The phrase "correctly identifying" has not so far been used by either me or the passages we're up to in the PI, so I'm not sure what you're responding to here, or why it's in quotes. As for this: — StreetlightX

That was the second time I used the phrase by the way. I didn't use it to indicate that I was quoting anyone. It was in quotation marks because I wouldn't say there is anything that counts as "correctly identifying," so it would be " so-called." I was basically suggesting it as what there was maybe an attempt to get at or suggest.

The problem is that ostension, by definition, is always demonstrative, and demonstratives are always of something. Pointing to 'this' is always demonstrative of something (else): X is an instance of [a color/shape/texture/size/etc]. It is demonstrative even if it simply is 'the thing I am talking about' (*point* "that is what I am talking about"; which can be read: "the role occupied by what I am talking about is that"). One would not be pointing otherwise. In other words, ostension is by definition inseparable from generality, — StreetlightX

For one, this sounds like you're saying that we couldn't point at something or someone and utter a proper name. But that can't be what you're saying. But that's separable from generality.

Has anyone proposed using any kind of companion where we can refer some of these questions about ostensive definitions and such? Everything seems scattered and not formed in a coherent whole, that using a companion would provide.

I'd be interested in anything from Routledge.

For one, this sounds like you're saying that we couldn't point at something or someone and utter a proper name. But that can't be what you're saying. — Terrapin Station

Indeed it isn't. Which is why names are not demonstratives.

Okay, but then what you're saying isn't very clear, starting with the fact that proper names for particulars are separable from generalities.

Re "demonstrative" in the sense that you're using it, you can't be saying that we can't ostensively present proper names, because we obviously can and do.

Yep. But the pointing out of a proper name is still to employ that proper name in a role: "that is X" [implication: refer to him as such; or, she is the one you're looking for; etc - there is a whole grammar implied here]; I speak of and about a name differently than I speak of and about a color. A name remains a name (indefinite article), no matter how singular the name is.

How are you connecting "employ that proper name in a role" (not to suggest that I'm agreeing with that--we'd have to define it better) with "inseparable from generality"?

§30: "An ostensive definition explains the use - the meaning - of a word if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear".

What does that have to do with proper name ostension and the comment you made about generality?

(Again not that I agree with Wittgenstein there, but that's another issue)

A role is always general. That's... just what it means to be or to 'occupy' a role. A name plays the role... of a name, with a distinctive grammar shared by other uses of names. Basic stuff dude.

So re generality and its complement you weren't making a type/token distinction?

I quite obviously mean what Wittgenstein does when he speaks of types, places, and roles in language and the like. I thought that was quite clear given this is a PI thread, and I was literally discussing passages from the book but I guess I'm mistaken?

Sure, so re generality and its complement you weren't making a type/token distinction?

Wouldn't it have been easier to just answer that?

I don't know what you're talking about - 'Generality and its complement'?

Everything seems scattered and not formed in a coherent whole, that using a companion would provide. — Wallows

That is the way that PI is written, scattered and not formed into a coherent whole. If a companion provided us with a coherent whole it would be a faulty interpretation.

But also it would be odd if Wittgenstein thought that Augustine was saying that. — Terrapin Station

That's the force of Wittgenstein's argument against Augustine though. He argues that Augustine's description of learning through ostensive definition is wrong because it only provides a partial description. As well as ostensive demonstration, the student must also already know how to do something, distinguish kinds of usage, and this in itself is an important part of language. So he argues that the person already has an important basic understanding of language prior to being able to learn through ostensive definition. This understanding, is a knowing how to do something, which makes the student active in the ostensive learning. So it is only by removing the student's active participation in ostensive learning that Wittgenstein has an argument against Augustine. So this is how he presents Augustine's position, as if the student is passively receiving ostensive definition. I would say that it is not so much Wittgenstein's intention to attack Augustine's description, but to use the obvious inadequacy of Augustine's description, as a platform to launch into his own position.

