Although the following essay is lengthy, I hope my fellow Forum participants will enjoy it.

ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED BY ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER’S EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Arthur Schopenhauer, the perceptive faculty of the understanding, which operates in terms of the transcendental principle of cause and effect, assigns causes to the body’s sense impressions a priori. Objects, as causes, and an external world (space and time in which the objects are situated) are constructed from the minimal input of our sense impressions. An external world of phenomenal objects exists for consciousness through the a priori constructive activity of consciousness.

What follows is a selection from Schopenhauer’s doctoral dissertation wherein he offers a description of this process as he understood it:

"For what a poor, wretched thing mere sensation is! Even in the noblest organs of sense it is nothing more than a local specific feeling, capable in its way of some variation, yet in itself always subjective. Therefore, as such, this feeling cannot possibly contain anything objective, and so anything resembling intuitive perception. For sensation of every kind is and remains an event within the organism itself; but as such it is restricted to the region beneath the skin; and so, in itself, it can never contain anything lying outside the skin and thus outside ourselves. Sensation can be pleasant or unpleasant – and this indicates a reference to our will – but nothing objective is to be found in any sensation. In the organs of sense, sensation is heightened by the confluence of the nerve-extremities; it can easily be stimulated from without by the wide distribution and thin covering of these; and, moreover, it is especially susceptible to particular influences, such as light, sound, and odor. Yet it remains mere sensation, like every other within our body; consequently, it is something essentially subjective whose changes reach our consciousness (brain) only in the form of the inner sense and hence of time alone, that is to say, successively. It is only when the understanding begins to act – a function not of single delicate nerve extremities but of that complex and mysterious structure the brain that weighs three pounds and even five in exceptional cases. ---only when the understanding applies its sole form, the law of causality, that a powerful transformation takes place whereby subjective sensation becomes objective intuitive perception. Thus by virtue of its own peculiar form and so a priori, in other words, prior to all experience (since till then experience was not yet possible), the understanding grasps the given sensation of the body as an effect (a word comprehended only by the understanding), and this effect as such must necessarily have a cause. Simultaneously the understanding summons to its assistance space, the form of the outer sense also lying predisposed in the intellect, i.e., in the brain. This it does in order to place that cause outside the organism; for only in this way does there arise for it an outside whose possibility is simply space, so that pure intuition a priori must supply the foundation for empirical perception. In this process, as I shall soon show in more detail, the understanding now avails itself of all the data of the given sensation, even the minutest, in order to construct in space, in conformity therewith, the cause of the sensation. This operation of the understanding … is not discursive or reflective, nor does it take place in abstracto, by means of concepts and words; on the contrary, it is intuitive and quite immediate. For only by this operation and consequently in the understanding and for the understanding does the real, objective, corporeal world, filling space in three dimensions, present itself; and then it proceeds, according to the same law of causality, to change in time and to move in space. Accordingly, the understanding itself has first to create the objective world, for this cannot just step into our heads from without, already cut and dried, through the senses and the openings of their organs. Thus, the senses furnish nothing but the raw material, and this the understanding first of all works up into the objective grasp and apprehension of a corporeal world governed by laws and does so by means of the simple forms already stated, namely space, time, and causality. Accordingly our daily intuitive empirical perception is intellectual, and it has a right to claim this predicate … "

Despite this detailed description and the uncontested accuracy of his claim that our intuitive empirical perception is intellectual, nevertheless, I submit that Schopenhauer’s epistemological theory may be incomplete because he neglected to address the following two major issues.

ISSUE 1: The human brain cannot operate solely in terms of the Transcendental Principle of Cause and Effect (TPC&E) to construct particular phenomenal objects within its spatio-temporal context. To accomplish this goal successfully it also must use the Transcendental Faculty of Perceptual Imagination (TFPI).

The human brain is equipped with two kinds of imagination. The first kind of imagination, with which we are most familiar, is the brain’s Faculty of Reflective Imagination (FRI).

The Faculty of Reflective Imagination (FRI) enables the human brain to visualize things existing, or events occurring, now, in the past, or in the future, differently than the ways in which they are ordinarily perceived or experienced. The FRI provides the “what would it be like if …?” kind of imagining that comprises the foundation for all human creative endeavor in philosophy, history, mathematics, physical science, technology, social science, and the arts. The brain’s FRI is under the direct control of the human will; but it can be subject to inspiration.

However, despite the obvious, crucial importance of the FRI for humankind’s progress, it is not the primary focus of this part of the investigation. Instead, the primary focus of this part of the investigation is the brain’s second kind of imagination; viz., its Transcendental Faculty of Perceptual Imagination (TFPI).

