There's a balance to be found I think. Sure, I would love to live unrestrained, and uninhibited. Wosret to the max! -- but prudence, and care for consequence gets in the way, and probably should. The premise is still framed in terms of suffering and joy. Perhaps the sages are wrong, and there is more suffering in domestication and sublimation, and more joy in Dionysian thrills. The ideal, the good that I've been taught, and enchants me is irrespective of my own suffering and joy. One does good, high quality behaviors, which are pro-social (read moral), because they are high quality, and pro-social behavior regardless of how much personal suffering or joy they engender. When meeting conventions is insufferable for you, and the conventions are unjust, there are pro-social means of reproach.

Everyone has a rebellious streak, and wish to do what isn't permitted, at least in play, but most care too much about social ties, and consequences to become too uppity, and although there may be great joys to be attained in the most anti-social of behaviors, this in no way entices me. — Wosret

Fair points! :) Don't know much what to say, as there's not much I disagree with lol :p

I agree that "truth is true" has a tautologous feel to it. Similarly so with reason being reasonable. And I don't disagree that the statements don't tell us much about their subject matter. But I would still say that truth is true, and that reason is reasonable.

I don't think reason judges between values, but that reason judges simpliciter -- and that judgment requires a normative standard by which to judge and is, therefore, at least partially a value. (I'm not committed one way or the other on whether or not reason is or isn't a value) I don't see why a value cannot be a criteria for values, though, or why the criteria for truth cannot be true. I would expect the criteria for truth to be true. (I've not always thought this, but I've changed my position). And I would expect to be drawn to certain values based on what I already care about. — Moliere

Things are determined to be true in reference to the criteria for truth, correct? But if the criteria of truth is itself true, how has that been determined? In reference to itself? That is merely begging the question. In reference to another criterion? The criterion of truth of the criterion of truth? So on ad infinitum, so that in the end we never have a criterion of truth which is true? See Moliere it doesn't matter what you would say. Reason determines that this is an irrational idea, regardless of the fact that you choose to say it, believe it, or whatever. The fact that you expect the criterion of truth to be true says something about you, not about how things really are.

The only argument in the above being: All Normative standards are values. Judgment requires a normative standard. Therefore, judgment requires values. — Moliere

Who says Reason cannot determine a normative standard given our nature and the nature of the world?

Also, I agree that the good is not "what seems to work for us" -- I stated that this is how one finds the good, not that this is what it is to be good. — Moliere

It seems to me that being drugged the whole day is good. So therefore, :s I am on my way towards finding the good? Because seriously, there are people for whom it seems that staying in a drugged state is the best thing. But we know that such languishing is not good. Therefore "what seems to work for us" seems to be quite a bad method for finding the good in this circumstance. Methods for finding the good must be objective, and not tainted by our cognitive biases and subjectivity.

Perhaps you are one of the lucky few who can, through reason, see the form of the good. Well, I am not. So what am I to do with this theory, then? — Moliere

You can identify the good through pure reason too. It just takes reflection and a certain mindfulness to detach yourself from how you would feel about something, and instead determine how things really are. How should human beings really behave given such and such a human nature and such and such a world? If a human being was really conscious of his/her nature, and the nature of the world, how would they behave? What would they do? That is why ethics comes after metaphysics (the study of the world in the broadest context), physics (as per Epicurus/Lucretius, the study of the world and of ourselves from a physical point of view), and epistemology (the study of our cognitive faculties). If you answer these questions before, ethics becomes a matter of pure reason, pace Spinoza.

Maybe it's just a terminological disagreement. I would just say that the romantic is following the ethic of a romanticism. That is the type of person they are. And, sure, the romantic is good in accord with what the romantic cares about. But not in accord with what the Epicurean cares about. But does this make him against ethics? I wouldn't say so. — Moliere

The romantic may be following the ethic of romanticism. So what? The question here is, should he? Is that the best thing for him? You seem to say yes. I seem to say that there may be some desires/potentials within him that would be truer to his nature and (s)he is not aware of them for example.

