Well, I don't know what to make of your discussion on the PI. I'm somewhat confused about what both of you mean by "meaning" here. Do you want to lead the reading group? How about you, Terrapin Station? Or maybe someone else? I don't know. — Posty McPostface

That confusion about what 'meaning' means is completely appropriate. It is confusing! If philosophy is an activity, the process of clarifying our thinking, then bombs away.

That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a
primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say
that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. — W

I read this as: we have a naive pre-interpretation of what language is really doing. Wittgenstein gives examples that fit this naive idea. That's from PI.

Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a
saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The
functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.
(And in both cases there are similarities.)
Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when
we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their
application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are
doing philosophy. — W

Words side-by-side on the page (out of the context of their use) look to be all the same kind of thing. But we aren't looking at them in their dynamic application. We are just staring at them, not watching them work.

I found a pdf of the PI, btw.

Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to someone; and I
begin by pointing to a chessman and saying: "This is the king; it
can move like this, ... . and so on."—In this case we shall say: the
words "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a definition
only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'. That is,
if he has already played other games, or has watched other people
playing 'and understood'—and similar things. Further, only under these
conditions will he be able to ask relevantly in the course of learning the
game: "What do you call this?"—that is, this piece in a game.
We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something
with it can significantly ask a name. — W

This already-having-to-know seems important to me. We can't start from zero and build everything up explicitly. We 'fade in' to having language. We always already have an initial understanding of what is going on that we can't get behind. If we try to get behind it, we have to use this understanding to try and do so. All the radical questions of the skeptic presuppose all kinds of tacit knowledge of what is going on.

Suppose, however, someone were to object: "It is not true
that you must already be master of a language in order to understand
an ostensive definition: all you need—of course!—is to know or
guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to. That is,
whether for example to the shape of the object, or to its colour, or to its
number, and so on."——And what does 'pointing to the shape',
'pointing to the colour' consist in? Point to a piece of paper.—And now
point to its shape—now to its colour—now to its number (that sounds
queer).—How did you do it?—You will say that you 'meant' a different
thing each time you pointed. And if I ask how that is done, you will
say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, etc.
But I ask again: how is that done?

...

And we do here what we do in a host of similar cases: because
we cannot specify any one bodily action which we call pointing to the
shape (as opposed, for example, to the colour), we say that a spiritual
[mental, intellectual] activity corresponds to these words.
Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there,
we should like to say, is a spirit.
37. What is the relation between name and thing named?—Well,
what is it? Look at language-game (2) or at another one: there you
can see the sort of thing this relation consists in. This relation may
also consist, among many other things, in the fact that hearing the
name calls before our mind the picture of what is named; and it also
consists, among other things, in the name's being written on the thing
named or being pronounced when that thing is pointed at.
38. But what, for example, is the word "this" the name of in
language-game (8) or the word "that" in the ostensive definition
"that is called . . . ."?—If you do not want to produce confusion you
will do best not to call these words names at all.—Yet, strange to say,
the word "this" has been called the only genuine name; so that anything
else we call a name was one only in an inexact, approximate sense.
This queer conception springs from a tendency to sublime the logic
of our language—as one might put it. The proper answer to it is: we
call very different things "names"; the word "name" is used to
characterize many different kinds of use of a word, related to one
another in many different ways;—but the kind of use that "this" has
is not among them.
....
What lies behind the idea that names really signify simples?—
Socrates says in the Theaetetus: "If I make no mistake, I have heard
some people say this: there is no definition of the primary elements—
so to speak—out of which we and everything else are composed; for
everything that exists1
in its own right can only be named, no other
determination is possible, neither that it is nor that it is not . . . . . But
what exists1
in its own right has to be .... . named without any other
determination. In consequence it is impossible to give an account of
any primary element; for it, nothing is possible but the bare name;
its name is all it has. But just as what consists of these primary elements
is itself complex, so the names of the elements become descriptive
language by being compounded together. For the essence of speech
is the composition of names."
Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractates LogicoPhilosophicus] were such primary elements.
47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is
composed?—What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?—The
bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms?—
"Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense
'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple
parts of a chair'.

— W

Just some passages I think are ripe for discussion.

Suppose, however, someone were to object: "It is not true
that you must already be master of a language in order to understand
an ostensive definition: all you need... — W

I'll offer this: Wittgenstein starts from the assumption that language is learned from ostensive definition. He proceeds to describe problems with this assumption. It appears like ostension cannot account for the different "ways" in which the same word may be used. He calls language use in general "a game", but each different way constitutes a different language-game. He concludes this analogy by describing how learning a game requires learning rules. But learning rules requires that one already knows some rules, so it appears like learning a game requires that one already knows a game. So learning a language cannot be accounted for by ostensive procedure, because this requires that one already knows some rules of procedure. You'll find this argument at 30-33.

in conclusion, I would say that Wittgenstein argues that language is not learned by ostension, because ostension will not demonstrate the way that the word is being used, the "sense" of meaning. All words have different ways of use, different "senses", and the learner must be able to distinguish the sense. A different sense would constitute a different game, and a different game would have different rules. The learner must be able to determine which game is being played, and this implies that the learner already knows some sort of game.

