What is the subject matter of philosophy?

_db

This is one idea that has troubled me for some time - what is the subject matter of philosophy? What does a philosopher study?

Obvious answers to this question include but are not limited to:

Existence (metaphysics)
Choices (ethics)
Beauty (aesthetics)
Knowledge (epistemology)
Government (political philosophy)
Divinity (theology)

All of these are quite abstract. Nowhere can you see, touch, smell, hear, taste, or otherwise feel government. Nowhere can you hold the property red-ness in your hand. Nowhere can you find knowledge just sitting around somewhere.

And yet we all have some sort of conception of what government is, what red is like, and what constitutes knowledge.

Furthermore, the aforementioned list is awfully disconnected, at first glance, when in comparison to the natural and social sciences, or even disciplines outside of science in general. Biologists have a fairly clear-cut domain: the study of living creatures (whatever living means). Astronomers have a clear-cut domain: the study of medium-to-extraordinarily large objects outside of the immediate atmosphere of Earth. Lawyers have specific documents to guide their work, and a specific culture they work within.

Meanwhile the list above describes a bunch of various things that philosophy studies, without any immediately clear way of seeing how they all fit together. At what point does metaphysics become aesthetics? At what point does ethics turn into evolutionary psychology? At what point does theology turn into epistemology?

What holds this network of problems together in the web commonly referred to as philosophy? More importantly, why are these questions often seen as distinctly philosophical, and not within the realm of other methods of inquiry?

I have been reading A. M. Moore's fantastic book The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, which, as the title might suggest, is a loose narrative of the enterprise of metaphysics since Descartes. It is fundamentally a work in metaphilosophy. And the fundamental claim of the book, in fact the very first statement, is that metaphysics is "the most general attempt to make sense of things."

I think the most important point of this statement is the identification of metaphysics as an attempt, and not a discipline. This loosens the definition of metaphysics, and turns it into something more akin to an anthropological drama; something that is inherently human. This coincides well with Nicholas Rescher's claim that philosophy, in particular metaphysics, is something that any rational agent inevitably does, because he has to.

The second most important point of the statement is the part regarding sense. Metaphysics is the attempt to understand the very fabric of intelligibility, the way we make sense of the world. This coincides well with the extremely prevalent idea that metaphysics is necessary for science to take off - without sense, or without a plan to make sense of sense, where do we even start? Indeed many thinkers, from Aristotle to Descartes to Whitehead to Peirce all thought that metaphysics in some sense was a necessary component of any kind of sensible inquiry.

Another way of putting all this is that metaphysics studies the transcendent: the conditions necessary for immanent sensibility. Which sounds remarkably similar to the immanent objectivity of the phenomenologists, and the studies of the transcendental idealists who focused on the conditions for immanent objectivity.

But how can we even come to know the transcendent, if we are "within" the transcendent? As Moore asks in his book, can we come to know the transcendent? And if we can come to know the transcendent, can we do so through novel and creative ways (respectively)?

Because of the focus on transcendence, it seems to stand that the "subject matter" (if that is even applicable) of metaphysics is ultimately outside the domain of experimentation. Experimentation occurs within immanence, where things change and events happen. But the transcendent doesn't change. Events happen, but event does not. Things change, but thing and change itself do not. Because of the lack of change or occurrence in the transcendent, there cannot be any manipulative experimentation in the sense of "taking control of nature", because if we could take control of the transcendent, this would only necessitate the existence of another, true transcendent.

Because of all this, metaphysics becomes the attempt to understand the transcendental and necessary conditions for intelligibility. An analogy would be of watching a theatrical program and wondering how the various dramatic structures work behind-the-scenes; except in the case of metaphysics, we can't just sneak around the stage and observe the machinations of the playwright, because we are Beings-in-the-world, part of the world itself and thus unable to "escape" the world and view it outside of the lens of our own perceptions. The best we can do is speculate on the possibly-necessary. Indeed in the past any sort of unobservable entity in science was often said to be "metaphysical" - a possibility that was necessary for a theory to make sense.

