Does no one ever read to learn something in your reality? — Metaphysician Undercover

In philosophy? What would they be learning, and how would they be sure they had learnt it?

Philosophy: love of wisdom. You're not familiar with Socrates are you?

The fact that you are never sure that you learnt it, is the reason why you keep reading more.

The fact that you are never sure that you learnt it, is the reason why you keep reading more. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not following your reasoning here, why would never being sure you learnt it advise reading more? In hope some surity might one day come, perhaps? I can perhaps see that in some defined topic with widespread agreement. If I didn't get maths I might well simply continue reading in the hope that one day I get what everyone else seems to have got. But what is it that everyone seems to have got in philosophy? I've reached just about the highest level of 'state-approved' learning it's possible to reach. I'm not sure I've 'got' anything at all.

You name me a conceivable position one could hold with respect to the current text and I'll find you a professional published philosopher who holds that view. To be honest, the view you personally seem to hold would be about the hardest, Norman Malcom perhaps is closest.

The point is it seems to be a quest which the very nature of it admits will never be fulfilled.

I'm not following your reasoning here, why would never being sure you learnt it advise reading more? In hope some surity might one day come, perhaps? I can perhaps see that in some defined topic with widespread agreement. If I didn't get maths I might well simply continue reading in the hope that one day I get what everyone else seems to have got. But what is it that everyone seems to have got in philosophy? I've reached just about the highest level of 'state-approved' learning it's possible to reach. I'm not sure I've 'got' anything at all. — Isaac

Consider what Wittgenstein says here:

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.

How would you relate to this? How does Wittgenstein propose to separate "ideal" from "perfect?

81 ...But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect ...

I would say, that judging by your paragraph above, you would read something, have a vague understanding, despite the possibility of some misunderstanding, and accept your reading as sufficient. Would you call it perfect? Myself, if I was interested in the subject, I would not be satisfied with a vague understanding with some degree of misunderstanding. That would be an imperfection in my understanding. If the subject interested me, I would reread the text to get a better understanding of it, or proceed to read something else relevant to help me out. It's just a matter of approach, some of us actually are "striving after an ideal", that's just what is instinctual to us, while others are not. But it is the nature of "the ideal" which is tricky. So long as we recognize that "the ideal" is by its very nature impossible to achieve, then we are never frustrated by the reality that we never obtain the ideal, despite the fact that we are striving for it, and therefore we continue to better our understanding through this striving for the ideal.

You name me a conceivable position one could hold with respect to the current text and I'll find you a professional published philosopher who holds that view. To be honest, the view you personally seem to hold would be about the hardest, Norman Malcom perhaps is closest. — Isaac

I've read the book before, much of it more than once, and have not formed a firm "position". That is because far too much of it is difficult to understand, and I never took the time to understand each passage. I reread sometimes as I read, and upon reading the book I had respect for the fact that I still
didn't understand much of it, and so I continued to reread some passages. That's why I am really enjoying the exercise of this thread. Maybe by the end of this I will be able to hold a position.

The point is it seems to be a quest which the very nature of it admits will never be fulfilled. — Isaac

Exactly, that's the nature of "the ideal". Do you know the saying "practise makes perfect"? We practise with the goal of getting better. It's not really the goal of perfection, because we respect the fact that perfection is impossible. So let's remove 'the ideal", because it's not real, it's not at all practical. But then what direction is "better"? There is no such thing as better now, and where we are is perfect.

And how do we know they are 'good' in the absence of having what they say concur with what we already believe (or arrive somewhere we unexpectedly find ourselves comforted by)? What other measure would you use, surely not something as vacuous as 'truth'? — Isaac

By that measure a good teacher is one who panders. Why should a teacher concur with what we already believe unless what we already believe is unquestionably correct? To arrive somewhere we unexpectedly find ourselves comforted by is to go nowhere. A philosophical education is not about being comforted, it is about having the rug pulled out from underneath you. It is about being disoriented and lost. Wittgenstein said:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there. (CV 65)

Socrates was called a torpedo fish because he left his interlocutors numb and confused. Plato’s ascent from the cave was painful and contrary to the desire to crawl back into the comfort of the darkness of the cave.

Under the guidance of a good teacher the text opens up. We begin to see things in it that we had overlooked. The text becomes more cohesive. Passages we could not understand now make sense. But a good teacher is also one who teaches us not to rely on her.

So if you don't approach a text with such expectations as I describe, what justification do you have for the belief that an author has something to teach you? Do you think that justification lies outside of your expectations and biases? — Isaac

You open the book and begin reading it. Perhaps you are not ready for it and put it aside. Perhaps you think that since the author is held in such high regard that you should make the effort to work through it. Perhaps your work pays off, perhaps it doesn’t.

