So Darwin explains Kant? — Wayfarer

I wasn't referring specifically to Darwin—he certainly has no patent on the idea of evolution. It seems plausible to me that over the course of human history, ("history" here taken to include so-called "prehistory") humans have progressively reflected on their experiences and exercised their imaginations, constrained by logic (itself the child of such reflections) which has culminated in the last few thousand years in the evolution of the dialectical process we refer to as "the philosophical tradition". A major part of this has consisted in generalized characterizations of the necessary nature of human experience, which is what constitutes the categories relating to phenomena such as Aristotle and Kant, for example, have explained them.

A similar, but less radically evolutionary, because more traditionally constrained, process also happened in the East. This difference between East and West is also reflected in the arts. music and literature and of course the evolution of science in the West.

I kind of get the intuitive sense of saying that evolutionary development accounts for our innate ability. But then, even Noam Chomsky, who's pretty firmly wedded to naturalism, allows there's something deeply uncanny about the acquisition of language (in Why Only Us? co-authored with Robert Berwick.) Of course, I don't dispute the fact of evolution, but I'm sceptical of the sense in which it has become a 'theory of everything' in respect of human nature. See Anything But Human. Anyway, I won't pursue it as this thread has stayed admirably on-point thus far and it's a digression.

I think we can only know what experience, and refelection on the nature of experience tells us. We can also elaborate and extrapolate from formal rule-based systems like logic, mathematics, chess, Go etc. — Janus

In chess, the rule that the Bishop can only move diagonally is arbitrary, in that the rule could equally have been that it moves vertically or horizontally. Therefore, what happens in the world, the Bishop moving diagonally, is necessary and universal once the rule has been made, even though the rule itself is neither necessary not universal.

For Hume, no knowledge about the world, discovered by a constant conjunction of events within experiences, can be either necessary nor universal, in that, even though the sun has risen in the east for 1,000 days, there is no guarantee that on the 1,001st day it doesn't rise in the west.

However, Kant wanted to show that it is possible to discover knowledge about the world that is both necessary and universal from experiences of the world using a transcendental argument. From a careful reasoning about one's experiences, it is possible to discover pure concepts of understanding, ie, the Categories, that are necessary and universal, which can then be used to make sense of these experiences.

Introduction to CPR - page 2 - Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge - what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.

A pictorial representation of the Transcendental Argument:

For Hume, the rules of chess, even though necessary and universal, cannot be discovered from experiences of the world, but are invented by the human intellect. For Kant, using the Transcendental Argument, the rules of chess as necessary and universal can be discovered from experiences of the world.

“…. Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of human cognition, some are destined for pure use à priori, independent of all experience; and their title to be so employed always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience. I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects, the transcendental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from empirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained through experience and reflection thereon; consequently, does not concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both apply to objects completely à priori. These are the conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this inquiry.

But a deduction of the pure à priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely independent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a quaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cognition. It is therefore manifest that there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions and by no means an empirical one; also, that….

….all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure à priori conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether peculiar nature of these cognitions…”
(My emphasis)

all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure à priori conceptions, are vain — Mww

The question remains, how does Kant justify the possibility of a "transcendental deduction?

how does Kant justify the possibility… — RussellA

Justifying possibility makes no sense.

Therefore, what happens in the world, the Bishop moving diagonally, is necessary and universal once the rule has been made, even though the rule itself is neither necessary not universal.

For Hume, no knowledge about the world, discovered by a constant conjunction of events within experiences, can be either necessary nor universal, in that, even though the sun has risen in the east for 1,000 days, there is no guarantee that on the 1,001st day it doesn't rise in the west. — RussellA

The chess rules could be changed, just as we might think the laws of nature that determine that the Sun rises in the east could change. In fact it is far easier to see how the rules of chess might be changed.

However, Kant wanted to show that it is possible to discover knowledge about the world that is both necessary and universal from experiences of the world using a transcendental argument. From a careful reasoning about one's experiences, it is possible to discover pure concepts of understanding, ie, the Categories, that are necessary and universal, which can then be used to make sense of these experiences. — RussellA

I think we already use the categories to make sense of experiences. It is on the basis of reflection upon how experiences must be for us in order that we can make sense of them that the synthetic a priori is generated, as I understand it.