Thus, to segue into philosophy in general, we can call other fields as the attempt to speculate on the more specifics of the possibly-necessary. Ethics would be the study of the transcendental possibly-normative. Aesthetics would be the study of the transcendental possibly-beautiful. Political philosophy would be the study of the transcendental possibly-governmental. And all these branches of philosophy are united by their speculative inquiry into the transcendental - that which is and can be applied everywhere. Value applies everywhere we go. Beauty applies everywhere we go. Government applies everywhere we go. Any sort of meta-question is going to be philosophical in nature, for it covers the entire issue and the context in which it resides, which cannot in theory be studied by the discipline of the question, in question. Any sort of immanence will have a transcendent structure which cannot be studied by the immanent itself and its immanent methodology, and since we are immanent ourselves we can only attempt to study the transcendental by a shift in methodology, if there can even be such a methodology.

Hoo

↪darthbarracuda

And the fundamental claim of the book, in fact the very first statement, is that metaphysics is "the most general attempt to make sense of things." — darthbarracuda

Yes, I agree. It's the most general and therefore necessarily an abnormal or revolutionary discourse. "I think "sophistry" as its primordial ground, because you have to successfully established the rules of "logic" or "legitimate" reason within whatever discourse is most general. Thought rethinks its own essence, but that is almost to re-invent its own essence.

Metaphysics is the attempt to understand the very fabric of intelligibility, the way we make sense of the world. — darthbarracuda

An analogy would be of watching a theatrical program and wondering how the various dramatic structures work behind-the-scenes; except in the case of metaphysics, we can't just sneak around the stage and observe the machinations of the playwright, because we are Beings-in-the-world, part of the world itself and thus unable to "escape" the world and view it outside of the lens of our own perceptions. The best we can do is speculate on the possibly-necessary. Indeed in the past any sort of unobservable entity in science was often said to be "metaphysical" - a possibility that was necessary for a theory to make sense. — darthbarracuda

Nice. I agree. We posit necessary structures. Whence certainty? The beauty of the idea in our living context seduces. We live successfully as-if. No one has come along with something better yet.

I think the most important point of this statement is the identification of metaphysics as an attempt, and not a discipline. This loosens the definition of metaphysics, and turns it into something more akin to an anthropological drama; something that is inherently human. This coincides well with Nicholas Rescher's claim that philosophy, in particular metaphysics, is something that any rational agent inevitably does, because he has to. — darthbarracuda

Yes, that makes it sound more alive. We are all metaphysicians, even the illiterate, as soon as we can speak, if not before. We have "software" that can contemplate and edit itself --and can apparently contemplate this ability to contemplate and edit itself. We are self-consciously self-conscious. We can think about "unknown unknowns" in the abstract.

I like Rescher, too. His methodological pragmatism acknowledges our loyalty to paradigms or belief-systems and not really to individual beliefs.

Terrapin Station

Here are a few of my favorite "What is philosophy" quotes:

"The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term." -- Wilfrid Sellars

“Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of philosophy—for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.” -- Bertrand Russell

“The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as to not seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it.” -- Bertrand Russell again, in a more humorous mood.

“Just this business of bringing to clear consciousness and expressing coherently the principles which are implicitly intended in our dealing with the familiar, is the distinctively philosophic enterprise.” -- C.I. Lewis

“The aim of philosophy is to see all things in the world in proportion to each other, in some order, i.e. to see reality as a system, or at least any part of it as belonging to some system.” -- Susanne K. Langer

“The inspiration of the artist, the vision of the mystic, the social urge of the reformer, the emotions of the lover, and the moral intuitions of the plain man, all are grist to the philosopher’s mill. He must also take into consideration the conclusions and discoveries of the scientist.” -- C.E.M. Joad

_db

Yes, that makes it sound more alive. We are all metaphysicians, even the illiterate, as soon as we can speak, if not before. We have "software" that can contemplate and edit itself --and can apparently contemplate this ability to contemplate and edit itself. We are self-consciously self-conscious. We can think about "unknown unknowns" in the abstract. — Hoo

Another interesting part of Moore's book is the emphasis on the tension between self-consciousness and self-confidence. If we're too self-confident, we might step beyond the limits of intelligibility and into the realm of obscurantism and bullshit. If we're too self-conscious, we submerge into a quasi-masturbatory skepticism feigning as wisdom. There has to be a balance between the two extremes of rationalism and empiricism. Which I suspect

↪apokrisis

would label as pragmatism.

