But what is the negative outcome of no one living a good life? — schopenhauer1
You haven't really answered that except with an elusive "it's a net benefit". Non-existent people don't cry over spilt milk. But it is true actual people will experience adversity if born. Thus Benatar''s asymmetry applies. — schopenhauer1
Not experiencing good, does not matter if there is no actual person being deprived. However, it is always good that someone was not exposed to adversity or harm needlessly — schopenhauer1
like your notion of someone has to live out a good life for some elusive idea of having a "net benefit" obtain in existence. — schopenhauer1
Odd, but since it is not the usual way of looking at things, you automatically dismiss it. — schopenhauer1
And this matters why and for whom? — schopenhauer1
Why does a total matter here? — schopenhauer1
If we are summing up bits of good from everyone in some grand total (in what, a calculator in the sky?) then one can conclude that billions of lives only barely worth living would be the best outcome, but that would make no sense. This idea called the "Repugnant Conclusion" by Derek Parfit, is the kind of outcome you get with utilitarian notions of simply summing up net positive and negative the way you seem to explain it. — schopenhauer1
Rather, it should be looked at on the level of harm to the individual, not how an individual somehow adds to the grand total of some universal utilitarian calculation. — schopenhauer1
Granted, my opinion comes from the idea of the asymmetry. No person will be harmed, and it is not good or bad if someone is not born to experience good. — schopenhauer1
No one needs to go though adversities and life experiences of overcoming-to-get-stronger, if they don't exist in the first place to need it. Why create this need for need? Why create a situation that exposes new people to lacking something that they need to fulfill? Why create a situation that exposes new people to adversity that needs to be overcome? This impulse to create these situations on behalf of someone else is more an indication of the already-living person's inability to cope with the idea of nothingness. Our restless, willful natures prevents creates the notion that a non-existent person is a sad future.. That nothingness is sad. Nothingness is nothing. A philosopher once said, the nothing "noths". Whats wrong with noth-ing? Let non-existent people stay non-existent. Why do people feel we are bearers of some Promethean fire of being that needs to be carried forth and spread? Why use future people as "bearers of knowledge" or "bearers of experience" in such a matter? Is non-existence this scary to people? Is the blessed calm of nothingness seen as a blithe that must be eradicated with the strum und drang of life? What about survival-comfort-relief-boredom-relief needs to be lived out by a future person? What pleasures need to be had, if there was no person there in the first place to care? Certainly we can see the logic that preventing harm is a good thing, and no one loses out who doesn't exist in the first place.
I've answered that loaded question without playing into your hand. — S
If it's a choice between a neutral option and a better option, then obviously the better option wins. And the better option is obviously the one with a net benefit. — S
That argument doesn't work, in spite of my agreement with you that a nonexistent person cannot be deprived of anything. It doesn't work because as moral agents we are capable of making decisions for better or worse, and if we consciously refrain from making a better decision, then we bear the responsibility for that. So, if we consciously decide to refrain from procreation, knowing that the chances are that procreation will lead to a life worth living, then, without good reason not to, that's the least moral option of the two. — S
Yes he wrote a whole book on it. Ironically your argument for it not being much of an argument is not much of an argument. — schopenhauer1
So just saying "he's written a book about it" is not an argument. Summarise his reasoning and submit it for criticism or else there's little point in raising the matter. — Isaac
I'm not automatically dismissing it, as anyone following our dialogue can see, I've been providing a reasoned basis for rejecting your position. — S
Ethicists like Phillipa Foot, Alistair MacIntyre, John McDowell, Lucy Allais, to name just a few have all written books with opposing arguments. — Isaac
Does John McDowell ever discuss anti-natalism or the "value of existence" or anything of the sort directly in any of his papers? Can you point me to something? — John Doe
that the ideas being addressed in this thread are hopelessly entangled in a very broad set of meta-ethical concerns that are only being addressed by referring to 'you should read this book/thread'. I'm assuming that's why you asked at the outset whether the thread's thought experiment was intended to be persuasive to folks with a different meta-ethical stance or whether OP's already taking certain moral axioms for granted (of course there's nothing wrong with that if he wanted to have an ethical conversation that did not get bogged down in meta-ethics). — John Doe