Haha. No, i wouldn't say that any conflation is valid. — Terrapin Station

Conflation is a form of synthesis and there is no law of logic which says that it is an invalid form of synthesis. Any claim that such and such conflation is invalid would need to be justified with an argument. It doesn't suffice to simply dismiss someone's position as a "conflation" because "conflation" on its own does not imply any illogical, or invalid procedure.

X is an instance of [a color/shape/texture/size/etc]. It is demonstrative . . . In other words, ostension is by definition inseparable from generality, — StreetlightX

I'm asking about your comment there re "inseparable from generality."

You said x is an instance, presumably in the sense of an instantiation, a token of a type. And i was assuming you were using "demonstrative" in this sense: "a word or morpheme pointing out the one referred to and distinguishing it from others of the same class"

So were you not making a type/token distinction there re generality (in distinction to things that are not generalities)?

That's the force of Wittgenstein's argument against Augustine though. He argues that Augustine's description of learning through ostensive definition is wrong because it only provides a partial description. — Metaphysician Undercover

But arguing that it's wrong where it turns out that you're simply misunderstanding the conventional connotations of the term?

Conflation is a form of synthesis and there is no law of logic which says that it is an invalid form of synthesis. Any claim that such and such conflation is invalid would need to be justified with an argument. It doesn't suffice to simply dismiss someone's position as a "conflation" because "conflation" on its own does not imply any illogical, or invalid procedure. — Metaphysician Undercover

It would be up to you to argue that the two supposedly distinct concepts or terms are the same thing.

I was using the word in the same manner as Witty speaks of places and kinds. Consider it a synonym, if you like. Your question is still confusing to me because it lacks any context with the PI or its concerns. And so I still have no idea what motivates it. I can only tell you how I meant it. If you want to connect it to some other issue, that's for you to do. I'm not that interested in going in circles here. If you have a question about the PI, the arguments in it, or my presentation of them, present them. Otherwise I'll abstain from continuing this very strange conversation.

I can only tell you how I meant it — StreetlightX

Yeah, that's what I was asking you. The problem is that "ostension is inseparable from generality" seems very obviously wrong (as do many other things you said and that you quoted from Wittgenstein). I don't recall if Wittgenstein actually said "ostension is inseparable from generality." If so, if you were basically just quoting him, we can look at that passage again. Maybe there's some way to read "ostension is inseparable from generality" that would make it not obviously wrong, but that's why I'm asking you about it.

The problem is that "ostension is inseparable from generality" seems very obviously wrong (as do many other things you said and that you quoted from Wittgenstein). — Terrapin Station

It's been explained though. It's unfortunate you don't understand I guess.

Well via a lot of other comments that were obviously wrong (hence my "as [are] many other things you said and that you quoted from Wittgenstein"). I prefer to tackle one at a time if possible. (Because as we can see here, it's difficult enough to resolve just one.)

One last way to put it: ostension is indexical - acquiring definite meaning from a particular space and time - and all indexicals by definition are general; there's a reason why this or that can refer to, well, pretty much anything, precisely because indexicals have no particular content when shorn of their deictic employment. If indexicals were not general and always tied to some particular thing or another, one would be confronted by weird objections like 'that's not a this!... everyone knows what a this is, and that's not it!'. This is, like... first year grammar.

So, with this, just to give an example of the many problems that are occurring with each statement:

ostension is indexical - acquiring meaning from a particular space and time — StreetlightX

All meaning is from a particular space and time period. So if that's sufficient to count as indexical, language is indexical period.

and all indexicals by definition are general; there's a reason why this or that can refer to, well, pretty much anything, — StreetlightX

So, if by "general," we mean something like "doesn't have a particular. relatively fixed use, but could be applied to anything (within certain constraints, at least)," then (1) when we're talking about a particular individual learning by ostension, this is trivially false (because for example, an individual can learn a proper name via ostension, and that individual may from that point forward ONLY use that proper name for the particular thing in question), though (2) if we're trying to talk more broadly, any term could be applied to anything--it just depends on the individual in question (which is part of the reason that all language is connected to particular space and time).

precisely because indexicals have no particular content when shorn of their indexical employment. — StreetlightX

So as an additional requirement on indexicals, we can say (which is closer to the conventional sense of them) that they're words that are used for referents that change based on particular perspectives, where more than one perspective can obtain in the same area at the same time (for example, how "I" and "you" work in Engligh during a conversation), where the referents in question are not necessarily even the same type of thing ("this" and "that").