How did you 'find' this? What sensation caused you to doubt your original beliefs, not their lack of concordance with 'truth' surely (not in Plato at least), for if you already knew what 'truth' was so as to be able to make the comparison you would not have needed to read Plato. — Isaac

It was not a sensation. I found what I thought were weaknesses and began to pull the argument apart only to find out that it was not as weak as I had assumed. I thought of counterarguments and found that they did not hold up against what he was saying. In short, he won the imagined argument every time. I came to question my assumption that some guy who lived in ancient times could not know more than someone living today. I came to question my assumption that I saw things as they are.

Yes, but it is a mode of historical thinking, biographical thinking, not necessarily philosophical thinking. — Isaac

For me it is neither historical nor biographical. It is a direct engagement with the text itself. At some point historical and biographical background may be helpful, but it may also be misleading. A first rate philosopher is not a product of history, he makes history.

Is Kripke's obviously faulty paraphrasing any less philosophy for the fact that he misrepresented Wittgenstein? — Isaac

If he misrepresents W. then he will not be useful if my goal is to understand W. He may have something of value to say - some here evidently believe he does. The point of this topic is to understand the PI. If the text leads you to your own thoughts then that is all well and good, but it does not help us understand W.

If you give even a cursory glance over the secondary literature, you will see that intelligent, well-respected academics have been able to answer all of your questions in just about every conceivable way and virtually none of them agree, leaving you free to choose whichever answer satisfies you. So what are you going to base that choice on if not your existing beliefs? — Isaac

It is because there is so little agreement that I became interested in W. What I base my choice on is what seems to me to be most faithful to the text itself.

Again, I would ask you how you are making the judgement that the author is worth reading outside of your pre-existing beliefs about what is of value? — Isaac

The judgment that an author is worth reading is something that may evolve as I spend time reading the author. I may be drawn in or I may lose interest. Perhaps it is the fact that the author challenges my beliefs and values that I interesting. Perhaps it is the author’s way of looking at things that I find interesting. Perhaps it is the author’s ability to change my mind that I find most compelling.

If you want to defer to the secondary literature that is your choice, but some of us prefer to work through the text itself.

I am going to hold off going further with this because it will only take us further from the PI.

How would you relate to this? How does Wittgenstein propose to separate "ideal" from "perfect?

81 ...But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect ...


I would say, that judging by your paragraph above, you would read something, have a vague understanding, despite the possibility of some misunderstanding, and accept your reading as sufficient. Would you call it perfect? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. That is what I think Wittgenstein is saying. Not just in those paragraphs, but in his dismissal of the heirachy of analycity, his treatment of exactness, his talk of signs, basically half the book so far has been trying to get us to see that there is not an ideal, no universal frame, no perfect correspondence. Ramsey does the same, in his own way, and I'd certainly recommend reading his notes sometime, if you're interested. The "vague understanding" I might get from my reading is not made less vague by analysis, analysis provides only alternative information. I cannot somehow 'find' behind the text, the meaning, simply by looking hard enough. It must be shown, one must wrestle with actual philosophical problems, one must 'see' what Wittgenstein means, but to think you can then put that understanding back into language for others to learn from is to misunderstand what Wittgenstein is trying to show.

I am going to hold off going further with this because it will only take us further from the PI. — Fooloso4

No problem, we're obviously worlds apart on this because I think this is exactly what the PI is all about. To bring it back to the text (as you seem to not see the thematic link), I'm referring particularly to section 90 where he talks (using Augustine's example investigations) about how we feel as though our philosophical critique must penetrate a phenomena, yet our confusion is dissolved by realising that this is not what we are doing at all. What we are doing something far more vague, we are only exploring the possibilities of phenomena, the kinds of things we say.

So yeah, if you think it's nothing but a distracting sideline, I can't see us finding much common ground from there.

In the middle of a discussion of conceptual commonalities and distinctions W. introduces three paragraphs on seeing. The connection between seeing and concepts is something that will be addressed later. Seeing is not passive perception, it involves active conception.

Seeing what is in common. — PI § 72

In order to see what various things have in common requires making distinctions and disregarding all other features.

And what is then to prevent us from viewing it - that is, from using it - only as a sample of irregularity of shape? — PI § 73

Note that viewing it in such cases it an activity, a way of using it.

Of course, there is such a thing as seeing in this way or that; and there are also cases where whoever sees a sample like this will in
general use it in this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way. For example, someone who sees the schematic drawing of a cube as a plane figure consisting of a square and two rhombi will perhaps carry out the order “Bring me something like this!” differently from someone who sees the picture three-dimensionally. — PI § 74

Seeing it this way or that. In the Tractatus (5.5423) he gives us two ways of looking at the two dimensional drawing of a cube. We can deliberately see something this way or that. But it is not always deliberate. In some cases looking at it this way rather than that may be wrong, as in the example of when you want someone to bring you a cube, but in other cases it may allow you to see things and thus regard things in a new way, leading to some insight. In addition, there is no hard line between viewing objects and viewing situations.

