There has been much said about successful reference. As I understand it, many a philosophical position diverge at this point. There is a fork in the road. The scope of consequences stemming from one path or another cannot be overstated nor can the knowledge of them be overvalued. I am of the very strong opinion that all actual cases of successful reference share the same core set of common denominators. That core, however, is unobservable. Rather, it can only be arrived at by virtue of careful strong groundwork and subsequent consideration. So...

Let's pave the way...

When a capable creature is referring to some thing, they are always doing so via common language use. There are no examples to the contrary. There is no stronger justificatory ground. In order for successful reference to happen, a speaker must draw an other's attention to the same thing that their attention is already upon by some linguistic method or another. The thing being referred to by the language user must also be picked out by the 'listener' in order for successful reference to take place. If that does not happen, the method fails, and it is not a case of successful reference even if the same method could be used by the same speaker with a different listener and successful reference would happen. This is only to place shared meaning where it belongs in this discourse; at the level of existentially necessary for any and all cases of successful reference to happen. Think Witt's beetle. I would strongly caution the reader to remember that it does not follow from the fact that a method has failed to successfully refer that it always fails.

So, a speaker's attention is on some thing in particular, and s/he wants to draw an other's attention to that thing. S/he does so by virtue of common language use. That is always the case. Pointing is perhaps(arguably) the simplest known method. Describing that which has been previously named and described, and naming that which has been previously named and described are the most complex known methods. The different methods are all existentially dependent upon different things. Those differences will become more apparent, and obvious in many cases, in due time.

First we look to actual examples of successful reference with the sole intention of seeing what they all have in common that is relevant and/or germane to this particular endeavor. We're gathering actual examples and isolating the universally extant common denominators from that which is subject to individual, historical, familial, cultural and/or societal particulars. The results will be a well-grounded candidate for subsequent consideration. The strongest ground.

We have A.) naming practices, B.) descriptive practices and C.) both(some combination thereof). The following chronological possibilities are on order.

1.)naming without ever having used descriptive practices
2.)describing without ever having used naming practices
3.)naming that which had been only previously described
4.)naming that which had been both previously named and described
5.)describing that which had been only previously named
6.)describing that which had been both previously named and described

There are two rudimentary methods of successful reference; naming and descriptive practices. All actual examples include at least one of those two. The list above is a complete set of the six different chronologically possible combinations of successful reference. There are four logically possible combinations of the first two resulting in six different methods. So, actual examples show us two distinct methods and logical possibility leads to six logically possible different methods for successful reference. Purportedly, successful reference can be the result of any one of these 'methods'. I say "purportedly" because that is exactly what I'm attempting to take proper account of, and hopefully by doing so will be able to definitively determine whether or not all six suggested methods are actually capable of successful reference, as compared/contrasted to being just logically possible. So, which enumerated groups - if any - are supported by the available evidence, and which ones rest their laurels upon logical possibility alone?

Let's consider them individually...

The first method above is existentially dependent upon only naming practices. By definition enforced by coherence, this method cannot be existentially dependent upon any of the other possible methods. That which is prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Logically speaking, a creature whose actively involved in naming without ever having used descriptive practices must not have ever used descriptive practices prior to that naming practice event. Failure to acknowledge and maintain that meaningful distinction renders the phrase "without ever having" meaningless. Furthermore, this line of thought gives the notion of "prior to" a much stronger foothold that traditional a priori notions. This foundation is a chronological one, which is intuitively obvious.

Actual cases of 1.) can not and will not include any of the other methods, lest it would not be a case of 1.). Are there such cases? Of course there are! We can look and see that happening for ourselves. There are everyday actual real life examples of people actively involved in naming practices without ever having used descriptive practices. So, there are cases of 1.). Thus, that group is grounded upon logical possibility and bolstered by correspondence.

Onto the next group...

The second method above is existentially dependent upon only descriptive practices. Again, by sheer definition alone - that is enforced by pains of maintaining coherence - this method cannot be existentially dependent upon any of the other possible methods. That which is prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Logically speaking, a creature whose actively involved in descriptive practice without ever having used naming practices must not have ever used naming practices prior to that particular event. Failure to acknowledge and maintain this meaningful distinction renders the phrase "without ever having" utterly meaningless. Furthermore, just as before, and by the very same standard of measure, cases of 2.) can not and will not include any of the other methods, lest it would not be a case of 2.).

But alas!

Much unlike the first method on the list, the second has never been seen. We've never watched that taking place! There are no actual cases of someone actively involved in descriptive practices without ever having used naming practices. Since there are no actual cases of 2.), there can be no actual cases of 3.), for naming that which had been only previously described, requires having been only previously described, and there are no such actual cases. Thus, everyday happenings lead us to realize that two of the six logically possible methods are nothing more than that. 2.) and 3.) are not well grounded, for both have an unacceptable emaciated justificatory ground. They beg for correspondence, but are found sorely lacking. Those two groups rest their laurels upon logical possibility alone. Logical possibility is insufficient for truth. When that logical possibility contradicts everyday events, well there are no stronger grounds for dismissal.

Time to revisit our thoughts by rearranging the list of methods.

1.)naming without ever having used descriptive practices
2.)describing that which had been only previously named
3.)naming that which had been both previously named and described
4.)describing that which had been both previously named and described

Methods 2-4 above are all existentially dependent upon both naming practices and descriptive practices. By sheer definition alone - that is enforced by pains of maintaining coherence - any and all cases of 2-4 must include at least one of the other methods.

Are there any examples, actual or logically possible ones that are not effectively accounted for?