BUT, it's definitely not the case that ostensive learning consists exclusively of indexicals in that more precise sense. Indexicals in this more limited sense would be a very small percentage of what anyone would learn ostensively.

That is the way that PI is written, scattered and not formed into a coherent whole. If a companion provided us with a coherent whole it would be a faulty interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hence should we be aware of the significance the blue and brown books may have on this discussion?

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_and_Brown_Books

All meaning is from a particular space and time period. So if that's sufficient to count as indexical, language is indexical period. — Terrapin Station

Oh dear. Yeah, not worth continuing when this is the level of response :( Please learn some basic grammar terms before continuing :smile:

Oh dear. Yeah, not worth continuing when this is the level of response :( Please learn some basic grammar terms before continuing — StreetlightX

"Oh dear" is one thing we can agree on. ;-)

But arguing that it's wrong where it turns out that you're simply misunderstanding the conventional connotations of the term? — Terrapin Station

You don't seem to get Wittgenstein's point. Describing the learning of language as an ostensive exercise, with or without the "conventional connotations" associated with the term, is an incomplete description of what is involved in learning language. This is because a large part of what constitutes knowing how to use language must be already known before the ostensive exercises can have the desired effect.

So if we separate in analysis, what "ostensive definition" actually refers to, from the "conventional connotations" associated with the term, and find that the "conventional connotations" refer to already having some knowledge of how language works, then we can dismiss "ostensive definition" as being an insufficient description of how we learn language. The "conventional connotations" are actually hiding the fact that one must already have an understanding of some aspects of how language works, before ostension can be effective, and therefore hiding the fact that the process of learning language cannot be adequately described by ostension.

Hence should we be aware of the significance the blue and brown books may have on this discussion? — Wallows

No, I actually think this is irrelevant. The discussion here is of the "Philosophical Investigations" specifically. An author, in philosophy especially, often changes one's mind as time passes, so to bring in other writings, as if they are part of this book, would probably be more confusing than helpful. For the same reason, if we discuss a philosophical text, we do not seek to reference the author's rough copy, unless maybe there are some specific problems to clear up. If the topic of discussion here was the evolution of Wittgenstein's philosophy, that would be another thing.

No, I actually think this is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Please help me recall, anyone, as I have poor memory.

Did Wittgenstein not prep students with the blue and brown books used in his lectures before moving onto the Investigations?

You don't seem to get Wittgenstein's point. Describing the learning of language as an ostensive exercise, with or without the "conventional connotations" associated with the term, is an incomplete description of what is involved in learning language. This is because a large part of what constitutes knowing how to use language must be already known before the ostensive exercises can have the desired effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I pointed out way back, if by "learning" we don't mean that odd notion that has it that one is given something wholesale where the person receiving it is entirely passive in the process--and Augustine surely isn't using "learning" that way, and neither am I, then I don't agree with Wittgenstein that learning a language can not be done via ostension. I wouldn't say that it always is learned via ostension (well, at least not on a more restricted definition of ostension; on the broadest definition, I might say that), but I'd say that it could be.

and find that the "conventional connotations" refer to already having some knowledge of how language works, — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not what I'm referring to. I'm referring to the fact that conventionally, "learning" doesn't connote being given something wholesale where the person receiving it was entirely passive in the process. It rather connotes something where the learner was an active participant, where learning necessarily involved them thinking about what they're hearing, etc.

That second sentence in no way implies "already having some knowledge of how language works."

Did Wittgenstein not prep students with the blue and brown books used in his lectures before moving onto the Investigations? — Wallows

None of them were (officially) published during his lifetime.

Yes, I stand corrected. If memory serves me right he didn't even want the blue and brown books published.