Not in physics. In physics a wave is a phenomenon that behaves in accordance with the wave equation. — andrewk
don't think physics provides any reason to doubt that the elementary particles (as described in the Standard Model) exist and have measurable physical properties just as everyday macroscopic objects do. — Andrew M
To complicate matters, the 'wave function' is, I believe, a misnomer. It's not a 'wave' in the way waves are understood either in physics or in everyday discussion. — andrewk
what does it mean for a physical system to be in a superposition of states given that it will always be measured in a definite state? — Andrew M
don't think physics provides any reason to doubt that the elementary particles (as described in the Standard Model) exist and have measurable physical properties just as everyday macroscopic objects do.
— Andrew M
I don't agree with this. I've spoken to physicists who say that there is no reason to believe that what they call "particles" in the Standard Model, are actually particles at all. That's just the word that is used. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue here is that a "field" is an imaginary thing, created by mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover
Could you explain what a Higgs field is? — frank
That's the interpretive problem in a nutshell. — Wayfarer
A tool (a map of Paris say) may be just a tool and not be the thing it describes, but it very much still describes Paris. Thus I object to the statement that the tool doesn't describe anything.I believe that if you say that something 'not real' describes 'a real thing' you're just re-asserting a realist/representational view. The 'unreal'/'non-representational' view of the wave-function advocated by Rovelli, Bitbol etc is that the wave-function does not describe anything. It is just a tool. — boundless
I would not call what a table lamp does 'epistemic', so again, I do not personal hold view described there.This is very compatible with the view that collapse is due to an increase of knowledge (i.e. an 'epistemic', not 'ontic' view).
Disturbingly close, yes, to the point where no arbitrarily close inspection will yield a difference. This is not true of the paper map of Paris.In other words, 'real' and 'representational' should be taken as synonyms (or very close to that) - the point is that there is a biunivocal correspondence between mathematical formalism and reality.
I don't think there is just the two choices. It is certainly not representational in my opinion, but the wave function has meaning only in relations, not objectively, so it isn't ontological as in 'is real' but more like 'does relate to'. 5 really is less than 7 and that is not just a representational property of the tool that is the integers, and yet the integers don't need to have Platonic realism (ontological meaning) for that relation to be true.The point in bringing this distinction between two different 'sub-interpretations' of dBB was simply to explain better what I mean by 'real'. If you think that the wave-function has some ontological meaning, then the wave-function is real/representational. If not, it is just a tool of some sorts.
In your reply you seek first to counter my suggested definition of 'wave' by referring to the definition currently on Wikipedia - which anybody could change in two minutes - and then at the end of your third para to claim that part of the Wikipedia definition is nonsense. — andrewk
That's like saying that what we call "apples" aren't actually apples, that's just the word we use. So it's really a semantic issue. If one understands particles in a classical sense (i.e., as having an absolute state) then, I agree, physics gives us no reason to think such things exist. However if one understands particles (and apples) in a quantum/relativistic sense (as having a relative or relational state) then there is no problem - it's a natural fit. — Andrew M
Or, conversely, it's not imaginary since it has physical consequences. Perhaps consider it a manifestation of the measurement problem that can be understood in terms of potentiality. — Andrew M
No, It doesn't, and it isn't.The point remains, that in physics a wave is defined as a vibration in a medium. — Metaphysician Undercover
Apologies for slow reply time. — noAxioms
A tool (a map of Paris say) may be just a tool and not be the thing it describes, but it very much still describes Paris. Thus I object to the statement that the tool doesn't describe anything. — noAxioms
This is very compatible with the view that collapse is due to an increase of knowledge (i.e. an 'epistemic', not 'ontic' view). — boundless
I would not call what a table lamp does 'epistemic', so again, I do not personal hold view described there. — noAxioms
In other words, 'real' and 'representational' should be taken as synonyms (or very close to that) - the point is that there is a biunivocal correspondence between mathematical formalism and reality. — boundless
Disturbingly close, yes, to the point where no arbitrarily close inspection will yield a difference. This is not true of the paper map of Paris. — noAxioms
I don't think there is just the two choices. It is certainly not representational in my opinion, but the wave function has meaning only in relations, not objectively, so it isn't ontological as in 'is real' but more like 'does relate to'. 5 really is less than 7 and that is not just a representational property of the tool that is the integers, and yet the integers don't need to have Platonic realism (ontological meaning) for that relation to be true. — noAxioms
In my opinion Wheeler's view is a bit ambiguous. At times he suggests some form of 'panpsychism'. In other places, he seems to suggest that an 'observer' can be a sufficiently complex physical object. By 'sufficient complex physical object', I mean that such an object must be able to store and process information. And maybe, he considers that these objects are somehow sentient.