This can be seen in the following comment from W.:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) — Culture and Value 16

In order to see what various things have in common requires making distinctions and disregarding all other features. — Fooloso4

Seeing what things have in common is not a matter of making distinctions though. It is a matter of seeing different things as the same, seeing all the different shades of blue, as the same colour, blue. So it is somewhat opposed to making distinctions, it is overlooking differences, to say that different things are the same.

It is relevant to the different ways that we can see things. One might see all the different shades of blue as different colours, or one might see them all as the same colour, blue.

Seeing is not passive perception, it involves active conception. — Fooloso4

In order to see what various things have in common requires making distinctions and disregarding all other features. — Fooloso4

Note that viewing it in such cases it an activity, a way of using it. — Fooloso4

In some cases looking at it this way rather than that may be wrong, as in the example of when you want someone to bring you a cube, but in other cases it may allow you to see things and thus regard things in a new way, leading to some insight. — Fooloso4

Right, so all these descriptions of what 'seeing' really is are perfectly reasonable, but all you've done here is paraphrase them. Yes, things can be seen one way or another, who on earth thought they couldn't? Yes, sometimes seeing things one way can cause problems when you act on that conception, other times it can be quite useful. Again who on earth ever thought that this was not the case? Remember, Wittgenstein is speaking to an audience of highly educated philosophers.

You obviously have to don't really think that someone widely credited with being one of the greatest philosophers who have ever lived is thus acclaimed because he provided us with such banal insights as the fact that we sometimes see things one way and sometimes another?

So what do you think Wittgenstein is trying to show with respect to the theme of the book? Where do you think this discussion of 'seeing' is leading? Why bring it up now? What does Wittgenstein want us to do with it?

So what do you think Wittgenstein is trying to show with respect to the theme of the book? Where do you think this discussion of 'seeing' is leading? Why bring it up now? What does Wittgenstein want us to do with it? — Isaac

I would say that he is leading to 75 from 74. Or else we could accuse him of being out of order.

75. He approaches the concept "game" from a slightly different perspective (a different way of seeing it). He asks what does it mean to know what a game is without being able to say what a game is. This is how "concepts" have been exposed to this point, we use words without being able to define them. So he asks: "Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition?"

76. He proceeds toward investigating this possibility. If someone else were to draw a boundary (define the concept), it would be different from the boundary "I" would draw; "I" want to draw no boundary at all. "His concept can then be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it." The two concepts are like two pictures, the other having clear boundaries between the different colours, Wittgenstein's as colour patches with vague contours. (Notice the analogy with how we see things, the other person has an image with sharp boundaries, like clear 20/20 vision, Wittgenstein's is like a person who does not see so well, seeing different colours, but vague boundaries.)

77. Now he proceeds to question how the sharp bounded image can be made to correspond to the vague one. This is to investigate the question implied at 75. Is defining the concept an attempt to represent the undefined concept? He describes this as a "hopeless task". " Anything—and nothing—is
right." And he says that this is what we find in the fields of aesthetics and ethics. This would be the case if we attempted to define such concepts as "good". So, "it will be easier for you to see that the
word must have a family of meanings."

At 77 he appears to be dismissing the method of Platonic dialectics. The Platonic method is to analyze all the different ways a word is used, and attempt a synthesis which is consistent and representative of "the meaning" of the word. It requires a thorough analysis of the different ways of using the word, rejection of contradiction, and a striving towards the "ideal" representation of meaning. Wittgenstein appears to be saying that instead of trying to determine the ideal definition of words like "good", as is the method of Platonic dialectics, we ought to allow a family of meanings, because this is "easier".

There is no one thing that all things that have something in common have. Making distinctions is not the one thing that seeing what things have in common have in common.

See the second case in § 72, the shapes and shades of leafs in §73, and other examples where we see what things have in common despite their differences. Do we see a dog and a horse or cow as the same or different? In some respects we can see them as the same and in others as different. They do have a lot in common.

As to different shades of blue, as the samples get closer to green or red some will see them as blue but others will say they are no longer blue but aqua or violet. How much yellow or red makes a difference for seeing the samples as having blue in common or no longer being blue?