I'll offer this: Wittgenstein starts from the assumption that language is learned from ostensive definition. He proceeds to describe problems with this assumption. It appears like ostension cannot account for the different "ways" in which the same word may be used. He calls language use in general "a game", but each different way constitutes a different language-game. He concludes this analogy by describing how learning a game requires learning rules. But learning rules requires that one already knows some rules, so it appears like learning a game requires that one already knows a game. So learning a language cannot be accounted for by ostensive procedure, because this requires that one already knows some rules of procedure. You'll find this argument at 30-33. — Metaphysician Undercover

I need to read it again, but if that's his argument, one obvious flaw is this: in saying that language is learned via ostensive definitions, and in comparing that to a game (where we accept (even though there's no good reason to) that the comparison is literally true, that a game can only be a game if it follows set rules (again, there's not a good reason to accept that besides stipulating that that's the sort of game we're talking about)), one is NOT saying that all games are language, or that all rules are language (well, or if one is also saying either one of those things, they'd need to be supported, too), so the fact that learning rules requires that one already knows some rules (also--what's the argument for that?--it doesn't at all seem self-evident to me, otherwise we'd have to say something like "some rules are built into brains automatically," which would be particularly dubious if we're saying that rules are necessarily linguistic) wouldn't imply that the language game can't be learned on top of the rules that one already knows.

Start by setting out his definition of “language” and what he says in the first few pages.

I think you've left out the crucial part of the argument, what he spends the majority of the pages talking about, and that is how we could distinguish the way in which the word is being used, through ostensive demonstration. That is where the difficulty is. I think that's what the numerous examples are meant to convey. The conclusion is that language cannot be, and therefore is not, learned through ostensive definitions because this would require that one already know a language, in order to learn a language.

I think the premise which forces this conclusion is that some kind of language is required to clarify the ostensive demonstration in reference to the way that the word is being used. So as a simplistic example,(Wittgenstein's appear a bit complex), if you point to an object and say "red", the student needs to know that you are referring to the colour of the object, not the name of the object I.e. the student needs to be able to determine the way that the word is being used, the type of aspect of the world it is meant to signify, as pointing cannot provide this.

so the fact that learning rules requires that one already knows some rules ... wouldn't imply that the language game can't be learned on top of the rules that one already knows. — Terrapin Station

This is problematic because it would require that rules could exist in some form other than a linguistic form. How could that be?

. .

Here are a few quotes that may help.

Every significant word or symbol must essentially belong to a 'system,' and...the meaning of a word is its place in this 'system.'


I now prefer to say that a system of propositions is laid against reality like a rule.

If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation...,I would say that when language is looked at, what is looked at is the form of words and not the use made of the form of words.


— Wittgenstein

Holistic semantics explains why removing words from their customary language-games creates insoluble pseudo-problems, what most of us call philosophy.

Wittgenstein's holism applies to our selves as well as to our language: society comes first and individuals are born of, and continuously borne by, this context. Even our 'insides,' so to speak, come from the outside because we only have a sense of these internal contents --how to look for them, their taxonomy, what it makes sense to say about them --via the grammar learned from language games.

Atomism in some form or another has been the default ontology for most of the history of philosophy; objects are what they are because of their own intrinsic nature, gaining only superficial features from whatever relationships they happen to enter into. This metaphysical structure can then secure semantic determanicy. They simply mean what they mean regards of when, where, and by whom they are employed.
...
This idea is what authorizes drastic shifts in use that create philosophical confusion...Similarly, for present-at-hand ontology, 'the real entitiy is what is suited for thus remaining constant.' a prejudice that distorts metaphysics and compromises authenticity.

Heidegger and the late Witttgenstein embrace holism, according to which an object or word derives its nature and meaning from its place within a network, all other members of which likewise draw their sense from their interrelationships. This framework eliminates atomistic determinacy. — Lee Braver

I think this holism is anticipated in Hegel (and surely others as well.)

As far as I'm concerned this reading group has already started. I don't mind the lack of organization. A discussion is what's most important.

So, bombs away!

Whoa, couldn't we start over again with a new thread with an agreement of how much to read as a start?

It has been a few years since I read it and my knees hurt when I try to jog.

Again, I'm very apprehensive about leading anything here. I'm liking the anarchic manner in which we are discussing the Investigations. Please start a thread however you see fit for the matter.

Thanks.

