That fact that you're alive is located wherever you are, as (long as) you continue to breathe, metabolize, undergo cell division, etc. How in the world would you think that fact is located nowhere or everywhere or whatever you think? — Terrapin Station
nor do I think that it's located nowhere, I think that it's a category error. — S
I reject your position because, firstly, it seems completely inappropriate to assume that there must be a location from the outset — S
a fact located nearby me at all times whilst I'm alive. — S
If you think that it doesn't have a location, then you think that it's located nowhere. — Terrapin Station
The idea of extant things with no location is incoherent. — Terrapin Station
Why are you saying "a fact located nearby me"?
The fact is located at you. — Terrapin Station
You have a location. Your breathing has a location. Your metabolism and cell division etc. have a location. — Terrapin Station
Facts are states of affairs. Ways that the world is. There's a state of affairs that you exist, that you're breathing, etc. Those states of affairs have a location. — Terrapin Station
Are you thinking of "fact" linguistically? In other words, some people call true propositions "facts." I don't use "fact" that way (a la analytic philosophy, stemming from Russell, Wittgenstein, etc.) If you're asking me about "true propositions," my ontology of that is very different than what I'm saying about facts. — Terrapin Station
Facts are what's the case. If you are going to claim that what's the case has a location, — S
When one promises to do X, then X ought be done.
Whether or not I approve of X is irrelevant to what it means. — creativesoul
If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect? — Terrapin Station
Do you not know what counts as a moral statement? — Moliere
I'm hesitant to put necessary and sufficient conditions to the notion. It seems to me that it's not hard to discriminate between moralizing and statements of preference. — Moliere
Some aspects seem to include claims to universality across all responsible moral actors, the notion that one's belief does not change whether something is good or evil, and that the subject matter is of particular import to living life.
Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality — creativesoul
I think that I know. However, what I think I know does not always match up to conventional understanding/notions. I asked not to be intentionally obtuse, but rather to perhaps seque into reasoning that leads us to scrutinize the conventional notion of moral statement. — creativesoul
I don't understand the bit about unchanging belief... — creativesoul
Moralizing is thinking about one's own thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. — creativesoul
If I believe that "kicking puppies is wrong" is true then "kicking puppies is wrong" is true
"Kicking puppies is wrong" may be true, but my belief, or lack thereof, in said statement does not change its truth-value. — Moliere
This seems to cloistered in one's own thoughts, to me. — Moliere
When we moralize we are addressing others.
When Ted moralizes on the evils of adultery, he is not talking about his beliefs, he is talking about adultery.
A point I use because we can often moralize about what I don't think is within the domain of morality. You can rationalize why adultery is wrong by making some notion about promises, but to me it just doesn't come on the same level as, say, ensuring the hungry are fed or preventing murder.
But even when we moralize about what I believe is not morally significant, we're talking about actions, dispositions, or character -- not our own beliefs.
If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect?
— Terrapin Station
Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality. — creativesoul
Misunderstanding of what and a proper account of morality per what? — Terrapin Station
Misunderstanding of the role that meaning plays in making a promise, particularly regarding truth conditions setting that out. That's what I was discussing. — creativesoul
Proper account of morality cannot involve the objective/subjective dichotomy. — creativesoul
If you know what making a promise means, then the utterance of ought in question simply confirms that. It is what one expects to happen, solely as a result of knowing what making a promise means and believing that the speaker is sincere.
I've explained this numerous times in the other thread we're both involved in. Care to address what I've asserted? — creativesoul
Having said that, there are some interesting aspects of the grammar of moral language that can be cleaned up. Moral statements have a direction of fit that distinguishes them from some other sorts of statements; they are unlike mere statements of preference, in that they set out what others should do, not just what the speaker should do; and they have their import in providing justification for what we do. — Banno
But it seems that we say things we believe are right or wrong not to influence others -- at least when thinking about what is the right thing to do -- but because it is the right thing to do. — Moliere
Turns out Terrapin Station doesn't think mathematical statements have a truth value. I can't see how that could be made to work. — Banno
The direction of fit stuff is from Searle, and Anscombe; so it stretches across both Oxford and Cambridge. I think it very useful. — Banno
Something about saying moral statements are meant to influence others doesn't quite sit right with me -- not that I'm unfamiliar with the phenomena. Of course people say these things to influence others. But it seems that we say things we believe are right or wrong not to influence others -- at least when thinking about what is the right thing to do -- but because it is the right thing to do. — Moliere
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