When I used "against ethics", I meant against the ethical tradition. Epicurus, Epictetus, Spinoza, et al. develop very very similar ethics (especially in practice); they are all based on a dictatorship of Reason, and the differences come from a different conception of man and his place in the world. The stoics think that one should control one's passions, the Epicureans that one should minimise one's desires. Is that really that different? One achieves it by being tense, and watching every single moment to make sure that no immorality enters their mind, and the other achieves it by desiring little, and relaxing into the bossom of the existence. But these stances are all developed from overall conceptions of the world; they are developed by pure reason.

In this reading, the romantic is "against ethics" precisely because his ethics isn't one based on the dictatorship of Reason - Epicurus, Spinoza, Epictetus, etc. are pure reason (or very close to it).

I guess my "ethical" question goes deeper - should reason be dominated by the passions, or should reason itself become a passion dominating all the others a la Epicurus, Spinoza, et al.? — Agustino

Sometimes, yes. Moderation in all things, though. In some situations, a project of placing reason on the throne complies with both reason and the passions. But there is suspicion that where projects of that kind are too successful, the result is pathological. Passion can't really be dominated. It can be shut out of consciousness, though. And now reason struts around imagining that it's in charge... unaware of the real agendas manipulating thought and perception. Ideally, reason whispers wisdom. It shines a light on the truth... and when it comes to morality, it's the truths we don't want to hear that might be the most important.

I think it's also reason which can suggest that sorrow isn't a property of the world we live in. It's not something we're forced to endure by virtue of being alive. Sorrow resides in the hollowness of the soul. It's with sorrow that we comprehend the fragility of life. Sorrow is one face of love.

Things are determined to be true in reference to the criteria for truth, correct? — Agustino

I don't think that's correct, no. The determination of truth differs from the criteria of truth. Determination of truth deals with method -- epistemology. The criteria of truth is the necessary and suffucient conditions which make some truth-bearer true. So we might say, for instance, that those conditions are 1) A statement corresponds to a state of affairs, and thereby be a correspondence theorist about truth.

But how we determine what is true would differ from this. Truth is correspondence, but our epistemology may be empiricist, and largely borrowing from scientific practice.

The criteria of truth is more along the lines of asking "What is the metaphysics of truth?" -- and if we are consistent correspondence theorists [using the above briefly stated theory of correspondence], so it seems to me, then our theory of truth must either be not-true [perhaps not truth-apt], or it must correspond to a state of affairs.

But just because truth, in this scenario, must correspond to a state of affairs that wouldn't mean that this is how we check to see if truth corresponds to a state of affairs. If we are empricists then I'm not sure that you could do so -- you would have to conclude, to be consistent, that though the theory of truth corresponds to some state of affairs that there was no way to check said state of affairs, and so we don't know -- since justification is based on empricism [how we come to determine truth] -- that this is the case.

See the difference?

Reason determines that this is an irrational idea, regardless of the fact that you choose to say it, believe it, or whatever. The fact that you expect the criterion of truth to be true says something about you, not about how things really are.

Who is this reason, and how do you speak with them?

The only argument in the above being: All Normative standards are values. Judgment requires a normative standard. Therefore, judgment requires values.
— Moliere
Who says Reason cannot determine a normative standard given our nature and the nature of the world?

What would it mean for reason to do so? "Given our nature and the nature of the world" seems to evoke Hume. Which, if we are separating reason and passion as you seem to be doing, would be applicable.

Also, I agree that the good is not "what seems to work for us" -- I stated that this is how one finds the good, not that this is what it is to be good.
— Moliere
It seems to me that being drugged the whole day is good. So therefore, :s I am on my way towards finding the good? Because seriously, there are people for whom it seems that staying in a drugged state is the best thing. But we know that such languishing is not good. Therefore "what seems to work for us" seems to be quite a bad method for finding the good in this circumstance. Methods for finding the good must be objective, and not tainted by our cognitive biases and subjectivity.

That's the catch, though. There's no such objectivity outside of our cognitive biases and our subjectivity. You couldn't go to someone who believes drugs are the path to happiness and objectively show them that they are in the wrong. They have to find it for themselves.

You can identify the good through pure reason too. It just takes reflection and a certain mindfulness to detach yourself from how you would feel about something, and instead determine how things really are. How should human beings really behave given such and such a human nature and such and such a world? If a human being was really conscious of his/her nature, and the nature of the world, how would they behave? What would they do? That is why ethics comes after metaphysics (the study of the world in the broadest context), physics (as per Epicurus/Lucretius, the study of the world and of ourselves from a physical point of view), and epistemology (the study of our cognitive faculties). If you answer these questions before, ethics becomes a matter of pure reason, pace Spinoza.

