Upon rereading Pascal’s Wager, I was struck by how it seems to be promoting a belief forming schema which is harmful and perhaps immoral. His argument is as follows:

1. If one lives as a theist and
a. there is no God, one loses finitely.
b. there is a god, one gains infinitely.
2. If one lives as an atheist and
a. there is no god, one gains finitely.
b. there is a God, one loses infinitely.
3. If one can risk a finite reward for an infinite reward, one should.
4. The life of a theist risks a finite reward for an infinite reward.
5. One should live as a theist.

A few things I did not include in this outline: He thinks that you should not only live like you believe, but take steps to try and put yourself in an environment conducive to a particular belief. You should try to lower your passions, and go to mass, so that over time, perhaps you can come to true belief. Another note, is that he actually makes a slightly stronger claim, saying that if one lives as a theist and there is no god, one actually gains finitely, for they lived virtuously and were a true friend.

Pascal is then claiming that, if one is unsure of a belief, they should look at which belief maximizes their expected utility, and even if they cannot immediately belief that, they should live as if it were true, and try to limit their inhibitions in such a way as to induce this belief. These appears to be a deeply problematic schema, as the basis for one’s belief, or, at the very least, ones attempted belief, is not rationality, but utility. If one then comes to a belief, P, which has high utility, but then at a later time, hears somebody say Q, a belief which is incompatible with P, and with far less utility. Pascal’s wager would suppose that one would be better off not examining claim Q, as it could possible interfere with their gained utility from P. This type of schema would promote a credulous person who is not inclined towards developing true beliefs, which, it would seem, would be harmful in a belief forming schema.

To make it a little more tangible, one is told that if he snaps his fingers every Sunday morning, he will live an extra 10 years. He is unsure of what to believe, but then he is presented with a belief forming pill which will induce this belief in him. He should, on Pascal’s system, take the pill, have a dramatically irrational belief, but perhaps he will gain a large amount of utility, for virtually zero cost. This type of irrational belief, while innately harmless, would seem to promote gross irrationality.

Edit: for clarity