Hey love that graphic. I want one. :wink: Reminds me of Daniel Dennett's 'skyhooks'.

I think we already use the categories to make sense of experiences. It is on the basis of reflection upon how experiences must be for us in order that we can make sense of them that the synthetic a priori is generated, as I understand it. — Janus

I reckon that's about right. Thomas Nagel says in his book The Last Word that there are thoughts or principles that one cannot "get outside of," meaning they are so basic to our understanding and reasoning that we cannot meaningfully doubt or reject them from a position outside of them.

Nagel's argument is focused on the nature of reason itself and how certain principles, like those of logic and mathematics, are not just human constructs but are instead intrinsic to any rational thought. The idea is that to even argue against these principles, one would have to use them, thus demonstrating their inescapable nature. (This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.)

Justifying possibility makes no sense. — Mww

Kant distinguishes transcendental deduction from empirical deduction

A85 - I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori their transcendental deduction, and distinguish this from the empirical deduction, which shows how a concept is acquired through experience and reflection on it, and therefore concerns not the lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen.

Many are not convinced that transcendental deduction is possible.

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible?

The chess rules could be changed, just as we might think the laws of nature that determine that the Sun rises in the east could change. In fact it is far easier to see how the rules of chess might be changed. — Janus

Yes, this fits in with Hume.

The problem is with Kant. How can he discover what is necessary and universal just from experiences using transcendental deduction?

I think we already use the categories to make sense of experiences. It is on the basis of reflection upon how experiences must be for us in order that we can make sense of them that the synthetic a priori is generated, as I understand it. — Janus

Yes, we use the Categories to make sense of experiences.

However, Kant's transcendental deduction derives the Categories from these very same experiences.

How is this not circular?

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible? — RussellA

“….if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary….”
“….an explanation of the possession of a pure cognition….”

He doesn’t. There’s no need, no reason a justification be required. It may not even be possible to deduce the categories without eventually running into contradictions; maybe it’s just simpler to grant the possession of something which satisfies a specific requirement.

If the categories, or whatever serves the purpose of them, seem to have a justifiable purpose, then it is the requirement of reason to discover them, and determine the domain of their employment from a purely logical ground or precondition, in order to support a speculative metaphysical theory of human knowledge.

“…. Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a principle; because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea. A connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined à priori—both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.…”

Kant is merely calling the discovery of the categories a transcendental deduction of them.

“…. General logic (…) expects to receive representations from some other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into conceptions….

….. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content of à priori sensibility….

…. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure à priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind’s receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of it. This process I call synthesis….

…..By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition….

….the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations….

…..The first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding….”
————-

Thus, the explanation for possession as given, rather than a logical deduction from antecedents, of the categories, re: “those conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis”, as merely a constituent in a methodological procedure, all in accordance with a very specific, albeit entirely theoretical, system.
————
————

we use the Categories to make sense of experiences. — RussellA

No, we don’t. Not technically, and not with respect to CPR, which is what concerns this discussion overall. The categories make empirical cognition possible from which experience follows, regardless of whether or not such experience makes sense.

Thomas Nagel says in his book The Last Word that there are thoughts or principles that one cannot "get outside of," meaning they are so basic to our understanding and reasoning that we cannot meaningfully doubt or reject them from a position outside of them. — Wayfarer

(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer

Kant doesn't believe that we have innate principles or ideas, but discover them from careful reflection on experience.

From the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

This seems similar to Nagel's position that it is not because of evolution that humans are able to reason.

For Kant, the source of pure reason is reason itself.

Intro to CPR

Kant says that "The transcendent principles are principles of the subjective unity of cognition through reason, i.e. of the agreement of reason with itself"; "Objective principles are principles of a possible empirical use." This suggests that whatever exactly the use of the transcendent principles of pure reason is, it is not to obtain any knowledge of external objects, which can only be achieved through the empirical use of the concepts of understanding, their application to representations in space and time for the exposition of appearances.

If reason itself is the transcendental source of being able to to reason, and not a consequence of evolutionary adaptation, why isn't it the case that other reasoning animals, such as cats, don't have the same ability of reasoning as humans?

