What is "scientific causation"? When you look at the fundamental laws of nature (the ones whose constants you claim we can't inquire about scientifically) there is no mention of "cause".

Right! That is related to the point at issue. Science (or natural philosophy) assumes 'lawful regularity' as the basis of its explanations. Discovering those regularities and making predictions on that basis, is a very large part of what science does. But science doesn't explain those regularities, although it might speculate about their origin - which is what we're doing here. So the kind of cause that science is concerned with is a cause in terms of combinations of factors and antecedents - what are called in Aristotelean terms 'efficient causes'. Whereas this kind of question concerns formal causes, which I don't think has a counterpart in much scientific thinking.

a scientific response seems to involve virtual particle pairs, quantum fluctuations, radioactive decay (temporal indeterminism), spacetime foam/turbulence, the "pressure" of vacuum energy, the Casimir effect, Fomin's quantum cosmogenesis... — Jorndoe

The particular, eternally persisting, elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on — and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.

David Albert, review of A Universe from Nothing Lawrence Krauss.

Something real exists; not all that exists is real. Fictions and imaginary things exist, for example, and hallucinations similarly, but they're not real. Or that's how I tend to use those words (reality ⊂ existence). — jorndoe

So, not all that exists is real, but all that is real, exists? By "real" do you mean "empirically real", or something else? Because your position here seems to allow that something could exist in some way other the empirical, but not allow that anything could be real in any way other than the empirical.

And that seems to be diametrically opposed to the common theological notion that God does not exist (if to exist means to exist empirically) but that He is nonetheless real. As others have already pointed out numbers do not empirically exist, they cannot be seen or touched, and so on, but yet they seem obviously to be real.

If we take it as a starting assumption that God does not exist empirically, that is as an object of the senses, then is it not still the case that the logical possibilities are that he might be, in some way other than empirically, either real or imaginary?

@John, nah, I wasn't thinking of strange Platonic realms, just contrasting real with fictional.
Like Superman isn't real, but he does exist as a comic/movie character. Here he is:



Of course you may use the terms differently; my suggestion was just directed to @Metaphysician Undercover to avoid confuzzlement (per earlier posts).

Platonism was briefly touched upon in the opening post

anything that's changeless (or "atemporal") cannot be a mind, in part or whole, since we already know that mind (consciousness, thinking, phenomenological experiences, etc) is strongly temporal, comes and goes, starts and ends, un/consciousness (anesthetic)

... and some later posts here and there, including this one.

What objections are they? (That was part of the intent with the opening post.) By the way, please feel free to present your own argument, if you have it reasonably formalized. — jorndoe

Craig's argument is defective because contrary to other versions, such as Aquinas', he simply assumes that the universe has a beginning, rather than proving it as part of the agument, which Aquinas does. Because of this, he gets embroiled in a discussion of actual infinity versus potential infinity instead of starting at the true foundation of the cosmological argument, as formulated by Aristotle, which considers actual versus potential eternity rather than infinity.

Although there are other contemporary versions of the cosmological argument, these are among the most sophisticated and well argued in contemporary philosophical theology. — Michael Martin

I believe the Craig formulation is less complex than Aristotle's or Aquinas'. As I explained in my last post, the cosmological argument presents us with a vey particular set of problems, and offers solutions to those problems. The "argument" part is the presentation of the problems. Depending on how the problems are presented, the solutions vary. The Craig presentation doesn't adequately represent the complexity of the problems, so it is unsuccessful due to being over-simplified. It may be that he is trying to remove, or disguise the inductive aspect, but the inductive aspect is crucial.

By the way, please feel free to present your own argument, if you have it reasonably formalized. — jorndoe

I think that a properly formulated cosmological argument would go something like this:
p1. If there is observable activity, then time is passing.
p2. For any particular observable activity, the potential for that activity is prior in time to the activity itself.
c1. Inductive: The potential for observable activity, in general, is prior in time to that activity.
Problem: We now have a potential which is prior in time to all observable activity.
p3. Any potential requires an actuality as a cause, if it is to be actualized.
c2. If potential is prior to actuality, absolutely, this would ensure an eternal potential without the capacity to actualize itself, and therefore eternally no actual existence.
p4. There is actual existence.
c3. There is an actuality which is prior to observable activity.
Problem: how to describe this actuality. It is generally agreed that this actuality is God, but is God a type of perfect, eternal efficient cause, as Aristotle said, or is God a distinctly different type of immaterial cause, as the Neo-Platonists and Aquinas said?