If white turns into black some people say “Essentially it is still the same”. And others, if the colour becomes one degree darker, say “It has changed completely”. — Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 42

Right, so all these descriptions of what 'seeing' really is are perfectly reasonable, but all you've done here is paraphrase them. Yes, things can be seen one way or another, who on earth thought they couldn't? Yes, sometimes seeing things one way can cause problems when you act on that conception, other times it can be quite useful. Again who on earth ever thought that this was not the case? Remember, Wittgenstein is speaking to an audience of highly educated philosophers. — Isaac

And yet he points these things out. See, for example, Moore’s position on perception.

You obviously have to don't really think that someone widely credited with being one of the greatest philosophers who have ever lived is thus acclaimed because he provided us with such banal insights as the fact that we sometimes see things one way and sometimes another? — Isaac

Issues such as “seeing as” and framing are things that “highly educated philosophers” are still discussing. As I said he is introducing something that will be developed later.

So what do you think Wittgenstein is trying to show with respect to the theme of the book? Where do you think this discussion of 'seeing' is leading? Why bring it up now? What does Wittgenstein want us to do with it? — Isaac

The question is premature. We are still near the beginning of the book. I do not think that there is a single theme, but again it is too early to discuss whether there is one theme or several and what it or they may be.

I would say that he is leading to 75 from 74. Or else we could accuse him of being out of order. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think all of the PI is in 'order' so I wouldn't count on it.

So he asks: "Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition?" — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not as if the concept is just a definition to which we have yet to put words though. He's saying that that our ability to apply the unspecified definition is entirely and exhaustively what constitutes it.

Notice the analogy with how we see things, the other person has an image with sharp boundaries, like clear 20/20 vision, Wittgenstein's is like a person who does not see so well, seeing different colours, but vague boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, this is not a good analogy because it still implies that there is something there to be seen that the blurred image is hiding from the unfocused gaze. What Wittgenstein is saying here is that often there is no hidden shape, the edges appear blurred because they actually are blurred, they remain undefined because no definition seems required for them to function. In fact they may well be more useful blurred as they are.

At 77 he appears to be dismissing the method of Platonic dialectics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I too think that's what's going on here.

Wittgenstein appears to be saying that instead of trying to determine the ideal definition of words like "good", as is the method of Platonic dialectics, we ought to allow a family of meanings, because this is "easier". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see any evidence that Wittgenstein is taking this route because he thinks it is "easier". He's taking this route because he feels the dialectic process has caused more problems than it has solved. What meanings are now clear to us, that were previously clouded, as a result of the application of the Platonic dialectic method?

And yet he points these things out. See, for example, Moore’s position on perception. — Fooloso4

But Moore's question is very different. Moore is primarily investigating the relationship between the sense-data and the object surface. In fact he quite frequently makes reference to how difficult the problem of perception judgement actually is. It is to exactly this type of difficulty that Wittgenstein is marshalling what it is that we already know about the ordinary function of this judgment.

Issues such as “seeing as” and framing are things that “highly educated philosophers” are still discussing. — Fooloso4

Exactly. But are ordinary people struggling with their use?

The question is premature. — Fooloso4

Why?

again it is too early to discuss whether there is one theme or several and what it or they may be. — Fooloso4

Again, why? I'm genuinely confused as to what you're trying to do and it's quite difficult to get involved under such seemingly arbitrary restrictions.

But Moore's question is very different. Moore is primarily investigating the relationship between the sense-data and the object surface. In fact he quite frequently makes reference to how difficult the problem of perception judgement actually is. It is to exactly this type of difficulty that Wittgenstein is marshalling what it is that we already know about the ordinary function of this judgment. — Isaac

I do not want to compound the problem of trying to understand what W. is saying by raising questions about what Moore is saying. I am simply pointing to the fact that W. is not introducing the problem of perception out of the blue where others saw no problem. Moore’s paper Some Judgments of Perception was presented in 1918.

Exactly. But are ordinary people struggling with their use? — Isaac

They may be. Show a picture of a man watching children play to two groups of people one of which had earlier been told a story of a child molester and the other a story about a man who has just returned after being away from his family for a long time. The majority of the first group will see the man in the picture as sinister and the other as caring even though no direct connection has been made between the picture and the story. We do something similar all the time. A carpenter may see a tree as material for making a table, someone else as wood for the stove, a builder may see it as something that must be removed to build a house, and an environmentalist as an integral part of the ecosystem. We do not all simply see the same thing.

The question is premature.
— Fooloso4

Why? — Isaac

Because it is like asking how a musical theme develops in the third movement if we have only heard the first.

again it is too early to discuss whether there is one theme or several and what it or they may be.
— Fooloso4

Again, why? I'm genuinely confused as to what you're trying to do and it's quite difficult to get involved under such seemingly arbitrary restrictions. — Isaac

Again, how can we tell whether there is one or more themes to a piece of music if we have not yet heard the whole thing?