The TFPI is always operative and it has an absolutely necessary and strictly universal (a priori) function which makes it possible for the brain to visualize all of the phenomenal objects it actually experiences on a daily basis. However, unlike the FRI, the brain’s TFPI always operates independently of the human will and is not under its direct control.

The TFPI continuously provides the human brain with that panoramic, three-dimensional, spatio-temporal arena or context wherein the subjective (under the skin) sense impressions and subjective events detected by the senses can be given concrete, objective, perceptual form and shape. The TFPI makes possible continuously the brain’s conscious perception, or conscious visualization, of things existing and events occurring in an objective, three-dimensional space within itself. And this continuous, day-to-day, uninterrupted process of transitioning from subjective sense impressions to objective, three-dimensional portrayals within the human brain’s TFPI is a completely non-discursive process. It always occurs immediately, spontaneously, automatically, and without any prior conscious deliberate intent. Without use of the TFPI the human brain, operating solely according to the TPC&E, would never be able to envision the particular kinds of phenomenal objects it constructs.

However, precisely which kinds of phenomenal objects the brain, using the TPC&E and the TFPI, happens to construct and envision within its spatio-temporal arena at any given moment is not under its direct control. Instead, as will be explained in greater detail, the brain using the TPC&E and the TFPI, must also be guided throughout the objectifying process by a third, additional, indispensable factor.

ISSUE 2: The human brain cannot succeed in envisioning and constructing a particular phenomenal object out of subjective sense data if it depends only on the joint operation of the Transcendental Principle of Cause and Effect (TPC&E) and the Transcendental Faculty of Perceptual Imagination (TFPI); it also must be directed and guided throughout this process by specific Rules of Sensory Configuration (RSC).

According to Schopenhauer, the body’s sense impressions in their pristine state are experienced by the brain as being a subjective jumble of chaotic nonsense and he explicitly stated that nothing objective could ever lie in any sensation. Yet, despite this, he then went on to assert that the brain availed itself of all the data of the given sensations, even the minutest, to construct in space, in conformity therewith, the organized objective phenomenal cause of the sensations.

However, I would point out that no matter how carefully the brain might avail itself of all the several data, even the minutest, which are presented to it by the given sensations, in order to try to construct and visualize, using the TPC&E and the TFPI, the organized objective phenomenal cause of these sensations in space, I submit that it would remain unsuccessful in this effort. For if, as Schopenhauer claims, the human brain operates solely according to the TPC&E, then, I submit, it would be unable even to begin the objectifying process. The TPC&E is certainly a valid general rule, but it completely lacks the high degree of specificity and level of guidance the brain absolutely requires in order to insure its empirical success whenever it applies itself to the task of accomplishing particular kinds of phenomenal objectification. If one claims that the brain, relying exclusively on the TPC&E and the TFPI, somehow magically knows, in advance, how to construct and visualize precisely the correct kinds of empirical phenomenal objects and somehow also magically knows, in advance, how to select the correct subsets of subjective sense impressions that will comprise precisely those kinds of empirical phenomenal objects and no other, then, we submit, that person is mistaken.

If the starting point is bare (under the skin) sense impressions in which there is nothing objective to begin with, then how can the brain ever succeed in getting from them to the envisioning of particular kinds of empirical phenomenal objects by simply using the TPC&E and the TFPI? How can the brain, without being able to directly access and follow specific models, patterns, or rules of sensory organization, know how to envision precisely the correct kinds of empirical, phenomenal objects from out of the subjective sensory chaos it encounters simply by using, as it were, a magical, abstract, epistemological wand called the TPC&E?

Furthermore, it makes no sense to claim that non-phenomenal objects (be they things-in-themselves or Platonic Ideas) (a) act as transcendent causes of the given sense impressions and/or (b) more to the point, act as transcendent exemplars, or patterns, which drive and guide the efforts of the brain whenever it envisions particular kinds of empirical phenomenal objects. Why? Because from the frame-of-reference of human consciousness, which is the only frame-of-reference humans can experience, transcendent, non-phenomenal objects (be they Kant’s things-in-themselves or Plato’s Ideas) simply do not exist. As Schopenhauer, himself, put it:

