Sad events decrease with time as society becomes more advanced.

Possibly God foresaw that 'all should end well' and went ahead with creation anyway.

Why wouldn't he just start humanity at that advanced time, skipping all the pain and stuff

Because he's not Omnipotent, the God I have in mind is powerful but does not do magic.

Creation is a giant game of Conway's Game of Life, we are generated via brute force algorithms like evolution. This is because it was too difficult for God to design life from scratch; it had to be evolved.

1. In many sad events, we can’t see what good features outweigh the bad features.

2. Therefore it is likely that there are unjustified sad events : the good features don’t outweigh the bad. (from 1)

3. Therefore it is likely that: If God exists, the. He allows unjustified sad events. (from 2)

4. God would never allow unjustified sad events.

5. Therefore it’s likely that: God does not exist. (from 3 & 4 via MT) — Yajur

I dont think 2 follows from 1. It is just as likely to be a lack of insight as it is the good not outweighing the bad.
3 also does not follow from 2. (and includes an unsupported claim). You havent any reason in your argument that god would be allowing sad events with no justification. It can just as easily be said it serves a greater good, or that you cannot have the good without the right amount if bad. Also, Once again, the problem could be a lack of insight/knowledge.
4 is not a supported claim either, why wouldnt he allow such a thing? He might have a higher priority than leeping sad events to a minimum.
Your conclusion in 5 doesnt work either as far as I can see, even if the rest had no problems, you could still draw the conclusion that god isnt omni-benevolent, or that mankind simply cannot see gods plan.
I think if you want to tighten up your argument you need to make 1 more robust, i think the adjustments to the rest will be easier then. You should only be able to draw one conclusion from the prior step in your argument for it to be strong.

The problem I am posing is for an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient God. If you don't believe that he is all three concurrently this contradiction doesn't apply

This is the old problem of evil, which I think does rule out the existence of an all-powerful, all-good and all-knowing God, but I am not sure that eliminates other conceptions of God, like a less than all-powerful being, as an example.

You only see the pain as bad because of your limits as a human. God sees all and in His great wisdom knows this pain is not bad but good.

You're assuming that God is omnipotent, and created this physical universe. Not all Theists agree with you on that.

You're making an unsupported claim that the good doesn't outweigh the bad.

i've posted a lot about that, so I'll be brief: A life, or a long finite sequence of many lives, is temporary. The sleep at the end of lives is final and timeless (perception or knowledge of time is soon gone in the ever deepening sleep at the end of lives).

The peaceful quite rest and sleep at the end of lives is therefore final and timeless.

So our temporary life, or long finite sequence of them, is a brief anomaly, a blip in timelessness.

Yes, it can be bad in a particular life. It's inevitable that, among the infinity of hypothetical experience-stories, there will be some bad ones. God didn't create them. God can't contravene logic, as by making there be (for example) a true and false proposition.

You've only proven that there can't beyour God.

Michael Ossipoff

1. In many sad events, we can’t see what good features outweigh the bad features.

2. Therefore it is likely that there are unjustified sad events : the good features don’t outweigh the bad. (from 1)

3. Therefore it is likely that: If God exists, the. He allows unjustified sad events. (from 2)

4. God would never allow unjustified sad events.

5. Therefore it’s likely that: God does not exist. (from 3 & 4 via MT) — Yajur

from a different post - but just to give the skeptical theist response here as well:

Skeptical theists address the argument from evil - with the concept of compensating goods.

For something to be a compensating good:
1. It has to be significantly good , so good in fact, that anyone would say it was a good worth the evil
2. The good could not be possible without the evil.

In the cases of evil caused by the choices of men - the compensating good is free will.

In the cases where evil is not caused by choices of men - such as natural disasters - skeptical theists use a the concept of cognitive distance. The atheist will say I have looked around, and I don't see any compensating good for this natural disaster - therefore there is no compensating good. The skeptical theist response is, what makes you think we have the ability to be aware of every compensating good, or recognize it as such even if we saw it.

The atheist argument is a no-seeum argument - and the skeptical theist response is we may well not posses the tools needed to see it or recognize it as such.

It is important to note, that the AFE is an atheist argument against the existence of God, the theist only need provide a reasonable case where a 3 O God and evil can co-exist. There is no obligation on the part of the theist to prove the compensating good argument - their only obligation is to present a reasonable case for compensating goods - if the atheist want to continue to make the AFE case to change the mind of the theist - it is his obligation to prove that compensating goods argument is unreasonable.

