• Francesco di Piertro
    7
    I have been doing a lot of thinking about the various stances Christinas can take when it comes to salvation and hell. In “The Inescapable Love of God”, Thomos Talbott frames the discussion by claiming that every Christian can only choose two of the following regarding salvation:

    A. God wants to save everyone.
    B. God can save everyone.
    C. Some people are eternally condemned.

    Let us first consider the implications of denying A. Talbott understands denying A to be on par with the view of many traditional Calivinists, or any Christians choosing to posit the unconditional elect and limited atonement. On this view, it appears that while God could save everyone (B), He provides salvation to the elect by atoning for their sins, but does not choose to provide salvation for or atone the sins of those who are not elect (denying A). While it is conceivable that a Calvinist could say that all are elect, thus denying C, it is highly unlikely on such doctrine. While I do not think it would be right to generalize all Calvinists as being committed to a view of hell that aligns with eternal condemnation, for the sake of considering Tallbott’s claim, it appears that if Calvinists were to choose two of the previously mentioned views regarding salvation, most would pick B and C.

    Let us next consider the implications of denying B. Talbott claims that such a view will likely have a very strong concept of free will and reflect some traditional Arminian doctrine. Arminian influenced reasoning for denying B would likely claim that while God wants to save everyone (A), some people will be eternally condemned (C) because of the fact that God values human free will to such an extent that He cannot save everyone. More simply, humans can utilize their free will to eternally choose to deny salvation from God. As previously mentioned regarding Calvinists, it is likely too strong a generalization to commit all Arminian Christians to the view of hell that aligns with eternal condemnation. However, if Talbott is right to claim that every Christian can only choose two of A, B, or C, it appears most Arminians, because of their stance on free will, would opt for picking A and C.

    Thus, the final option to consider is that of denying C. Talbott understands denying eternal condemnation as a view held by Christian exclusivist universalists – those being people who claim that God wants to save everyone (A), God can and did save everyone (B) through the death and resurrection of Christ, but that while judgment is real and hell is populated, condemnation in hell is not eternal for anyone (denying C). Christian exclusivist universalism does not deny that there are consequences for sin and denying God, but that all will eventually experience salvation by the grace of God, the sins of all humans being atoned for through Christ.

    Most objections to Christian exclusivist universalism regard God’s perfect justice and cite New Testament parables from Jesus where he rather clearly references hell/judgment/condemnation. The most common examples include the parable of Jesus telling of the sheep being separated from the goats, the sheep and goats entering Heaven and Hell respectively. Or, the parable where Jesus speaks of wheat being bundled and stored in a barn while the chaff is set aflame. However, Christian exclusivist universalists are free to object that while these parables do appear to be referencing condemnation, the condemnation is not made explicitly eternal. God can still be perfectly just and not eternally condemn sinners. It is also worth noting that this view does not undermine human free will in this life. For, as previously mentioned, humans are still free to deny God. The qualification is that while there are consequences for denying God, the consequences will not be eternal.

    Nonetheless, this view may have some implications regarding post mortem free will and it is worth noting that I empathize with those who consider the possibility of conceiving of one being able to eternally deny God. While this may be possible, I think Christians also have good reasons to conceptualize God as one who will not rest until all choose to accept His gift of salvation through faith in Christ and proclaim Him as Lord.

    As a Christian myself, I find the Christian exclusivist universalist view compelling. The eternal torment/condemnation view of Hell is usually quite hard for most people (Christian or not) to reconcile with an omnibenevolent God, yet abandoning it often brings God’s justice into question. Thus I think this view offers a way of considering condemnation and hell that is both Biblical and real, while still complementary to an omnibenevolent and perfectly just God.