No.


2. the universe began to exist — jorndoe

What you are not taking into account here, is that Craig argues for an eternal efficient cause, just like Aristotle's eternal circular motion. Such an efficient cause is distinct from any efficient causes which we know of, because of the necessary element of perfection. The efficient cause can only be eternal due to some perfection. The circular motion can only be eternal if the circle is perfect. No point on the circle can be different from any other point, in order that none is the beginning or the end. This is the same principle utilized by no-boundaries theories. Since Craig argues for an eternal efficient cause, his position falls into this category, as that efficient cause can only be eternal through a similar type of perfection. The difference between Craig and "no-boundaries" is that Craig wants a separation between the perfect (ideal) eternal efficient cause, and the universe which it causes, while "no-boundaries" assumes that the universe is such a perfect (ideal) eternal efficient activity. So Craig takes one step beyond "no-boundaries", to recognize that this is an ideal, and therefore not the universe which we know, separate from it, but he does not proceed to recognize that such ideals do not have actual existence. This, I believe is crucial to a true understanding of the cosmological argument.

[...] and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.

The diallelus.

Unless...are you insisting that Krauss start talking about "nothing" (here, here), or make things up, or ...? I once ran into a fellow that had written a whole book about "nothing"; you'd think there wouldn't be much to write about, but...a whole book. :)

From the earlier post:

So where does that "come from"?

If that holds, then what does it mean to ask where it all "comes from"?

Right! That is related to the point at issue. Science (or natural philosophy) assumes 'lawful regularity' as the basis of its explanations. Discovering those regularities and making predictions on that basis, is a very large part of what science does. But science doesn't explain those regularities, although it might speculate about their origin - which is what we're doing here. So the kind of cause that science is concerned with is a cause in terms of combinations of factors and antecedents - what are called in Aristotelean terms 'efficient causes'. Whereas this kind of question concerns formal causes, which I don't think has a counterpart in much scientific thinking. — Wayfarer

That is a common (mis)conception about the nature of science, but there is another conception - the conception developed by Karl Popper, which I prefer.

According to Popper, there is no *assumption* of lawful regularity, he did, after all, dispense with induction entirely. Science, in particular our fundamental theories, are explanatory i.e. scientific theories are conjectured explanations of some aspect of the physical world that is testable.

Science as it stands explains a great number of observed regularities and irregularities. As for events such as the big bang, I'm not sure whether you would describe that as a regularity, but there are existing explanatory theories that take us back to almost the beginning of the universe, which are testable.

It doesn't seem sensible to impose arbitrary limits on what aspects of reality science can address.

That is what I would describe as dissimulation.

If someone demonstrated that the rate at which some object fell varied from the prediction it would create a sensation.

And in this context 'almost' doesn't cut it.

The point I'm making simply is that science doesn't explain scientific law, which many seem to assume it can. So if you're looking for a 'first cause' in the sense postulated by what science means by 'cause', then you're never going to find one, because to find a cause, in the scientific sense, means that the causal relations of which 'a law' is an instance, already exist. That is why, as I understand it, physics can 'rewind the tape' of the Big Bang to within an infinitesmal of the singularity, but never to it - even in principle. It is also why it will never be possible to know whether the Big Bang event was in some sense destined to result in intelligent life, although as mentioned previously, the so-called 'fine tuning' arguments certainly seem to suggest it. (So personally, I think, with everything known to the natural sciences, that natural theology actually has a pretty good case right now.)

As for William Lane Craig, I acknowledge that I think many of his arguments are at least as persuasive of those of his opponents - granted, I am not an atheist - but still not be impressed by him, or his arguments. I think the whole 'scientific argument for God', is barking up the wrong tree, that if you need to prove that God exists, in a sense that would fulfil a scientific requirement then you're already missing the point. You prove what you believe by how you conduct yourself, against a background where you know you don't really know.