Hoo

↪darthbarracuda

If we're too self-confident, we might step beyond the limits of intelligibility and into the realm of obscurantism and bullshit. If we're too self-conscious, we submerge into a quasi-masturbatory skepticism feigning as wisdom. — darthbarracuda

Good points. Both of these point together toward a self-consciously pursued ideal of staying within the limits of intelligibility. I remember being younger and having a hunch that a certain phrase was profound and then repeating it without being able to paraphrase it or really master it. So I was passing on a string of marks/noises that "felt" valuable without having a strong grip on them. But at some point I started holding myself to a higher standard. Even today, though, there may be an inescapable "fuzz" on philosophical/analogical thinking. But one is (or strives to be) always ready to paraphrase.

Yes, pragmatism does tend to reject "quasi-masturbatory skepticism" as I understand it. Genuine inquiry is driven by genuine doubt. Differences that make no difference in life are set aside as word-games, terminological disputes. (Of course metaphysicians get attached to their favored terms, so there is some difference even here in emotional life. Hence the difference involved is implicit worldly or "trans-philosophical.")

apokrisis

Because of the focus on transcendence, it seems to stand that the "subject matter" (if that is even applicable) of metaphysics is ultimately outside the domain of experimentation. Experimentation occurs within immanence, where things change and events happen. But the transcendent doesn't change. Events happen, but event does not. Things change, but thing and change itself do not. Because of the lack of change or occurrence in the transcendent, there cannot be any manipulative experimentation in the sense of "taking control of nature", because if we could take control of the transcendent, this would only necessitate the existence of another, true transcendent. — darthbarracuda

Note that metaphysical intelligibility depends on the duo of the (transcendently) general and (immanently) particular. So it is not really any different from scientific reasoning in employing an epistemic method of theory and measurement, or a modelling relation.

So if we talk about the generality of things as "substantial being", then we support such a claim by offering examples of things that seem "measurably" substantial, like a horse or a cup. Our transcendent concepts are empirically argued using examples. They arise as the inductive limits of what seems immanently to be the case.

Where metaphysics goes further is in apply dialectical or dichotomistic reasoning to generality itself. It derives polar pairs of limits to frame its talk about possibility.

So the world seems full of things that either are changing a lot or not changing much if at all. Or the world seems full of things that are accidental happenings, or at least accidental until we discover reasons why they had to have occurred. From that empirical evidence, we can then generalise towards the complementary limits of what might be the case.

We can argue - with logical rigour - that either flux or stasis, either chance or necessity, are the limits of possibility. And in being able to name the bounds of possibility, we are talking about the reality of the transcendent - that is, the limits where reality in fact has gone as far as it can possibly go.

So the transcendent, the abstract, doesn't in fact exist. Or it exists only in the sense of being a limit on immanence.

The secret of metaphysics is thus that it does not just generalise. It generalises in this particular way - dialectically or dichotomistically - to identify the fundamental categories of existence.

Then science has another trick up its sleeve. It turns the empirical into a matter of measurement. It now turns the world into a play of numbers. Transcendence is brought down to the level of the confirming particulars.

If horse or cup now denotes a substantial quality, science turns instances of "horse" or "cup" into acts of quantification. Or more generally, if existence is poised between complementary bounds like chance and necessity, stasis and flux, science is about measuring the position of particular things in terms of the relative distance to those global bounds.

So science is in the business of micro-transcendence. It turns the fine detail of immanent reality into an "externalised" pattern of numbers.