"…the fundamental idealistic view advanced by Kant has lost nothing through my rectification; on the contrary, it has gained insofar as with me the demand of the causal law vanishes and is abolished in empirical intuitive perception as its product. Consequently, such demand cannot be extended to a wholly transcendent (this author’s emphasis) question about the thing-in-itself. Thus, if we refer to my previous theory of empirical intuitive perception, we find that its first datum, sensation, is something absolutely subjective, a process within the organism because it is beneath the skin. Locke has shown fully and thoroughly that these sensations of the organs of sense, even assuming their stimulation by external causes, cannot possibly have the slightest resemblance to the nature and quality of those causes, thus that sugar bears no resemblance to sweetness, or a rose to redness. But even that they must have an external (i.e., transcendent, this author’s emphasis) cause at all, depends on a law whose origin lies demonstrably within us, within our brain. Consequently, this necessity is ultimately just as subjective as is the sensation itself. In fact, time this primary condition of the possibility of every change and so too of the change by virtue whereof the application of the concept of causality can first occur; and also space, which first renders possible the shifting outwards of a cause then presenting itself as object, are subjective forms of the intellect, as Kant has conclusively demonstrated. Accordingly, we find residing within ourselves (i.e., immanent to human consciousness) all the elements of empirical intuitive perception and nothing in them that would reliably point to something absolutely different from us, to a thing-in-itself."

Also, empirical phenomenal objects, being resultant end products, cannot act as causes, and the sense impression subsets cannot be their effects. Instead, it is the specific Rules of Sensory Configuration (RSC), acting as causes, which control, guide, and direct the brain’s spontaneous selection and organization of the appropriate subjective sense impression subsets into particular kinds of empirical phenomenal objects (the effects). The RSC control, guide, and direct the brain’s TFPI in ways that enable it to spontaneously identify, separate out, and synthesize, from out of the original jumble of chaotic sensory nonsense, precisely those subsets of subjective sense impressions that will correspond exactly to the correct kinds of phenomenal objects to be envisioned in space and time. In other words, the brain’s TFPI, when it operates according to the TPC&E, needs to be directed and guided with a high degree of specificity throughout the spontaneous, non-discursive, objectifying process by these rules of sensory configuration to be successful in envisioning precisely the right kinds of empirical, phenomenal objects.

According to Schopenhauer:

"… the understanding is the artist forming the work, whereas the senses are merely the assistants who hand up the materials. But its method here consists throughout in passing from given effects to their causes which thus present themselves first as objects in space."

By contrast, I submit that use of only the TPC&E by the brain’s TFPI reminds one, instead, of a master builder who is restricted to being able to visualize the look of projected structures only in the broadest of outlines because he lacks the all-important detailed architectural plans (Rules of Sensory Configuration) to follow that will spontaneously direct and guide him as to precisely how to go about actually building the visualized empirical structures from out of the given sense impressions.

If posited empirical phenomenal objects are not to be considered mere arbitrary, capricious, magical constructions of the human brain, then I submit that, in addition to the Transcendental Principle of Cause and Effect (TPC&E) and the Transcendental Faculty of Perceptual Imagination (TFPI), there must be an indispensable, third factor involved in empirical intuitive perception which Schopenhauer did NOT take into account. A factor that accompanies the sense impressions and functions, as it were, in the capacity of dynamic architectural rules which continuously guide and direct the brain during the process of objectification so that, in any given situation, it will spontaneously construct and envision, in precise detail, only a certain kind of empirical phenomenal object, and no other.

In conclusion, specific Rules of Sensory Configuration (RSC), which function as dynamic sensory templates, are needed to guide the brain so that it is able to select precisely those subsets of subjective sense impressions that are required to construct the correct kinds of phenomenal objects. The sense impressions alone, inherently lacking any objective information as to kind, cannot themselves provide adequate guidance to the brain in this regard, nor can the TPC&E or TFPI compensate for, or ameliorate, this deficiency. Acting jointly, the TPC&E and TFPI may permit the brain to envision phenomenal objectivity in general, but, I submit, they do not permit the brain to envision phenomenal objectivity at the exquisite level of specificity and fine detail that would be needed in each case. The brain requires something that can provide it with detailed guidance concerning the kinds of empirical phenomenal objects it is called upon to construct and envision by a source other than the sense impressions, per se, and other than the joint action of the TPC&E and TFPI.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE RULES OF SENSORY CONFIGURATION

Still to be considered is the following question: What, precisely, is the epistemological status of the dynamic Rules of Sensory Configuration (RSC) that spontaneously guide and direct the brain, when it uses the TPC&E and the TFPI, to synthesize specific subsets of the body’s subjective sense impressions into, and visualize them as, particular kinds of empirical phenomenal objects?

In agreement with Immanuel Kant, characteristics exhibited by the objects of experience which are absolutely necessary and strictly universal are transcendental a priori, while characteristics exhibited by the objects of experience which are of a limited necessity and a restricted universality are empirical a posteriori.