Dr. Hudson does a very good job of explaining the skeptical theist view on the AFE here - worth the hour and he is entertaining as well.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJbgnyFlW5M

4. God would never allow unjustified sad events. — Yajur

You should specify that you are talking about an omnipresent, omnipotent and benevolent God. In my short time on this forum I noticed that God seems synonymous with the Abrahamic concept of God, even though a lot of people believe in entirely different forms of God, deity or the Divine.

But even in the case of an omnipresent, omnipotent and benevolent God, it is not said that suffering shouldn't exist. Suffering, however unjustified it may be, often strengthens the people who undergo it. Those who succumb to it may go to heaven or hell, depending on how they lived, or perhaps they are granted another chance in the afterlife, but I wouldn't dare speculate about that.

I have a few objections to this argument. First, I will focus on premise one. I do not see any reason why sad events, especially such events that are rendered as gratuitous evil, have to contain “good features”. In other words, an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, or omnipresent being is not automatically committed to construing every bad, evil situation or event with a perspective of good. I think that the God of the Judeo-Christian worldview is presented as emotive and relational. Thus, I do not see why this God would have to render events of gratuitous evil as containing “good features”, or is in need of proving that there are more “good features” outweighing the “bad features”. I think God can render these sad events as legitimately sad or as evidence of evil without compromising any of His omibenevolence, omnipotence, or omnipresence.

Now a common follow up objection will likely be, why then would God allow any of this evil in the first place? This brings me to my main objection to this argument, which is against premise two. I think that God was justified in creating beings with free will so that He could have relationship with them. In creating beings with this capability of free will, God created beings with the capacity for evil. I also think God was justified in having there be consequences for when free will is utilized against His will – for evil. Thus, I view these instances of sad events, evil, or even gratuitous evil as evidence of what is often termed as “original sin”. I do not think God views these events as good or as containing more “good features”, but rather as results of the reality that our world is not existing as it was intended to be – the consequence of exercising free will outside the will of God as conveyed in Genesis. In short, I am challenging premise two by suggesting that God views the presence of evil as evil, but also as a justifiable consequence.

To close, I will also defend that God can operate in such a manner and still remain omnibenevolent. I think God, in full recognition of the evil that is quite abundant in the fallen state of our world, would not have been justified in allowing humanity to suffer the consequences of evil for the rest of eternity. Thus, from a Christian perspective, God conquers death and evil and freely offers every being the opportunity of choosing, via faith, an eternity void of the consequences of evil – life as it was intended to be. However, this does not mean that evil, even gratuitous evil, will cease to exist on earth. Yet, the omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omnipresent God manages to remain just and good by redeeming humanity from its justly deserved earthly consequences that were brought about by evil corrupting things as they were intended to be. Thankfully, from this perspective, things will not always remain this way.

Your response to premise 1 misinterprets Yajur’s original claim: He is not stating that the good does truly not outweigh the bad, only that we often lack the ability to see how the good could outweigh the bad. He then reasons from that to premise 2: because we so often cannot see how the good outweighs the bad, it is at least likely that the good does not outweigh the bad in every single instance. This is supported with nearly unlimited antidotal examples of sad events that all center around the same theme:

1. The good always outweighs the bad if the bad event has a good purpose.
2. Suffering is a bad event.
3. Suffering has a good purpose if it has the potential to positively impact a life.
4. If no one witnesses the suffering, and the sufferer does not survive, then suffering does not have the potential to positively impact a life.
5. Possibly, no one witnesses the suffering, and the sufferer does not survive.
6. Therefore it is possible that the suffering did not have the potential to positively impact a life.
7. Therefore it is possible that the suffering does not have a good purpose.
8. Therefore it is possible that the good does not outweigh the bad.

Notice the point of these examples are not to prove that we cannot see how the good outweighs the bad all the time — simply that it is possible that the good does not always outweigh the bad.

You also state that maybe, “you cannot have the good without the right amount of bad.” But if we’re assuming an Greatest Conceivable Being as the one in charge of creating good, I fail to see how the existence of good necessitates the existence of some amount of bad. Take the God we’re assuming— He is Maximally Good without any bad, so clearly bad is not required to exist in order for good to exist. Of course, different rules apply to humankind, because we are not Maximal Beings, but then you wonder why God would even create us at all? If Maximal Good existed before humankind, without any bad, why would God then increase the amount of bad to exist by creating humankind?