As for the scientific arguments concerning a first cause, Karen Armstrong has this to say:

The modern period started in 1492. The people of Europe began a voyage to secularisation which was accelerated by three 16th-century movements: the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. Christians began to succumb to the temptation to apply the impressive methods of science to the realm of religion. Isaac Newton, in particular, led the way by arguing that the design and complexity of nature pointed to the existence and character of nature’s God. ‘At a stroke’, Armstrong claims, ‘Newton overturned centuries of Christian tradition. Hitherto, theologians had argued that the creation could tell us nothing about God (Psalm 19?, Romans 1?); indeed, it proved to us that God was unknowable.’

Religion, fatally, had begun to look to reason and science for support. What then would happen when a later generation found another explanation for the design and complexity of nature? Religion would be undermined, as it indeed was when German higher criticism investigated the Bible ‘rationally’ and Darwin, Marx and Freud produced ‘scientific’ explanations for human behaviour. Christianity had to fight for its life, which is where we are today. ‘But this would not have been the case’, she argues, ‘had not Christians allowed themselves to become so dependent upon a scientific method that was entirely alien to it.’

What she says religions really are is a felt relationship with the origin or ground of being, 'that from which everything arises'. That is understood very differently in different traditions and cultures (although it is also pointless to argue whether all these approaches are 'the same' or 'different' or 'in conflict'). The only thing that is important, is in having that felt relationship with the origin of everything. Ultimately it beats even sex (or so legend has it).

God is not a personal being who stands apart from and over his creation. God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao is simply a name we give to ultimate reality. We can say nothing about god, not even that he/it exists or does not exist. Religious stories were never intended to be understood literally or factually; they are symbolic. The symbols and practices and rituals of religion are there to enable the faithful to get in touch with this transcendent reality, and thus be enabled to better negotiate the vicissitudes of life and to show genuine compassion to others. This is ‘what religion really means’. It has nothing to do with historical events or doctrines, nothing to do with a personal relationship to a creator God.

Unfortunately many think in terms of the mythical 'sky-father' thereby fulfilling the prejudices of all those who think that religion is infantile.

The point I'm making simply is that science doesn't explain scientific law — Wayfarer

New theories not only provide better explanations of reality, they explain why previous theories were successful or otherwise. Newton's gravity explained elliptical orbits, general relativity explained gravity in terms of curved geodesics in space-time. What makes you think this process must stop?

And there just happen to exist scientific research programs into the nature of scientific laws e.g. Constructor Theory.

So if you're looking for a 'first cause' in the sense postulated by what science means by 'cause', then you're never going to find one, because to find a cause, in the scientific sense, means that the causal relations of which 'a law' is an instance, already exist. — Wayfarer

Did the law of evolution already exist at the big bang? You keep claiming that science means something by "cause" despite the notion of "cause" being absent from our fundamental theories. Nevertheless, you don't explain why science cannot address any particular type of "cause" if it exists.

Anyway, under our fundamental time-reversible theories, it is a anthropomorphic prejudice to claim the past causes the future and not the reverse.

n the scientific sense, means that the causal relations of which 'a law' is an instance, already exist. That is why, as I understand it, physics can 'rewind the tape' of the Big Bang to within an infinitesmal of the singularity, but never to it - even in principle. — Wayfarer

No such in-principle barrier exists.

Science doesn't 'describe reality', it describes phenomena and their causes. Science doesn't explain why nature exhibits regularities called 'laws'.

Science doesn't 'describe reality', it describes phenomena and their causes — Wayfarer

OK, taking you at your word, what phenomena and their "causes" does quantum mechanics describe? How did we discover quantum entanglement, superposition, and even the Higgs boson, years before the phenomena were observed?

General relativity told us theoretically that there was a big-bang, and that there should be a remnant of that visible in a microwave background. General relativity told us of the existence of the perihelion effect of Mercury, time dilation necessary for GPS, black holes, and gravitational waves.

Quantum physics was discovered because of a false prediction, i.,e. Planck's investigation of 'black body radiation' indicated that it should have culminated in the so-called 'ultaviolet catastrophe'. Understanding why that didn't occur, is what led to positing of the quantum.

In fact one of the apparent anomalies of quantum theory is the so-called 'quantum leap' which was said to be truly unpredictable, i.e. couldn't be ascribed to a cause. It was this which caused Einstein to say that he couldn't accept that 'God plays dice'. The other was the discovery of the uncertainty principle, which likewise seems to undermine the idea of deterministic causes giving rise to predictable effects.