The greatest danger to pure reason is reification, the blaming of reason for doing, or the blaming for failure in not doing, this or that merely because reason is or is not the kind of thing suited to meet expectations. To express reason, or any metaphysical faculty, as a conception, merely in order to forge an exposition of the methodological system to which they all are necessary constituents, does not carry any implication whatsoever these are things in themselves, or are existents of any kind.

“…. This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics, after the example of the geometricians and natural philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the external boundaries and the internal structure of this science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition à priori, nothing must be attributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason…”

“…. Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It is, relatively to new states or conditions, determining, but not determinable….

……Hence we cannot ask: “Why did not reason determine itself in a different manner?” The question ought to be thus stated: “Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain phenomena in a different manner?”….

……But this is a question which admits of no answer. For a different intelligible character would have exhibited a different empirical character; and, when we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority—permissive or prohibitive—of reason…..

……Now, reason is not subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of phenomena to each other—for these are not things and therefore not causes in themselves—but it cannot produce any difference in the relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason…..

……Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which, however, we cannot go; although we can recognize that it is free, that is, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena. But for what reason the intelligible character generates such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our reason to decide. The question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the following would be: “Why does the transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in space?” But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not require us to entertain any such questions….”

Sometimes, it’s more foolish to ask the question, then to expect a satisfactory answer.

If reason itself is the transcendental source of being able to to reason, and not a consequence of evolutionary adaptation, why isn't it the case that other reasoning animals, such as cats, don't have the same ability of reasoning as humans? — RussellA

Why should they have? Why would you expect that? Aristotle called humans ‘rational animals’, the implication being that while we’re animals in some respects due to the power of reason we’re distinct. (Aristotle did not hold to any kind of ‘divine creation’.) I think even a naturalist ought to be able to accept that idea. I think one of the lamentable consequences of evolutionary biology in popular discourse is that by regarding ourselves as just another species, we loose sight of what makes us human (again, see Anything But Human.)

Regarding the innate capacities of the mind - ‘capacities’ or ‘categories’ are not the same as ‘innate ideas’. We have, for instance, the innate capacity to learn language, which human infants generally do by age three, and which no other animal does (this is the subject of Noam Chomsky’s studies of ‘universal grammar’). Same with a range of other capacities, such as music and mathematics - which again, no animal possesses. Reason and language open up horizons of being which are not perceptible to animals. This is both a responsibility and also a burden - a burden which in my view a great deal of what goes by the name of ‘philosophy’ in modern culture doesn’t wish to accept.

The problem is with Kant. How can he discover what is necessary and universal just from experiences using transcendental deduction?

I think we already use the categories to make sense of experiences. It is on the basis of reflection upon how experiences must be for us in order that we can make sense of them that the synthetic a priori is generated, as I understand it.
— Janus

Yes, we use the Categories to make sense of experiences.

However, Kant's transcendental deduction derives the Categories from these very same experiences.

How is this not circular? — RussellA

We can reflect on the general nature of experience or perception and derive the ineliminable attributes. For example, perception of objects is unimaginable without space, time, form and differentiation.

Kant's twelve categories are:

Quantity: Unity Plurality Totality

Quality: Reality Negation Limitation

Relation: Inherence and Subsistence (substance and accident) Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) Community (reciprocity)

Modality: Possibility Existence Necessity

These categories seem to be Kant's attempt to pinpoint what is essential to the ways we understand things. Do you not think we can reflect on our experience and thinking in order to discover the essential elements?

Nagel's argument is focused on the nature of reason itself and how certain principles, like those of logic and mathematics, are not just human constructs but are instead intrinsic to any rational thought. The idea is that to even argue against these principles, one would have to use them, thus demonstrating their inescapable nature. (This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer

When we identify the characteristics that are essential to reason, that is to human reasoning, and formulate them as principles that is a different thing than conjecturing about how our capacity to reason may have evolved. Kant's categories show us how we can think about quantity, quality. relation and modality. Someone might come up with some other categories that Kant didn't think of. For example, it occurs to me that 'nullity' might have been included in the 'quantity' list of categories.