But IMO, he does not give a 'special role' to human consciousness (or animal consciousness...).
Personally, I prefer either Bitbol's approach, where you can define perspectives to sentient beings, or Rovelli's approach where you can define a perspective to everything (and might relate Rovelli's view to a form of panpsychism). — boundless
As a well-known article about the measurement problem of quantum mechanics puts it: the quantum theory can describe anything, but not everything [Peres1982][Fuchs2000].
EM waves don't have a propagation medium either. — fdrake
Think that's how it happened. Michaelson-Moorley? Michaelson-Morley, was linked by andrewk earlier in response to MU IIRC. — fdrake
From the standpoint of the then current aether models, the experimental results were conflicting. The Fizeau experiment and its 1886 repetition by Michelson and Morley apparently confirmed the stationary aether with partial aether dragging, and refuted complete aether dragging. On the other hand, the much more precise Michelson–Morley experiment (1887) apparently confirmed complete aether dragging and refuted the stationary aether.[A 5] In addition, the Michelson–Morley null result was further substantiated by the null results of other second-order experiments of different kind, namely the Trouton–Noble experiment (1903) and the experiments of Rayleigh and Brace (1902–1904). These problems and their solution led to the development of the Lorentz transformation and special relativity. — Wikipedia
Take an electron for example. It must be a particle in the classical sense, because the structure of molecules and atoms is dependent on those particles. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, so as I explained above to andrewk, I'll accept that a field is assumed to be more than imaginary. The problem is that it is modeled as the potential for activity, rather than a real active thing. So the issue is with the modeling technique, not the assumption that an imaginary thing is real. Therefore there is an inconsistency between the assumption, that the field is a real active thing, and the modeling of the field, as the potential for activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, the classical sense (with absolute state) can be rejected altogether. On a relational model such as Rovelli's RQM, particles, atoms and molecules (and apples, desk lamps and human beings) are all quantum systems with relative state. — Andrew M
On a quantum fields model, the fields for each particle type are real whereas it is particles that are potentials between interactions. — Andrew M
That's what I've been discussing with andrewk, whether EM waves are real waves or not. Andrewk insists that "wave" is defined in physics in such a way that a medium is not required for a wave. But this is contrary to the Wikipedia page on waves in physics, and contrary to what I learned in high school physics, as well. I think andrewk is just fabricating a definition to support an ontological position, and asserting the correctness of that intentionally directed definition. — Metaphysician Undercover
Andrewk insists that "wave" is defined in physics in such a way that a medium is not required for a wave. But this is contrary to the Wikipedia page on waves in physics. — Metaphysician Undercover
Electromagnetic waves do not require a medium. Instead, they consist of periodic oscillations of electrical and magnetic fields originally generated by charged particles, and can therefore travel through a vacuum.
The classical sense of "object" can be rejected altogether, and we no longer have any objective reality, everything is a "relative state". — Metaphysician Undercover
Boltzmann's kinetic theory of gases seemed to presuppose the reality of atoms and molecules, but almost all German philosophers and many scientists like Ernst Mach and the physical chemist Wilhelm Ostwald disbelieved their existence.
all the opponents of the Copenhagen interpretation do agree on one point. It would, in their view, be desirable to return to the reality concept of classical physics or, to use a more general philosophic term, to the ontology of materialism. They would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we observe them. — Werner Heisenberg
The double potential does not make energy actual, energy maintains its definition as a potential. Nor does the fact that the fields represent the potential for interaction between particles make the fields actual, they maintain their created status as potential. and we now have a double layer of potential. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the point of the op then. The classical sense of "object" can be rejected altogether, and we no longer have any objective reality, everything is a "relative state". — Metaphysician Undercover
The field itself is constructed as potential, then you layer another potential on top. — Metaphysician Undercover
In other words, there is no view of an object from nowhere — Andrew M
Are you not familiar with the idea of kinetic energy and the difference between that and the idea of potential energy? — Janus
As Banno analyzed earlier here, this already has a precedent in relativistic physics which is also consistent with an objective reality. — Andrew M
The field is not constructed as potential. QFT says that the physical things that we observe emerge from the interactions of more fundamental physical fields. That is, those physical fields (one per particle type) are part of the ontology of QFT. — Andrew M
Well good. Being sure is being closed minded. I try not to be sure about anything, but I do it anyway.I actually am not sure. — boundless
The table lamp does acquire information (physics definition), so I can go with that.I would not call what a table lamp does 'epistemic', so again, I do not personal hold view described there.
