lol--so it's my problem "not being able to read" when it was a typo.

Meaning is not independent of its idea. When I have an idea about something, be it a state, a mathematical relationship or an ethical significance, it constitutes the meaning in question. I'm not talking about an idea leading to an idea. There is no step of deriving my idea and its meaning from something else.

I'm talking about the presence of a describing idea itself.

Whatever idea/meaning I'm using to describe is reporting something independent me me or has some genuine relationship to doing so (in the case of false claims, the idea/meaning I have does not reflect what is independent of me).

Meaning is not independent of its idea. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yeah, just ignore all of that stuff that I wrote in the last post addressed to you.

I'm talking about the presence of a describing idea itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

And you have to be kidding with crap like that. The whole post really. I can pick it apart, but what good is that going to do us? You're still going to keep writing like that.

No, your problem is that you don't argue in good faith. You still haven't directly answered the questions I asked. You're an insincere time-waster, Terrapin; you have nothing intelligent to say, all you practice and all you warrant is ignore-ance. :vomit:

I wasn't ignoring it. My point was it didn't apply: I wasn't trying to describe stepping from one idea to other.

I was talking about is what having an idea constitutes itself, and how this relates to meaning of our ideas and the outside world.

No, your problem is that you don't argue in good faith. You still haven't directly answered the questions I asked. — Janus

You're asking me if the interpretations are more or less correct. I said, "No, they're not more or less correct."

Are you saying that you're asking me:

(a) are they more correct?

or

(b) are they less correct?

Where I'm only allowed to choose (a) or (b)?

If so, my response is that "correct" is a category error here.

Is arguing in "good faith" only saying things that you think I should say/that you're comfortable with, even if you don't agree with it? If I believe that "correct/incorrect" is a category error here, what am I supposed to answer? Am I supposed to give an answer that I don't at all agree with, just because that's the answer you'll be comfortable with?

I was talking about is what having an idea constitutes itself, — TheWillowOfDarkness

Phrases like "what having an idea constitutes itself" do not make any grammatical sense to me. So I don't know what to do with that.

Aside from that, we can just discuss whatever you'd like to discuss and forget about the earlier stuff, but try to write less "continentally" if you can or I'm just going to be stumped at most of it (in which case I won't be able to discuss much).

I'd say that is untrue: there is always a causal connection between the original work of Shakespeare and any copy of it. In any case I don't see the relevance to the present argument. — Janus

We know there is a material difference between an intentionally produced object and one that is not intentionally produced; and that difference consists in the neural and perhaps physiological activity that gave rise to the one and not the other. — Janus

It seems to me that, like @Isaac, you now identify the meaning the text objectively has with a meaning that the text was, at some point in the past, assigned by the writer. You treat the causal chain that lead to the text as a property of the text. That is not accurate though.

Assuming a material, causal universe it makes sense to treat the past as a material property, since all past states are embodied in the current state. However, that is a property of the universe in it's entirety. The current state of the universe includes it's past state, including the brain states of writers, but it does so only by virtue of including, by definition, every effect of every event.

This is not true for the text itself. The text does not include all past States leading to it's creation. If it did, it would have to include all information on the universe going back indefinitely. The text is a partial effect of the past state that includes some information, but not all. You therefore have to explain how "the intention for the text to mean X", as a mental state, is represented by a brain state and this brain state is then fully represented by the text.

And for that, we need to identify a property of the text at present that carries that information.

By the way: I am not getting notifications for your replies for some reason.

No, the thought experiment is not significant because such a thing has never happened and never will happen. — Janus

You cannot possibly know that it never will happen.

In practice we can always tell the difference between human-made and naturally occurring objects. If you disagree perhaps you can provide a counterexample. — Janus

I cannot tell the difference between stone age tools and stones chipped by chance, at least not with high certainty.

But if we limit ourselves to texts: it's a truism that everything we identify as a human text must be possible to identify as a human text. There is no telling whether we have correctly identified all human symbols from the past. Perhaps some old scribbles that look like art to us are really text? And there are things like the Voynich manuscript.

Anyways I don't claim that humans cannot identify human texts. I am saying we identify them by running them through our specifically human pattern recognition hardware. We figure out what texts say by imagining ourselves as the author of the text and using the result as the "meaning of the text". But that meaning never traveled from the text into our brains, because how would that even work?