It seems reasonable to think that the categories reflect the nature, not just of our thinking, but also of the things we think about. Reason could not have evolved, and cannot exist, in a "vacuum", it must have something "outside itself" to work with. How do I know what I said in the last sentence is true? By reflection on the nature of reasoning; it's a phenomenological insight, not something that can be empirically demonstrated perhaps. It's akin to Kant's:

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer

Aristotle called humans ‘rational animals’, the implication being that while we’re animals in some respects due to the power of reason we’re distinct. — Wayfarer

If human reason cannot be explained in terms of evolutionary adaption, how did it originate?
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Regarding the innate capacities of the mind - ‘capacities’ or ‘categories’ are not the same as ‘innate ideas’. — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe that humans are born with "knowledge how" rather than "knowledge that", using Gilbert Ryle's terminology.

Though the same question, if human "knowledge how" cannot be explained in terms of evolutionary adaption, how did it originate?

If human reason cannot be explained in terms of evolutionary adaption, how did it originate? — RussellA

Have you considered the meaning of the term 'irreducible'? It means can't be explained in other terms.
If you were to 'explain reason', and considering that explanation is one of the principle functions of reason, then do you think that it would be feasible to explain the faculty which we use to seek explanations? There seems a problem of recursion to me.

The idea of origination in empirical philosophy might be something very different to origination as it was understood in classical philosophy. Scientific naturalism seeks explanations in terms of antecedent causes - what combination of factors give rise to what effects. It is far removed from the meaning of causation in classical philosophy, although to really explain that would take a long essay (and one which I may not be equipped to produce!)

Suffice to say that in evolutionary theory, the supervening reason for the existence of any faculty is that it facilitates propagation of the species. Reason becomes subordinated to survival, to what is useful or practical. But that again sells reason short, in that it undercuts the sovereignty of reason. (There's an interesting book on this topic, The Eclipse of Reason, by Max Horkheimer, which we've discussed here over the years, see this gloss.)

And, Happy New Year. :party:

We can reflect on the general nature of experience or perception and derive the ineliminable attributes. For example, perception of objects is unimaginable without space, time, form and differentiation. — Janus

Yes, we couldn't perceive objects without the footing of space, time, form and differentiation.

But suppose we never had this footing in the first place. Where did this footing come from?
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These categories seem to be Kant's attempt to pinpoint what is essential to the ways we understand things. Do you not think we can reflect on our experience and thinking in order to discover the essential elements? — Janus

Yes, we can look at swans in the world and know that all the swans are white. One question is, where did this ability come from. Who is right, the Rationalist's innatism or Kant's Transcendental Deduction?

Happy New Year :grin:

And, Happy New Year — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree that the Old Year did not cause the New Year, it was just an antecedent. However, without the Old Year there would be no New Year.

Thanks for your wishes, and looking forward to what the New Year brings. :grin:

There’s no need, no reason a justification be required. — Mww

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible?

Kant justifies that humans have this ability in giving an example of a Transcendental Deduction in the Refutation of Idealism in B274

However, in assuming that the Categories derive from careful reflection about experiences, rather than the innatism of the Rationalists, he is basing his theory on what is probably an incorrect premise.

The deeper problem remains that he doesn't justify his premise that the Categories derive from careful reflection about experiences rather than the innatism of the Rationalists.
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If the categories, or whatever serves the purpose of them, seem to have a justifiable purpose, then it is the requirement of reason to discover them — Mww

Kant's belief is that the Categories are not innate although they are a prior to experience, and are discovered from a careful reflection about experiences, "the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience" (SEP - The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness)

For example, within the the experience of looking at a phenomena, the category of the concept of a circle presents itself within the phenomena as being so necessary and universal that transcendentally conforms the existence of the category itself .

It is not so much that we need to reason in order to discover the categories, but the categories present themselves as being so necessary and universal within our experiences that we have no choice but to accept them.
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Kant is merely calling the discovery of the categories a transcendental deduction of them. — Mww

Though Kant does distinguish between general logic and transcendental logic.

Intro to CPR - After a brief explanation of the distinction between "general logic" and "transcendental logic" - the former being the basic science of the forms of thought regardless of its object and the latter being the science of the basic forms for the thought of objects (A 50-5 7/B 74- 82)

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What is transcendental Deduction

Any object must have Categories as its characteristics if it is to be an object of experience. For example, from the Category of quantity, there is unity in that all swans are white, plurality in that some swans are white and totality, in that Cygmund is white (SEP - Categories).

I see shapes, appearance, phenomena. Where does my concept of all, some and one come from. The Rationalists defend innatism, the Empiricist believes from experience and Kant by using a transcendental deduction on experience.

