It seems to me that it's hard to decide whether a will is good without thinking in terms of the goodness or value of certain objects in the world and actions related to those objects. Does someone who feeds the hungry manifest good will? I think so, but I think that's because food is good in the context of hunger.

Implied is neither good nor will have meaning on their own. Is that what you meant?

It does seem right to me, but then again 'will' is such a loose term, even without taking into consideration semantic drift (Kant was writing in German in the 18th century, after all.) Empathy seems good, but it's hard to say exactly what empathy's relation to 'will' is. I feel like what Kant means by will probably contains empathy, but that's just a gut-feeling.

Nothing in the world—or out of it!—can possibly be conceived
that could be called ‘good’ without qualification except
a GOOD WILL. — tim wood

Here I agree. I would interject, however, that having a "good will" is not sufficient alone.

Implied is neither good nor will have meaning on their own. Is that what you meant? — tim wood

Roughly, yes. IMO, there is a great interdependence between the 'atomic meanings' of words. To overstate, there is only one meaning or one embodied concept system. And more specifically, I think abstractions like the good in general ultimately have their ground in what humans automatically value (food, warmth, love, etc.) Similarly 'will' depends on more specified desires. What we gain in flexibility of application (in generality), we sacrifice in knowing what we are actually talking about. When we take a very general word out of context and a do kind of physics on it, I think the results are usually not worth the trouble. I associate this kind of insight with the spirit of Kant's CPR.

That is, then, that "good" as adjective doesn't convey much or mean much, except perhaps by reference to something good. Which means that in all cases, "the good X" is a noun substantive and not a phrase.

As to a ground in ultimate value as desire, overlooked is the possibility of good as a matter of reason. If you want to base reason in desire, I suppose you can, but it's not very useful, and is destructive of what is useful.

As to a ground in ultimate value as desire, overlooked is the possibility of good as a matter of reason. If you want to base reason in desire, I suppose you can, but it's not very useful, and is destructive of what is useful. — tim wood

Note however that you critique my approach in terms of utility (the useful.) As I read you, my approach is possible but not useful and therefore not good. What is utility if not another word for giving us what we want? A free floating reason would be like a calculator with nothing worth calculating. Why would we bother to prove or criticize if the proved or criticized thesis wasn't promising or threatening?