Is it wrong? Yes I think its wrong to *rationally* create human embodiment, but the more I actually see the way in which children are so mindlessly and irrationally created, the less I think reproduction is really even in the realm of moral judgment at all. Sometimes it seems like sex, pregnancy and reproduction can be treated entirely as biological functions, much like eating or sleeping. Does it make sense to question the moral value of your stomach digesting its food? Perhaps questioning the morality of reproduction is along the same nonsensical lines. — Inyenzi
Case in point, I am myself solidly antinatalist. I think it is wrong to create human embodiment and the suffering it necessarily entails, and it ought not be done. But at the start of this year me and my girlfriend had a pregnancy scare. Thankfully she ended up miscarrying but still, it just really brought home how mindless and crudely biological it all is. We were drunk and (to put it crudely) wanted to fuck, didn't bother with protection and she became pregnant. At the time of sex, the moral weight of what we were risking couldn't have been further from my mind. If she didn't miscarry, human suffering would have mindlessly proliferated itself. And perhaps when the child was old enough to question its predicament I'd tell him or her that life is gift, and overcoming and learning from its struggles and miseries makes it all worth it. Maybe the child will question and argue against these reasons for its creation, but these were not actually why it was created, it was all so much more mindless and biological than that. — Inyenzi
(...)it's justified to make a decision to act on what you reasonably believe would be in their best interest — S
Q1. Whose side do you think you are on? As in, whose interests do you think you're defending? — S
Q2. Do you accept that a variation of your argument can be used against you? — S
Q3. Are you against any kind of activities where you might - or are likely to - face adversity, which would include countless activities like reading a book, playing a game, going to school, playing an instrument, participating in a sport, engaging in debate, and so on and so forth? — S
I ask the first question because the answer isn't clear to me, and the possible answers seem peculiar to me. You can't be on the side of most people, because you're against the wishes of most people. Are you on the side of a minority of people? If so, why should the wishes of a minority supersede the wishes of a majority? Or are you on the side of no one? In other words, people themselves are the problem, and only a world devoid of people is what matters. — S
I ask the second question because it seems clear to me that the tables can easily be turned on you by imagining a hypothetical person who wants to live a good life and is willing to face adversity in the hope of achieving that. Like your scenario with the monk, one can imagine an innocent prisoner who wants to be freed in order to live a better life, and you have the key. Would you keep him locked up? Would that be ethical? — S
And I ask the third question because if adversity is such a problem - apparently so much of a problem that it's not even worth the possibility of starting a life and living through it to reap the rewards - then, for sake of consistency or in other words so as to avoid a double standard, shouldn't you be endorsing the avoidance and minimisation of adversity in life? And if so, that would seem to rule out a lot of activities. — S
But someone who does not exist does not have interests that can be furthered. — Andrew4Handel
If someone is unconscious and you help them that could be against there interest if they wanted to commit suicide. if you say that it is in someones interest to be born before conception you can equally say it is against their interests and they could have reverse preferences. — Andrew4Handel
On the issue of burden I find it absurd and cruel to create someone and then attack them when they complain about a life they didn't chose. — Andrew4Handel
I think there are good reasons to think life is unethical or bad thing even if someone has a preference for it. — Andrew4Handel
So even if you don't think consent is important you can still make an unethical choice on someone else's behalf. — Andrew4Handel
The only situation where consent might not be an issue if one far far removed from this reality where absolutely everyone was deliriously glad to be alive and lived in total equality. — Andrew4Handel
However, being glad to be alive still does not tell us whether the context is a good one. You could engender this delirium by a drug. — Andrew4Handel
My life could have been less of a burden to me and I greatly resent that fact. Some parents and societies make life worse and also refuse to take responsibility for this. — Andrew4Handel
The future person. — schopenhauer1
Preventing harm and adversity for them. — schopenhauer1
Guess what though? No one needs be deprived of the flipside of the benefits :D. In the scenario of uniquely preventing all adversity for a future person, without any deprivation to that individual, then one should prevent adversity. That is the argument. — schopenhauer1
There is not even a person that I have to promote their "welfare" or "happiness". — schopenhauer1
What counts in the scenario of birth is prevention of harm only, as the downside is nothing to no one. — schopenhauer1