However, neither the Empiricists nor Kant can explain how when we see a wavelength of 700nm we perceive the colour red, as the colour red is not in the wavelength 700nm. Only innatism can explain that we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm

What is a transcendental deduction. If flying over a desert island I see a set of stones on a beach having the same arrangement as the word SOS, it is possible that they could have rolled into that shape by the wind, but the likelihood is remote. Using transcendental deduction, I deduce that on the island must be or has been human life. A Transcendental deduction deduces from an observation something that cannot be seen in the observation yet is essential to the existence of the observation.

In B276 within the section on The Refutation of Idealism Kant gives an example of a Transcendental Deduction

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Have an enjoyable New Year, and wishing you all the best. :grin:

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible? — RussellA

The possibility is given by showing how an empirical deduction doesn’t work. The justification is given by the demonstration of their place and purpose in a method, and that they are in no way self-contradictory.

In logic generally, deduction is top-down, re: from the general to the particular. Transcendental logic, then, is nothing but the kind of deduction it is, or, which is the same thing, nothing but the conditions under which the deduction is accomplished.

Transcendental, in Kantian philosophy, is that by which pure a priori is the determining condition.

Also in Kantian philosophy, a priori is meant to indicate the absence of any and all empirical conditions, hence, the denomination “pure”.

A deduction in Kantian philosophy follows the general rule of logic, in which a minor premise is subsumed under a major, for which a conclusion exhibits the relation of them to each other.

From all that, it follows that a transcendental deduction, first, must be purely a priori therefore can have no empirical predication whatsoever, insofar as it is transcendental, and second, it must exhibit reduction from the general to the particular, insofar as it is that certain type of logical operation.

Now, with respect to a transcendental deduction of the categories, which is in fact the title of a subsection dedicated to just that, this kind of argument cannot have to do with representations of objects, because, being purely a priori, there are no phenomena hence no representations of objects, but still must be a reduction from the general to the particular in order to qualify as a deduction. It follows that without representations of objects, but requiring the general as a major premise, it must be a conception relating to the representation of any object, or, which is the same thing all objects.

So, first, that which makes cognition of all objects possible, is the “diversity in pure intuition”, which serves as the major in a deductive syllogism. But the major subsumes under itself the minor, which is said to be the synthesis of the diversity, which has already been termed the synthesis of matter of objects to their form, from which arise phenomena, a conception which represents all objects in general, or, which is the same thing, phenomena are that which are subsumed under the diversity in pure intuitions a priori.

All that being the case, with respect to the pure conceptions of the understanding, re: the categories, it is quite clear there is no experience, and no examination of the nature of experience, insofar as experience, being defined as….

“…. an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception.…”

…..and given only a diversity in general, and a synthesis of it, there is as yet no determination of a particular object, hence no cognition of an object at all, and by which experience is impossible, which immediately removes experience from any consideration regarding the origin and purpose of the categories.

“….. The first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding….”
(A79/B104)
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Now…..why is this the case. Hmmmm, let’s find out, shall we?

1.) If Kant deduces the categories in accordance with logical syllogisms having empirical content, he loses the capacity to enounce the conditions for pure thought of possible objects. All cognitions must be of appearances alone, and no object that is not an appearance can ever be thought;
2.) It is in this way that noumena are impossible for this kind of intelligence, in that, while noumena are indeed objects of pure thought, they are not and cannot be appearances to which alone the categories apply, and therefore by which noumena are termed “the limitation on sensibility”;
3.) There is no transcendental conditions that are determinable by sensibility. All conceptions as representation, whether empirical or a priori, belong to understanding alone, but confining the categories, which are pure conceptions a prior only, having no representation belonging to them**, and the expositions related to them, to understanding and reason respectively, Kant removes the possibility of cognizing objects from the mere affect they have on the senses. In so doing, he justifies the ding an sich as that which is real but for which experience is impossible, along with noumena which isn’t even real, insofar as they are never to meet the criteria of being phenomena.
(**the schema of the categories are not representations; they are merely conceptions subsumed under and modifying the conception of the category itself of which they are members)
4.) If Kant deduces the categories in strict accordance with logical method, even a priori, he must limit himself to form only, pure logic being devoid of content by definition. Any conception devoid of content is empty, any empty conception cannot be ground for determining the cognition of objects. If this is the case, the third requisite remains missing, and the transcendental predication falls apart. But it doesn’t, in that there is the cognition of objects, and because that is the case the methodology stands, the third requisite must be present. All that’s left, having already denied innateness given by mere birth, and failing the non-contradiction of a pure deduction on transcendental ground, Kant’s position is simply to grant the validity of the categories as “given by the understanding”, which he then calls the exposition of the possession of them, rather than the syllogistic conclusion making them absolutely true.
5.) In which is found the subtelty behind the mention, “ so long as we are careful in the construction of our fictions, which are no less fictions on that account…”
6.) A transcendental deduction can never follow from an observation, by definition. B276 is rife with pure a priori conceptions, hardly to be amendable to empirical conditions. “My existence in time” is a presupposition, not an observation.