Valentinus started the reading group here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4520/philosophical-investigations-reading-it-together

I welcome all interested participants to join us in that thread for the reading group.

Thanks!

Just a little comment: It seems to me that we have a living, breathing network of concepts that is continuous with social practice. Is there a sharp line between action and language? Flipping someone off seems to live in the middle of that. How shall we decode a wink? or a nod? What does 'sorry' mean, exactly? Is pointing part of the language game?

If we really want to get radical, then do we really have concepts and not a single system? Is this system crystalline or net-like simply because we can stare at words in isolation? What is the ant? Does the little worker ant make sense apart from its colony?

Does the little worker ant make sense apart from its colony? — macrosoft

The single ant is a solipsist.

The single ant is a solipsist. — Posty McPostface

Indeed, but he forgets where he learned the language to make that claim. (Can we say that he dreamed up the colony and his ant-childhood? I guess so. But this verges on monstrosity. Breakfast of Champions.

The ant doesn't care. It doesn't give two shits. It simply does.

The ant doesn't care. It doesn't give two shits. It simply does. — Posty McPostface

I see. Well I have seen that philosophy expressed if not lived by. Max Stirner just burned down everything --in theory. He was very famous for a time, and he dedicated his truly wicked book to his 'sweetheart.' They didn't last. He ended up unfamous and just getting by for quite a few years. I still respect his critique of the 'the sacred.' But, as Marx said, this was still just words, just (anti-)theology.

The ant doesn't care about anything apart from it's role as a worker. It is a very Kantian creature and communist in nature or even totalitarian.

The ant doesn't care about anything apart from it's role as a worker. It is a very Kantian creature and communist in nature or even totalitarian — Posty McPostface

OK. But the ant sounds all mixed up. Do those things go together? The ant doesn't care. He's Walt Whitman. He contains contradictions.

The ant just does. It doesn't think. Blasphemy?

I think you've left out the crucial part of the argument, what he spends the majority of the pages talking about, and that is how we could distinguish the way in which the word is being used, through ostensive demonstration — Metaphysician Undercover

I left out anything you didn't specify immediately above. As I said re PI, "I need to read it again.". I was just going by what you had said.

if you point to an object and say "red", the student needs to know that you are referring to the colour of the object, not the name of the object I.e. the student needs to be able to determine the way that the word is being used, the type of aspect of the world it is meant to signify, as pointing cannot provide this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Two things are pertinent here. One, people may very well wind up with different things in mind for the same terms, and two, what happens is that people observe various instances of pointing (literally or figuratively) and "grunting" (or making marks or whatever) and they attempt to formulate abstractions and make deductions so that various occasions of pointing and grunting make sense/are relatively consistent observationally, including re related pointing and grunting. This second set of methods isn't always successful, of course, and we see the results of that often, including on this board.

This is problematic because it would require that rules could exist in some form other than a linguistic form. How could that be? — Metaphysician Undercover

Natural laws are one example. (Whether we believe that there really are natural laws or not.)

Every significant word or symbol must essentially belong to a 'system,' and...the meaning of a word is its place in this 'system.' — Wittgenstein

For that one I simply say "wrong."

An individual could look at meaning that way, but it's simply a contingent fact about how that individual thinks.

society comes first — Lee Braver

Society can't come first. What would the society in question be comprised of?

Even our 'insides,' so to speak, come from the outside because we only have a sense of these internal contents --how to look for them, their taxonomy, what it makes sense to say about them --via the grammar learned from language games. — Lee Braver

He's conflating ontology with epistemology and philosophy of language there.

objects are what they are because of their own intrinsic nature, gaining only superficial features from whatever relationships they happen to enter into. — Lee Braver

I don't agree with any intrinsic/superficial distinction of that sort.

This metaphysical structure can then secure semantic determanicy — Lee Braver

?? An ontological structure isn't going to suggest anything about "semantic determinacy" whatever that's supposed to amount to, exactly. Why is he jumping from ontology to semantics anyway?

Similarly, for present-at-hand ontology, 'the real entitiy is what is suited for thus remaining constant.' — Lee Braver

There's a string of words, eh? No idea what in the world "suited for thus remaining constant" would be saying. Is that another Heidegger term? Whenever anyone uses Heideggerian terminology (like "present-at-hand") I have to look up (again) what the f--- it's supposed to amount to, because no matter how many times I look it up, I can never remember it, because the explanation never seems to make much sense, it always just seems like Heidegger was assuming a bunch of completely wonky shit that's not very accurate or observant, etc.

Heidegger and the late Witttgenstein embrace holism, according to which an object or word derives its nature and meaning from its place within a network, all other members of which likewise draw their sense from their interrelationships. This framework eliminates atomistic determinacy. — Lee Braver

What determines meaning is how a particular individual thinks about the meaning of something, whether that individual thinks "holistically" or "atomistically" or whatever else.