We are reading the book together section by section just as we would when reading it for the first time. For all I know some may be reading it for the first time. Not everyone who follows to topic contributes to it. No doubt the second time through one sees some things differently, but you cannot get there by bypassing the process of reading the text. Occasionally reference is made to latter sections but as a comment in passing rather than an attempt to jump ahead.

I am simply pointing to the fact that W. is not introducing the problem of perception out of the blue where others saw no problem. — Fooloso4

But you're not saying that Wittgenstein is merely tackling the problem of perception, such that support for this would be others having mentioned the problem. You were specifically defending the concept that what Wittgenstein says in these passages is in some way elucidatory. That requires a defence that others have been labouring with the actual concept you're claiming he is clarifying, and I don't see that in Moore.

We do not all simply see the same thing. — Fooloso4

No we don't. And Wittgenstein points this out. But my question was not "is this the case?", my question was "does anyone seriously think it isn't?". Your examples of people seeing things differently answers the first question, not my actual question. The point here, is that which Wittgenstein comes to around 89 on, that the problem is in part that we should think anything queer is going on here. That metaphysical propositions have the character they do often only because they sound queer, not because they are.

it is like asking how a musical theme develops in the third movement if we have only heard the first. — Fooloso4

But in what examination of music does anyone make any comment at all after only hearing the first. In what form of musical exegesis do we pause after the first chords to say "well, here are some musical notes played one after the other, but let's say no more for now"?

We are reading the book together section by section just as we would when reading it for the first time. For all I know some may be reading it for the first time. Not everyone who follows to topic contributes to it. No doubt the second time through one sees some things differently, but you cannot get there by bypassing the process of reading the text. — Fooloso4

OK, so all that is about reading the text, but we are not here and now reading it are we? The activity we are undertaking collectively is writing about it. You have, in none of your explanation above made any reference to writing about it. What I'm asking you is what you would like people to write, if not what we think the author is aiming at, if not how we might use or relate to the aphorisms, then what is it about them to which you would like to restrict topics of discussion. Would you prefer I feign ignorance of the remainder of the text?

You were specifically defending the concept that what Wittgenstein says in these passages is in some way elucidatory. — Isaac

I am simply pointing to the connection between perception and conception, something he will be discussing latter on.

That requires a defence that others have been labouring with the actual concept you're claiming he is clarifying, and I don't see that in Moore. — Isaac

I have made no claim that he is clarifying anything or addressing a particular concept that anyone else has dealt with. I simply pointed out that in a section dealing with conceptual boundaries, clarity, and so on, he gives a set of visual rather than conceptual examples.

I mentioned Moore only because you asked why he would bring up such things to an audience of highly educated philosophers, as if it were odd that highly educated philosophers would even consider such obvious things.

But my question was not "is this the case?", my question was "does anyone seriously think it isn't?". — Isaac

People generally believe what they see. They believe they saw a creepy looking guy leering at the children. When thinking about it they may acknowledge that there may be more than one way of looking at it, but generally people act on and react to what they see without consideration of how else one might look at it or what they might see if they look at it differently.

Isn't this what W. is doing with his various examples?

The point here, is that which Wittgenstein comes to around 89 on, that the problem is in part that we should think anything queer is going on here. That metaphysical propositions have the character they do often only because they sound queer, not because they are. — Isaac

That there is something queer going on is something you interjected. There is nothing queer about it. I don’t see what metaphysical propositions have to do with the passages being discussed or anything I have said.

But in what examination of music does anyone make any comment at all after only hearing the first. — Isaac

That is the point. We don’t. And yet that is what you want to do here.

In what form of musical exegesis do we pause after the first chords to say "well, here are some musical notes played one after the other, but let's say no more for now"? — Isaac

There may be a great deal to say about the notes that have been played, but we cannot say anything about the notes that have not been played. We hold off saying anything about the piece as a whole until we have heard the whole of the piece.

OK, so all that is about reading the text, but we are not here and now reading it are we? — Isaac

Some have read the whole thing but others have not. If you do not approve of this approach then why do you keep coming back just to complain about it?

There is no one thing that all things that have something in common have. Making distinctions is not the one thing that seeing what things have in common have in common. — Fooloso4

I know, but the point is that "seeing what things have in common" is really a matter of overlooking their differences. So when we see all the different shades of blue, simply as blue, I think that this might actually be a deficiency in the way that we see them, because we are seeing them all as the same, "blue" when they are in fact different.

See the second case in § 72, the shapes and shades of leafs in §73, and other examples where we see what things have in common despite their differences. Do we see a dog and a horse or cow as the same or different? In some respects we can see them as the same and in others as different. They do have a lot in common. — Fooloso4

Right, so if we see dogs and horses and cows all as animals, we see them as the same, animals. But I think that this is not a very precise or accurate way of seeing them, because it is a matter of overlooking all the differences between them, and seeing them all as the same, animals.