However, both the transcendental a priori characteristics of phenomenal objects and the empirical a posteriori characteristics of phenomenal objects occur within the limits of human consciousness; neither the former, nor the latter, characteristics can be TRANSCENDENT to human consciousness, both are IMMANENT to human consciousness, and, for this reason, both are SUBJECTIVE.

Now, if any Rule of Sensory Configuration (RSC), as previously described, can be shown to have an absolutely necessary and strictly universal applicability to all possible subsets of the body’s subjective sense impressions and, thus, by extension, to all possible kinds of phenomenal objects, then one can conclude that that rule is transcendental a priori. But no specific RSC, as previously described, can be shown to have an absolutely necessary and strictly universal applicability to all possible subsets of the body’s sense impressions. At most, any given RSC can be shown to have a limited necessity and restricted universality or applicability just to those particular subsets of the body’s subjective sense impressions which constitute one specific kind of empirical phenomenal object.

These Rules of Sensory Configuration (RSC), like the body’s subjective subsets of sense impressions to which they apply, are themselves indigenous to the empirical part of subjective consciousness, not to the transcendental part of subjective consciousness. They can be experienced only a posteriori. As such, they can have nothing to do with Kant’s transcendent things-in-themselves, or with Plato’s transcendent Ideas. They are independent immanent empirical rules of sensory configuration which accompany specific subsets of the body’s subjective sense impressions and they directly affect and guide the brain whenever it uses the TPC&E and the TFPI to spontaneously construct and visualize specific kinds of empirical phenomenal objects that correspond to and are comprised of those subsets of the body’s sense impressions

A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF SUBSTANCE

I submit that the definition of substance which originated with John Locke and was critiqued by George Berkeley and David Hume is superfluous to this expanded version of Arthur Schopenhauer’s epistemological theory. There is no need for a “something, I know not what” sub-stratum to underlie the sense impressions as an adjunct to the empirical a posteriori Rules of Sensory Configuration (RSC).

It is an undeniable fact that to every objective configuration of its sense impressions, which the brain executes and then names, the brain also feels compelled to superimpose, via the TPC&E and the TFPI, an additional perception which it calls the phenomenal object’s substance or matter. However, upon detailed logical analysis this additional perception of substance or matter proves to be an empty, superfluous, unwarranted, phantom perception. In fact, the term substantial or material object turns out to be a contradiction in terms. Empirical, phenomenal objects are one thing, material or substantial objects are another. The former objects are considered real, whereas the latter are considered illusory. Substance, or matter, is interpreted to be a non-existent something, above and beyond the perceived sense impressions which comprise and exhaust the phenomenal object, that serves as an invisible support or sub-stratum for the sense impressions that comprise the perceived empirical, phenomenal object.

However, I submit that this admittedly empty, superfluous, and unwarranted phantom perception is not, for all that, absolutely meaningless or absurd, and it should not be dismissed out of hand. Substance, or matter, presents us with the occurrence of a perpetual, stubborn, ubiquitous, cognitive fact that still needs to be accounted for, somehow, epistemologically. The very possibility of its pervasive existence throughout the realm of sense perception (even as an error or as something that ought not to be) certainly deserves some sort of cogent explanation.

Arthur Schopenhauer, in his own way, distinguished clearly between the perceived phenomenal object, on the one hand, and matter or substance, on the other. To a certain degree he confirmed and preserved the nothing status of matter at the perceptual level, and straightforwardly he interpreted the essence of matter to be the will. Consider the following statements in this regard:

"…matter is that whereby the will, which constitutes the inner essence of things, enters into perceptibility, becomes perceptible or visible. Therefore, in this sense matter is the mere visibility of the will, or the bond between the world as will and the world as representation. It belongs to the latter in so far as it is the product of the intellect’s functions; to the former, in so far as it is that which manifests itself in all material beings; i.e., in phenomena, is the will. Therefore, every object as thing-in-itself is will, and as phenomenon is matter. If we could divest any given matter of all properties that come to it a priori, in other words, of all the forms of our perception and apprehension, we should be left with the thing-in-itself, that which, by means of those forms, appears as the purely empirical in matter, but would then itself no longer appear as something extended and acting; that is to say, we should no longer have before us any matter, but the will. This very thing-in-itself, or the will, by becoming the phenomenon, by entering the forms of our intellect, appears as matter, that is to say, as the supporter, itself invisible but necessarily assumed, of properties visible only through it. Therefore, in this sense, matter is the visibility of the will."