It seems to me that, like Isaac, you now identify the meaning the text objectively has with a meaning that the text was, at some point in the past, assigned by the writer. You treat the causal chain that lead to the text as a property of the text. — Echarmion

I don't know about @Janus, but this is not an accurate paraphrasing of my position. What I'm saying is that the meaning of a word is not what the author intended it to mean, it is what the word is used for. When we say a tool "is used for" some task, we are not expecting it to actually be in such use at the time, it is an historical fact about that tool and yet we speak quite plainly of it as a property of the tool. I don't see any difference with the pattern of ink-marks we call a written word. If it was, at one time, used for a certain task, then such a history is a property of that word. Given that its use is its meaning, then its meaning is a property of that word. The same way its use for driving nails is a property of the hammer, its tendency to emit beta radiation is a property of Carbon-14... Past events and future potential are quite unproblematically spoken of as properties of the objects.

I don't know about Janus, but this is not an accurate paraphrasing of my position. What I'm saying is that the meaning of a word is not what the author intended it to mean, it is what the word is used for. — Isaac

Whether you use a past intent or a past use, the argument stays the same. The history of an object is not necessarily a property of the object, for the reasons stated.

When we say a tool "is used for" some task, we are not expecting it to actually be in such use at the time, it is an historical fact about that tool and yet we speak quite plainly of it as a property of the tool. I don't see any difference with the pattern of ink-marks we call a written word. If it was, at one time, used for a certain task, then such a history is a property of that word. Given that its use is its meaning, then its meaning is a property of that word. The same way its use for driving nails is a property of the hammer, its tendency to emit beta radiation is a property of Carbon-14... Past events and future potential are quite unproblematically spoken of as properties of the objects. — Isaac

This line of argument seems circular to me. You take a possible statement about an object "this object is used for X" and interpret this statement to mean that the (past and present) usage of the object is a property of the object. You then use this interpretation to prove that the interpretation is correct.

You're assuming the thoughts behind the statement and then you're further claiming that because people think this way, this is how things actually are. None of these steps really follow though.

The (historical) use of a tool is also not the same as the instability of certain configurations of protons, neutrons and electrons. That instability is a property of the atom whether or not that atom is currently decayed.

You then use this interpretation to prove that the interpretation is correct. — Echarmion

I never said "correct". What possible measure of "correct" could we be using here? Against which table of answers are we comparing ours to check if it's right? I said "unproblematic".

you're further claiming that because people think this way, this is how things actually are. — Echarmion

As above, I never said "... actually are", and as above, if you're interested in getting at how things "actually are" what are you going to use to see how close you've got?

The (historical) use of a tool is also not the same as the instability of certain configurations of protons, neutrons and electrons. That instability is a property of the atom whether or not that atom is currently decayed. — Echarmion

But we don't talk about the instability of the configuration of protons and neutrons. We talk about the emission of beta radiation. We don't say that a property of Carbon-14 is that its neutrons are arranged in such-and-such a way, we say that it is radioactive, meaning, quite clearly, that it emits (in this case) beta radiation.

Assuming a material, causal universe it makes sense to treat the past as a material property, since all past states are embodied in the current state. However, that is a property of the universe in it's entirety. The current state of the universe includes it's past state, including the brain states of writers, but it does so only by virtue of including, by definition, every effect of every event. — Echarmion

That probably doesn't amount to something different than what I'd say, but I'd avoid phrasing it as "the past being embodied" etc. What's embodied is evidence of past states (which just amounts to present properties which are the effects of and from which we can deduce past states), but not literally the past itself.

In any event, the more important point is that "culture A used x to refer to y" doesn't make x refer to y outside of that particular historical context. But S would say that x refers to y (historical) context-independently.

Also, I wouldn't call the above meaning.

But we don't talk about the instability of the configuration of protons and neutrons. We talk about the emission of beta radiation. We don't say that a property of Carbon-14 is that its neutrons are arranged in such-and-such a way, we say that it is radioactive, meaning, quite clearly, that it emits (in this case) beta radiation. — Isaac

A common definition of "radioactive" is "emitting or relating to the emission of ionizing radiation or particles," but in any event, that issue had nothing to do with meaning.

A common definition of "radioactive" is "emitting or relating to the emission of ionizing radiation or particles," but in any event, that issue had nothing to do with meaning. — Terrapin Station

It does if you'd make the least effort to follow my line of argument instead of just dismissing as irrelevant anything which you cannot, after barely a minute's thought, see the relevance of.

