considering the exchanges Ive seen between the more prolific posters.
In other words, I cannot tell if he was joking or not because it might actually be a case someone could make. — DingoJones

Fair point. Some of them are a bit borderline hebephrenic.

You restore my sanity. — S

I think it unlikely either of us are fully sane. We do afterall continue to post as if our words might actually be taken account of, despite the evidence to the contrary. You know what they say about the definition of insanity...

In a rational system, judgement is nothing more than the faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense, from which an external object is cognized without contradiction, and is called experience.

In a moral system, which is rational but with different means and ends, employment of the faculty of judgement responsible for uniting a freely determined law with a willful volition, from which an act is cognized as good, and is called morality.

Need be no more complicated than that. — Mww

I would not boast about not understanding this bit of text; it would be nothing to boast about. Can it be, S., Isaac, Dingo, that you really do not understand it?

Had to look that one up lol
“hebephrenic“. Good to know.

Why did you include me in that? Did I say something about it and forget?
Anyway, there is a simple point in amongst the run on string of thinly veiled attempts to sound intelligent, but its not very interesting. You are easily impressed.

I would not boast about not understanding this bit of text; it would be nothing to boast about. Can it be, S., Isaac, Dingo, that you really do not understand it? — tim wood

"These new clothes look wonderful!" exclaimed the emperor.

And then a child called out from the crowd, "But he's wearing nothing at all!".

And Tim Wood asked of the child, "Can it be, child, that you really do not appreciate the splendid wonder of the emperor's new clothes?".

You think, with a handful of exceptions, that this board is full of people with reading and learning deficiencies? — DingoJones

:wink:

How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best? — creativesoul

Which what? Law? Little bit experience, little bit heredity, little bit personality, whatever the moral agent thinks best for him. Subjective moral relativism; the moral consequences can be taught, the moral choices available to make can be taught. The actual choices made cannot be taught, for they are made in the moment.

Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself? — creativesoul

No. Yes. (Ok...only partly)

Humor me, for comparative purposes. Besides, you’ve asked me to expound, and I did. Now I’m calling fair play.

So let's make a start. — Isaac

Nahhhh, let’s not. I don’t know how to write in English.

Well, you know what they say........mockery is the fool’s critique.

Why, thou sayest well. I do now remember a saying, 'The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.'

This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around. — creativesoul

I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which.

So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism?

Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent). — creativesoul

I agree with this answer. A promise could be both true and false in different senses. But we are still left with the issue about whether a promise, understood as a statement about what will come to pass, could be true or false now depending on whether or not it will come to pass, or whether it is only true or false when its coming to pass or not is decided. I think I favor the latter.

How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
— creativesoul

Which what? — Mww

Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.

Morality is codified rules about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Belief about those rules involves coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with them involves common language use. Belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is existentially dependent upon neither; thinking about morality, nor the language necessary to do so. — creativesoul

Coming to terms with them involves common language use
— creativesoul

Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules. — Mww

Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself?
— creativesoul

No. Yes. (Ok...only partly)

Humor me, for comparative purposes. Besides, you’ve asked me to expound, and I did. Now I’m calling fair play. — Mww

Well. There's much that I've set aside. One who understands Kant ought not have issue understanding what I'm arguing here. I mean, even the Everydayman understands that coming to terms with anything and/or everything that one can come to terms with involves common language use.

This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.
— creativesoul

I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which. — Janus

Well, I respect Russell tremendously. If what you say is true then he and I have different positions regarding what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. I'm fairly settled on the idea of correspondence to fact where facts are actual events; that which has happened; what has happened. There can be no such correspondence between a statement and that which has not happened. Prediction are about exactly that. They're complex 'forms' of expectation. All expectation is grounded upon thought/belief about what has happened, but expectation is always about what has not.

So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism?

Good question. Off the cuff, because that is a new line of thought for me, it seems it could be a consequence thereof. Not sure though.

I think predictions are about what has not happened. Being true requires corresponding to that which has. At least, that rendering seems to be working fairly well for me.

Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).
— creativesoul

I agree with this answer. A promise could be both true and false in different senses. — Janus

I grant the case you've made for it. I'm glad I followed it to your liking. I would not assent what you're saying here though, for reasons already given.

If this marks the end of this discussion, it also marks an appropriate time for giving thanks...

Cheers!

I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which.

So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism? — Janus

Yes, it seems so. And I reject that, being influenced in my thinking on such matters by Hume. And Russell himself made a point in agreement with Hume:

The turkey found that, on his first morning at the turkey farm, he was fed at 9 a.m. Being a good inductivist turkey he did not jump to conclusions. He waited until he collected a large number of observations that he was fed at 9 a.m. and made these observations under a wide range of circumstances, on Wednesdays, on Thursdays, on cold days, on warm days. Each day he added another observation statement to his list. Finally he was satisfied that he had collected a number of observation statements to inductively infer that “I am always fed at 9 a.m.”.

However on the morning of Christmas eve he was not fed but instead had his throat cut.

Well, you know what they say........mockery is the fool’s critique. — Mww

Well, you know what they say... A proverb is a crappy argument. (I don't think that one's going to catch on).