It's not as if the concept is just a definition to which we have yet to put words though. He's saying that that our ability to apply the unspecified definition is entirely and exhaustively what constitutes it. — Isaac

No, he's not stating that at all, he's asking if this is the case. There's a difference between stating what one believes is the case, and asking if such and such is the case. So he asks if this is the case.

75 What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it
mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow
equivalent to an unformulated definition? So that if it were
formulated I should be able to recognize it as the expression of my
knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely
expressed in the explanations that I could give?

That is what he asks at 75. Then he proceeds with the analogy of the pictures, at 76-77, to demonstrate that this is not the case. Putting a definition to the concept is like producing the picture with clear boundaries to correspond with the picture with vaguely outlined colour blotches. When the picture is too vague, like in the case of "good" the task is hopeless.

No, this is not a good analogy because it still implies that there is something there to be seen that the blurred image is hiding from the unfocused gaze. What Wittgenstein is saying here is that often there is no hidden shape, the edges appear blurred because they actually are blurred, they remain undefined because no definition seems required for them to function. In fact they may well be more useful blurred as they are. — Isaac

There is something there, the concept, in the undefined version the boundaries are vague and blurred. In the analogy it is "two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed, but with clear contours." To answer the question above (at 75) he is asking if the defined version (clear contours) can be made to correspond with the blurred version. He says that the "degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness." If there is not even a hint of an outline, he says that it becomes a hopeless task. This is how he sees concepts in aesthetics and ethics, concepts like "good". It would be extremely difficult (a hopeless task). So in the case of these concepts with extremely vague contours, he seems to think that it would be impossible to provide an adequate corresponding definition.

I don't see any evidence that Wittgenstein is taking this route because he thinks it is "easier". He's taking this route because he feels the dialectic process has caused more problems than it has solved. What meanings are now clear to us, that were previously clouded, as a result of the application of the Platonic dialectic method? — Isaac

He clearly indicates that providing a clear definition of meaning for these ethical concepts like "good", might be a "hopeless task", and states as a conclusion that it would be "easier" to consider a family of meanings.

Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.

Right, so if we see dogs and horses and cows all as animals, we see them as the same, animals. But I think that this is not a very precise or accurate way of seeing them, because it is a matter of overlooking all the differences between them, and seeing them all as the same, animals. — Metaphysician Undercover

We might see humans and pigs as being very different but we use the valves from pig hearts to replace faulty human valves. That would not be the case if it was not seen that humans and pigs have this in common.

I mentioned Moore only because you asked why he would bring up such things to an audience of highly educated philosophers, as if it were odd that highly educated philosophers would even consider such obvious things. — Fooloso4

I didn't question Wittgenstein bringing the matter up at all, I asked why you would consider that merely paraphrasing them without drawing out any philosophical conclusion was a comment worth making on a philosophy forum. The only answer I could think of was that you thought his summary in that section (that we see things differently in different circumstances) was itself the conclusion of philosophical interest,so I was questioning that. Otherwise, to use your musical analogy, all you have said is "here the composer plays some notes - we'll see why he chose those particular notes later". If all you're saying is "here Wittgenstein mentions some observations - we'll see later why he did" then isn't that just a description of any investigation of any sort, what kind of first time reader are you catering for that might be unaware that in section 72 Wittgenstein makes some observations?

When thinking about it they may acknowledge that there may be more than one way of looking at it — Fooloso4

Right, which is the sole point I was making. I know Wittgenstein is not always easy to interpret, but you'd have to take a pretty weird reading to miss the fact that he quite clearly states that philosophy does not provide us with new facts. That people see things in different ways is a fact. That the term 'game' has several meanings is a fact. That meanings are not learned by ostention is a fact.

This is why I'm getting so frustrated, because I think Wittgenstein has a huge amount, of great significance to say. One of which is that philosophy does not provide new facts, and yet on a philosophy forum the vast majority of contributors are treating this valuable work as if it were exactly that. A series of facts about language, human psychology, colours... All because you daren't stick your neck out and say something of philosophical interest about it.

don’t see what metaphysical propositions have to do with the passages being discussed or anything I have said. — Fooloso4

What? Literally the entire book is about how we deal with metaphysical propositions. I think I'm starting to understand why we might be at such odds over this.

That is the point. We don’t. And yet that is what you want to do here. — Fooloso4

Yes, we don't because we don't make any comments at all. Who stops a piece of music after the first few bars to point out the fact that the composer has used some notes?