General relativity didn't predict the big bang, that idea was first developed by Georges Lemaître in a paper called 'The primeval atom'. When it was first floated, Einstein and many others resisted the idea.

All the predictions arising from general relativity are examples of predictions made on the basis of mathematical reasoning. It is intriguing that Einstein was able by these means to predict many things long before the means to discover them was even available (leading to the many headlines we've seen over the years, 'Einstein Proved Right Again), and using nothing other than a pencil and paper! Quite why mathematical physics is able to make such predictions is another fascinating subject, and one explored in Eugene Wigner's The Unreasonable Efficiency of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences'. (Personally, I think this is related to what Kant describes as 'the synthetic a priori', but that is a separate topic.)

None of which counts against what I said.

Science is fallible, evidence-driven, bias-minimizing, self-critical methodologies, whereby models converge on evidence. But it's worthwhile noting that "the map is not the territory", perhaps like knowledge about something isn't that something.

Since science is the single most successful epistemic endeavor in all of human history, you might take that as evidence of self-justification - science meets it's own criteria.

But there's no promise of omniscience (assuming omniscience makes sense). In principle, though not (necessarily) in practice, scientific results are descriptive, rather than pro/prescriptive. Scientific results can be useful to a somewhat unparalleled degree. If your kids fall ill, then I personally recommend taking them to your accredited medical doctor, not your homeopath, witch doctor, priest or shaman, and there's a reason for that.

There isn't anything stopping us from taking near death experiences, reincarnation, miracles, Noah's flood or what-have-you serious. If we were to do so, I'd expect development of fallible theories we could learn from, that would be of some use.

God is not a personal being who stands apart from and over his creation. God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao is simply a name we give to ultimate reality. — Armstrong

I guess the word "God" apparently is up for grabs. :-}
The majority of contemporary theists would disagree, or at least speak of a different God/god; they and Armstrong can't both be right.
Hence ignosticism; unlike, say, the Moon, or even dark energy, there just isn't anything particular to show.

Craig's God and Armstrong's God are not the same.

If your kids fall ill, then I personally recommend taking them to your accredited medical doctor, not your homeopath, witch doctor, priest or shaman, and there's a reason for that. — Jorndoe

No kidding. I personally drive a car and am employed on a computer. So, I don't spend my days driving sheep around stony paddocks with a staff and slingshot to drive off wolves.

'The map is not the territory' is associated with General Semantics.

'Omniscience' is something attributed to deity. How that can be, and what it means, is a very difficult question of interpretation, but I don't automatically reject it on that account. Religion claims to be 'revealed truth'. Whatever that means, may well not be equatable to a mathematically-precise description of physical facts.

Craig's God and Armstrong's God are not the same.

Alternatively, they're seeing different parts of the same elephant, and reacting accordingly.

I think that a properly formulated cosmological argument would go something like this:
p1. If there is observable activity, then time is passing.
p2. For any particular observable activity, the potential for that activity is prior in time to the activity itself.
c1. Inductive: The potential for observable activity, in general, is prior in time to that activity.
Problem: We now have a potential which is prior in time to all observable activity.
p3. Any potential requires an actuality as a cause, if it is to be actualized.
c2. If potential is prior to actuality, absolutely, this would ensure an eternal potential without the capacity to actualize itself, and therefore eternally no actual existence.
p4. There is actual existence.
c3. There is an actuality which is prior to observable activity.
Problem: how to describe this actuality. It is generally agreed that this actuality is God, but is God a type of perfect, eternal efficient cause, as Aristotle said, or is God a distinctly different type of immaterial cause, as the Neo-Platonists and Aquinas said? — Metaphysician Undercover

You should open a new thread. (Y)

I wasn't suggesting platonic realms or anything of that sort; just a purely logical exploration of the concepts "existence' and 'real' to see what ways we can think or imagine them. This would involve trying to start form a position devoid of any ontological commitments, kind of like Husserl 'epoche'

Alternatively, they're seeing different parts of the same elephant, and reacting accordingly. — Wayfarer

According to Craig God is personal, according to Armstrong God is not; according to your alternative, one end of God is personal, and another end is not. :D
Up for grabs. (Unless there's a means to verify/falsify?)