    I think the Christian exclusivist universalist view can be outlined as follows:

    1) If God is omnibenevolent, then He desires to save everyone.
    2) God is omnibenevolent.
    3) Therefore He desires to save everyone. (1,2, MP)
    4) If God is omnipotent, then He can save everyone.
    4a) God did save everyone through the death and resurrection of Christ.
    5) God is omnipotent.
    6) God can/did save everyone. (4,5, MP)
    7) If God is perfectly just, then all are condemned.
    7a) All sin and fall short of the glory of God.
    8) God is perfectly just.
    9) Therefore, all are condemned. (7,8, MP)
    10) If everyone is saved, then condemnation is not eternal.
    11) Therefore, condemnation is not eternal. (6,10, MP)

    I look forward to hearing objections!
  • Ben Hancock
    14
    Hi Francesco, I appreciate your clarity. I'd like to disagreeing with the 1st premises and 9th premises.
    you make:
    If God is omnibenevolent, then He desires to save everyoneFrancesco di Piertro
    Therefore, all are condemned.Francesco di Piertro

    it seems that to be omnibenevolent doesn't oblige God to do anything for us, merely that God cannot do any evil thing. The passages you referenced, if they say some will be condemned, imply that at no point can they be saved, for if they are condemned they can have no part with God. And so if God condemns anyone, He could not have wanted to save everyone.
    1. If God is omnibenevolent, He cannot do/be evil
    2. God is omnibenevolent
    3. God cannot do evil (1,2 MP)
    4. If God cannot do evil, he cannot have part with sin
    5. He cannot have part with sin (3,4 MP)
    6. Humans have sinned
    7. God cannot have part with humans (4,6 MT)
    Now, this argument can be extended given a few other characteristics of God, the first is that God is eternal. This is common Christian theology so I won't prove it here (sorry).
    8. If God is eternal, and He can have no part with humans, they are condemned eternally
    9. Humans are condemned eternally (7,8 MP)
    Granted, I am an annihilationist, so that death is the end and post-mortem redemption is not an option as God must sustain them.
    God omnibenevelonce then, leads to the conclusion that humans are condemned eternally. Based on biblical evidence, this conclusion seems more likely than that no one is condemned. The condemnation brought up in your post must be eternal or else at any time God risks losing his omnibenevelonce.
  • Brillig
    11
    1. If God is omnibenevolent, He cannot do/be evil
    2. God is omnibenevolent
    3. God cannot do evil (1,2 MP)
    4. If God cannot do evil, he cannot have part with sin
    5. He cannot have part with sin (3,4 MP)
    6. Humans have sinned
    7. God cannot have part with humans (4,6 MT)
    Ben Hancock

    Hi Ben,
    I think you provide a viable alternative definition of omnibenevolence, but even granting that, I do not think your argument is sound.

    Firstly, I find it a little unclear what you mean by "have part with sin." Maybe if you gave that phrase a working definition, I could follow the assumptions between (4) and (7) more easily. As it is, I do not think (7) follows from (5) and (6) [or from 4 and 6, which is what you listed in your argument form, but I think the MT is 5 and 6]. I imagine "have part with" to mean something along the lines of "be in proximity to" or "associate with." If it is true that God cannot be in proximity to sin or associate with sin, it still does not necessarily follow that he cannot be in proximity to and associate with people who have sinned at some point in time. It seems that all (5) implies (under the definition I've attempted to provide) is that God cannot be near a person actively committing a sin, and that God cannot himself commit a sin.

    Perhaps you could phrase it like this:
    1. If God is omnibenevolent, He cannot be or do evil
    2. God is omnibenevolent.
    3. God cannot do evil.
    4. If God cannot do evil, he cannot be associated with or in proximity to sin.
    5. He cannot be associated with or in proximity to sin.
    6. Humans have been known to sin at times.
    7. God cannot be associated with or in proximity to humans when they sin.

    If these circumstances are true, then God could remove, and possibly punish, people that are still actively sinning, and then bring them back to him when they have stopped. This conclusion seems more in line with Francesco's original conclusion, although it does not necessarily support the argument that he used to reach that conclusion.

    However, with this new phrase (which I take to mean the same thing as "have part with") substituted into the argument, it seems more apparent that the first half of (4) does not entail the second half. God could certainly be around evil or sin, and even be associated with sin, without himself actually doing any evil. So I would contend that neither of these arguments are sound past the conclusion in (3).
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