If you do not approve of this approach then why do you keep coming back just to complain about it? — Fooloso4

Haven't you just answered your own question? It's because I do not approve of this approach, and, as I have mentioned before, the fact that I do not approve of this approach, and my reasons why, are absolutely pertinent to the book. The text is about conducting philosophy. We are conducting philosophy. How we do it is the subject of the text.

I had just thought this might be a thread to discuss Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, not re-write it using slightly different words.

The only answer I could think of was that you thought his summary in that section (that we see things differently in different circumstances) was itself the conclusion of philosophical interest — Isaac

There are several issues - same/identity and difference (a problem that is as old as philosophy itself), seeing the same thing differently, and the connection between seeing and conceiving.

Literally the entire book is about how we deal with metaphysical propositions. I think I'm starting to understand why we might be at such odds over this. — Isaac

That does not mean that every passage and every issue that is addressed is a metaphysical one.

Yes, we don't because we don't make any comments at all. — Isaac

That ignores and distorts what has been said. There has been some paraphrasing but there has been more. What there has been a lot of from you is arguing about how we should be doing this and how we should be relying on the secondary literature. It is a waste of time and I am not going to indulge you any longer.

78. He provides examples to demonstrate that there is a difference between knowing something, and being able to say it. How a clarinet sounds, for example.

79 The phrase "Moses did not exist" has different meanings depending on how "Moses" is defined, or described.

The name 'Moses' can be defined by means of various descriptions.

I believe this is a pseudo-problem created by conflating description with definition. These two are distinct. A description presupposes the existence of a thing being described, whether that thing is imaginary or not. A definition does not describe a thing, but a use, it describes the word's meaning, its use. Descriptive terms have meaning without having a thing which is being described. If there were such a thing, it would be a concept as in the case of "red". So descriptive words have potentially a definition, the definition describing the word's use. Now we introduce the proper noun, the name of a person. There is neither a definition, nor a description, which is appropriate, because this name signifies the thing to be described, whether imaginary or not. So the name, in this sense of a proper noun, cannot have an associated definition because it already has a designated use of referring to a particular thing (imaginary or not), nor is there necessarily a description for that thing.

Wittgenstein produces a similar resolution, saying that the name "N" has no fixed meaning. You can see that in the conflation of description and definition, this means that neither definition nor necessary description, can be properly assigned to it. So he asks: "Should it be said that I am using a word whose meaning I don't know, and so am talking nonsense?"

The proper noun is symbolic of the law of identity, which allows that a thing may be identified without a description. Further, the thing identified need not be a descriptive concept like in the case of "red", such that the name has meaning (use) in that way. The law of identity allows that a symbol can have meaning, by referring directly to a thing; that thing being neither a conception providing for the use of the word (and the possibility of a definition), nor is it necessary that the thing has a description whatsoever.

What there has been a lot of from you is arguing about how we should be doing this and how we should be relying on the secondary literature. It is a waste of time and I am not going to indulge you any longer. — Fooloso4

If you think that's what I've been doing you clearly haven't understood a word I've been saying.

80 continues to question the idea of fixed meaning. Is it possible there could be rules which govern the use of words?

81 is quite difficult, and I believe pivotal to an understanding of Wittgenstein's belief of how rules apply within language. Here's the concluding paragraph from each, ed. 3, and ed. 4

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, ed. 3

All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning
something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may
mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a
sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus
according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, Hacker, Schulte, ed. 4

Notice the disagreement between "lead us", and "mislead us". I believe that this ambiguity is indicative of what Wittgenstein means when he says that someone operates according to a rule.

It’s been a bit since I posted in here last, but I’d like to pick up where I’ve left off and try to catch up! Brief recap: we’re in a section where Witty is inveighing against the idea of analysing things into component parts. In particular, Witty has turned his attention to the notion of similarity, and exactly how - if at all - one is able to specify the similar.

§73

§73 can be read as something like an ‘application’ of Witty’s argument so far. If §71 tired to show that ‘blurred concepts’ like ‘stay roughly here’ did not resolve into any further specificity upon analysis (where ‘analysis’ ought to be taken as the the opposite of synthesis: breaking apart into pieces, as opposed to putting together), §73 turns its attention to the ‘ideas in our head’ when we think of certain things. The question, as with §71, is something like: how specific does such an ‘idea' have to be? Witty answer is basically that it doesn’t have to be specific at all: it can be a ‘general’ leaf, a 'schematic’ leaf without all the details ‘filled in’ as it were. Just as ‘stay roughly here’ can also be understood as something like a general schema without 'in-built’ particularity.

The second half of §73 brings back the question of roles, although the word is not uttered as such: Witty speaks instead of 'understanding as’ (as in, to understand X as Y), which can be read as ‘to understand X playing the role of Y’ (in a language-game Z)'. The series of rhetorical questions which close off the section -

“What shape must the sample of the colour green be? Should it be rectangular? Or would it then be the sample of green rectangles?- So should it be ‘irregular’ in shape? And what is then to prevent us from viewing it a that is, from using it a only as a sample of irregularity of shape?”