I have no divine command to promote someone's future "good life" in the scenario or any other agenda I might have for the future person, simply to prevent unneeded adversity or harm. — schopenhauer1
I'm not sure which one you mean other than something along the lines of, "If you are thinking of potential children, why not think of their net benefits rather than just preventing adversity? Why should that be the only thing to worry about?". — schopenhauer1
Again the response is that preventing pleasure/good is not bad when there is no one there to be deprived. It is always good to prevent harm however. — schopenhauer1
Not in an absolute "this is a definite" way. Once born, we can choose all sorts of adversity that we would like to challenge ourselves with. That is not the scenario of birth where there is uniquely no one there to be deprived of pleasures in the first place, and no one that needs to overcome challenges to get to a "better" place (whatever that might mean metaphysically speaking). — schopenhauer1
I'm on the side against creating adversity for people for whatever reasons are projected onto the new humans. — schopenhauer1
This is silly. — schopenhauer1
No person existed prior to birth who wants anything. You would literally be creating the desire for the good life out of nothing by creating the person. The creation happens first. However, there is no need to want to overcome diversity prior to birth. Adversity also includes non-desired adversity too, don't forget. — schopenhauer1
I explained earlier I think there is a different decision for starting a life and continuing a life. — schopenhauer1
Once we are alive we do whatever utilitarian things we must to prevent adversity. — schopenhauer1
But we cannot avoid most adversity, I'm aware of that. The real world demands it. — schopenhauer1
I am opposed to making people go through it, even if people are enculturated that some of the adversity is good for them. We can get into the psychology of what people say, but I'd rather not. But if you think that is needed beyond the simple axiology of preventing all adversity, I will be glad to provide it for you. — schopenhauer1
But I do think in general, giving others adversity unduly is not good. However, sometimes it "has" to be done. So that is another ethical dilemma. Now we must put people in adverse situations and that is the "best" scenario for them. Sure, that is the real world, but someone was brought into the real world. — schopenhauer1
No, that's not possible. You can't be on the side of the future person because a consequence of what you're advocating is that there would be no such person to benefit from our actions. — S
And what we know about present people makes it more likely that you would be acting against the wishes of the future person, which is another reason why you can't be on their side. — S
So, with that in mind, and thinking about this rationally, I ask again: whose side do you think you're on? — S
They cannot possibly benefit from that. They cannot benefit from anything at all if they don't exist, and your position makes it impossible for them to exist. — S
No, either both count or neither count. Take your pick. Or, perhaps you already have in effect. If the prevention of joy means nothing to no one because no one is around to lose out, then the prevention of harm means nothing to no one because no one is around to benefit. You can't have your cake and eat it. And if you think otherwise, then you've abandoned reason. — S
That argument is nonsense on stilts. It is not rational to maintain, on the one hand, that a future person would benefit from the prevention of adversity, yet, on the other hand, that they would not lose out from the prevention of joy. — S
There doesn't need to be for my argument to work. And I'm guessing that you think the same about your argument. So why even bring that up? — S
That's a red herring. You don't need a "divine command" to do anything that I'm arguing in favour of. You don't need to do anything at all, really, because hundreds of babies are born every minute. — S
No, if preventing pleasure isn't bad because there is no one there to be deprived, then preventing harm isn't good because there is no one there to gain. — S
You've kind of skimmed over the point without really addressing it. I know that, once born, we can act so as to either increase or reduce the chances of encountering all sorts of adversity, such as that which would inevitably be encountered in the activities that I listed. The question is, given that this adversity can be avoided or minimised to the extreme, why aren't you endorsing this? It's because you don't really believe that adversity is as big a problem as you make it out to be when the context is your pet topic. That's a double standard.
You're just using adversity as an excuse for extinction. Extinction is what you really care about, and extinction is against the wishes of most people, and the wishes of most people are a likely reflection of what the wishes of a future person would be, which means that in all likelihood you're not going to be on the side of a future person, which is a good reason for rejecting your claim that you're on their side. — S
It's a matter of likelihood, not projection. If, for arguments sake, three out of every four people feel that life is worth living, then that makes it very likely that a future person would feel the same way.