Craig is going for an omni*, atemporal, aspatial, simple/indivisible/atomic, selfaware, sentient, conscious, perfect, loving/caring/compassionate, personal, intervening all-creator (of the universe, heaven, hell, you, I), that brought the universe about (ex nihilo) by free will, and that warrants worship/prayer. Something along those lines anyway.

Well, I am never going to be a Craig acolyte. But if you're evaluating these ideas purely as philosophical propositions, or as kind of quasi-scientific theories, then indeed they often seem contradictory and it is easy to argue that they all negate each other. But those to whom it means something are required to make a judgement about what they mean in an existential sense - what it means to believe it. But to those who don't believe it, none of the positions are particularly meaningful.

From my point of view, however, any of them that say they have a monopoly on truth, I will generally not accept. That is why Karen Armstrong's attitude is superior, in my opinion, because it is analytical and synthetic i.e. finds common threads in various traditions and sees how they indicate common truths (which as a generic approach is different to the 'confessional' approach of Craig et al.)

Besides which, the points mentioned in your last paragraph are in accordance with classical theistic doctrine, but then, it is obvious that many people can claim to believe in such, and then persist in furious disagreement as to what it means. Such is life, and also one of the reasons why I'm Buddhist. :-|

I wasn't suggesting platonic realms or anything of that sort; just a purely logical exploration of the concepts "existence' and 'real' to see what ways we can think or imagine them. This would involve trying to start form a position devoid of any ontological commitments, kind of like Husserl 'epoche' — John

Oh, OK. Well, the semantics thing (earlier in the thread), Husserlian (reductive) phenomenology and such, seems tangential to Craig's argument, but surely has material for a thread of it's own? I think it came up after one of the side-tracks (subjective/objective, mind/other, ...). Do you think there's an angle to Craig's argument?

I may have picked up on (focused too much on) this comment ...

As others have already pointed out numbers do not empirically exist, they cannot be seen or touched, and so on, but yet they seem obviously to be real. — John

... recalling this ...

It sounds trite, but in that case, '4' is the terminus of explanation. There is no point asking 'why does 2+2=4'; it is simply the case. — Wayfarer

Anyway, defining existence and reality, phenomenology and empiricism, abstracts and numbers, are topics with plenty material for topics on their own.

true, but I think these have bearing on the subject, because it underscores the fact that it is not the straightforward question of causality that it might seem to be. Overall, a pretty good discussion.

General relativity didn't predict the big bang, that idea was first developed by Georges Lemaître in a paper called 'The primeval atom'. When it was first floated, Einstein and many others resisted the idea. — Wayfarer

Your misrepresentation of the history of quantum mechanics is utterly woeful. So much so that it is difficult to summon the enthusiasm to correct you.

Fortunately in your misrepresentation of the early history of the theory of the big-bang you make the matter easy. Georges Lemaître's essay 'The primeval atom' was written 30 years after the paper in which he introduced the idea of the big-bang. The first six words of the English translation of that paper are:

According to the theory of relativity

The discovery of the big-bang is a direct consequence of general relativity, as are black-holes, wormholes, gravitational waves.

While we are on the subject, the irony is not lost on me that it is General Relativity that tells us that there has to be a "beginning", and that you prefer to pretend that there is some arbitrary barrier to science discovering *why* and *how* that event occurred.

But nevertheless, it was George leMaitre who first introduced the concept of the Big Bang, it wasn't introduced by Einstein. According to Wikipedia, the gap between LeMaitre's original paper, and the paper that introduced the Big Bang theory was actually 3 years (1927 and 1930), not thirty. (It's also interesting that Einstein is said to have exclaimed after one of LeMaitre's presentations that '"This is the most beautiful and satisfactory explanation of creation to which I have ever listened', although the provenance of the quote is contested.)

While we are on the subject, the irony is not lost on me that it is General Relativity that tells us that there has to be a "beginning" — Tom

What I said was that it is impossible to 'wind the clock back' to the singularity, because at that point, there were no actual laws, nor time and space. That, I believe, is a fact. It is also of note that there are ongoing conflicts about whether the Big Bang really can be said to constitute 'a beginning', precisely because, in Hawking's words, '“A point of creation would be a place where science broke down. One would have to appeal to religion and the hand of God,”(Why Physics can't avoid a Creation Event,)New Scientist.

your misrepresentation of the history of quantum mechanics is utterly woeful. So much so that it is difficult to summon the enthusiasm to correct you. — Tom

Or the facts, apparently.