One, people may very well wind up with different things in mind for the same terms, and two, what happens is that people observe various instances of pointing (literally or figuratively) and "grunting" (or making marks or whatever) and they attempt to formulate abstractions and make deductions so that various occasions of pointing and grunting make sense/are relatively consistent observationally, including re related pointing and grunting. — Terrapin Station

Yes, people "may" wind up with different things in mind, but to be able to use language successfully we must avoid that. And we do learn to use language successfully, so we must be able to avoid that. That's the issue, when there is a multitude of possible interpretations, each correct according to a particular set of rules, where does the capacity to avoid the wrong interpretation, by choosing the appropriate set of rules, come from?

Natural laws are one example. (Whether we believe that there really are natural laws or not.) — Terrapin Station

As I said, that's problematic. Would you argue that inert matter is capable of interpreting natural laws in order to know how to behave? Or how would these natural laws exist, and act to influence the behaviour of matter?

Yes, people "may" wind up with different things in mind, but to be able to use language successfully we must avoid that. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't believe that's the case at all. As long as the involved parties parse things as going smoothly, consistently, coherently, etc. it doesn't matter what they have in mind, exactly.

Of course, language very often doesn't go smoothly, consistently, coherently, etc. to some parties who are paying attention. But sometimes it does, and it can regardless of people having very different things in mind.

where does the capacity to avoid the wrong interpretation, by choosing the appropriate set of rules, come from? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't agree that there are any wrong interpretations. It's not wrong to be different.

Re what people have in mind, they can have very different content where we have no idea that they do, and we might never be able to acquire an inking of that.

Would you argue that inert matter is capable of interpreting natural laws in order to know how to behave? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you thinking maybe I'm in a loony bin?

I don't believe that's the case at all. As long as the involved parties parse things as going smoothly, consistently, coherently, etc. it doesn't matter what they have in mind, exactly.

Of course, language very often doesn't go smoothly, consistently, coherently, etc. to some parties who are paying attention. But sometimes it does, and it can regardless of people having very different things in mind. — Terrapin Station

Sure, it's not absolutely necessary, and it can go smoothly, but misunderstanding is likely the case.

I don't agree that there are any wrong interpretations. It's not wrong to be different. — Terrapin Station

But isn't it necessary to understand what the author intended, to interpret, isn't that what is "meant"? If an interpretation is not consistent with what was meant, can't we say that it's wrong?

Are you thinking maybe I'm in a loony bin? — Terrapin Station

More like you didn't seem to give much thought to what you said. Perhaps in that case there is no such thing as the correct interpretation.

But isn't it necessary to understand what the author intended, to interpret, isn't that what is "meant"? If an interpretation is not consistent with what was meant, can't we say that it's wrong? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I don't agree with any of that. For one, I more or less agree with the "intentional fallacy."

More like you didn't seem to give much thought to what you said. — Metaphysician Undercover

Isn't that rather patronizing and arrogant on your part?

No. I don't agree with any of that. For one, I more or less agree with the "intentional fallacy." — Terrapin Station

I'm just going by how the word "meaning" is commonly used, and defined in the dictionary. The meaning of a word is what is meant by that word, and what is meant is what is intended. Words have various different "senses", different ways in which they can be used, and we determine the meaning in a particular instance of use by referring to the context, what is meant by the speaker, or author.

So I'm following the rules of the language-game that I'm playing, while you're playing some other game. I haven't the foggiest idea of what you mean by "intentional fallacy", so that's lost on me.

Isn't that rather patronizing and arrogant on your part? — Terrapin Station

No, I don't think so, it's what I honestly believed, that you didn't give much thought to what you said. And since you didn't try to explain, your reply just reinforced that belief.

I'm just going by how the word "meaning" is commonly used, and defined in the dictionary. The meaning of a word is what is meant by that word, and what is meant is what is intended. Words have various different "senses", different ways in which they can be used, and we determine the meaning in a particular instance of use by referring to the context, what is meant by the speaker, or author. — Metaphysician Undercover

A problem with that is that on my view, you can't actually observe another persons' meanings, intentions, etc. Those things are mental phenomena. They can't be made identical to something that's not mental phenomena.

I agree, you do not "observe" another person's meaning, you deduce, or infer it. And, you do this through the means of the meaning you produce in your mind, your own meaning. But it is often very important in interpretation to distinguish the two, the other's meaning, and your own meaning. You cannot simply assume that the meaning produced in your mind is what is intended by the speaker, or author. And if it is not, then we can argue that you have produced an incorrect interpretation. So I believe it is important to respect the possibility that one's own interpretation may be incorrect, and therefore do whatever possible to ensure that it is as close as possible to the correct interpretation. That requires empathy, putting oneself in the other's position, to determine what the other intended.