And so generally we are stuck in an immanent reality. But we manufacture a transcendental point of view by establishing bounding limits both "looking upwards" and also "looking downwards". Looking upwards, we see metaphysical generality. Looking downwards, we then turn the micro view into patterns of numbers - digits read off measuring instruments.

So if this is the way metaphysics has worked out - first learning how to look upwards to generality, then downwards to particularity - might not the same apply to all philosophical disciplines?

Either it should. Or else maybe metaphysics is a different game for good reason. And both answers would be uncomfortable for those other philosophical disciplines.

Barry Etheridge

This is one idea that has troubled me for some time - what is the subject matter of philosophy? — darthbarracuda

You worry too much and should definitely get out more!

What does a philosopher study? — darthbarracuda

Other philosophers mostly!

_db

Our transcendent concepts are empirically argued using examples. They arise as the inductive limits of what seems immanently to be the case. — apokrisis

Yes, this, very much. This is a big part of what I was getting at: while the rest of science can easily point to what they study, the metaphysician has to use analogies and examples, because what they study is not the particular. I can't just open my desk drawer and pull out a natural kind by-itself, or a property by-itself, or causation by-itself. I can't study the nature of tropes under a microscope, only infer their existence. This is one of the reasons I'm skeptical of particular-favoring nominalism, for particulars are only understandable within a broader general context.

Where metaphysics goes further is in apply dialectical or dichotomistic reasoning to generality itself. It derives polar pairs of limits to frame its talk about possibility. — apokrisis

I don't know what this means. Do you have any examples?

We can argue - with logical rigour - that either flux or stasis, either chance or necessity, are the limits of possibility. And in being able to name the bounds of possibility, we are talking about the reality of the transcendent - that is, the limits where reality in fact has gone as far as it can possibly go. — apokrisis

But this begs the question as to why reality is constrained as it is. Which leads us to the conclusion that there is something keeping it all in line, something fundamentally static, that acts as the joints or structure of reality. A television screen can only produce certain colors on its display - but there is a structure behind this television that we never get to see that doesn't change, isn't constrained in the way the screen is. And so we can disassemble the television and see what's going on, however in the case of metaphysics we can't do this because we are fundamentally part of the world, which would requires a disassembly of the disassembler, which conceptually and dare I say logically is impossible.

Then science has another trick up its sleeve. It turns the empirical into a matter of measurement. It now turns the world into a play of numbers. Transcendence is brought down to the level of the confirming particulars. — apokrisis

Platonism?

And so generally we are stuck in an immanent reality. But we manufacture a transcendental point of view by establishing bounding limits both "looking upwards" and also "looking downwards". Looking upwards, we see metaphysical generality. Looking downwards, we then turn the micro view into patterns of numbers - digits read off measuring instruments. — apokrisis

I would argue that objects exists everywhere, at any scale, micro to massive. The objects have parts, sure, but they are nevertheless objects, whatever you take objects to be. Certainly a human being is not a transcendent component of existence unless you're an idealists, and certainly we aren't "just" numbers that magically turn into matter. We ourselves exist in our own level, dependent but not identical to these other hierarchies.

apokrisis

This is one of the reasons I'm skeptical of particular-favoring nominalism, for particulars are only understandable within a broader general context. — darthbarracuda

Yes, I am against nominalism because it is only "micro-transcendence" in this fashion. To name a particular or an individual is just as much an act of naming (or semiosis) as to name a general or universal. It is to imagine standing outside the thing in question - a horse, a mountain, a whatever - and to know it for what it absolutely is in terms of some wider framing context.

I don't know what this means. Do you have any examples? — darthbarracuda

Are you kidding? Discrete~continuous, chance~necessity, local~global, atom~void, matter~form, body~mind, flux~stasis, vague~crisp ... the standard list is pretty long.

