THE ARGUMENT FOR THE BEGINNING IN THE AESTHETICS

First, I apologize for the possibly anomalous writing, for I am neither a native English speaker nor particularly skilled one.

Second, I present immediately the argument, which is found at the beginning of the Transcendental Aestethics:

«There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experi­ ence; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exer­ cise if not through objects that stimulate our senses and in part themselves produce representations, in part bring the activity of our un­derstanding into motion to compare these, to connect or separate them, and thus to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience?7 As far as time is con­cerned, then, no cognition in us precedes experience, and with experi­ence every cognition begins.» p.136 of the Cambridge(Guyer, Wood) edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.

To me, this argument is clearer stated:

A

(1) If the cognitive faculty has been awakened, then cognitions have begun.

(2) But it has been.

THEN

Cognitions have begun.

B

(1) If the cognitive faculty has been awakened, it was due to objects of senses or otherwise.

(2) Not otherwise.

THEN

By the objects of senses.

C

Definition: Experience:= Type of object(of the senses)

THEN

All our cognition begins with experience.


Of course the argument may be restated to offer new perspectives or due to give account of others Kant's thoughts either expressed later in the CPR or elsewhere.

SOME PROBLEMS

The beginning of cognitions is not the beginning, strictly, of knowledge: knowledge requires a system, thus a more complex working process: a simple multiplicity of cognitions do not constitute knowledge, in so far as we have to be aware of the cognition been happened, and being of ourselves.

Hence: the beginning would be the reflection a n d the consequent awareness of the distinction between a subjective and an objective unity.

This requisite of referential recognition is underlined by Kemp Smith too in his Commentary on the CPR.

There is a restriction to this argument: the condition of Time. Now, Time is defined thermodynamically, as irreversibility of processes, on the basis of our interactions with the empeiria(physical world): we see irreversible phenomena because what the Boltzmann constant is the index of is big enough(e.g. friction).

Thus, the beginning of knowledge, as to satisfy the requisite of awareness, it is empirical. But this way it is not verisimilar, that at least the possibility of recognizing knowledge, as resulting from a particular kind of process, i.e. cognitive, would not be empirical too.

Let me explain further and be clearer: if knowledge is to be characterizing a certain kind of cognitive type(e.g, the human with no intellectual intuition), it is plain that it relies on the recognition of it as a result of a process typical of men. Then, iff the methods of deducing, from given material, the absolute structures of any cognitive process, rely on the material furnished by reflection, which is indeed empirical in nature, them those methods are at least dependent on some empirical factors.

Thus, either it is to be denied that our structures, through which the cognitive process articulate itself, are absolute or we are force to admit that the method of deducing them is not pure(independent from ALL experiences whatsoever).

I exposed this point, because in the introduction of the CPR is asserted, that it is NECESSARY to distinguish between pure a priori, a priori and a posteriori(empirical). This is based on a mere assumption, i.e. that experience isn't capable of necessity and rigorous universality, while such properties are OBJECTIVELY recognizable in the sciences(e.g. Pure Mathematics: algebra, geometry).

At now, this be sufficient: I will wait for your help and thoughts about it. Thank you.