General relativity didn't predict the big bang, that idea was first developed by Georges Lemaître in a paper called 'The primeval atom'. — Wayfarer

"The Cosmic Atom" was an essay published in 1957.

But nevertheless, it was George leMaitre who first introduced the concept of the Big Bang, it wasn't introduced by Einstein. According to Wikipedia, the gap between LeMaitre's original paper, and the paper that introduced the Big Bang theory was actually 3 years (1927 and 1930), not thirty. (It's also interesting that Einstein is said to have exclaimed after one of LeMaitre's presentations that '"This is the most beautiful and satisfactory explanation of creation to which I have ever listened', although the provenance of the quote is contested.) — Wayfarer

1927 is 30 years prior to 1957.

I don't recall anyone claiming that Einstein developed all the solutions to his field equations and that others such as Friedmann, Lemaître, Robertson, Walker, De Sitter or Gödel weren't allowed to.

What I said was that it is impossible to 'wind the clock back' to the singularity, because at that point, there were no actual laws, nor time and space. That, I believe, is a fact. — Wayfarer

So, if general relativity is a fact, inflation is a fact, quantum mechanics is not a fact, then you are certain of the facts that obtain at the end of past-directed timelike geodesic? Good for you!

The Cosmic Atom" was an essay published in 1957. — Tom

It might have been, but I didn't use the term 'cosmic atom'. I said that Georges LeMaitre introduced the theory of the primeval atom, which he did, in 1927-1930.

So, if general relativity is a fact, inflation is a fact, quantum mechanics is not a fact, then you are certain of the facts that obtain at the end of past-directed timelike geodesic? — Tom

Please spare the sarcasm. What I am saying, which you are not addressing, is that physics has been able to estimate what happened right back to infinitesmal seconds after the 'big bang' event started, but that it cannot 'see' to the singularity, for the obvious reason that at that point, there is no space, time, or physical law in effect. I am not claiming any special knowledge of physics, this is general knowledge, as far as I'm concerned, although apparently it's something you don't know.

All of which is besides the point, but I am loathe to try and explain what that is, again.

You should open a new thread. (Y) — jorndoe

Thanks for the vote of confidence, I'll consider that.

What I said was that it is impossible to 'wind the clock back' to the singularity, because at that point, there were no actual laws, nor time and space. That, I believe, is a fact. It is also of note that there are ongoing conflicts about whether the Big Bang really can be said to constitute 'a beginning', precisely because, in Hawking's words, '“A point of creation would be a place where science broke down. One would have to appeal to religion and the hand of God,”(Why Physics can't avoid a Creation Event,)New Scientist. — Wayfarer

The discovery of the big-bang is a direct consequence of general relativity, as are black-holes, wormholes, gravitational waves. — tom

General relativity, in conjunction with observations of the universe, have forced people to conjure up "the big-bang" to account for the appearance of a time when general relativity does not apply. Black-holes are a place where general relativity does not apply. What this indicates is that general relativity, as a universal theory, is inadequate. It does not indicate that these things, the big-bang, and black-holes really exist in the way described by the theory, because the theory does not apply here, therefore it cannot produce any description of these occurrences. What is revealed by observations of the universe, and the application of general relativity, is that general relativity is very deficient. Instead of re-evaluating general relativity, scientists turn to mathematicians to come up with all sorts of magic tricks to hide the ineptitude of the theory as a universal theory. Its true applicability is really very limited in scope.

Please note, Big Bang is not the assertion of a zero-dimensional singularity of infinite density and temperature, nor is it the assertion of a definite earliest moment (a "t = 0" to use Guth's wording). Such assertions are unwarranted extrapolation; for one, we don't have a sufficiently justified, stable theory unifying relativity and quantum mechanics (both of which are overwhelmingly well justified, albeit domain-specific). Per se, Big Bang is a model of inflation, expansion, and attempt to go as far back as is warranted. These scientists don't tend to just make things up and call it a day.

What is inflation, expansion?

What is inflation, expansion? — Metaphysician Undercover

A fictional law firm.


Err... The terms just refer to epochs and changes over time as per the model. Lots of technicalities. Many years ago things were much denser.

Big Bang; Wikipedia article