— noAxioms
Ok, I agree. Bad choice of terms on my part. For the sake of generality, let's just say 'not ontic' instead of 'epistemic' and drop using the word 'knowledge' in favor of 'addition of new 'information'' (for the lack of a better term).
It may or it may not. Wasn't this the thing we said we're not sure about? It seems quite interpretation dependent, even to the point of interpreting the meaning of 'ontological'. Tegmark's mathematical universe says that the wave function is what the universe is. It doesn't just describe it, but it actually is it. That's one kind of ontological statement: mathematics is fundamental, not just descriptive. Another kind would be two different interpretations of this mathematical universe where the mathematical structure has the property of existing (MWI variant) as opposed to RQM, where 'exists' is a relation, not a property. That's a different sort of ontological statement. RQM doesn't say that the universe doesn't exist (isn't nihilistic). It just gives no meaning to the phrase.Disturbingly close, yes, to the point where no arbitrarily close inspection will yield a difference. This is not true of the paper map of Paris.
— noAxioms
Again, you are right! I should have said, instead: 'non-representational' means that the wave-function simply does not have any ontological meaning.
Sounds like what I have in mind as well. For me, unicorns don't exist. For the unicorn, I don't exist. You seem to indicate that what I've described is something else.I am not sure if what you are describing here can be applied to the 'version' of RQM that I have in mind where after the observation, for the observer, the other branches do not exist.
Or maybe they're physical but not real.BTW, I am sympathetic to some kind of realism for mathematics. I do not believe that mathematics is entirely a product of our minds but, at the same time, the usual version of mathematical Platonism does not convince me. So, maybe mathematical relations are 'real' (but not 'physical'). Interesting view
I would not call what a table lamp does 'epistemic', so again, I do not personal hold view described there.
— noAxioms
Ok, I agree. Bad choice of terms on my part. For the sake of generality, let's just say 'not ontic' instead of 'epistemic' and drop using the word 'knowledge' in favor of 'addition of new 'information'' (for the lack of a better term). — boundless
The table lamp does acquire information (physics definition), so I can go with that. — noAxioms
Again, you are right! I should have said, instead: 'non-representational' means that the wave-function simply does not have any ontological meaning. — boundless
It may or it may not. Wasn't this the thing we said we're not sure about? It seems quite interpretation dependent, even to the point of interpreting the meaning of 'ontological'. — noAxioms
Tegmark's mathematical universe says that the wave function is what the universe is. It doesn't just describe it, but it actually is it. That's one kind of ontological statement: mathematics is fundamental, not just descriptive — noAxioms
Another kind would be two different interpretations of this mathematical universe where the mathematical structure has the property of existing (MWI variant) as opposed to RQM, where 'exists' is a relation, not a property. That's a different sort of ontological statement. RQM doesn't say that the universe doesn't exist (isn't nihilistic). It just gives no meaning to the phrase. — noAxioms
And no, neither MWI nor RQM needs to accept this mathematical foundation. I just used the mathematical universe example to illustrate two different kinds of ontology. — noAxioms
I am not sure if what you are describing here can be applied to the 'version' of RQM that I have in mind where after the observation, for the observer, the other branches do not exist. — boundless
Sounds like what I have in mind as well. For me, unicorns don't exist. For the unicorn, I don't exist. You seem to indicate that what I've described is something else. — noAxioms
BTW, I am sympathetic to some kind of realism for mathematics. I do not believe that mathematics is entirely a product of our minds but, at the same time, the usual version of mathematical Platonism does not convince me. So, maybe mathematical relations are 'real' (but not 'physical'). Interesting view — boundless
Or maybe they're physical but not real. — noAxioms
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