Again, I think we're evoking Hume's critique here, especially with all the emphasis on pure reason.

Maybe it's just a terminological disagreement. I would just say that the romantic is following the ethic of a romanticism. That is the type of person they are. And, sure, the romantic is good in accord with what the romantic cares about. But not in accord with what the Epicurean cares about. But does this make him against ethics? I wouldn't say so.
— Moliere
The romantic may be following the ethic of romanticism. So what? The question here is, should he? Is that the best thing for him? You seem to say yes. I seem to say that there may be some desires/potentials within him that would be truer to his nature and (s)he is not aware of them for example.

I don't think that the committed romantic has desires, at least, which are truer to their nature. Lord Byron had no need for Epicurs. If you are to ask me, when I look at his life I see it as a reductio of Romanticism. But that's just myself. Lord Byron would have to see the folly of his ways in order to be brought back -- but he could consistently hold to romantic values.

When I used "against ethics", I meant against the ethical tradition. Epicurus, Epictetus, Spinoza, et al. develop very very similar ethics (especially in practice); they are all based on a dictatorship of Reason, and the differences come from a different conception of man and his place in the world. The stoics think that one should control one's passions, the Epicureans that one should minimise one's desires. Is that really that different? One achieves it by being tense, and watching every single moment to make sure that no immorality enters their mind, and the other achieves it by desiring little, and relaxing into the bossom of the existence. But these stances are all developed from overall conceptions of the world; they are developed by pure reason.

In this reading, the romantic is "against ethics" precisely because his ethics isn't one based on the dictatorship of Reason - Epicurus, Spinoza, Epictetus, etc. are pure reason (or very close to it).

I suppose our disagreement, then, has more to do with the notion "Pure reason", and on how to read ethical theorists.

I don't think that I would commit to a belief that any ancient ethicist relies on Pure Reason to establish their ethics. The notion of reason in ancient thought differs from the notion of reason in the era of Spinoza, et al. They are not enlightenment thinkers, and while there are distinctions between pathos and logos, etc., there is no effort to vindicate their ethical stances by the light of pure reason. They aren't even really looking at ethics in the same way as enlightenment and early modern thinkers do.

They use rational argument, and believe that beliefs change character, and that changing beliefs -- through philosophy and reason and whatnot -- will change character. But this is so very different from enlightenment ethical thought.

Epicurus, especially, seems an odd man out here. He didn't even believe in the study of logic, except insofar that it would help in the project of pleasure. The stoics thought logic was valuable unto itself, but Epicurus was no logician, and even made fun of philosophical theorists [like Aristotle] who would talk too much about ethics while not doing anything to cure the soul. Philosophy, too, is not valuable unto itself, but is valuable only insofar that it brings pleasure to the sick. That's his focus -- certainly not the sort of beacon of pure reason that you seem to take him for.

Not that I have a problem with that, obviously. Like I noted, I can go as far as Kant, which in some ways is to concede too much ground to reason anyways -- but his work was a critique of Pure Reason. And even his ethics uses notions like a "fact of reason", which seems sensible, but they are wholly embedded in the subject. As long as you are consistent, and if everyone does things your way the world remains consistent, you are permitted to do what you will. With standards like that -- which is a normal criticism of deontology -- you can certainly derive values which are in conflict with one another, and which would require a person to choose between them. How do you choose, if Pure Reason allows this sort of conflict? Pure Reason is like the donkey equally spaced between two haystacks, watching both. The donkey needs a swift kick, and reason needs a purpose to operate -- which, so I would say, is where our emotional lives enter the picture.

And you are correct. There is something question-begging to this. But, as I said, all ethics presuppose themselves. You can question an ethic -- but only in light of another one.

I don't think that's correct, no. The determination of truth differs from the criteria of truth. Determination of truth deals with method -- epistemology. The criteria of truth is the necessary and suffucient conditions which make some truth-bearer true. So we might say, for instance, that those conditions are 1) A statement corresponds to a state of affairs, and thereby be a correspondence theorist about truth.