- attests again to the fact that the 'same thing' can play different roles, and that there definitive answers to these questions can only be sought in relation to particular language-games: there is no 'general theory’ that would satisfy these questions in advance. One must ‘look and see’, ‘up close’ to get answers to these question. So rigorous is this that for Witty, even to understand a schema as as schema (and not as the shape of a particular leaf) ‘resides in the way the samples are used’. i.e. their role in a game.

I see that he has now moved from describing ostensive definition as a demonstration of how words are used (at the beginning of the book), to this point (73), where ostensive definition is now described in terms of how the objects, samples are used. He performs this inversion with the principle stated at 50. The sample is "the means of representation". Ostensive definition is not a case of using words, and demonstrating how one ought to use words through the use of words, it is a case of using objects, samples, to demonstrate the meaning of words.

§74

§74 expands on the theme of understanding-as, this time tying it to the question of perception: the question of 'seeing-as'. In fact, part of what's at stake in §74 is drawing a certain kind of equivalence between seeing-as and understanding-as. A puzzle I'd like to draw out is: why this equivalence? And the clue is in the fact that Witty says that seeing-as does not imply seeing differently; [re-ordering slightly]:

§74: "It is not so ... that someone who views this leaf as a sample of ‘leaf shape in general’ will see it differently from someone who views it as, say, a sample of this particular shape".

By which I understand that the leaf will not look different, in terms of specular quality, to two different people who see the leaf-as-X in different ways [sample or general schema]. So if seeing-as differently does not mean that the leaf looks different, what does it mean? Witty's answer, as ever, turns upon how different roles imply different uses:

§74: "someone who sees the leaf in a particular way will then use it in such-and-such a way or according to such-and-such rules".

To which we might add something like: someone who sees the leaf in a different particular way will use in a different such-and-such way, etc. Note that by emphasizing use in this way - the fact that the same thing, seen-as differently, will in turn be used differently in corresponding games - Witty ends up doing something really interesting with perception: he makes it less about the sensorial, qualitative/raw 'feeling' aspect of it ('qualia', etc), so much as incorporates perception as having a part to play in intelligibility. The role of the perceived in Witty's account of intelligibility has less to do with the sensory than the grammatical(!), of all things.

This is something Witty will expand upon at length in later sections, but here I just want to note that this helps us answer the 'puzzle' I set out at the beginning - the equivalence of understanding and perception. By modelling, as it were, the latter on the former, Witty aims to once again 'de-interiorize' perception - just as he did with the memory-image in §56/57. Just as, in §56/57, the importance of the memory-image had to do with its role in a langauge-game, so too does perception's importance come out in the role it also plays in an economy of use:

§74: "Whoever sees a sample like this will in general use it in this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way."

And the clue is in the fact that Witty says the seeing-as does not imply seeing differently; — StreetlightX

I believe that what is said here, is that to "see" a sample as a sample of a universal, rather than as a particular, might be said to "see" the sample differently, but it is not really a matter of seeing the sample differently, it is really a matter of using the sample differently. So if we say that the person sees the sample differently, "this might well be so—though it is not so—for it would only be to say that, as a
matter of experience, if you see the leaf in a particular way, you use it in such-and-such a way or according to such-and-such rules." I.e., when you see the leaf in this or that way, you are using the image of it, in your mind, in this or that way. The sample is understood as...

Witty aims to once again 'de-interiorize' perception - just as he did with the memory-image in §56/57. Just as, in §56/57, the importance of the memory-image had to do with its role in a langauge-game, so too does perception's importance come out in the role it also plays in an economy of use: — StreetlightX

Here's a brief note on this subject. I do not agree with this characterization of a "de-interiorizing" at this point. There is no warrant for an exterior/interior dichotomy here. And this is the same as at 56/57, the division of internal/external is shown to be irrelevant. There are internal and external aspects implicated, but to create such a division is of no advantage to the inquiry. Witty is describing the way that one "sees" the sample in ostensive definition (73), as a consequence of the way that the sample is used in demonstration. (You might call this an external using of the sample.) Further, the way that one "sees" the sample (74), "the sample is understood as...", is itself a using of the sample by the learner. (You might call this an internal using of the sample within one's mind.) So talking in these terms, of how the sample is used, does not immediately necessitate an internal/external division, the sample is used internally and externally. "How the sample is seen", or more appropriately, 'the sample is understood as...", is a description of the use of the sample, whether it's using the sample externally in demonstration, or using the sample internally in understanding.