Bet none of that is in your secondary literature!!!!!!

WOOHOO!!!

The problem is with Kant. How can he discover what is necessary and universal just from experiences….

He can’t, and doesn’t try, denying the very possibility. Discovery just from experience is always contingent through the principle of induction.

…..using transcendental deduction? — RussellA

That deduction is for necessity and universality, rather than that which is either or both. The application of these is to experience, but not the derivation of them from it.

The key: transcendental is not cognition by conceptions, which arise spontaneously in understanding and condition experience, but cognition by means of the construction of conceptions, which arise through reason and find their proofs through experience.

I admit I have a less than basic understanding of Kant; however, I would welcome an invitation to participate in a reading group focused on the reading and discussion of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Should a group be formed, I would gladly become an active participant. With that said, "Happy New Year to all."

I would welcome an invitation to participate in a reading group focused on the reading and discussion of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Should a group be formed — Debra

I'm afraid @Shawn was last heard of 11 months ago.

I have never taken part in a Reading group, but I guess this thread is as close to a reading group as there is on the Forum. I know there is a section on the Forum titled Reading Groups, but even those threads are quite loosely organised. A Reading group sounds structured, which Threads on the Forum tend not to be.

Being on the Forum, you don't need an invitation as such to participate in any thread, apart from just diving in. :grin:

Thanks so much for responding I am new to all this.

I am new to all this. — Debra

On the left of the screen under "Categories" is a section "Help", but is quite minimal.

1) To reply to someone, highlight a relevant part of their post, and then click on the "quote" which appears.
2) To check you are happy with your draft, click on "Preview" before clicking on "Post Comment"
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4) Even after posting, you can edit your post. At the bottom of your post, hover the cursor over the date, then click on the three dots, which brings up edit.

1) Transcendental, in Kantian philosophy, is that by which pure a priori is the determining condition.
2) From all that, it follows that a transcendental deduction, first, must be purely a priori therefore can have no empirical predication whatsoever
3) Now, with respect to a transcendental deduction of the categories, which is in fact the title of a subsection dedicated to just that, this kind of argument cannot have to do with representations of objects, because, being purely a priori, there are no phenomena hence no representations of objects, but still must be a reduction from the general to the particular in order to qualify as a deduction.
4) If Kant deduces the categories in accordance with logical syllogisms having empirical content, he loses the capacity to enounce the conditions for pure thought of possible objects.
5) A transcendental deduction can never follow from an observation, by definition. — Mww

To my understanding, these comments seem to ignore the importance of the empirical in the nature of Kant's Transcendental Deductions.

My position is along the lines of the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

As regards the principles and ideas that we need to make sense of experiences, Kant does not agree with the Rationalist's innatism, does not agree with Locke that we can abstract such principles and ideas just from empirical experience but does believe that such principles and ideas may be discovered from careful reflection on empirical experiences using transcendental deduction.

However, I suggest that the term "Transcendental deduction" should be treated as a figure of speech rather than literally, as transcendental requires both induction and deduction, both from the general to the particular and from the particular to the general.

From the SEP article Kant's Transcendental Arguments, a Transcendental Argument begins with a strong premise, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a necessary condition for the premise.

As I see it, the transcendental deduction of either a priori pure intuitions of space and time, a priori empirical intuitions of things such as circles or a priori pure concepts of understanding (the Categories), is not possible in the absence of an empirical experience.