But how we determine what is true would differ from this. Truth is correspondence, but our epistemology may be empiricist, and largely borrowing from scientific practice.

The criteria of truth is more along the lines of asking "What is the metaphysics of truth?" -- and if we are consistent correspondence theorists [using the above briefly stated theory of correspondence], so it seems to me, then our theory of truth must either be not-true [perhaps not truth-apt], or it must correspond to a state of affairs.

But just because truth, in this scenario, must correspond to a state of affairs that wouldn't mean that this is how we check to see if truth corresponds to a state of affairs. If we are empricists then I'm not sure that you could do so -- you would have to conclude, to be consistent, that though the theory of truth corresponds to some state of affairs that there was no way to check said state of affairs, and so we don't know -- since justification is based on empricism [how we come to determine truth] -- that this is the case.

See the difference? — Moliere

Yes, but you're employing "criterion of truth" in an entirely different sense from me. Here's what I've been meaning by it all through-out: http://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/ . Epicurus for example, (since I know you are an Epicurean), held that sense experience is the criterion of truth. I thought you meant the same thing by criterion of truth, so that's why I got confused.

The stoics thought logic was valuable unto itself — Moliere

False, just check out Epictetus who emphasises the difference between philosophical discourse and philosophical practice.

It is as if, in the area of the exercise of assent, we were surrounded by representations, some of them "objective" and others not, and we did not want to distinguish between them, but preferred to read treatises with titles like On Comprehension ! How does this come about? The reason is that we have never carried out our reading or our writing in such a way that, when it comes to action, we could use the representations we receive in a way consonant with nature; instead, we are content when we have learned what is said to us, and can explain it to others; when we can analyse syllogisms and examine hypothetical arguments — Epictetus

Epictetus shows that the only justification for reading theoretical treatises [...] is so that, in concrete situations, we can act in conformity with mankind's rational nature — Pierre Hadot

Most of Ancient Philosophy did theoretical philosophy in order to lead to a specific way of life - of course there are a few exceptions like the Aristotelians. Epicurus was by far not the only one.

Yes, but you're employing "criterion of truth" in an entirely different sense from me. Here's what I've been meaning by it all through-out: http://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/ . Epicurus for example, (since I know you are an Epicurean), held that sense experience is the criterion of truth. I thought you meant the same thing by criterion of truth, so that's why I got confused. — Agustino

Cool.

Though, with Epicurus, I think that one fair and consistent reading is that he is using another criteria to accept his criterion of truth -- pleasure.

The stoics thought logic was valuable unto itself
— Moliere
False, just check out Epictetus who emphasises the difference between philosophical discourse and philosophical practice.

It is as if, in the area of the exercise of assent, we were surrounded by representations, some of them "objective" and others not, and we did not want to distinguish between them, but preferred to read treatises with titles like On Comprehension ! How does this come about? The reason is that we have never carried out our reading or our writing in such a way that, when it comes to action, we could use the representations we receive in a way consonant with nature; instead, we are content when we have learned what is said to us, and can explain it to others; when we can analyse syllogisms and examine hypothetical arguments
— Epictetus

Epictetus shows that the only justification for reading theoretical treatises [...] is so that, in concrete situations, we can act in conformity with mankind's rational nature
— Pierre Hadot

Well, I would think that, given this, that you'd be even more in line with the thrust of my argument there. I was trying to concede that with the stoics you could possibly argue that there's a bridge of reason between them and enlightenment, because they valued logic as a practice unto itself [which is true of them as a class, at least my readings have lead me to believe this, because they believed that reason, nature, and God were interlinked in some way, so exploring logic was in some way related to their ethical project, whereas for the Epicureans it was not]. But, given this, I think you would agree that there are not any ethical theorists in the ancient world who rely upon pure reason to justify their ethics.

But, given this, I think you would agree that there are not any ethical theorists in the ancient world who rely upon pure reason to justify their ethics. — Moliere

It seems to me we don't have the same definition of pure reason. Epicurean philosophy for me does rely on pure reason - it certainly doesn't rely on faith and/or the emotions. It uses those, but its determinations are based on reason. It seems to me that you think of "pure reason" as theoretical logic, abstracted from life. I think of it as the practical logic that we use in life.