But this begs the question as to why reality is constrained as it is. Which leads us to the conclusion that there is something keeping it all in line, something fundamentally static, that acts as the joints or structure of reality — darthbarracuda

It answers the question in terms of the emergence of a dynamical symmetry state, an equilibrium balance. An equilibrium has emergent stability because it is a state where continuing (microstate)change no longer makes a (macrostate)change.

There is an entire science of (thermo)dynamics now.

I would argue that objects exists everywhere, at any scale, micro to massive. — darthbarracuda

And so do voids.

So yes, that is what happens when you have complementary limits to being coupled then to the freedom for all balances to be struck within those limits.

So if the universe has the possibility to be clumpy and object like, this requires in matching fashion that it has the possibility for empty spaces. Each possibility necessitates the other. And then if this dichotomy is freely expressed over all scales, then you will have objects and voids of every possible size.

Hence the commonness of fractals or scalefree patterns in nature. Nature expresses this principle - of separation and mixing - everywhere we look.

Certainly a human being is not a transcendent component of existence unless you're an idealists, and certainly we aren't "just" numbers that magically turn into matter. We ourselves exist in our own level, dependent but not identical to these other hierarchies. — darthbarracuda

The natural view of humans is that we are peak complexity. And this can be measured directly in terms of entropy production, as should be the case if existence is ruled by the second law of thermodynamics.

So humans - as negentropy - can be reduced to a number such as the number of barrels of petroleum burned per capita, an entropic footprint.

The Universe is composed of objects and voids - or entropy producers and entropy sinks. And humans are measurably the most concentrated forms of intelligence. Or in other words, the most effective local sources of entropy production our corner of the Universe at least has witnessed.

(So if we ask what the subject matter of philosophy essentially is - even if it is only now becoming apparent - then it is thermodynamics. :) )

_db

It answers the question in terms of the emergence of a dynamical symmetry state, an equilibrium balance. An equilibrium has emergent stability because it is a state where continuing (microstate)change no longer makes a (macrostate)change.

There is an entire science of (thermo)dynamics now. — apokrisis

Emergence from what? poof! existence, ta-da!

So if the universe has the possibility to be clumpy and object like, this requires in matching fashion that it has the possibility for empty spaces. Each possibility necessitates the other. And then if this dichotomy is freely expressed over all scales, then you will have objects and voids of every possible size. — apokrisis

Objects need not be "clumpy" to be objects. Again this depends on what you consider to be objects. Voids can be objects, since we can predicate them.

And humans are measurably the most concentrated forms of intelligence. — apokrisis

How do you know this?

(So if we ask what the subject matter of philosophy essentially is - even if it is only now becoming apparent - then it is thermodynamics. :) ) — apokrisis

I mean I know this was more tongue-in-cheek than anything but if that's the case then everything is thermodynamics which makes it an empty term.

apokrisis

Emergence from what? poof! existence, ta-da! — darthbarracuda

Is there no evidence in the world of emergence?

Voids can be objects, since we can predicate them. — darthbarracuda

On what exactly - their lack of predicates?

How do you know this? — darthbarracuda

Neuroscience when it comes to measuring information density. Economics when it comes to measuring ecological footprint.

I mean I know this was more tongue-in-cheek than anything but if that's the case then everything is thermodynamics which makes it an empty term — darthbarracuda

Actually I'm serious. And thermodynamics is a rich enough model of causality to unify our notion of the world.

Don't forget that is how metaphysics started - Anaximander's model of existence as the separation of the Apeiron into the hot and the cold. And now cosmological science understands our existence in terms of a Big Bang making the transition to a Heat Death.

_db

Is there no evidence in the world of emergence? — apokrisis

I don't see what you're saying here. I agree there are emergent phenomenon, but these nevertheless are dependent upon a more basic ontological level. They supervene on it. You can't drive to work without a car, you can't have an object without brute facts behind it. Somewhere along the line is the primitive that does all the metaphysical work.