And I already know what your stance is in terms of being against creating new humans because of the adversity that they would face. I wasn't questioning what you're against. You've purposefully answered in a way which reveals nothing new and evades what I was trying to get out of you. So I ask again, whose side are you on? Or is it that you are in fact on nobodies side, but you're either in denial about that or you're reluctant to come out and say that that is so because you know that it would make you look bad (and rightly so!). — S
You see, there was no person who existed prior to birth who was just sitting around undisturbed in peaceful bliss like a Buddhist. — S
The creation happens, then there's someone, and this someone is privileged with the opportunities that only life can bring. There is no need to want anything prior to birth, and there is no need to face adversity, but that is neither here nor there. In that scenario, no one can benefit, whereas in the real world, people can. Standing a good chance is better than standing no chance. So the real world is better than your hypothetical world devoid of life (which doesn't even compete). — S
A double standard. — S
But we frequently don't. You frequently don't. You put yourself in situations which count as examples of easily preventable adversity all the time! You're doing that every time you decide to engage in debate on here. You do that whenever you go to the gym, or play a game of chess, or read an intellectually challenging book, or whatever it is that you do in your spare time - there's bound to be something else that counts for you beyond this forum. Why the hypocrisy? You must really take after your namesake. — S
We can't avoid it completely whilst we're alive, but that wasn't what I was challenging. I was challenging why you presumably don't do more to at least avoid it where possible or minimise it to the extreme, as one would reasonably expect if adversity is a problem so severe that it warrants nothing less than the extinction of humanity! — S
Yeah, well, I am opposed to using a sledge hammer to crack a nut. That's not a sensible way to approach the problem either way. — S
Adversity is a consequence of life, and life for most people is worth living. If you're not like most people, and you don't see it that way, then that's too bad, but you shouldn't take it out on humanity. I worry about people who think like you. You're not so different from an incel. — S
Oh please. Where have I endorsed attacking people? — S
Should parents just stop being parents and leave their kids to fend for themselves? — S
The future person. — schopenhauer1
Preventing harm is always good — schopenhauer1
It is just always good to prevent harm, but it is not bad if you prevent pleasure (unless there is someone who already exists to be deprived). — schopenhauer1
That is the terminus of this ethical axiom. — schopenhauer1
No get the argument right first. Rather, I don't think a person has to exist for preventing adversity to be good. I DO think a person has to exist for prevention of pleasure/good to be bad. Otherwise, it is not bad (or good). — schopenhauer1
Because you have to create the person (with all the negative effects on that person) in order to create happiness. — schopenhauer1
Meanwhile, no one needed nothing, and no negative effects were incurred in my formulation. — schopenhauer1
That goes with the Buddhist analogy. — schopenhauer1
It's not a red herring. — schopenhauer1
Other than harm, anything else does not need to take place, it is the desire or result of the parent for a child to be born to fulfill X reason. — schopenhauer1
Already explained the asymmetry that I think is the case. — schopenhauer1
I've already explained the unique scenario of starting a life, vs. the scenario of already being born. — schopenhauer1
That is simply an analogy. — schopenhauer1
Why is it good to create someone who can "benefit"? — schopenhauer1
What right do you have to expose someone to adversity just because you want to give an opportunity to "benefit"? — schopenhauer1
A different standard. — schopenhauer1
To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. — schopenhauer1
I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day. — schopenhauer1
I did say we can try to minimize harms and maximize benefits, etc. once alive. — schopenhauer1
The problem only exists for the already born obviously. — schopenhauer1
That is an extreme accusation I gather for rhetorical point-making. I don't know much about "incels" but what I've heard in the media is they are extremely misogynistic and want to harm specific groups of people. I would obviously say that both those things are bad and unethical. — schopenhauer1
Look, I am not going to do this back and forth anymore for a fourth round. I can answer every individual point, but this would never end, and the debate would quickly lose its main focus and my interest. I'm not going to change your mind. You are not going to change mine. We can get some value from this perhaps by strengthening our arguments, but I have no pretensions that either you or I will magically realize the other one has the "true" insight into this matter. — schopenhauer1
Rather, I see this going in a dismal ad hominem way, which I already see with your accusations that my antinatalist arguments are equivalent to the "incels". [That analogy is quite spurious. I liken most antinatalist arguments to vegan arguments. That is to say, antinatalists present their case non-forcefully and it is up to the individual to decide. There is no malicious intent, there is no condemnation. The philosophy does not advocate violence towards anyone, but ironically, the opposite- it is trying to prevent all harm and in a passive way.] — schopenhauer1
I'd like to sum up what I see to be the main differences in our core values, as that is the heart of the matter. What this comes down to is a difference in values. My main value is that the moral obligation lies in not creating/exposing someone else to harm. There is no moral obligation, however, to not prevent good. — schopenhauer1
Compassion for the individual who will experience harm, the injustice of forcing someone into adversity are part of the reasoning. — schopenhauer1
Connected to the above is the idea that exposing the individual to harm cannot be justified by some net calculus that this person might bring into the world (for himself or society). — schopenhauer1
Exposing another individual to harm should be avoided, and preventing birth prevents exposing another person to all of life's harms. — schopenhauer1
Any harm that's been done cannot be rectified (post-facto) by the hope/fruition of a future benefit either by reports of an individual (as you think the outcome will be), or by somehow adding to society's net benefit (if that kind of measurement is even commensurable or reliable). — schopenhauer1
To further explain the above, I will provide the analogy that this is like forcing someone to run an obstacle course because they can get some benefit from it, or be strengthened by it. — schopenhauer1
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