The point is that radioactive is talked about as a property of Carbon-14, yet, as your definition demonstrates, it does not directly refer to anything about the atom which is currently the case. It refers to a property of the atom which is the case only once every 5,700 years. That is, its emission of a particle of beta radiation.

The point is that radioactive is talked about as a property of Carbon-14, yet, as your definition demonstrates, it does not directly refer to anything about the atom which is currently the case. It refers to a property of the atom which is the case only once every 5,700 years. That is, its emission of a particle of beta radiation. — Isaac

Tell me what this has to do with meaning, and if I think you've made a good case for that, we'll talk about it in this rather than in another thread.

I never said "correct". What possible measure of "correct" could we be using here? Against which table of answers are we comparing ours to check if it's right? I said "unproblematic". — Isaac

As above, I never said "... actually are", and as above, if you're interested in getting at how things "actually are" what are you going to use to see how close you've got — Isaac

Presumably, you are making a case for meaning to be objective and using the "unproblematic" use of language as an argument. If that's not what you're doing, then what were you trying to say?

But we don't talk about the instability of the configuration of protons and neutrons. We talk about the emission of beta radiation. We don't say that a property of Carbon-14 is that its neutrons are arranged in such-and-such a way, we say that it is radioactive, meaning, quite clearly, that it emits (in this case) beta radiation. — Isaac

Yes, but when we say a substance is "radioactive", we do not mean to say that every single atom is at this exact point in time decaying and emitting radiation. We treat "radioactive" as a property of the substance because it's atoms are unstable, not because the substance is used to produce radiation.

This splitting hairs over the exact meaning of common phrases is precisely why arguments from "ordinary language" don't work.

The meaning of a word is the use it is put to (I haven't yet argued for this yet, arguments in favour are relatively common).

The use something is put to does not need to be a present, currently occurring use, but can be a part of its history (my argument about the way in which we say a hammer is used to drive nails even if it is not currently being used that way) .

The non-present, history (or future potential) of an object is unproblematically referred to as a property of that object (my argument about Carbon-14).

So, the meaning of a word (the use it has been put to in its history) can be unproblematically seen as a property of the word.

Presumably, you are making a case for meaning to be objective and using the "unproblematic" use of language as an argument. — Echarmion

Yes, you could say that. I'd more emphasise that I'm making the case for there being no purpose behind arguments to the contrary because there is no problem to solve by them.

Yes, but when we say a substance is "radioactive", we do not mean to say that every single atom is at this exact point in time decaying and emitting radiation. We treat "radioactive" as a property of the substance because it's atoms are unstable, not because the substance is used to produce radiation. — Echarmion

Exactly my point (except the last bit about utility). The object (Carbon-14) does not have to actually currently be emitting beta particles in order to have the property of being radioactive, even though radioactive means "emits particles of radiation". It is sufficient that it did emit such particles and that it could do again in the future.

So, with a word. If it did once cause a particular reaction in language users when spoken, then that is sufficient to say that the ability to cause such a reaction is a property of the word.

Okay, that makes sense at least with respect to why you've been pursuing the angles you've been pursuing, but the problem is that I don't agree with any of it, starting with the old "meaning is use" idea.

We could say that the meaning of x to S is determined by the way S "uses" x, but that would have to amount to us saying that the use we're talking about is the specific associative way that S thinks about x, and we could say just as well that "meaning is thought." That would be as accurate/ inaccurate, detailed/not detailed, in a similar way, to "meaning is use."

Aside from that, "meaning is use" has some merit as a bumper sticker slogan in that we pay a lot of attention to behavior, context, etc. when we assign meanings to other persons' utterances, and that can influence our own meanings.

Yeah, I thought you might not agree with that bit, but perhaps the whole argument about meaning as use is best given its own thread. Perhaps we should shelve that for now and concede that it is a block to agreement here.

The other aspects of disagreement might be fruitful in their own right, but again, without conceding to meaning as use, they don't alone argue for anything related to the OP.

I think if your position is that meaning is a private subjective sensation, however, there is still (to my mind) the question of whether the ability to cause such sensations in language users is a property of the word, as per the ability of Carbon-14 to produce beta particles, or the ability of a blue cup to cause correctly calibrated spectrometers to register 'blue'. But that may be a different argument to the one set out in the OP here.