On what exactly - their lack of predicates? — apokrisis

Well, yes. An object isn't just something that we can hold in our hands. Black holes, parasites, staplers and armies are all objects. They all act as a subject of a predicative statement. Had they had no properties then we wouldn't be able to predicate them. This is the fun little "hole" problem all over again - do holes exists or are they just the lack of something else?

Neuroscience when it comes to measuring information density. Economics when it comes to measuring ecological footprint. — apokrisis

But surely you're not going to limit yourself to the immediately-accessible (Earth). That's just bad science. Unless there's a good reason to believe that humans are as good as information processing can get - in which case the AI dream is a pipe dream.

apokrisis

I don't see what you're saying here. I agree there are emergent phenomenon, but these nevertheless are dependent upon a more basic ontological level. — darthbarracuda

Isn't that what they say about quantum mechanics? You can't conjure up reality out of pure possibility?

You are wedded to ontic principles that are already defunct by 100 years.

An object isn't just something that we can hold in our hands. Black holes, parasites, staplers and armies are all objects. — darthbarracuda

Glad to know you have such a loose definition of objects. The vaguer your position, the less it can be challenged.

But surely you're not going to limit yourself to the immediately-accessible (Earth). That's just bad science. Unless there's a good reason to believe that humans are as good as information processing can get - in which case the AI dream is a pipe dream. — darthbarracuda

Well there are certainly good reasons to think AI a pipe dream. Just as there are good grounds for saying something about the biophysical constraints on life or intelligence as they would exist everywhere in the Universe.

But I'm not sure why you are making a meal of this. Even a crude measure of complexity - like the integrative capacity represented by a trillion synaptic connections inside the typical skull - would show Homo sap to be at the edge of the envelope.

You can talk about other animals with larger brains, but the encephalisation quotient is what counts to comparative neurobiology in putting us at the top of nature's tree.

And you could say the universe must be full of entities with higher IQs. But we can say if they are in the vicinity, they're not waving back. (Just picking up the occasional country hick for a good probe.)

_db

Isn't that what they say about quantum mechanics? You can't conjure up reality out of pure possibility? — apokrisis

I never said that. I said that there has to be some sort of hypostasis, the Aristotelian Being of Pure Actuality, for something to appear. "Nothing" is incoherent.

Glad to know you have such a loose definition of objects. The vaguer your position, the less it can be challenged. — apokrisis

Or, I had a very general definition of objects. Remember that I never made any ontological realist claims about objects. I'm actually in favor of mereological nihilism.

And you could say the universe must be full of entities with higher IQs. But we can say if they are in the vicinity, they're not waving back. (Just picking up the occasional country hick for a good probe.) — apokrisis

Probably cause other planets are really freaking far away and it's highly unlikely we'll ever be able to differentiate between natural stellar radiation and intelligent communication.

apokrisis

"Nothing" is incoherent. — darthbarracuda

But how many times have I said that and spelt out the alternative - that constraints emerge to regulate a chaotic everythingness?

kenhinds

↪apokrisis

Almost speaking ina conundrum or paradoxal thought

_db

↪apokrisis

And what is this everythingness other than pure possibility, what you just denied was the case? What is everythingness?

Moliere

A thought I've been favoring of late is that philosophy is the attempt to lessen human stupidity in all its forms. Since human stupidity is pervasive -- excluding no one person -- we see philosophy addressing it in many various topics. And in the usual history given in western philosophy we see that it was born not of wonder as much as a cure to superstition, to unjust political systems, to a lack of scientific knowledge, to a lack of an understanding of our human souls. . . (or, at least, these are particular ways of interpreting the ancients within this mold)

So it's not entirely unfair to characterize philosophy in this manner, either.

The consequent of this idea would be that philosophy's subject matter is actual human stupidity.

apokrisis

What is everythingness? — darthbarracuda

Are you just going to run round in circles never listening?

We agree nothing can't come from nothing. Which is why I support metaphysical positions which argue existence arises via the constraint of pure potentiality, called variously apeiron, tao, vagueness, firstness, indeterminacy, quantum foam, etc, depending on whose metaphysical system it is. And chaotic everythingness is another attempt at a descriptive term for the same idea.

