects the veracity of our everyday perceptions and beliefs.

Falsification of a theory is not equivalent to disproof of a theory, and you appear to be conflating the two in you responses to andrewk. — John

LSD section 6: "...it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified."

LSD section 19: "...the theoretical systems of the natural sciences are not verifiable, but I assert that they are not falsifiable either."

And of course Popper provides a methodological solution to this problem. I guess that's why it's called the "Scientific Method"?

LSD section 19: "...the theoretical systems of the natural sciences are not verifiable, but I assert that they are not falsifiable either." — tom

Again, provide the full context:

I admit, a conventionalist might say [my emphasis], that the theoretical systems of the natural sciences are not verifiable, but I assert that they are not falsifiable either.

...

Thus, according to the conventionalist [my emphasis], it is not possible to divide systems of theories into falsifiable and non-falsifiable ones. — Popper

And remember that Popper isn't a conventionalist.

LSD section 6: "...it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified."

Full context:

A third objection may seem more serious. It might be said [my emphasis] that even if the asymmetry is admitted, it is still impossible, for various reasons, that any theoretical system should ever be conclusively falsified.

...

I must admit the justice of this criticism; but I need not therefore withdraw my proposal to adopt falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation. For I am going to propose (in sections 20 f.) that the empirical method shall be characterized as a method that excludes precisely those ways of evading falsification which, as my imaginary critic [my emphasis] rightly insists, are logically possible. — Popper