As I see it, the compatibilist position is that a person 'could have done otherwise', based on an epistemological interpretation of that phrase and that, since that's the only interpretation that anybody has been able to suggest so far, that's the maximum sort of free will that anybody could imagine. — andrewk
Are you sure? Compatibilism seems more like "a person is to blame for their choices, even though 'choice' doesn't exist".
"Could have done otherwise" doesn't mean anything under determinism. If "could" refers to anything real, then determinism does not hold at that point - i.e. either the laws of physics are wrong, or our understanding of them. I don't think compatibilists complain too much about physics. — tom
Are you sure? Compatibilism seems more like "a person is to blame for their choices, even though 'choice' doesn't exist". — tom
Only if she didn't have the capacity (e.g. being paralyzed by a stroke) or didn't have the opportunity (e.g. because her car had been stolen), or both, do we normally say that she could not have done otherwise. — Pierre-Normand
They would likewise define "choice" in a manner compatible with determinism, and so argue that we do have and make choices. To argue that this isn't what a choice is doesn't make much sense unless "choice" already refers to a real thing, and that the compatabilist's description of this thing is mistaken. But, of course, that would entail that we have and make choices anyway. — Michael
Playing word-games to preserve moral responsibility seems utterly futile. — tom
This is what I don't get. Under determinism, what happens is a sensitive function of the initial conditions at the big bang, or if you prefer the conditions at any other time. Choice cannot exist, neither can "testability".
either the laws of physics are wrong, or our understanding of them. I don't think compatibilists complain too much about physics. — tom
At its core, quantum mechanics can be regarded as a non-classical probability calculus resting upon a non-classical propositional logic.
Defining an appropriate form of determinism for the context of general relativistic physics is extremely difficult, due to both foundational interpretive issues and the plethora of weirdly-shaped space-time models allowed by the theory's field equations.
This is what I don't get. Under determinism, what happens is a sensitive function of the initial conditions at the big bang, or if you prefer the conditions at any other time. Choice cannot exist, neither can "testability". Playing word-games to preserve moral responsibility seems utterly futile. — tom
Second, I think 'free will' is an idea unrelated to determinism. Its history is theological and in contemporary debates it remains akin to theology, a way of relating a person's view of psychology to their view of ontology. — mcdoodle
So even under determinism, one can distinguish having a choice from having no choice. [...]
And what one can distinguish has meaning. My having a determined choice means that my choosing determines the event, and having no choice means that my choosing has no effect. — unenlightened
It is a good thing, even when one is a naturalist, that one's philosophy of mind not conflict with one's metaphysics or with one's ontological understanding of living beings. One's desire to avoid such conflicts need not be a covert attempt to save supernatural belief. — Pierre-Normand
I am an ardent advocate of science as a method and a body of work but against metaphysical naturalism, and I think the two things are confused in determinism/freewill debates. — mcdoodle
How do you get from "what happens is a sensitive function of initial conditions" to "choice cannot exist"? What if the compatabilist defines "choice" in such a way that it, too, is a sensitive function of initial conditions? Then making choices can (and maybe does) occur even if determinism is the case. — Michael
Well not all laws of physics are deterministic. — m-theory
Determinism is often an interpretation more so than a necessary conclusion.
This is especially true of the foundations of quantum theory, which are by definition probabilistic. — m-theory
Thermodynamics is not symmetrical.Both General Relativity and the Standard Model are time-symmetric theories. — tom
There is no axiom of free will in qm.At a less prosaic level, the removal of the free will axiom from QM renders all physical theories deterministic. — tom
Thermodynamics is not symmetrical.
Surely you don't intend to suggest that the above listed theories can simply ignore thermodynamics? — m-theory
There is no axiom of free will in qm. — m-theory
And that is one of the reasons thermodynamics is *not* regarded as a fundamental theory. — tom
This is nonsense. All of science implicitly assumes the free will of the experimenter. In QM this is made explicit in Bell's Theorem and various similar theorems. Otherwise we are super-determined — tom
Please provide the laws of physics that are non-determinisic. — tom
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.