Additionally, would an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God “have a higher priority than keeping sad events to a minimum?” If he has all possible power, and he has all possible love for all living things, there is no reason he would not try to keep sad events to a minimum.

You do raise a good point that it is possible God just isn’t omnibenevolent then. Would that fit all the requirements of being the Greatest Conceivable Being, though? For loving is greater than not loving, so it would be the greatest to love maximally.

Your response to premise 1 misinterprets Yajur’s original claim: He is not stating that the good does truly not outweigh the bad, only that we often lack the ability to see how the good could outweigh the bad. He then reasons from that to premise 2: because we so often cannot see how the good outweighs the bad, it is at least likely that the good does not outweigh the bad in every single instance. This is supported with nearly unlimited antidotal examples of sad events that all center around the same theme: — adhomienem

You have added words to his, “at least” as likely is not the same as being likely. His initial statements are simple and concise, I do not think I have misinterpreted anything.

You also state that maybe, “you cannot have the good without the right amount of bad.” But if we’re assuming an Greatest Conceivable Being as the one in charge of creating good, I fail to see how the existence of good necessitates the existence of some amount of bad. Take the God we’re assuming— He is Maximally Good without any bad, so clearly bad is not required to exist in order for good to exist. Of course, different rules apply to humankind, because we are not Maximal Beings, but then you wonder why God would even create us at all? If Maximal Good existed before humankind, without any bad, why would God then increase the amount — adhomienem

Greatest conceivable being is not the same as a being of pure good is it?
My point was that there are other possibilities than the conclusions drawn in the OP on the steps made, that I pointed out. I think you are conflating GCB with other god concepts.

You are indeed going after premise 1, which states “In many sad events, we can’t see what good features outweigh the bad features.”

Your counter to this seems to be “In many sad events, there are no bad features. The things we perceive as bad, are all part of God’s justice.”

You seem to be saying that the nature of our world is a natural consequence of our sin, because it is only just that sinned beings live in such a world filled with suffering. There is no greater good, because the suffering itself is just. This results in some conflicting beliefs. You have stated that in this system, gratuitous evil can exist. But this is not the case. On your schema, all suffering is just, and is therefore not gratuitous, but perfectly reflecting our sin.

This is hard to defend, as it seems that God could have made a world filled with sin and free will, but not as naturally bad. Why do hurricanes and childhood cancer exist? Well, God wills for them to suffer. This kind of natural suffering seems entirely unrelated to the suffering created by say, someone sinning and murdering somebody else. So it would seem that God, in this situation, has created beings he knew would sin, and then, on top of them being sinned and therefore separated from him, he puts them in a world which has a multitude of things ready to kill them, in seemingly terrible ways, because he is just.

This creates a variety of problems. If all of this suffering is just, then what moral qualms should you have about inflicting suffering on other people? If you were to torture somebody else, that suffering would all be part of the grand justice of God’s vision. Why was the holocaust bad? Well it wasn’t, it was just. If it is good to be just, and it is just to suffer, then it is good to suffer. It seems that you run into some pretty serious problems when adopting your counter to premise 1.

You say God doesn’t view these events as good, but you say that it is just that they happen. Does God not think justice is good?

Originally posted by @Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant:

"The evidential problem of Evil can be understood as the following argument:

In many sad events, we can’t see what good features would outweigh the bad features.
Therefore, it is likely that there are unjustified sad events (the good features do not outweigh the bad features)
Therefore, it is likely that: if God exists, then he allows unjustified sad events.
God would never allow unjustified sad events.
Therefore, it is likely that God does not exist. (3, 4 MT)

I object to premise four that God would never allow unjustified sad events. We do not know, in the absolute sense, what kind of god God is. He could have designed us and the world as we know it, but walked away and took His hands off of his creation to allow it to grow, change, fall, or stay stagnant depending completely on the independence, or lack thereof, of the world. In this sense, God is not allowing unjustified sad events happening, they just are happening as a result of the nature in which he gave our world.

Another case could be that God could have made the world differently, as in there is the possibility of a world without disease, hunger, poverty, sadness, sin, and whatever else one wishes to rid the world of. According to counterfactuals of creaturely freedoms, the problem is not that this ideal world could not exist, it is simply that God cannot make it exist because of our free will ability. No matter what people will always make the same choices in the same circumstance regardless of the world in which it is set. According to Tomas Bogardus, Adam and Eve will always choose to eat the forbidden fruit. There is always the possibility that they could choose to drop the fruit; however, we know that they will not ever choose this because this could only occur if we change their human nature (or instinct). "