I think if your position is that meaning is a private subjective sensation, however, there is still (to my mind) the question of whether the ability to cause such sensations in language users is a property of the word, as per the ability of Carbon-14 to produce beta particles, or the ability of a blue cup to cause correctly calibrated spectrometers to register 'blue'. But that may be a different argument to the one set out in the OP here. — Isaac

Yeah this is basically the same conversation as the other thread now. ;-)

At any rate, meaning, on my view, is the associative act that we're performing. I wouldn't say that external things cause that associative act . . . the associative act is in response to external things often, and we could say that they catalyze it, but I wouldn't say they cause it, because you could easily expose someone to a cup or whatever and they might not perform the associative act at all.

I wouldn't say that external things cause that associative act . . . the associative act is in response to external things often, and we could say that they catalyze it, but I wouldn't say they cause it, because you could easily expose someone to a cup or whatever and they might not perform the associative act at all. — Terrapin Station

I guess that's what I was trying to get at with the incorrectly calibrated spectrometer. There's still some other chain of events which have to all be in place on order for the spectrometer to record 'blue' as a consequence of what the light waves reflected from the cup do to it.

How would you describe the colour of the cup when in the depths of space? Is it blue because /if/ white light hit it it /would/ reflect back blue? Doesn't that, and the above, fall foul of your restriction the the response must be the same each time for it to count as a property of the object?

I guess that's what I was trying to get at with the incorrectly calibrated spectrometer. There's still some other chain of events which have to all be in place on order for the spectrometer to record 'blue' as a consequence of what the light waves reflected from the cup do to it. — Isaac

To record blue, sure. x having property F is a different thing than D recording that x has property F.

fall foul of your restriction the the response must be the same each time for it to count as a property of the object? — Isaac

We're really having a communication problem if you believe that I said anything at all like that.

What I said was that I don't buy that potentials are real, except as a manner of speaking about something not being impossible. Potentials are not existent >>whatevers<< that somehow obtain as something not actualized. Potentials are the fact that (a) it's not impossible for x to be in state S, and (b) the properties of x make it more likely that x will be in state S in the future than other possible states.

Again, this stuff, on my view, has zilch to do with the thread topic, though.

It seems to me that, like Isaac, you now identify the meaning the text objectively has with a meaning that the text was, at some point in the past, assigned by the writer. — Echarmion

I would say that a text, insofar as its author created it for some reason, embodies something of the intentions of its author. A text also possesses intentionality in the phenomenological sense that it is about something. But all texts can be transliterated or paraphrased in various ways which can yield a number of more or less different interpretations. The so-called "literal" meaning of an ancient text, as is the case with a modern text, will be detremined by the common use of the icons, symbols, words, phrases, and so on, in the culture in which it was created.

The text does not include all past States leading to it's creation. If it did, it would have to include all information on the universe going back indefinitely. — Echarmion

I haven't said a text "includes" all past states leading to its creation. What does "include" even mean here? The text is the result of all past states leading to its creation. Each instantiation of a text is thus unique, but all reproductions of an original text are obviously causally connected to the original. .

...meaning is a mental activity... — Terrapin Station

And if you cling to that and don't step outside of it, even for just a second, then we won't get anywhere. It's a dead end.

I know that you were directing these questions at Terrapin and his crazy views, but I'll give you the right answers.

So where is the fact that the hammer was used to hit nails? — Isaac

The question doesn't make sense.

If humans capable of recollecting the fact ceased to exist would it cease to be the case that the hammer was used to hit nails? — Isaac

No.

Meaning isn't a property of objects like hammers. Meaning is a mental activity that we engage in.
— Terrapin Station

Unless I've missed something, I thought that was the topic of this thread, merely asserting it does nothing to progress the discussion. — Isaac

Indeed!

The disagreement with S isn't at all about "The word 'dog' WAS used to refer to dogs." It's not about something historical.

The disagreement with S is that in S's view, the word dog has a meaning--not past tense, but present tense--at time T2, even if no persons exist at time T2. He's not saying something about how the word was used there. He's saying that the word has a meaning at T2, which is a correct meaning at T2 (not a correct meaning about or in the context of T1, where we're simply reporting usage at a past time). — Terrapin Station

It's partly about something historical, and that part is important. If it weren't for that, then it wouldn't have meaning.

The big difference between us, which you've made more explicit in your last few posts, is that I don't just trivially define meaning in a way which necessitates a subject, whereas you do.

he big difference between us, which you've made more explicit in your last few posts, is that I don't just trivially define meaning in a way which necessitates a subject, whereas you do. — S

Meaning doesn't require a subject due to a definition. The realization that it requires a subject is the result of an ontological investigation/analysis.