And:

"That matter by itself, separated from form, cannot be perceived or represented, rests on the fact that, in itself and as that which is the purely substantial of bodies, it is really the will itself. But the will cannot be apprehended objectively or perceived in itself, but only under all the conditions of the representation, and thus only as phenomenon. Under these conditions, however, it exhibits itself forthwith as body, that is, as matter clothed in form and quality; but form is conditioned by space, and quality or activity by causality and so both rest on the functions of the intellect. Matter without them would be just the thing-in-itself; i.e., the will itself."

But, I think, even here something was misleading about the way Schopenhauer chose to explain the nature of matter or substance. He claimed the will was really “out there” in the configured phenomenal objects, only just disguised and hidden from perceptual view by a mask consisting of space, time, and the sense impressions. And he also claimed that if we could completely delete this mask and yet, somehow, still be able to perceive what remained “out there,” then we would, in fact, perceive the will to be the real basis and foundation of all perceived phenomenal objects.

However, in this respect, I think George Berkeley was more faithful to the situation than was Arthur Schopenhauer when he asserted, without any qualifications, that “matter” and “nothing” were convertible terms. And I think by characterizing matter or substance in this objective or quasi-objective manner, Schopenhauer tended to qualify his more fundamental contention that the will constituted the subjective, transcendent, metaphysical basis of the brain itself.

Quite simply, the will (as thing-in-itself) is never an object; nor, in principle, could it ever be perceived by the brain as an object, or as something in the object. The will is never really “out there” in the configured phenomenal object only just disguised and hidden from perceptual view by a mask consisting of space, time, and the sense impressions. In fact, even if the brain could somehow completely delete space, time, and all the sense impressions from the perceived phenomenal object, and even if then, somehow, the brain could perceive what remained, still it would not perceive the will. Instead, in agreement with Berkeley, the brain would perceive a void, nothing! Let one proceed as far as one can into the sub-atomic heart of the phenomenal object. Even at the quantum level of photons, quarks, charms, and ups, and downs, and quantum entanglement, and what have you, one still would not have transcended the realm of the phenomenal object and have arrived at the thing-in-itself.

In my opinion, the admittedly “sensuously empty” perception of matter, or substance, as contrasted with the “sensuously full” perception of the phenomenal object, can be explained more simply, directly, and adequately by a slightly different interpretation which abides fully with Berkeley’s contention, yet remains quite consistent with most of the basic principles and insights provided by Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

Matter, or substance, can be interpreted to be the direct result of the spontaneous, persistent, albeit always futile attempt by the brain to capture and incorporate into the phenomenal objects a controlling configuring agency (Schopenhauer’s will) whenever, via the TPC&E and the TFPI, the brain is compelled to construct those phenomenal objects out of the appropriate, corresponding, empirical subsets of sense impressions under the guidance of empirical a posteriori rules of sensory configuration.

This controlling configuring agency is not the empirical sense impressions, is not the transcendental forms of intuitive perception (space and time), is not the TPC&E, is not the TFPI, is not the empirical a posteriori rules of sensory configuration, is not the phenomenal object, and is not the brain itself. It is no one of these things operating alone, nor all of them operating together. These are, instead, simply the collective means and medium through which the controlling configuring agency (the will) compels the brain to express objectively within itself the configuring agency’s phenomenal creations.

Substance is the empty, yet eloquent, result of the brain’s heroic, but always unsuccessful, attempts to capture and incorporate the elusive, controlling configuring agency (the will) itself as an integral component of the phenomenal objects it is forced to construct. Substance is the empty, yet eloquent, epistemic symbol of the brain’s perpetual, persistent, failed attempts to make visible to itself in an objective manner the hidden, transcendent, configurator (the will).

In this regard, then, there may be just one Rule of Sensory Configuration that enjoys a special epistemological status when contrasted with all the other Rules of Sensory Configuration. A unique Rule of Sensory Configuration that is transcendental a priori, rather than empirical a posteriori, and which takes epistemic precedence over, and is presupposed by, all the other empirical a posteriori Rules of Sensory Configuration.

A transcendental a priori Rule of Sensory Configuration which necessarily and inescapably applies to all sense impression subsets without exception and which compels the brain’s TFPI to incorporate nothing = substance into all empirical phenomenal objects at the same time as it constructs those empirical phenomenal objects in accordance with the corresponding empirical a posteriori Rules of Sensory Configuration; a concept that is, by the way, somewhat similar to Jean Paul Sartre’s concept of the Pre-Reflective Consciousness as nihilating activity.