I am reasonably sure that Kant's position is that it is not possible to abstract these ideas and principles just from empirical experiences, but rather, transcendentally deduce them from empirical experiences.

these comments seem to ignore the importance of the empirical in the nature of Kant's Transcendental Deductions. — RussellA

They in fact do ignore, because there is none. Might you be confusing, or co-mingling, the nature of, which can ignore the empirical, with the application to, which cannot?

He says, in clear print, for the categories there isn’t technically a deduction, but an explanation for the possession of them. An explanation for, under certain conditions, merely serves the same purpose as, does the same job as, obtains the same results as, and in effect, just is, a transcendental deduction.
————-

My position is along the lines of the SEP article…. — RussellA

….and mine is along the lines of reading CPR. I wouldn’t begrudge you your position, but I wouldn’t allow that it be at the same time a Kantian position.
————-

As I see it, the transcendental deduction of either a priori pure intuitions of space and time….. — RussellA

These are not transcendental deductions.

“…. Section 1 Of Space;
#3 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.

By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a conception, as a principle, whence can be discerned the possibility of other synthetical à priori cognitions….”

I’ve been over this. To treat as a deduction properly is to relate premises in a syllogism. The content of the judgments which are the premises in a syllogism regarding space and time would necessarily be conditioned by the infinite, and any conclusion derived from relations conditioned by the infinite is useless for human knowledge. Hence the reduction from the general impossible to know, re: space in its infinite capacity, to the particular, re: the space of only that capacity which limits the extension or shape of a possible appearance, which is thereby possible knowledge.
————

I am reasonably sure that Kant's position is that it is not possible to abstract these ideas and principles just from empirical experiences, but rather, transcendentally deduce them from empirical experiences. — RussellA

In Kant, the appearance of a thing does not give us that it is, e.g., a circle, but only that such thing has a certain shape. Circle, is a quality of the shape of the space into which that appearance extends, the quantity of the shape of the space is its extension. Both of these are preconditions for representing the given appearance under a certain set of empirical conceptions, and from which knowledge of it follows. These preconditions reside in pure understanding, technically they are explained as belonging to pure understanding, therefore are antecedent to any experience hence cannot be derived from them.

Guy’s wife has looked the same for so long, he just takes the relation of this appearance and that experience as apodeitically affirmed. He doesn’t need the recognition, the methodological understanding, that his intellectual system works exactly the same way for the first instance as each and every subsequent instance, for the effect this single thing he knows as “wife” has on his senses.

If the very first time you saw the moon it appeared as an illuminated circle, but some other time you saw some object in the sky that didn’t appear as an illuminated circle but merely as some partially illuminated shape….. how would you ever justify calling it the moon?

Don’t make a big deal out of it; all you have here is two perceptions, two appearances, and nothing else. These demonstrate the conclusion that the appearance to the senses alone of a thing, does not contain the means for judging what it is. And furthermore, that the successive appearances of the same thing under different conditions does not in itself justify remembering what it is. Your wife, regarding congruent experiences, and the moon, regarding non-congruent experiences, both sustain the proposition that experience itself cannot be a condition by which experience occurs.

I've read more, thought more, and tried to beat myself up a bit about this.

This is correct. IFF one accepts that the thing that appears to our senses, is the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I am unsure this is true, or makes sense given immediately prior you quoted the same thing and then just it was wrong, in Kant.
Kant tells us that there are real, material objects 'out there' of which we can know nothing things in themselves. But that these objects cause our intuitions... which are not, as far as we care capable of knowing, anything like hte thing-in-itself..

"On the contrary, the transcendental conception of phenomena in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made."
---
"They do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their reality as representations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this very reason problematical, the other, the form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears—which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and necessarily to the phenomenal object."
---
"On the other hand, the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are affected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called sensibility, and remains toto caelo different from the cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom."
--
"And for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be said à priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to say anything."
--

"..this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things as phenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe to them, are looked upon as really given; only that, in so far as this or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-consciousness, although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance."

These seem cautious admissions that the only inference is that things-in-themselves cause us to receive empirical intuitions of them, which are unable to be classed as anything about the thing-in-itself because of hte removal that occurs between the TII causing representation to our cognition.

"I find that the house is not a thing in itself, but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown."