To help you out, this is one of the many other times I've explained the exact same thing to you in detail....

http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/15094#Post_15094

Wayfarer

Philosophy is neither religion nor science. It drops you at the border.

Incidentally, I differ with the first line in the OP

Existence (metaphysics)

These terms are not interchangeable. Whether what is real and what exists are the same is itself a question for metaphysics. For example, are there 'real possibilities?' Are the real numbers real, and in what sense? These are metaphysical questions, but they're not necessarily about 'what exists'. They're about what the term 'existence' means, and whether they apply to such concepts.

apokrisis

I guess that what causes confusion here the is notion that this 'ur-stuff' is called at the same time 'material' and 'pure potentiality'. Usually, we refer to the 'potential' and the 'actual as opposites and we tend to consider all material stuff actual, not potential (even if they inherently have the potential to become something else). So, in this view, the unstructured primal material cannot be said to be (just) 'pure potentiality'. We might say that it is actually something (something formless) and potentially something else (something structured)? — Πετροκότσυφας

I agree this is difficult conceptually. But the key is not to cling to the notion of "stuff". There is neither structure (ie: form) nor matter in this primal state. Instead, the claim is that both material degrees of freedom and global regulative constraints emerge together in mutual co-dependence (to use the Buddhist term now).

The argument for this is logical. We start with what exists - substantial being. And this substantial being has formal and material cause. It is in some global state of organisation or regulation. And it is also composed of equally definite "stuff". It is made of particles or - in modern physics - local degrees of freedom.

So what are we left with if we reverse the emergence process that could produce this kind of substantial organisation? Well both the formal cause and the material cause must melt back together into an ur-state where neither (definitely) exists, but each potentially could be actualised as a division of the ur-state - a symmetry-breaking of its symmetry.

It's all a bit like trying to imagine the grin of the Cheshire Cat. But it is logical in that it imputes to the primal state exactly that which is known to emerge out of it in complementary fashion. So if the substantial world is definite constraints in interaction with definite degrees of freedom, then the insubstantial origins of this world is the potential for both these things - and therefore beyond any kind of material state, or pre-stuff.

Whatever else, both form and matter are equally dissolved in being returned back to the ur-state. There is nothing ur-material to be unformed, as opposed to in-formed or structured.

It sounds weird but it fits with modern physics. If you are talking quantum field theory, you have the same chicken and egg issue. Which comes first, the excitation or the field? Each reveals the existence of the other. So what then came "before"?

apokrisis

↪Πετροκότσυφας

So what do you understand by the term "matter" then? What kind of thing do you believe it to be exactly?

_db

We agree nothing can't come from nothing. Which is why I support metaphysical positions which argue existence arises via the constraint of pure potentiality, called variously apeiron, tao, vagueness, firstness, indeterminacy, quantum foam, etc, depending on whose metaphysical system it is. And chaotic everythingness is another attempt at a descriptive term for the same idea. — apokrisis

But you're being inconsistent with your use of "existence". You said that nothing can't come from nothing, and yet say that a constraint of pure potentially is where existence comes from, but pure potentiality obviously exists for us to predicate it, so are there different kinds of existence to you, or are you just talking about the particularization of the general, i.e. a transformation of something that already exists? If the latter, then the apeiron is not where existence comes from, it's where particulars come from.

apokrisis

But you're being inconsistent with your use of "existence". — darthbarracuda

I am contrasting vague existence with crisp existence. Or in fact talking now about the development of persistence.

So yes, I have to use your language in an attempt to communicate. We can agree roughly on the metaphysical image of what it is "to exist" - with the useful apparatus of predication that flows from that, along with also the Parmidean implications of eternalism and other issues which are the consequent paradoxes of "existence".

But then - way over here in a different metaphysical space that holism and organicism calls home - there is another image of emergent self-regulation, a world where everything is founded on flux and develops persisting stability. That image of being has its own language.

What is the subject matter of philosophy?

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