One is about the report of the thing, the other is about the thing. Sometimes we talk about the report. Is that not the thing in those cases? — creativesoul
Formally, there is no problem with it. I have never seen a philosophical criticism that was compelling either. — Snakes Alive
Knowing what "the man who killed Bob" means is quite simply inadequate for successful reference if knowing that is equivalent to knowing which man uniquely satisfies that description. Knowing that Allen killed Bob does not help a listener at all when it comes to knowing who Jane is talking about. — creativesoul
So, bear with my confusion! If we are to quantify over possible worlds then, we can only "measure" (quantify) counterfactuals by an accessibility relation to our own world. Therefore how can we assert something as necessarily true in all possible world's if quantification of modal relations (counterfactuals) is/are restricted to only our world? — Wallows
Accessibility relations hold among a set of worlds – it doesn't matter which one is actual, and the standard modal logic does not even mark an actual world. — Snakes Alive
he whole point of the modal logic is that any arbitrary formula can be evaluated fro truth or falsity relative to any world. And once you have a semantics for counterfactuals, you can plug this into your modal logic. — Snakes Alive
This depends on whether you are an actualist or possibilist for QML. — Wallows
Again, I am professing an actualist interpretation of QML. If you assume my position then Counterfactuals can only be truth apt relative to our world. This is an assumption that I understand applies to both actualist and possibilist interpretations. — Wallows
The validity of the Barcan formulae follows independently from ordinary, independently plausible semantics for the universal quantifier and the box. If one objects to it, one had better have a pretty good reason, and I'm not aware of one. — Snakes Alive
I believe the point I'm trying to make is the following and bears some semblance to the Barcan Formula in restricting the domain of truth-aptness to the actual world: — Wallows
The issue you're talking about is that the Barcan formula's validity makes it impossible that worlds accessible from a world have 'larger' domains than the world from which they're accessed: in other words, domains don't 'grow' across accessibility relations. This is fine, however, not because of commitments to modal actualism, but because to think that distinct worlds are associated with distinct domains in the first place is a mistake. — Snakes Alive
One can make a logic this way, but it is probably a bad idea. There is just one domain of individuals, and it is not anchored to worlds to begin with. — Snakes Alive
So, when we talk about possible worlds, and specifically make stipulations about counterfactuals, then we are restricted to the domain of the actual world? Does that make sense? — Wallows
What do you mean? — Wallows
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