The transcendental object, i cannot find as distinguished from the thing-in-itself. If that's the case, then Kant seems to be fairly obviously connecting the two in a causal relationship - albeit, one with entirely unknowable properties.

And yet, there remains some idiotic insistence that noumena and thing-in-themselves are the same thing. Or the same kind of thing. Or can be treated as being the same kind of thing. — Mww

I was absolutely wrong on this, and misunderstood Noumena entirely.

And we can say there are none, even if it is only because we wouldn’t know of it as one if it reached out an bitch-slapped us. — Mww

My current understanding is that this is an incomprehensible hypothetical :P
Noumena cannot appear to us, as we have no non-sensuous intuition. But this just goes to how wrong i wass earlier... So thank you for that.

Going to leave this here, though, as it directly contradicts what I've come to think is what Kant meant:

"The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena"

and then this, which just seems a cop out

"If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense."

This seems to restrict noumena to merely things-in-themselves, as perceived by something other than sensuous intuition. Curious, and unhelpful lol

My thoughts, and I'm perfectly fine with your telling me I've missed the boat entirely here because I pretend no expertise in this.

Where @Mww and you were discussing:

And yet, there remains some idiotic insistence that noumena and thing-in-themselves are the same thing. Or the same kind of thing. Or can be treated as being the same kind of thing.
— Mww

I was absolutely wrong on this, and misunderstood Noumena entirely. — AmadeusD

I take issue with the "idiotic insistence" suggestion, as if the equation of the noumena and thing in itself is such an unsustainable suggestion that it is to be ridiculed.

For example, from Wiki:

"Noumenon and the thing-in-itself
Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for this relationship.[15] However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only loosely synonymous, inasmuch as they represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives,[16][17] and other scholars also argue that they are not identical.[18] Schopenhauer criticised Kant for changing the meaning of "noumenon". However, this opinion is far from unanimous.[19] Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.[20]

He is much more doubtful about noumena:

"But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.[21]

A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.[22]"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon#:~:text=However%2C%20Stephen%20Palmquist%20holds%20that,that%20they%20are%20not%20identical.

This is just to say that the equation of noumena and the thing in itself is not idiotic, but is a point of debate among scholars.

The last paragraph of what I quoted makes the most sense to me, assuming I followed it, and that is I take it the distinction being drawn is that "noumena" is a reference to an epistimilogical statement that says "X cannot be known," where "cannot be known" is what it means to be noumenal. So X is noumenal. However, "the thing in itself" is a reference to the ontological object and is that actual thing that cannot be known. It is X. We therefore say "the thing in itself is noumenal," meaning all we know of X is that it is unknowable.

All of this is to say:

X = "the thing in itself"
Y = "that which cannot be known"
"That which cannot be know" = "noumenal"
All Xs are Y
Only Xs are Y

So. X is Y is a correct statement.
The error, I assume that is drawing this debate is where X is Y is reinterpreted to X = Y? That is the idiotic insistence of equality?

We then can debate why X is Y is a different statement than X = Y, which is probably true, but I'm not sure how that changes any part of our analysis, but I can see what some would say "is" and "is the same as" are not importantly different.

I found this helpful: https://epochemagazine.org/07/the-thing-in-itself-a-problem-child/

The primary part of your post relates to this:

Kant tells us that there are real, material objects 'out there' of which we can know nothing things in themselves. But that these objects cause our intuitions... which are not, as far as we care capable of knowing, anything like hte thing-in-itself.. — AmadeusD

This seems a contradiction from the above. We now know two things about the thing in itself: (1) it is unknowable and (2) it causes intuituitions. #1 appears definitionally true, but #2 an empirical statement. If X (the thing in itself) causes me to see a flower, I can say something pretty substantive of X, specifically that it elicits a particular intuition, but I don't think I can say that because it's noumenal. I can only say there are Xs out there and intuituions in here, but I can't say any particular X is consistently responsible for any particular intuition.

That is why I have a problem with the causative suggestion of X eliciting certain intutitions. That tells us too much about X. It tells us there is this fuzzy, unclear sort of energetic impulse out there that makes us experience and presents us with an extreme sort of representationalism, which I personally would lean toward, but I'm not sure Kant comes out and says that.

Anyway, I'm open to reconsidering. With Kant, I'm never sure if I'm just not following it or whether it's just not followable.