Well, you know what they say... A proverb is a crappy argument. (I don't think that one's going to catch on). — Isaac

:lol:

I would not boast about not understanding this bit of text; it would be nothing to boast about. Can it be, S., Isaac, Dingo, that you really do not understand it? — tim wood

Where did I say I didn't understand it? I mocked it for being vacuous, implied that there was no substance there to understand in the first place and called @Mww out on that. The issue of my actually being able to understand the words never arose.

How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
— creativesoul

Which what? — Mww


Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant. — creativesoul

Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree.

I'll start you off.

1. Murder... But what about wars... OK murder of innocents... But who qualifies as innocent... Murder of children then... Infanticide... Oh, how about murder of innocent children who are healthy... Damn, back to 'innocent' again... Right, this time I've got it, we're all universally opposed to the murder of healthy children... Slaves, indigenous genocides in the colonial era, 'shame' killings in Islam...

Perhaps we need to start smaller.

Everyone like puppies right....? (shit, don't they eat puppies in Indonesia?)

How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
— creativesoul

Which what? — Mww


Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
— creativesoul

Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree.

I'll start you off. — Isaac

Nah. You cannot start off explaining what I'm referring to by virtue of saying something remarkably different and then talking about that.

Not interested.

What... You mean I misinterpreted something you said? And you the master of erudite volubility. I feel such a fool!

Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree. — Isaac

No, no, no. You give him too much credit. He didn't even make that qualification. You know, it's the ones we all have. There's not a single person out of around 7.5 billion people who doesn't have them, apparently.

No, no, no. You give him too much credit. He didn't even make that qualification. You know, it's the ones we all have. — S

Ah yes, perhaps that is the "remarkably different" aspect I so carelessly introduced. If so, I look forward to hearing what Harold Shipman and I share with regards to our moral outlook. I think we both quite like crosswords... Maybe that's what he means.

even the Everydayman understands that coming to terms with anything and/or everything that one can come to terms with involves common language use. — creativesoul

Yeah, that seems to be all the rage these days, from Pinker, Fodor, Crane, even Dennett, fercryinoutloud....with this LOT theory. Language is far and away one of the more spectacular aspects of the human condition, and is certainly indispensable for general communication. But I don’t communicate with myself, and even granting something like modern versions of cognitive architecture, the theories leave much to be desired, and when push comes to shove, I find them no more satisfactory than good ol’ Enlightenment epistemological speculation. No one knows for sure how this stuff happens, but it does happen, so we are free to speculate as much as we want, within the confines of logical possibility.

If coming to terms with everything necessarily involves common language use, how did we come to terms with common language;
Nine times out of ten, there just isn’t time for common language use;
As a young human with limited experience, being informed of “2” does use common language, but he hasn’t come to terms with anything. He will use “2” by rote in expressions or operations that include it, but without any concept of quantity;
Specific task-oriented cognition uses imaging, not common language;
If I do use common language when I think to myself, maybe it is only because such would be absolutely necessary iff I were to then tell you about it. Maybe it’s merely a sub-conscious anticipation that I use common language in thinking *BECAUSE* it may be henceforth so communicated. Maybe, because I need language for you to understand me, I need language to understand myself;
What is happening in a deaf person’s head, who has no access to common language *use*. He is still a rational human, so it is logical to suppose he thinks as a rational human, which implies common language use is not necessary for *his* coming to terms with anything;
Given the human brain has innate capability for logical inference....somehow.....naturally.....and is equally representational....ditto....it stands to reason that common language use is merely what we say we’re doing when the underlying mechanics is at work. We’re not conscious of our basic cognitive faculties, so we insert what we know into the logical form of our mechanisms. But that doesn’t explain the how of knowing, which leaves room for speculative epistemological theory.

So, yes, coming to terms involves common language use, but that coming to terms doesn’t describe what exists a priori that needs coming to terms with.

Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant. — creativesoul

OK. Good place to start. To stipulate point of view invariant relegates experience to irrelevance because of the concept of invariant cancels it, but allows room for pure reason because of a point of view requires it. To stipulate the principle of universality implies that which every otherwise rational agency has naturally incorporated in his mental being. If we allow these the name of innate ideas or notions, we are naming something common to all humanity.

It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case. I can think there are some that should reside, that ought to reside, but I cannot have the knowledge that they do reside. If it is impossible to know a thing, and any supposition about it is the sole remainder, then it follows necessarily that any qualification as to its relative good is merely another supposition.

No supposition in and of itself can be proven to be the case. If all that exists with respect to point of view invariant universal moral beliefs is innate ideas, and the exposition of innate ideas are given from pure reason because experience is irrelevant here, and pure reason is itself a point of view with great variance amongst moral agencies, then we have contradicted the major premise.

There may be point of view invariant innate ideas of a universal moral beliefs, but we won’t ever indubitable conclude what they are. Even the relative worth of them is not point of view invariant, and I don’t see how we can say any of them should be without infringing on the the right of pure reason to testify for its respective owners.

I think it safe to say universally we are each moral agents, but the kind of moral agent we each are, is strictly a function of our own point of view. Still, we can without contradiction think a moral belief better or worse than some other moral belief, but only to ourselves, simply from the ones we each hold, but that serves no other universality than the “as if” of deontological doctrine.

Nevertheless, I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be, and how its relative benefit can be manifest.

That was hilarious, well done!