A three-dimensional space surrounds me. Using my senses, I can perceive a wide range of different entities which are situated in and distributed throughout this space in all directions. I can, if I wish, focus my attention on individual entities within this space while simultaneously ignoring others. I can investigate each entity from an unending number of frames-of-reference which consist of combinations of the entity’s different facets and of my different points-of-view. This can be done on both a micro- and macroscopic level and it can be done from a common-sense point of view or from a scientific point of view. I can also investigate any relationships that hold between and among such entities.

I perceive the entities by using my senses but I cannot perceive any purported “raw” sense data, “raw” sense impressions, “raw” sense qualities, or “raw” ideas of sensation that exist in a manner that is isolated or separated from the existence of the perceived entities.

I can only perceive entities in three-dimensional space which always consist only of completely integrated sensory information.

Certainly, I can hypothesize the isolated existence of something called “raw” sensory data. In my mind, I can abstract “raw” sensory data from the perceived entities, but I have never and will never be able to perceive or experience in isolation the existence of the “raw” sensory data that I abstract.

So, if what I have just described to be the case is the case, then can it be argued convincingly that this abstract, isolated, sense-data based starting point of British Empiricism did not provide a veridical foundation for the epistemological investigations pursued by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume?

Like to know what you think about this.